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Irenaeus’ pro-material theology, arguing specifically against Gnostic anti-materialism, 
has received much attention in Ireanean scholarship. Likewise, Irenaeus’ account of the Devil 
has been similarly noted. What is missing, however, is a study that shows the interconnection 
between Irenaeus’ account of the Devil and his larger doctrine of creation.  This thesis will build 
upon, and then go beyond the work of previous Irenaeus scholars, by showing how Irenaeus’ 
cosmology and anthropology are deepened by his account of the Devil. By connecting these 
various strands of Irenaus’ thought, something scholarship hitherto has not yet undertaken, this 
thesis, first, demonstrates the occasionally questioned unity of Irenaeus’ theology as a whole, 
and, second, brings to the fore a so far underaccentuated early Christian tradition that allows for 
a full appreciaton of the created world as the stage within which God intends to perform his 
drama of human salvation. 
In Irenaeus’ view, the Devil was appointed by God to be a steward of the material world 
until such time as humanity could come of age and assume its proper lordship. Given this 
backdrop, Irenaeus offers us an account of the Devil’s fall in which the Devil was motivated by 
envy of humanity, rather than pride against God, as other later Christian writers would have it. 
The world was the prize that humanity originally possessed and that the Devil, through 
subterfuge and deceit, stole. Humanity’s loss of the world’s throne sets the stage for the 
soteriological narrative that Irenaeus tells.  
From this starting point Irenaeus constructs an anthropocentric, terrestrial eschatology 
that necessarily climaxes with the overthrow of the Devil and the re-enthronement of a 
resurrected humanity upon a renewed earth. Irenaeus’ narrative can be set in contrast with the 
Gnostic narrative, which culminates in the denouement of humanity’s materiality. Likewise, 
Irenaeus’ account can be set in contrast with later Platonized Christian soteriological accounts 
(e.g. Origen and Augustine) which move away from Irenaeus’ account of the Devil and thus 
arrive also at different anthropological and soteriologcal conclusions. This thesis will highlight 
how Irenaeus, resourced by his account of the Devil, is able to capture the terrestrial and 
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Irenaeus, the Devil and Contemporary Scholarship 
 
 
‘The world is all the richer for having a Devil in it, so long as we keep our foot  





 Matthew Steenberg, in the opening sentence of his monograph on Irenaeus, 
observes, ‘Irenaeus of Lyons has earned the reputation of a theologian of creation’.2 A 
factual claim that can be defended by the relevant statements in Irenaeus. But Colin Gunton 
goes further, stating that Irenaeus’ ‘defense of the goodness of the material creation is 
without equal in the history of theology’.3 Gustaf Wingren is no less generous. When it 
comes to affirming a positive material anthropology, Wingren states that ‘it would be 
difficult to find anyone who surpasses Irenaeus either then or in the later period’.4 Such 
statements are, in my estimation, justly earned. Irenaeus’ polemic against his Gnostic 
opponents pushed his overall theological system in a strongly pro-material direction. His 
cosmology and anthropology are well developed and thoroughly integrated into his overall 
theological system. Arguably, these twin doctrines serve as the theological foundation of his 
entire thought. Given Irenaeus’ reputation as a theologian of creation, a great deal of 
scholarship has focused on this point. This dissertation intends to further the discussion 
regarding Irenaeus’ doctrine of creation by looking at an under-researched aspect of his 
thought—Irenaeus’ account of the Devil.  
The present project will demonstrate the ways in which Irenaeus’ account of the 
Devil pushes his telling of the overall Christian narrative in a distinctly pro-material 
direction, specifically as it relates to the goodness of the material world and the significance 
of human embodiment. As will be shown, Irenaeus offers us a Christian narrative that 
climaxes with the re-enthronement of a resurrected humanity upon a renewed earth, rather 
than the removal of human souls into an angelic heaven. In short, Irenaeus offers us an 
anthropocentric, terrestrial eschatology, rather than a (merely) theocentric, celestial 
eschatology. And foundational to the framing of Irenaeus’ soteriological story is his account 
of the Devil.  
                                                         
1 James, Varieties, 50. 
2 Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation, 1.  
3 Gunton, Triune Creator, 62.  




In this, the introductory chapter, I begin with a brief statement of my thesis, followed 
by a survey of relevant scholarship, a discussion of Irenaeus’ scant biographical details, an 
examination of his Gnostic context, and conclude with a short discussion of the relevant 
extant texts used throughout.   
 
 
I. Question of this Thesis 
 
It has now been effectively established by Devil scholars that the Christian account 
of the Devil evolved during the early years of the church. In broad strokes, the Christian 
accounts of the Devil can be categorized into an ‘early’ Irenaean account (first and second 
century) and a ‘late’ Augustinian account (fourth century and beyond). Origen, given his 
strong Platonist commitments, has been identified as a key transition point between the early 
and late accounts.5 The details of this evolution are too complex to be effectively 
summarized in the above brief statement. But for the purposes of this thesis, this general 
characterization suffices as a backdrop for positioning Irenaeus in the larger historical 
context. The burden of this thesis is not to chronicle the historical development of the Devil. 
Rather, I draw attention to the historical development as a way of highlighting the inner 
coherence of Irenaeus’ system. By positioning Irenaeus’ early account against the later 
Augustinian account, we are able to see more clearly the connection between Irenaeus’ 
Devil narrative and his anthropology and cosmology. Toward this end, a brief presentation 
of these ‘early’ and ‘late’ accounts is in order. We begin with Origen, as the key transition 
figure on the way to the later Augustinian account, and then set this in contrast with 
Irenaeus’ early account.  Note, the association of Irenaeus and Augustine with the early and 
later accounts is not meant to suggest that either theologian is the source of their respective 
views. Rather, I have chosen these two figures because they act as the most important 
spokesmen for each perspective. 
The late account of the Devil begins in earnest with Origen (at least)6, is championed 
by Augustine, and then reaches a relatively fixed form with Gregory the Great in the sixth-
                                                         
5 For this transition, see Kelly, Satan, 175-208; Russell, Satan, 80-106; Forsyth, Old Enemy, 
333-48. My own research on the early Christian literature bears out this conclusion. Beyond 
Irenaeus, the basic structure of this ‘early view’ can be seen in Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, and 
Theophilus. See Appendix B, and the chart on page 272.  
6 Origen is the first to extant writer to connect the ‘Lucifer’ of Isaiah 14:12 with Satan, ‘How 
you are fallen from heaven, o Lucifer, son of the morning… For you said in your heart, I will ascend 
into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God…I will ascend above the heights of the 
clouds; I will be like the most high’. Origen’s association of the Devil with Isaiah 14:12 (as well as 
with the ‘prince of Tyre’ of Ezekiel 28:12-19), became standard exegesis for later Christian writers, 




century. In this now standard narrative (which has been popularized in the contemporary 
English imagination through John Milton’s seventeenth-century masterpiece, Paradise 
Lost), the fall of the Devil and his angels occurs prior to the creation of humanity. Satan, not 
content with his limited status in relation to the Son, leads a rebellion against God in an 
attempt to usurp the Son’s dominion. The coup fails and the Devil and his angels (one third 
of all the angels) are cast out of heaven. Still determined to strike against God, the Devil 
avenges this defeat by attacking humanity—God’s prized possession. Notably the chief sin 
of the Devil is pride, and the primary and initial conflict of the narrative is between God and 
the Devil; humanity becomes involved in the fray only as an overflow of the already 
existing warfare between heaven and hell. The prize is heaven’s throne, and the war is 
between God and Satan. Humanity suffers as collateral damage, and the earth is simply the 
battle ground where two extra-terrestrial forces wage war.  
This account of the Devil fits well with, and indeed enables, anti-materialist accounts 
of the Christian soteriological narrative. Early Christian thinkers such as Origen and 
Gregory of Nyssa tended to downplay the significance of humanity and the material 
creation. For both Origen and Gregory, creation itself was a result of the fall, and thus not 
central to God’s redemptive purposes; at least not central in any kind of telic sense. 
Salvation was about leaving behind the material world and shedding the material body. 
(This general Platonizing tendency can also be found in later medieval theology, on into the 
present.) While Platonizing Christian thinkers such as Origen and Gregory are careful to 
leave a place for the body and creation, the overall effect of their system tends to be 
dismissive of materiality in ways that do not agree with the main concerns of the biblical 
canon. A late Augustinian account of the Devil is consistent with this basic Platonic 
narrative, in as much as it sidelines humanity and creation.  
Irenaeus’ narrative runs in a different direction. It should be pointed out here at the 
outset that Irenaeus’ account of the Devil is not neatly contained within a single segment of 
his work, but rather can be extrapolated from the relevant passages found throughout his 
writings. Nevertheless, it coheres as a consistent story despite being dispersed throughout 
his writings. In Irenaeus’ view, the Devil’s fall occurs after the creation of humanity, and is 
detailed in Genesis 3. The Devil’s first sin is his temptation of Adam and Eve. Most 
significantly, Irenaeus offers us an account of the fall in which the Devil is motivated by 
envy of humanity. The world is the prize that humanity possesses and is the object of the 
                                                         
the sin of envy vis-à-vis humanity. On the fall of Satan and the angels, see Princ. 1.5.5, 8.3. For an 
extended discussion of Origen’s doctrine of Satan and the fall, see Russell, Satan, 125-32 and 
Heine’s introductory comments in FOTC, vol. 89, 59-65. Origen’s account is developed further by 
Augustine, and then reaches a relatively fixed status with Gregory the Great in the sixth-century. See 




Devil’s desire. The Devil wishes to be worshipped as God, not by supplanting God in 
heaven, but by supplanting Adam on earth. As such, the Devil seeks Adam’s lordship over 
the material world, not Christ’s lordship over the celestial heavens. In the Irenaean account, 
the earth is the royal prize, not merely the battle ground. What is more, Satan is a 
(temporarily) successful usurper of Adam’s throne, rather than a failed usurper of Christ’s.  
Humanity’s loss of the world’s throne via death thus sets the stage for the 
outworking of the soteriological narrative that Irenaeus will tell. Not content with Satan’s 
rebellious actions, God enters the war between the Devil and humanity on the side of 
humanity, and reclaims the world’s throne via Christ—the God-man. For Irenaeus, 
reclamation of Adam’s throne by Christ, the true human being, and reestablishment of 
human dominion over the world and the angels, is crucial to Irenaeus’ biblical narrative in a 
way not seen in the later Christian writers. While Irenaeus portrays God and the Devil as 
chief rivals, he does so by grounding this conflict in the primary contest between Satan and 
humanity.  All of this comes together robustly to underscore and support Irenaeus’ 
cosmological and anthropological affirmation of the material world.  
The burden of this dissertation, then, is to show the strong coherence between 
Irenaeus’ account of the Devil and his larger anthropological and cosmological framework. 
As I intend to demonstrate, Irenaeus’ account of the Devil moves his overall soteriological 
narrative in a strongly pro-terrestrial direction. While it would be stating the point too 
strongly to claim that Irenaeus’ account of the Devil is the generative source of his 
cosmology and anthropology, it is certainly fair to state, and the core hypothesis of this 
dissertation, that Irenaeus’ account of the Devil supports, affirms, and undergirds his 
broader doctrine of creation.  
 
 
II. State of Scholarship 
 
Renewed appreciation of, or at least interest in, Irenaeus as an important historical 
and theological figure has grown in recent years.7 Yet scholarly interaction with Irenaeus’ 
view of the Devil is of a sufficiently limited nature that it cannot meaningfully be 
categorized as a specialized field of study. While Irenaeus scholarship abounds (and indeed 
has made a considerable recovery in the latter half of the twentieth-century), scholars have 
                                                         




tended to focus on topics such as Irenaeus’ anthropology,8 his cosmology,9 his interaction 
with the Gnostics,10 his atonement theory,11 his use of Scripture,12 the role he plays in 
debates regarding apostolic succession,13 and the way he informs our understanding about 
the unity (or disunity) of the early Christian communities.14  But there is not, to my 
knowledge, a comparable monograph or essay that focuses on Irenaeus’ view of the Devil as 
its main point of attention.  
Likewise, scholarly literature on the Devil abounds. But here again the focus of such 
literature only infrequently concentrates on Irenaeus, tending instead toward questions of 
theodicy (a conversation in which Irenaeus factors little), and the historical development of 
the Christian understanding of the Devil—a sort of ‘quest for the historical Satan’.15 Further, 
I am not aware of any study of the Devil (about Irenaeus or beyond) that analyzes the Devil 
primarily with a view to anthropological and cosmological concerns.  
As such, scholarship on Irenaeus’ view of the Devil tends to be tangential. What 
there is of it can be categorized along two lines: Devil scholarship that touches upon 
Irenaeus, and Irenaeus scholarship that touches upon the Devil. What is lacking is a full 
treatment of Irenaeus’ view of the Devil, and the manner in which his view of the Devil 
informs his wider anthropological and cosmological narrative. The present thesis intends to 
fill this space. What follows here is the requisite summary of the existing scholarship on 
Irenaeus and the Devil, with a view to showing how the present thesis both corrects and 
extends the contemporary research. We begin with Irenaeus scholarship that touches upon 




                                                         
8 For examples see Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology; Steenberg, Of God and Man; Orbe, 
Antropología; Fantino, L’homme image de Dieu; De Andia, Homo Vivens; Reeves, ‘The Glory of 
God'. 
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A. Irenaeus Scholarship that Touches on the Devil 
  
While Irenaeus scholars have long recognized the presence of the Devil in Irenaeus’ 
soteriological system, and while some have even noted the uniqueness of Irenaeus’ early 
Christian account of the Devil, in the main, only modest attention has been given to this 
aspect of Irenaeus’ thought. Eric Osborne’s important treatment of Irenaeus only touches 
upon the Devil in passing.16  The same brevity is seen in John Lawson’s standard work on 
Irenaeus’ biblical theology,17 as well as Denis Minns’ recent introduction.18  Paul Foster and 
Sara Parvis’ edited volume on recent trends in Irenaeus scholarship does not take up the 
subject of the Devil,19  and John Behr does not focus on the Devil in his two important 
books on Irenaeus;20 nor does the French scholar Jacques Fantino in his two volumes on 
Irenaeus.21 And where brief mention of the Devil is made, none of the above authors note 
that Irenaeus’ account of the Devil differs distinctly from later Christian accounts.   
Ian MacKenzie’s commentary on Epideixis offers us a bit more. MacKenzie interacts 
with Irenaeus’ account of Genesis 3 and the Devil’s involvement in humanity’s first sin.22 In 
this context MacKenzie includes a helpful section clarifying the relationship between Justin 
and Irenaeus on the subject of angels,23 and more importantly, covers much of the relevant 
textual territory in Irenaeus’ account of the Devil (the principle aspects of which can be 
found in Epid. 11-12, and 16). However, MacKenzie’s interaction with Irenaeus’ Epideixis 
is exegetical and theological in focus, tending toward soteriological and anthropological 
concerns. In MacKenzie’s treatment of Epid. 16 (where Irenaeus interprets Genesis 3), 
MacKenzie is more concerned with Adam than he is with the Devil. Likewise, MacKenzie 
pays little attention to the shifting historical development of the Christian concepts of the 
Devil.  As such, Mackenzie observes no differentiation between the early Devil narrative 
found in Irenaeus, and the Devil narrative of the later Christian tradition.  
In a similar way, Ysabel de Andia briefly touches on the main points of Irenaeus’ 
account of the Devil, 24  but like McKenzie does so primarily as a context for understanding 
the fall of humanity. Andia helpfully connects the Devil’s temptation of Adam in the Garden 
                                                         
16 Osborne, Irenaeus. Osborne offers a nice one page summary of Irenaeus’ basic Devil 
narrative, including most of the main components. See pp. 216-17. But Osborne does not offer us an 
extensive integration of the Devil’s role into Irenaeus’ larger soteriological plotline.  
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23 MacKenzie, Demonstration, 111-12.  




of Eden to the Devil’s temptation of Christ in the wilderness, but does not chase the thread 
of Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s fall through the whole of Irenaeus’ system.  
Four works, however, stand out as offering more than a cursory treatment of 
Irenaeus’ account of the Devil. The first is Gustaf Aulén’s classic work on the atonement, 
which presents Irenaeus as the chief representative of what Aulén terms the early ‘classic’ 
idea of atonement (set in contrast to what Aulén calls the later ‘Latin’ idea).25 Aulén 
approaches the atonement discussion largely through the lens of the incarnation, and is at 
pains to show that Irenaeus’ focus on the incarnation does not detract from a focus on 
Christ’s redemptive work; for Aulén, these two aspects of Irenaeus’ thought hang together. 
Toward this end, Aulén shows how the soteriological hurdles in Irenaeus are sin, death, and 
the Devil (i.e. the ‘powers’ that threaten to destroy humanity because of human rebellion). 
As such ‘the incarnation is the necessary preliminary to the atoning work, because only God 
is able to overcome the powers which hold man in bondage, and man is helpless’.26 Thus 
Irenaeus’ doctrine of atonement and incarnation must necessarily include the defeat of these 
enemies. ‘The Divine victory accomplished in Christ [over sin, death, and the Devil] stands 
in the center of Irenaeus’ thought, and forms the central element in the recapitulatio, the 
restoring and the perfecting of the creation, which is his most comprehensive idea’.27  
Aulén has rightly seen the import of the Devil in Irenaeus’ soteriological paradigm. 
For Irenaeus, salvation is far less about being saved from God the judge (such as we 
encounter in Anselm), and far more about being saved from the powers of evil that have 
taken hold of humanity. In particular, Aulén is to be commended for not reducing salvation 
in Irenaeus to mere deliverance from sin and death while omitting deliverance from the 
Devil; Aulén correctly insists throughout his treatment of Irenaeus that victory over the 
Devil is a necessary aspect of Irenaeus’ thought.  
Yet despite the centrality that Aulén’s assessment of Irenaeus gives to the Devil, 
Aulén’s focus on the doctrine of atonement limits the relevance of his commentary for our 
present purposes. Aulén does not explore Irenaeus’ Devil with a view to how this informs 
our reading of Irenaeus’ larger doctrine of creation. Most notably, Aulén seems unaware that 
Irenaeus is operating with a different view of the Devil from what will emerge in the later 
Christian tradition. Insofar as Aulén is most concerned to distinguish between the classic 
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and later Latin ideas of the atonement, the Devil’s identity and aims, and the way this 
intersects with Irenaeus’ larger theological paradigm, do not factor into his assessment.  
Gustaf Wingren follows the same basic lines as Aulén, but develops them more 
fully.28 Wingren’s treatment of Irenaeus has been the seminal work that has helped launch 
more positive appropriations of Irenaeus in the last half century. The focus of Wingren’s 
work is the intersection of Christology, anthropology, and soteriology in Irenaeus. In this tri-
fold assessment of Irenaeus, Wingren devotes the better part of a chapter to a careful and 
insightful analysis of the Devil’s role in Irenaeus’ system.29 Even more, Wingren carries this 
reading throughout his entire treatment of Irenaeus. For Wingren, ‘In Irenaeus every page, 
and almost every sentence, conveys the idea of a struggle, a never-ending contest, between 
the two active powers, God and Satan’.30 And indeed, Wingren notes many of the salient 
points of Irenaeus’ early account of the Devil, in particular the Devil’s envy of humanity. 
Yet Wingren does not seem to grasp fully that Irenaeus’ account is different from the later 
tradition. While Wingren notes that the Devil’s temptation of humanity is the occasion of 
his fall (a chief feature of Irenaeus’ early account of the Devil),31 Wingren still seems to be 
importing later readings of the Devil into Irenaeus’ system. For Wingren, the principal 
conflict in Irenaeus’ system is between God and the Devil. Satan has ‘rebelled against God 
and dragged man headlong with him in his fall’.32 Here and throughout, Wingren repeatedly 
implies that humanity has been swept into the Devil’s rebellion only subsequently. This way 
of speaking—of a Satanic fall that precedes the fall of humanity, and that in many ways 
occurs independently of humanity’s first sin—is a chief characteristic of the later Christian 
account of the Devil. So too is the idea that the chief conflict of the biblical narrative is 
between God and the Devil, rather than between the Devil and humanity. Thus it is not clear 
that Wingren has fully grasped the significance of these two distinct Devil traditions and 
their impact on Irenaeus’ interpretation (as will be elaborated in my thesis). The confusion is 
by no means disastrous for Wingren’s reading of Irenaeus, but it does cloud his 
interpretation of Irenaeus’ thought at the one point that Wingren is most concerned to 
elucidate—namely Irenaeus’ anthropology.  
The Spanish scholar Antonio Orbe has written extensively on Irenaeus. His two-
volume set on Irenaeus’ treatment of the parables of Christ provides a helpful picture of how 
Irenaeus interprets the teaching of Jesus and the weight he ascribes to the four Gospels.33 
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And his Espiritualidad de San Ireneo provides an effective overview of Irenaeus’ basic 
soteriological and theological positions on a variety of topics.34 However, neither work 
meaningfully interacts with Irenaeus’ view of the Devil.35 We get more in Orbe’s 
Antropología de San Ireno. Here Orbe devotes a dozen pages to an exploration of the first 
sin of both angels and humans.36 Orbe helpfully emphasizes the role of envy in the Devil’s 
temptation of Adam, connecting this envy with Adam’s participation in the divine life (i.e. 
that Adam is made in the image and likeness of God). But Orbe is keen to downplay the 
connection between the fall of the Devil and his envy of humanity, stating ‘[Irenaeus] is not 
overly concerned about the angel’s personal apostasy. If he [the angel] had not intended to 
drag humanity into it [the apostasy], his crime—first in time—would have gone unnoticed 
and without consequence for the economy. The serious thing is that he dragged away 
humanity’.37  This is significantly understated, as my thesis will show. Orbe here seems to 
be reading Irenaeus through the lens of the later Devil narrative, namely that the Devil’s fall 
takes place independent of humanity, prior to his temptation of Adam and Eve. Orbe’s 
dislocation of the Devil’s fall from his envy of humanity undercuts Orbe's ability to connect 
meaningfully Irenaeus’ account of the Devil with his account of Irenaeus’ broader 
anthropology and soteriology.  
In a similar vein, Orbe seems to assume (incorrectly) that Irenaeus is working from 
the assumption that angels (and thus the Devil) are ontologically superior to embodied 
humans. Thus for Orbe, the Devil is envious of humanity because God had chosen to 
‘deposit his treasures [i.e. his image and likeness] in jars of clay’ rather than ‘in the wealth 
of the angels’.38 God in choosing humanity over the Devil had exalted ‘the most 
infinitesimal and weakest over the superior angelic nature’.39 In this reading, the 
ontologically superior (i.e. Satan) is envious of the privileges and status of the ontologically 
inferior (i.e. humanity). But this reading of the Devil’s envy, I will show, runs in the exact 
opposite direction of Irenaeus’ anthropological framework when considered against the 
backdrop of the Devil. Contrary to Orbe’s conclusion, the Devil’s envy of humanity is not 
the envy of the ontologically greater toward the lesser, but the envy of the lesser toward the 
greater. 
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Perhaps the most relevant interpretation of Irenaeus and the Devil for my thesis is 
found in the work of Irenaeus scholar Matthew Steenberg.40  Though Steenberg’s treatment 
of the Devil is brief, he nonetheless offers us a number of insightful pages on the Devil’s 
temptation of humanity.41  Throughout his work, Steenberg is keen to show the cohesion of 
Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative. As such, Steenberg pays special attention to how 
Irenaeus’ narrative of salvation informs, in particular, his anthropology and cosmology. 
Toward this end, Steenberg rightly argues for the ‘commixture of protology and eschatology 
in Irenaeus’ reading of creation’; 42 for Steenberg, one cannot properly understand Irenaeus’ 
eschatological climax until one has properly understood Irenaeus’ protological starting point 
(i.e. the doctrine of creation, with special attention to the creation of humanity).  Here one 
might say that Irenaeus’ protology and eschatology form the two poles upon which the cord 
of his soteriology is strung; humanity’s salvation is worked out in light of what humanity 
was created to be—the lords of creation who uniquely bear the image of the Son of God. 
Insofar as the Devil is a significant ‘actor’ in Irenaeus’ protological narrative, Steenberg’s 
emphasis on Irenaeus’ protology compels him to highlight the Devil’s temptation of 
humanity. In particular, Steenberg notes how the Devil’s actions at the beginning of 
Irenaeus’ protological narrative help inform our reading of the climax of Irenaeus’ 
eschatological narrative. In this vein, Steenberg rightly grasps that one cannot do justice to 
Irenaeus’ soteriology without considering the role of the Devil.  
Yet the full implications of Irenaeus’ Devil narrative are not developed. Steenberg is 
aware of the differences between Irenaeus’ ‘early’ account of the Devil vis-à-vis the later 
Christian accounts, in particular the Devil’s stewardship of creation and his envy of 
humanity.43 But he does not press the distinction or utilize this insight for his reading of 
Irenaeus. The lack of singular attention to the Devil in Steenberg’s work is understandable; 
the focus of his work does not purport to be a treatment of Irenaeus’ view of the Devil. Yet a 
careful delineation of Irenaeus’ account of the Devil would strengthen the larger thesis 
guiding Steenberg’s work: namely that the whole of Irenaeus’ work hangs together in a way 
that magnifies the goodness of God’s creation—specifically humanity and the world—
through the saving actions of the incarnate Son, the perfect human being. In many respects, 
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my thesis intends to extend Steenberg’s soteriological treatment of Irenaeus, and show how 
Steenberg’s anthropological and cosmological reading of Irenaeus is deepened and 
resourced when considered in light of Irenaeus’ Devil narrative.  
 
 
B. Devil Scholarship that Touches on Irenaeus 
 
Contemporary Devil scholarship can be categorized along three main lines: 1) 
theological treatments of the Devil that are focused on theodicy and the problem of evil,  44 
2) systematic treatments of the Devil as contained in Christian Scripture, and 3) historical 
treatments of the Devil that seek to identify the origins of contemporary notions of the 
Devil. And of course many of these works blur the distinction between these three agendas.  
Irenaeus tends to show up infrequently or not at all in the first two categories of 
Devil scholarship. Gerald Messadie’s A History of the Devil makes no mention of 
Irenaeus.45 Elaine Pagels’ treatment of Satan is an attempt to show how the doctrine of 
Satan emerged out of the ‘orthodox’ party’s effort to suppress all other variants of 
Christianity.46 Irenaeus makes a number of appearances in Pagels’ work, but only as a figure 
who helped to institutionalize the church and suppress dissent; his actual views on the Devil 
are not developed. Likewise Bernard Bamberger’s historical survey of the Devil mentions 
Irenaeus only briefly in passing, and wrongly attributes to him the ransom theory of 
atonement.47 Paul Carus’ history makes only a single reference, again wrongly attributing 
the ransom theory to Irenaeus.48 Miguel A. De La Torre’s and Albert Hernandez’s Quest for 
the Historical Satan includes only three incidental remarks regarding Irenaeus, one of which 
(like Bamberger and Carus) wrongly attributes to Irenaeus the ransom theory of atonement.  
Charlotte Emily Kingston, in her dissertation on Gregory the Great’s view of the Devil, 
devotes a section of her thesis to the development of the Devil in early Christian thought; 
here she correctly notes the early tradition regarding the Devil’s envy of humanity, but only 
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makes a single passing reference to Irenaeus.49 Henry Kelly’s historical survey of the Devil 
offers a bit more. Kelly provides an assessment of the Devil within the canon of Scripture, 
and the era immediately following.50 In his post-biblical historical narrative, Kelly rightly 
positions Irenaeus within an early Devil tradition distinct from the tradition that will emerge 
post-Origen. According to Kelly, this early tradition can be traced to its culminating 
articulation in the Life of Adam and Eve (which Kelly dates to the fourth century—a date 
which scholars are by no means agreed upon),51 and then to its use in the Koran.52 But 
notably, Kelly does not identify Irenaeus as a key player in this transition. 
Gregg Allison’s Historical Theology devotes a chapter to the historical development 
of the Christian doctrine of angels, demons and Satan.53 Allison divides his historical survey 
into four main epochs: the early church, the Middle Ages, the Reformation and post-
Reformation period, and the modern period. Irenaeus makes a few appearances in the first 
section of this historical sweep. In particular Allison notes Irenaeus’ affirmation of the 
watcher tradition, Satan’s envy of humanity, and Irenaeus’ (incorrect) statement that the 
Hebrew word Satan means ‘apostate’. Allison’s assessment of the early church is helpful in 
identifying many of the main ideas that emerged in the early church regarding the Devil. But 
by lumping together the statements of such diverse figures as Theophilus, Justin, Irenaeus, 
Origen, Augustine, and Gregory of Nyssa (and the Shepherd of Hermas!) the reader is left 
with the impression that these figures all told the same basic story regarding the Devil. 
Allison’s failure to distinguish between an early and later Devil narrative is the chief 
drawback of his work on the Devil.  
Yet two historical surveys of the Devil are noteworthy for their attention to Irenaeus. 
The first is by Jeffrey Burton Russell. Russell’s four-volume work explores the identity of 
the Devil from ancient times until modernity and is the standard scholarly work on the 
history of the Devil.54 Like the work of many other Devil scholars, Russell’s work is 
focused on the issue of theodicy, with particular attention to the way good/evil dualism 
informs the various accounts of the Devil. Russell’s second volume in the series, Satan: The 
Early Christian Tradition devotes a chapter to Irenaeus.55  Insofar as Russell’s chief concern 
                                                         
49 Kingston, ‘Devil in Pope Gregory’.  
50 Kelly, Satan, 175-208. 
51 For the dating of this textual tradition, see De Jonge and Tromp, Life of Adam and Eve, 
75-78. Tromp and De Jonge suggest the wide date range of 100-600 AD.  
52 See Kelly, Satan, 175-84.  
53 Allison, Historical Theology, 298-308.  Allison’s work uniquely addresses the traditional 
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is theodicy and dualism, his assessment of Irenaeus moves in directions that are only 
tangential to my present thesis. Yet Russell rightly draws attention to key elements of 
Irenaeus’ account of the Devil. Russell notes that envy of humanity (rather than pride) was 
the chief sin of the Devil.56 He notes the lordship of humanity over the Devil and the other 
angels, and that the Devil’s fall is occasioned by refusal to submit to humanity’s lordship.57 
There are a few places where one might wish to correct Russell’s account of Irenaeus,58  but 
the major contribution of Russell—not to be under-appreciated—is the way that Russell 
clearly demonstrates that Irenaeus represents an early account of the Devil distinct from 
what will come later. For Russell, Irenaeus’ view of the Devil is the culmination of the 
reflection that had been taking place in the Christian communities from the time of the 
apostles, on through the ‘apostolic fathers’, and continuing with the later ‘apologetic 
fathers’. 59 Thus for Russell, though Irenaeus is not the originator of this early Devil 
narrative, he is the first of the Christian writers to most fully articulate it. Russell’s historical 
analysis provides a solid framework for assessing Irenaeus’ narrative with respect to the 
Devil narratives that come before and after. But as noted above, Russell utilizes the 
implications of this early account, and its difference from the later account, in the service of 
his study on theodicy. As such his assessment of Irenaeus’ account of the Devil is only 
tangentially related to our primary focus regarding Irenaeus’ doctrine of creation.  
The second significant historical treatment of the Devil is Neil Forsyth, The Old 
Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth.60 Forsyth’s work stands alongside of Russell’s 
historical survey in terms of importance, even if less comprehensive in scope. Like Russell’s 
work, Forsyth offers us an historical account of the Devil, tracing the development of this 
account from Gilgamesh to Augustine. Along the way he devotes a chapter to Irenaeus.61 
Forsyth is most concerned to give an account of the way that the Devil is a primary ‘actor’ 
in the various Jewish, Gnostic, and Christian narratives. Here Forsyth sets his work in 
contrast to other historical surveys that analyze the nature of evil in more abstracted 
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philosophical and theological categories. ‘My own position, however, is that Satan is first, 
and in some sense always remains, a character in a narrative…that is we must try to see him 
as an actor, or what Aristotle called an “agent”, with a role to play in a plot, or mythos’.62 
This agenda is traced throughout Forsyth’s work. According to Forsyth, the Jewish, Gnostic, 
and Christian theologians were concerned to present a coherent ‘mythos’—an intelligible 
story that accounted for the presence of evil while preserving the goodness of God. These 
mythic stories were designed as rebuttals to competing narratives (e.g. the Christian mythos 
of the Devil was developed in response to the Gnostic narrative).  Insofar as the competing 
narratives shifted and evolved, the various Christian accounts concerning the Devil likewise 
evolved and developed—moving from a focus on lust, to envy, and finally settling on pride 
as the Devil’s chief sin.  
This narrative reading of the Devil’s thus shapes Forsyth’s reading of Irenaeus. For 
Forsyth, Irenaeus is keen to present a Devil narrative that is coherent in the face of the 
Gnostic threat, while at the same time consistent with a number of disparate data points that 
have been handed to him from Scripture and the Jewish tradition—the Eden tradition, the 
watcher tradition, two distinct Pauline theories of redemption, an ‘Adam myth’ and so on.63 
Forsyth ultimately judges Irenaeus’ attempt a failure, and instead points to Augustine as the 
Christian thinker who will finally be able to achieve the master synthesis that will eventually 
become fixed dogma in the Christian tradition.    
Forsyth’s narrative treatment of the Devil is helpful at many key points. Forsyth is a 
professor of English, and his attention to a narrative reading of the Devil as a key character 
in a plot gives his treatment of the Devil a perspective unique from the other historical 
surveys. In my estimation, Forsyth’s insight about narrative readings is consistent with how 
the Devil functioned in the thought of the early Christian writers, and parallels the way I am 
likewise interested in reading Irenaeus. Also, Forsyth, along with Russell, identifies Origen 
as a key turning point in the development of early Christian accounts of the Devil.  
However, Forsyth’s treatment of the Devil in Irenaeus, like the other Devil 
scholarship, only tangentially touches on the key themes of my thesis. Forsyth’s primary 
aim is to show how Irenaeus’ account of the Devil emerged out of his conflict with the 
external force of Gnosticism.  As such, Forsyth does not focus on the internal coherence of 
Irenaeus’ account of the Devil with respect to Irenaeus’ larger soteriological system—most 
especially the way in which Irenaeus’ anthropology and cosmology neatly coheres with his 
account of the Devil.  
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Devil scholars—especially those working on the historical development of the 
Devil—often note the transition between the early and later accounts of the Devil in the 
Christian tradition (as can be seen with Kelly, Russell, and Forsyth). In particular, they 
make the observation (with varying degrees of force) that Irenaeus stands at the end of the 
early tradition, just before it gives way to the emerging later tradition. Origen is often 
identified as the initial shaper of this later account that eventually reaches culmination in 
Augustine (or Gregory the Great). These observations are particularly relevant for my thesis. 
But these Devil scholars, on the whole, have little interest in mining this insight for how it 
deepens our understanding of Irenaeus’ cosmology and anthropology.  
Likewise, Irenaeus scholars note (though not as often as one might prefer) the 
significant role that the Devil plays in Irenaeus’ system. But in the main, they fail to 
recognize that the Devil of Irenaeus’ system is distinct in important ways from the Devil that 
will emerge in the later Christian tradition. This oversight obscures the deep coherence of 
Irenaeus’ thought, and impoverishes our reading of Irenaeus’ anthropology and cosmology. 
What is needed therefore, and what I hope to provide, is a reading of Irenaeus that combines 
the best insights of these two scholarly fields, while extending them into a study of Irenaeus’ 
account of the Devil and its relation to his doctrine of creation. 
 
 
III. Biographical Details and Context 
 
The biographical details of Irenaeus’ life are little known. What we do know is 
gleaned from Adversus haereses as well as from two letters preserved in Eusebius’ Historia 
ecclesiasica. The first of these letters sheds light on the place and date of his birth. In a letter 
to Florinius, Irenaeus recounts an early boyhood memory of listening to the teaching of 
Polycarp (d. ca. 155), who was Bishop of Smyrna and the disciple of the apostle John.64 
This memory, along with his claim that the Book of Revelation was written toward the end 
of Domitian’s reign (98), and near to the time of Irenaeus’ own generation,65 suggests that 
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Polycarp: ‘I remember the events of that time more clearly than those of recent years. For what boys 
learn, growing with their mind, becomes joined with it; so that I am able to describe the very place in 
which the blessed Polycarp sat as he discoursed, and his goings out and his comings in, and the 
manner of his life, and his physical appearance…” Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.20.4-7. 




Irenaeus was born of Greek descent, most likely in Asia Minor, between the years 130-
140.66  
Irenaeus’ adult life begins for us in 177, in the Roman city of Lugdunum in the 
province of Gaul (modern Lyons in southeastern France).67  Lugdunum was a city of some 
import in the Western Empire during the time of Irenaeus, as can be seen by the imperial 
visits to the city. Claudius was born at Lugdunum, and Caligula put on mixed games there, 
as well as a competition in Greek and Latin oratory.68 The decisive battle of a civil war was 
fought in the city in 200AD, with the Emperor Severus securing for himself the purple 
against his rival Albinus. (Irenaeus was likely in the city during the battle).69 Lugdunum was 
an economically important city as well. The gold mints at Lugdunum produced coinage for 
the whole empire, and the silver mints for the western providences. This was at a time when 
the world was at an unprecedented point of industrialization. Analysis of arctic ice floes 
shows that the levels of metal released into the atmosphere were at the world's highest in the 
first two centuries of the first millennium, and were not equaled again until the industrial 
revolution.70 Given the influence of Lugdunum within the empire, Irenaeus’ bishopric was 
not without corresponding influence in the Christian community.71  
Sometime after Irenaeus’ arrival in Gaul, a bloody pogrom was carried out against 
the Christians, and the Christians in Lugdunum suffered greatly. At this time Irenaeus 
carried a letter from the churches in Lugdunum to Eleutherus, Bishop of Rome. This letter 
records the sufferings and faithfulness of the Christian confessors, and identifies Irenaeus as 
a presbyter of the parish in Lugdunum.72 Irenaeus later succeeded Pothinus, Bishop of 
                                                         
66 There is a wide variety of opinion regarding the date of Irenaeus’ birth. Osborn helpfully 
catalogs the various positions: Dodwell (98 AD), Grave (108 AD), Tillemont and Lightfoot (120 
AD), Ropes (126 AD), Harvey (130 AD), Dupin, Massuet, and Kling (140 AD), Boringer, Ziegler 
(147 AD). See Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 2. Osborn himself follows Benoit, who places the 
birth date between 130 and 140 AD. See A. Benoit, Saint-Irénée, 50. 
67 For the social, cultural, and historical context of second century Latin Gaul, see Secord, 
‘The Cultural Geography of a Greek Christian’, 25-33. See also Nasrallah, ‘Mapping the World’. 
Nasrallah explores how Justin, Tatian, and Lucian—second sophistic ‘truth seekers from the eastern 
ranges of the empire’—viewed the Roman world in which they lived. Irenaeus, who would not 
readily have identified himself with the philosophers and rhetoricians of the second sophistic, may 
nonetheless, also journeying from the east, have encountered the Roman world through a similar 
lens.  
68 Suetonius, Gaius Caligula, 20.  
69 See Kulikowski, Triumph of Empire, 86-87, for an account of the battle.  
70 See Goodman, Rome and Jerusalem, 94. Goodman draws upon Hong, Candelone, 
Patterson and Boutron, ‘Greenland Ice Evidence’, 1841-1843.  
71 Contra Jonathan Hill who minimizes the importance of Irenaeus in the early church. See 
Hill, History of Christian Thought, 26. 
72 Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.4.1. For the letter, see all of 5.1. Somewhat surprisingly, Irenaeus is 
nonetheless generally positive toward Rome and the empire. He writes appreciatively of the Romans 
that ‘through their instrumentality the world is at peace, and we walk on the highways without fear, 




Lugdunum, who died during these persecutions. Irenaeus’ bishopric seems to have extended 
over both Lugdunum and Vienne, and continued on into Victor’s bishopric in Rome, 
Eleutherus’ successor. 
A key event in Irenaeus’ life—one in which he lived up to his name, and which 
likewise shows the reach of his influence—is preserved in Eusebius. Eusebius records a 
letter of Irenaeus, written to Victor, Bishop of Rome (c. 190), in which Irenaeus seeks to 
reconcile diverging opinions between the East and the West with respect to the dating of 
Easter.73  At the height of the tension, Victor was threatening excommunication to the 
churches in Asia Minor. Irenaeus interposed, and through his efforts Victor came to agree 
that each church should set the date for Easter in keeping with its own traditions. 
Irenaeus has often been construed as a biblical theologian who was ‘not a very good 
philosopher’.74 The first charge is certainly true; he was indeed a biblical theologian.  And 
while Irenaeus avoids the finely tuned speculative reasoning and language one finds in the 
later Christian Platonists, he arguably demonstrates a robust awareness of and adeptness in 
the use of the philosophical categories of his day.75    
The exact date of and occasion for Irenaeus’ death are not known. There is a tenuous 
tradition that Irenaeus was martyred during the persecution of Septimius Severus in 202 or 
203. Jerome is the first to assert this in 410 in his commentary on Isaiah (chapter 64). 
However, Jerome does not make this claim in his earlier De viris illustribus—where one 
would naturally expect to find it. Osborn suggests the discrepancy may be the result of an 
interpolation from later Gallic traditions.76 The relatively late date of the tradition and the 




IV. Gnostic Context 
 
The Gnostic conflict figures significantly in Irenaeus’ work, and thus a sketch of this 
context at the outset of this thesis will be helpful for my argument to come. In recent years, 
                                                         
73 Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.24. For more on this event, see Osborne, Irenaeus, 5; Grant, 
Irenaeus, 8-10; Behr, Irenaeus of Lyons, 54-57.  
74 Norris, ‘Irenaeus and Plotinus’, 23.  
75 See Briggman, ‘Irenaeus’ Christology of Mixture’; Osborne, Irenaeus, 15-16, 255; 
Lashier, ‘Irenaeus as Logos Theologian’.  
76 Osborn, Irenaeus, 2.  
77 For more on Irenaeus’ general biography, see especially Behr, Irenaeus of Lyons, 13-66. 
Also Paul Parvis, ‘Who Was Irenaeus?’, 13-24; Grant, Irenaeus, 1-10, Osborn, Irenaeus, 1-6; and 




Michael Williams has argued that ‘Gnosticism’ is the wrong label for the group of texts 
traditionally classified as such.78 What ties these texts together, Williams has argued, is not 
gnosis, but rather the consistent presence of a ‘biblical demiurge’.79 Williams suggests 
‘biblical demiurgical’ as the best label for referring to the body of literature now commonly 
referred to as Gnostic.80 Williams’ work has been widely accepted, and has been almost 
single-handedly responsible for putting the term ‘Gnosticism’ in quotes.  I am in agreement 
with Williams regarding a biblical demiurge as the unifying element of Gnosticism. 
However, I depart from Williams insofar as he goes on to argue that these texts do not offer 
a consistently negative portrayal of the demiurge.81 Here I am more inclined to follow 
Irenaeus, who, contra Williams, insists that the Gnostic portrayal of the demiurge is almost 
universally negative.82 Throughout his writings, Irenaeus clearly views the Gnostics as anti-
body and anti-material. The demiurge is always the villain (or the dupe) in the Gnostic story, 
as recounted by Irenaeus. The work of the demiurge—namely all things material and 
earthly, including the body—are the dregs of the universe. Salvation is about being 
delivered from the material world of the demiurge. In response to this, Irenaeus goes out of 
his way to affirm both the goodness of the Creator and the goodness of the creation—both 
of which are directly attacked by the Gnostic systems. 
I would therefore adjust Williams’ label of ‘biblical demiurgical’ to ‘malevolent 
biblical demiurgical’, emphasizing the universally negative characterization of the demiurge 
in Gnostic thought. However, for consistency with past Gnostic scholarship, and for ease of 
use, I here retain the traditional term, while affirming Williams’ basic critique regarding the 
inadequacy of the label ‘Gnostic’.83   
                                                         
78 See Williams, Rethinking Gnosticism. Williams’ work challenged the scholarly consensus 
on Gnosticism as articulated at the Gnostic conference held in Messina, Italy, in 1966. 
79 Williams, Rethinking Gnosticism, 52.  
80 Williams, Rethinking Gnosticism, 52.  
81 Williams, Rethinking Gnosticism, 27-52.  
82 See Irenaeus’ account of the Cainites, Haer. 1.31; the Ophites, Haer. 1.30.5 ff.; the 
Barbeliotes, Haer. 1.29.4; Marcion and Cerdo, Haer. 1.27.2; Cerinthus,  Haer. 1.26.1; Carpocrates,  
Haer. 1.25.4; Saturninus and Basilides, Haer. 1.24; the Marcosians, Haer. 1.18.4, 1.19.1; 
Valentinus, Haer. 1.4-5. All of the above cast the demiurge in strongly negative terms. Similarly, the 
strain of teaching associated with Simon, though not having a single demiurge, maintained that the 
world was shaped by evil angels. In this sense, Simon’s narrative consists of many evil demiurges. 
See Haer. 1.23.2. The only exception on this point found within Irenaeus is the Ebionites. The 
Ebionites practiced circumcision, followed the Jewish laws, and acknowledged Jesus. Arguably, 
their Jewish commitments to the Torah kept them from demonizing the Creator. See Haer. 1.26.2. 
83 For a helpful summary of the Gnosticism that Irenaeus was battling, see Grant, Irenaeus, 
11-28; Minns, Irenaeus, 15-29; and Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology, 17-21.For a general 
introduction to the Nag Hammadi literature, and Gnosticm generally, see Meyer and  Pagels, 
‘Introduction’, 1-13.For a concise overview of the Valentinian school, see Thomassen, ‘The 





Of course, my departure from Williams presupposes that Irenaeus’ account of 
Gnosticism is largely accurate.  While some scholars question the reliability of Irenaeus’ 
account,84 many others have defended Irenaeus on this point.85 I am sympathetic with the 
defenders of Irenaeus regarding the general accuracy of his account of Gnosticism. But in 
many respects the accuracy of Irenaeus’ account is tangential to my main concern, namely 
the way in which Irenaeus’ account of the Devil fits with his broader anthropological and 
cosmological framework. For my purposes then, we need only concern ourselves with what 
Irenaeus thought the Gnostics taught, and how this understanding (whether fully accurate or 
not) influenced the way he articulated his overall theological system.86  
 
 
V. Texts and Translations 
 
Irenaeus’ two extant works are Adversus haereses, his major work against the 
Gnostics, and Epideixis tou apostolikou kērygmatos (hereafter Epideixis), which offers a 
short summary of the biblical storyline. Both works were originally written in Greek, but 
now remain complete only in Latin and Armenian translations, respectively.  
When and how the Greek text of Adversus haereses disappeared is uncertain; Greek 
copies existed as late as the ninth-century in Baghdad;87 the remaining Latin copies range 
from the twelfth to fifteenth centuries.88 Some of the Greek of Book One has been preserved 
by Ephiphanius, and smaller fragments of all five books have been preserved in Hippolytus, 
Eusebius, Theodoret of Cyrus, St. John of Damascus, and the Catenae Graecorum Patrum. 
Despite the loss of the Greek original, the Latin translation is as well preserved.89 For the 
                                                         
84 See for example, Pagels, ‘Conflicting Versions of Valentinian Eschatology’, 35-53.  
85 For an extensive list of scholars sympathetic to Irenaeus’ doctrinal characterization of 
Gnosticism, see Tiessan, ‘Gnosticism as Heresy’, 31-48. Tiessen himself concludes, ‘The Nag 
Hammadi discoveries have, for the most part, confirmed the reliability of Irenaeus and demonstrated 
his knowledge of the various gnostic traditions which appear in those texts’ (32). In any event, 
differences between Irenaeus and the Nag Hammadi collection need not mean that Irenaeus got it 
wrong. Papandrea rightly points out that, based on the poor transmission accuracy of fragments from 
Plato’s Republic found in the Nag Hammadi collection, an impeccable transmission accuracy of the 
Nag Hammadi collection should not be assumed. See Papandrea, Five Images, 19-20. 
86 Here I follow the same basic approach as Eric Osborn, ‘Since my concern is to understand 
Irenaeus, his criteria and his concepts, I have taken the account of his Protean opponents at face 
value’. Eric Osborn, Irenaeus, xiv.  
87 For a helpful analysis of the extant Latin manuscripts, see Unger, ACW 55, 12-13. For a 
helpful analysis of the existing print editions of the Latin, see Parvis, ‘Packaging Irenaeus’, 183-98. 
88 The Greek of Adversus haereses was used by the translators of the Armenian version in 
the sixth-century, and excerpts can be found in the Sacra Parallela (eight-century). Photius, in the 
ninth-century, read a Greek copy in Baghdad. See Unger, ACW 55, 12.  
89 See the introductory comments of Unger in, ACW 55, 14. Notably, Unger observes that 
the Latin translation is slavishly literal. While this makes for an awkward Latin reading, it carries the 




purposes of this study, I have followed the consensus of Irenaean textual scholarship which 
dates the original Latin translation to the early third-century, not long after Irenaeus’ own 
time, and while Gnosticism remained a threat.90  
For the Latin text of Adversus haereses, I have followed the relevant volumes in 
Rousseau, ed., Sources Chrétiennes. For the Greek text I have followed W. Wigan Harvey, 
Saint Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons: Five Books Against Heresies. The English translations of 
Adversus haereses I have revised and updated as necessary from A. Roberts and W. H. 
Rambaut.91 I have likewise consulted the English translations of Unger, found in Ancient 
Christian Writers, volumes 55, 64, and 65, as well as the French translation found in the 
relevant volumes of Sources Chrétiennes.  
The Armenian text of Epideixis was only relatively recently discovered in 1904, and 
made available in print in the 1919 edition of Patrologia Orientalis, vol. 12, edited by K. 
Ter-Mekerttschian and S. G. Wilson. The English translation for Epideixis used throughout 
is based on Armitage Robinson’s 1920 translation from the Armenian, unless otherwise 
noted. The English translations of Joseph Smith and John Behr,92 as well as the French 
translation by Rousseau found in Sources Chrétiennes, were likewise consulted. Bracketed 
Armenian transliterations are drawn from Smith. The translation of Epid. 12 and 14 used in 
Chapter Two, Section V follows the work of Matthew Steenberg in his essay, ‘Children in 
Paradise: Adam and Even as “Infant” in Irenaeus of Lyons’. Steenberg bases his translation 
first on Rousseau’s retrograde Latin edition of Epideixis which can be found in Sources 
Chrétiennes, vol. 406, and secondly on the Armenian text of 1919. Any departures from 
Steenberg’s English translation in my Chapter Three are identified in the notes. Bracketed 
Greek terms throughout are from Rousseau. 
The English translations of all non-English secondary works are my own, unless 
otherwise noted. All Scripture quotations are from the Revised Standard Version, unless 




                                                         
90 Tertullian appears to have used the Latin Adversus haereses as some of the passages in his 
Adversus Valentinianos quote it verbatim. And Feuardent even speculated that it was written by 
Irenaeus himself (though this seems unlikely given the poor quality of the translation). See 
Feuardent, Commonitio ad lectores de sua quinque librorum D. Irenaei edition (PG 7.1340C-D). 
Certainly it was extant by the time of Augustine, who quotes from it in the year AD 421 (C. 
Iul.1.3.5). For arguments in favor of early third-century, see Unger, ACW 55, 14-15; Grabe, 
Prolegomena, 1.2.3 (PG 7.1356), 1702; Harvey, St. Irenaeus, 1.144; D’Ales, ‘La date de la version 
latine de saint Irenee’, 133-37. 
91 ANF, vol. 1.  































Irenaeus’ account of the Devil, while significant in its own right, is an important 
aspect of his general thought insofar as it sets in motion his broader soteriological and 
theological narrative, which in turn informs his overall theological framework—most 
especially his anthropology and cosmology. Arguably, the theological conclusions that 
emerge out of the pages of Adversus haereses in large measure find their genesis in 
Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s identity and fall.  
The goal of Chapters One and Two, therefore, is to offer a brief summary of the 
important cosmological and anthropological themes in Irenaeus that will inform our 
understanding of Irenaeus’ demonology. Toward this end, there are a number of core 
questions I intend to answer in this chapter and the next. What is Irenaeus’ basic stance 
toward materiality? What does he think about the human body and the material world? What 
is the destiny of the material creation? What is the ultimate destiny of humanity, and how 
does this inform the opening act of Irenaeus’ drama?  What does it mean for humanity to be 
made in the ‘image and likeness’ of God? What is the destiny of humanity? When we 
consider at the outset the telos of Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative, namely the exaltation 
(indeed divinization) of humanity and the redemption of the material world, our capacity to 
read Irenaeus’ opening narrative account of the Devil is deepened accordingly.   
Central to Irenaeus’ cosmology is the basic contention that a good world was created 
for good humans by a good God. Irenaeus’ affirmation of the goodness of the material world 
can be seen in at least six ways, 1) the demiurge is identified as the true Father, 2) God 
creates the world directly with his own two hands (i.e. the Son and the Spirit), 3) creation is 
accomplished ex nihilo, 4) the material world is given as a gift to humanity, 5) God will 
renew the present earth to its pristine condition in a literal millennial kingdom, and 6) God 
will create a perpetual new heavens and new earth in the eternal age.   
In the following, each of these points will be examined in turn, with a view to 








I. The Demiurge as the True Father 
 
Most basic to Irenaeus’ doctrinal system is his insistence that God is the Creator of 
the material world. ‘Now this world is encompassed by seven heavens,1  in which dwell 
powers and angels and archangels, doing service to God, the Almighty who created all 
things’.2 And again, ‘The church, though dispersed throughout the whole world, even to the 
ends of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples this faith: a belief in one 
God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in 
them’.3 Of special note is the way in which Irenaeus underscores the import of God’s 
identity as Creator by linking this doctrine to his famous ‘rule of truth’. For Irenaeus, the 
‘rule of truth’ (or alternately ‘rule of faith’) is the summation of the apostolic deposit—a 
body of truths that mark the boundaries for what constitutes true Christianity.4 Each time 
Irenaeus explicitly mentions this foundational body of doctrinal content, he includes a clear 
and extended statement about God as Creator. Arguably, this aspect of the rule is its chief 
feature. He writes, ‘The rule of truth which we hold, is, that there is one God Almighty, who 
made all things by his Word, and fashioned and formed, out of that which had no existence, 
all things which exist’. 5  
Irenaeus is keen to press this point precisely because it lies at the heart of his debate 
with the Gnostics, who generally worked hard to put distance between God and the material 
world.  For the Gnostics, the world was not made by God, but by a lesser (and typically evil 
and ignorant) demiurge.6 The term ‘demiurge’ is taken from the Latinized rendering of the 
                                                         
1 Irenaeus’ conception of a ‘seven-heaven’ cosmology is not unique to him. See for example 
T. Levi, 3 and the Ascen Isa.10. Uniquely however, Irenaeus connects the names of the seven 
heavens with the gifts of the Spirit (see Epid. 9). Seven-heaven cosmology was likewise present in 
late Jewish thought; see Thackeray, St Paul and Contemporary Jewish Thought, 172–79. Irenaeus’ 
cosmology is significantly less speculative than the Gnostic cosmologies he combatted. Gnostic 
teachers (e.g. Saturninus and Basilides) typically maintained a series of descending heavens (even up 
to 365) with each emanation containing its own host of powers and angels. Irenaeus has little 
patience for such cosmologies, ‘…nor are there a series of heavens…madly dreamt’, Haer. 2.30.9. 
For an extended discussion on Irenaeus’ ‘seven-heaven’ cosmology, see MacKenzie, Demonstration, 
91-100; Smith, Proof, 146-47, no. 57; and Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 8-10.  
2 Epid. 9. 
3 Haer. 1.10.1. 
4 In content the ‘rule’ overlaps somewhat with the Apostles’ Creed; it does not, however, 
come to us through Irenaeus in a fixed creedal form. Irenaeus links the rule to baptism in Haer. 
1.9.4, which suggests that it had a catechetical function. For an analysis of Irenaeus’ rule, see 
Stewart, ‘The Rule of Truth’, 151-58; also Peter-Ben Smit, ‘The Reception of the Truth’, 354-373. 
5 Haer. 1.2.1. For other explicit references to the rule in Adversus haereses, see 1.9.4, 3.1.1-
2, 3.11.1. In Epid. 6, Irenaeus likewise details the substance of the rule, again beginning with God as 
Creator as the first principle. See also Epid. 3, where Irenaeus begins with baptism in the name of 
Father, Son, and Spirit, with God as Creator immediately following. 
6 Here I depart from Williams, Rethinking Gnosticism, 98-100, who does not see a 




Greek δημιουργός, literally meaning ‘public worker’. It first gained philosophical currency 
in Plato’s Timaeus, where it is used to refer to the divine being who gave form to the 
material world. For Plato, the demiurge is not the creator of the material world, but rather its 
‘craftsman’ or ‘shaper’. The Platonic demiurge is well-intentioned but limited; he does his 
best to shape the chaotic material of creation into order, but is met with limited success. In 
Plato’s Timaeus, and throughout the Platonic tradition, the demiurge is cast in a generally 
positive light. 7  
However, the concept of a demiurge is utilized within the Gnostic texts in more 
pejorative ways. For the Gnostics, the demiurge is not a benevolent maker/shaper of the 
material world, but a lesser god who most often functions as the primary villain of the 
Gnostic narrative. The identity and nature of the Gnostic demiurge was variously explained, 
but in nearly all instances the accounts were negative. He was he was one of the weak 
creating angels;8 he was less enlightened than Satan;9  he was ignorant of the heavenly realm 
above him;10 he wrongly presumed himself to be the true God;11 he was ontologically 
inferior to enlightened humans;12 he was envious of humans;13 his work was destined to 
come to ruin;14 he was the unintended and degenerate offspring of a wayward Aeon;15 and 
(most memorably) humans, upon their death, were to insult him as the means of ascending 
to the heavenly realm.16  
Both implicitly and explicitly, the Gnostic demiurge is set in stark contrast to the 
‘true Father’ –the beneficent, even if unknowable source, of all that is. The demiurge, in 
varying accounts, is either ignorant of the higher heavens and the existence of the true 
                                                         
7 For more on the Platonic demiurge, see Wainwright, ‘Concepts of God’. Also Williams, 
Rethinking Gnosticism, 20, and Gerson, ‘Demiurge’.  
8 Haer. 1.23.2, 24.4-6, 25.1. 
9 Haer. 1.5.4. 
10 Haer. 1.5.3, 1.17.1. 
11 Haer. 1.29.4, 1.30.6. 
12 Haer. 1.7.1, 1.25.2. 
13 Haer. 1.30.  
14 Haer. 1.17.2. 
15 Haer. 1.5, 1.16.3, 1.18.4, 1.19.1, 1.29.4. In the Valentinian account, the various heavenly 
Aeons come into being as emanations from the true Father. Sophia, the ‘last and youngest of the 
Aeons’ is a female aeon who leaves her consort (Desired) and strives to comprehend the unknowable 
Father; this knowledge is beyond her grasp. Her passion to know the unknowable causes her to fall 
into grief and despair, out of which the material content of creation springs into being. But being 
female, she can only give birth to substance, not form (for the Gnostics, ‘form’ comes from the 
male). This unformed material substance is personalized as Achamoth—a being with substance but 
no form. Form is granted to her by one of the higher male Aeons, and then from her are formed three 
types of substances – the spiritual, the ensouled, and the material (in descending levels of ontological 
worth). The demiurge, who is himself an ensouled being, owes his existence to Achamoth, who is 
his mother. The demiurge separates the ensouled substance from the material substance, thus 
shaping the material world that is visible to humanity. The demiurge mistakenly supposes that he has 
made all of these things himself, and that he is the true and only high God.  




Father, or he is jealous and envious that he has been relegated to the lower material world. 
Indeed, the demiurge is set in contrast with all that is good in the celestial realm. For the 
Gnostics, the greater Aeons who dwell within the Pleroma (i.e. the highest heavens) are in 
closer geographical and ontological proximity with the Father, and are opponents of the 
demiurge.17  
For the Gnostics, this unhappy account of the demiurge served to darken their 
cosmology. The Gnostic sects offered varied accounts regarding the creation of matter, but 
none of them were flattering. For the Valentinians, matter was created out of the sorrow, 
grief, and tears of a wayward Aeon whose passions had led her astray.18 In another passage 
this wayward Aeon is compared to Judas, and then again to the hemorrhaging woman of the 
gospels (with matter analogously compared to her hemorrhage).19 In Simon and Saturninus, 
matter was formed by envious and evil angels, of which the demiurge was one.20 The 
material world, insofar as it owes its origin or form to the demiurge, is guilty by 
association.21 Further, the existence of matter was never intended by the true Father and is 
thus incapable of salvation; it will ultimately and permanently be destroyed by fire.22  Thus 
the Gnostic association between the demiurge and the material world served to slander in a 
single stroke both the demiurge and his creation.23  
                                                         
17 The Gnostics generally maintained a hyperized version of Platonic emanation, taking the 
Platonic concept of emanation and expanding it (often to absurd limits).  The true unknowable 
Father was the ontological source of the succeeding pantheon of celestial beings, who were in turn 
the ontological source of lesser beings, on down to humans. The number of emanations varied in the 
Gnostics sects—from thirty to as many as three hundred and sixty, and beyond. See Haer. 1.24.3-4, 
2.16.2, 30.9.  
18 Haer. 1.2.3, 1.3.1, 1.4.1-3, 1.5.1, 2.13.7.  
19 Haer. 1.3.3. 
20 Haer. 1.23.2-3, and 1.24.1, respectively. 
21 In many respects, the Gnostics begin with a general Platonic suspicion about the material 
world, but they turn this suspicion into outright hostility by demonizing the demiurge.    
22 Haer. 1.6.1, 1.7.1, 2.29.3. See also Tatian, Graec.12, who suggests that the angels fell 
when they turned to what was inferior in matter and conformed their life to it. A similar sentiment as 
Tatian is conveyed in Origen, Princ. 1.8, 1.3-4, and Gregory of Nyssa, see Moore and Wilson, 
Gregory of Nyssa, 9-10. While Tatian, Origen, and Gregory do not insist that the material world is 
evil, they nonetheless have a basic metaphysical pessimism about the material world. On this point, 
they share more with Gnosticism than they do with Irenaeus.  
23 Here again I depart from Williams’ view that the Gnostics were not anti-materialist. The 
evidence he cites seems rather to invalidate the position he is arguing for. Williams argues 
unconvincingly that the social and political life of the average Gnostic was not anti-material, and 
therefore it is improper to use the term ‘anti-material’ as a label to describe Gnosticism (Rethinking 
Gnosticism, 100-01). Yet Williams himself admits that there is a paucity of evidence that gives us 
insight into the lives of average Gnostics (101), leaving his argument largely one of conjecture. No 
more convincing is Williams’ argument about the close connection between Gnosticism and 
Platonism (107-08). According to Williams, insofar as the Gnostics were making ‘efforts to reduce 
the cultural distance’ between themselves and the reigning philosophical system of their world, we 
should understand them to be world-affirming. Williams is correct that the Gnostics were drawing 
upon Platonic categories, but this is hardly evidence that Gnostics were world-affirming. Indeed, just 




Clearly much is at stake for Irenaeus on this point. Irenaeus cannot grant the Gnostic 
separation between the demiurge and the ‘true Father’ without simultaneously demonizing 
the Creator God of the Old Testament (who Irenaeus insists is the father of Jesus)24 and the 
material world (into which Jesus incarnated himself). It will not surprise us, then, to 
discover that Irenaeus will, on occasion, refer to God as the demiurgus. While this is not his 
only way of referring to God as Creator (he seems more typically to use conditor and factor) 
he nonetheless is quite willing at times to press the terminological association between God 
and the demiurge. In the first book of Adversus haereses, Irenaeus spends the majority of his 
efforts simply cataloguing the various strands of Gnostic teaching to serve as a negative foil 
before developing his own thoughts. But as he starts his second book, he more purposefully 
begins to establish the basic contours of his own system and engages with Gnostic thought 
more directly and critically. Toward this end, he refers to God as the demiurgus in the first 
chapter of book two; for Irenaeus, the fact that God is the demiurge is the ‘greatest 
principle’ that undergirds the entire Christian faith handed down by the apostles and taught 
in Scripture. He writes,  
 
It is necessary, then, that we begin with the first and greatest [primo et 
maximo] principle, that is, the Creator God [Demiurgo Deo], who made 
[fecit] the heaven and the earth, and all things [omnia] that are therein (whom 
these men blasphemously style the fruit of a defect), and to demonstrate that 
there is nothing either above him or after him; nor that, influenced by any 
one, but of his own free will, he created all things [fecit omnia], since he is 
the only God, the only Lord, the only Creator [Conditor], the only Father, 
alone containing all things, and himself commanding all things into existence 
[et omnibus ut sint ipse praestans].25 
 
And again in book four of Adversus haereses,  
 
There is therefore one God, who by the Word of Wisdom created and 
arranged all things [fecit et aptavit omnia]; but this is the Creator 
[Demiurgus] who has granted this world to the human race, and who as 
regards his greatness, is indeed unknown to all who have been made by him 
                                                         
material elements in Platonism. While the Platonic tradition offers varied accounts of the material 
world, some more positive than others, assessed on the whole, the entire soteriological narrative of 
Platonism leans strongly in a non-materialist (indeed often anti-materialist) direction.  
24 Haer. 1.22.1. 




for no one has searched out his height, either among the ancients who have 
gone to their rest, or any of those who are now alive; but as regards his love, 
he is always known through him [i.e. Christ] by whose means he ordained all 
things. 26 
 
The Gnostics tried to slander Irenaeus’ God by associating him with the demiurge; 
Irenaeus turns this on its head and lifts up the demiurge by associating him with the true 
God. What is more, by insisting that the demiurge and the true God are one and the same, 
Irenaeus is, at the same time, insisting upon the goodness of the material world. Insofar as 
the demiurge is indeed the true and high God, what he has willfully and purposefully made 
is necessarily good and worthy of admiration.  
 
 
II. God Creates Directly with His Own Two Hands 
 
As we have seen, Irenaeus is not content to merely assert that God is the ultimate 
source of creation (through endless emanations). For Irenaeus, God is the willful and 
personal Creator who himself personally makes and forms all things. Yet here Irenaeus must 
strike a balance. While he is keen to maintain the direct and personal involvement of the 
Father in creation, he is likewise compelled to ascribe a robust place to the Son and the Sprit 
as the means by which the Father created the world. Irenaeus is led into this tension through 
his commitment to the apostolic teaching contained in Scripture, most notably John 1:3. ‘All 
things were made by him [the Word], and without him nothing was made’.27  It is at this 
point that Irenaeus’ proto-Trinitarian framework emerges. It is important for Irenaeus that 
the activity of the Son and the Spirit in creation not be severed from the creative will of the 
Father. He writes,  
 
It was not angels, therefore, who made us, nor who formed us, neither had 
angels power to make an image of God, nor anyone else, except the Word of 
the Lord, nor any Power remotely distant from the Father of all things [neque 
                                                         
26 Haer. 4.20.4. See also 4.2.1. In book five Irenaeus begins with regular frequency to use 
the term ‘demiurge’ as a way of referring to the true God. See also Justin, 1 Apol. 8, 58, who 
likewise refers to God as the demiurge. 
27 Steenberg remarks, ‘No single verse of New Testament writing is of stronger influence on 
Irenaeus’ cosmological consideration than John 1:3’. See Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation, 69. 
Steenberg lists some of the following uses of this text in Irenaeus: Epid. 43; Haer. 1.8.5, 1.9.2, 




virtus longe absistens a Patre universorum]. For God did not stand in need of 
these [beings], in order to accomplish what he had himself determined with 
himself beforehand should be done, as if he did not possess his own hands 
[quasi ipse suas non haberet manus]. For with him were always present the 
Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, by whom and in whom, freely and 
spontaneously, he made all things…28 
 
This basic Trinitarian starting point is consistent throughout Irenaeus’ writings, and 
is established early in Epideixis, where Irenaeus holds together the creative activity of God 
the Father through the Son in the Spirit. He writes,  
 
Thus then there is shown forth One God, the Father, not made [avge,nhtoj], 
invisible, Creator of all things; above whom there is no other God, and after 
whom there is no other God. And, since God is rational [logiko,j], therefore 
by the Word he created the things that were made; and God is Spirit, and by 
the Spirit he adorned [kosme,w] all things: as also the prophet says: ‘By the 
word of the Lord were the heavens established, and by his Spirit all their 
power’. Since then the Word establishes, that is to say, works bodily 
[swmatopoie,w] and grants existence, and the Spirit arranges and forms the 
various powers, rightly and fittingly is the Word called the Son, and the 
Spirit the Wisdom of God. Well also does Paul his apostle say: ‘One God, the 
Father, who is over all and through all and in us all’. For ‘over all’ is the 
Father; and ‘through all’ is the Son, for through him all things were made by 
the Father; and ‘in us all’ is the Spirit, who cries ‘Abba Father’, and fashions 
man into the likeness of God. Now the Spirit shows forth the Word, and 
therefore the prophets announced the Son of God; and the Word utters the 
Spirit, and therefore is himself the announcer of the prophets, and leads and 
draws humanity to the Father.29 
  
                                                         
28 Haer. 4.20.1. 
29 Epid. 5. This same basic Trinitarian formula is likewise highlighted in Epid. 6, as part of 
the ‘rule of faith’. Here Irenaeus speaks of God the Father, the Creator of all things; the Word of 
God, through whom all things are made; and the Spirit of God who is poured out upon the earth, 




Here the Father creates all things; the Son ‘establishes and grants existence’ to all 
things; and the Spirit ‘arranges and forms’ all things.30 This tri-fold unity is neatly captured 
in Irenaeus’ reading of Romans 11:36. For Irenaeus, the ‘over all’ refers to the Father, the 
‘through all’ refers to the Son, and the ‘in all’ refers to the Spirit.  Thus for Irenaeus, the 
personal, creative activity of God is not compromised by the creative activity of the Son and 
the Spirit. The Father, ‘by his Word and Spirit, makes, and disposes, and governs all 
things’.31  
Irenaeus does not utilize the language of ‘trinity’ or the later catch-words of the 
fourth century, but his conceptual framework is substantively consistent with the later 
accounts of the Trinity that will emerge in the Nicene formula.32 For Irenaeus, the relational 
and organic unity between Father, Son, and Spirit is such that the creation of the world by 
the Father via the Son and the Spirit is not a mediated act of creation by the Father, but is 
the very means by which the Father himself creates directly.   
Here we encounter Irenaeus’ famous ‘two hands’ analogy.33 For Irenaeus, the Son 
and the Spirit are not intermediate agents of creation (like the Gnostic angels or the 
demiurge) but rather the ‘two hands’ of the Father himself.  ‘Now humanity is a mixed 
organization of soul and flesh, who was formed after the likeness of God, and molded by his 
hands, that is, by the Son and Holy Spirit, to whom also he said, “Let us make humanity”’.34 
                                                         
30 Cf. Irenaeus’ translation of Genesis 1:1 in Epid. 43, ‘Moses says in Hebrew, Baresith 
Bara Eloim Basan Benuam Samenthares, the translation of which  . . . is: A son in the beginning 
God established then heaven and earth’. The underlying Armenian is difficult and Irenaeus scholars 
do not agree about the best way to translate the text. The translation depends on whether one takes 
‘son’ as nominative or accusative. Smith, ‘Hebrew Christian Midrash in Irenaeus’, argues in favor of 
the accusative, and Behr, in his translation of Epideixis leaves it intentionally vague. See note 121 in 
Behr, On the Apostolic Preaching, 109 for a helpful summary of the issues.  
31 Haer. 1.22.1. 
32 That Irenaeus’ ‘Trinitarian’ framework is substantively consistent with the later Nicene 
articulation, see Gunton, The Triune Creator, 52-56; and especially Steenberg, Irenaeus on 
Creation, 61-100. Steenberg helpfully observes, ‘Irenaeus’ perception of the eternal life in the 
relationship of the three is indicative of the kind of Trinitarian language and vision that would be 
expounded more fully in the debates following Arius; and though we must not overestimate his 
Trinitarian articulation, we must not underestimate it either’, (63).  
33 Just as Irenaeus’ ‘two hands’ metaphor underscores the Father’s immediate involvement 
in creation, a similar point could be made through an exploration of Irenaeus’ ‘Logos’ theology. See 
Lashier, ‘Irenaeus as Logos Theologian’.  
34 Haer. 4. preface, 1. See also 4.20.1. The ‘two hands’ metaphor seems original to Irenaeus. 
Yet it occurs later in the non-Gnostic Teaching of Silvanus, part of the Nag Hammadi collection (the 
only non-Gnostic tract in Nag Hammadi). The text is of Alexandrian origin and likely late third 
century. The author writes, ‘Only the hand of the Lord created all these things. For this hand  of the 
Father is Christ, and forms it all. Through it, all has come into being, since it became the mother of 
all. For he is always Son of the Father’. For more on the origin and dating of this tract, see Pierson, 
‘Introduction’, 499-503. For more on the ‘hands’ metaphor in Silvanus, see Steenberg, Irenaeus on 
Creation, 81-84. The Egyptian province of Silvanus, along with its later date may suggest that 
Irenaeus’ ‘hands’ metaphor was quickly and widely distributed. Steenberg observes that this is not 
an entirely unrealistic possibility, given that the Oxyrrhynchus Papyri 3.045, which dates from the 




The proto-Trinitarian implications here are fascinating. But for our purposes the 
salient point to note is the way that Irenaeus insists on a Father-Son-Spirit formula that 
holds all three together in a way that preserves the personal creative activity of the Father.35 
Given Irenaeus’ confrontation with the Gnostics, it is not sufficient to simply assert that the 
Father is the ultimate and indirect agent of creation—as though God were like a king who 
gave commands to have a palace built. Rather, Irenaeus is at pains to insist that the Father 
himself is the Creator of the world, without mediators. Thus the Son and the Spirit do not 
merely work alongside the Father (as second and third independent creating agents), or 
serve as proxies or mediators of the Father’s creative power, working on the Father’s behalf. 
Instead, the Son and the Sprit must in some way be an extension and embodiment of the 
Father’s personal creative will. Thus the ‘two hands’ metaphor works powerfully to convey 
the creative unity that Irenaeus is so keen to preserve, insofar as the hands of an individual 
are organically (even ontologically) unified with that individual. To say that John built a 
cabinet with ‘his own two hands’ is saying (essentially) the same thing as ‘John built the 
cabinet himself’. As Lawson rightly notes, ‘“The Two Hands of God” is much more than a 
corollary of the doctrine of Creation. It is itself the expression of the doctrine of an 
immediately present and active God’.36 
All of this serves to underscore the goodness of creation. God not only approves of 
the material world; he has not only ordained that it comes to pass; he has even further called 
it into being with his own Word, and has arranged it and shaped it by his own Spirit. He has 
himself, with his own two hands, brought life and existence to the material world. The 
overall effect of Irenaeus’ ‘two hands’ metaphor is to highlight his basically pro-material 
cosmology. The Gnostic ‘Father’ will not sully himself with matter. But Irenaeus’ God is 





                                                         
of Irenaeus’ Adversus haereses (cf. Grant, Irenaeus, 6-7). Or it may mean that the ‘hands’ metaphor 
was not unique to Irenaeus, and was a common trope in early Christian writing. Both possibilities are 
intriguing with respect to the wider currency of Irenaeus’ proto-Trinitarianism. 
35 Some scholars have suggested that Irenaeus maintains a ‘Spirit-Christology’—namely that 
he collapses the Holy Spirit and the person of Jesus into each other, resulting in a binitarian view of 
God. Irenaeus’ ‘two hands’ metaphor pushes against this claim. In defense of Irenaeus’ proto-
trinitarianism, see Briggman, ‘Spirit-Christology’.  
36 Lawson, Biblical Theology, 122. For more on the ‘two hands’ motif in Irenaeus, see 
Lawson, Biblical Theology, 199-39, Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 21-24; Steenberg, Irenaeus on 
Creation,  80-84; and Gunton, Triune Creator, 52-56. Throughout his work, Gunton adopts Irenaeus 




III. Creation Ex Nihilo 
 
For Irenaeus, the fact that God created the world out of nothing is as important as the 
fact that God created it. Irenaeus is one of the earliest Christian writers to affirm the doctrine 
of creation ex nihilo.37 Here Irenaeus claims for the Christian tradition a doctrine that was 
still up for grabs among at least some otherwise ‘orthodox’ Christian thinkers. While non-
Gnostic Christianity universally affirmed God as Creator, some early Christian writers seem 
to suggest an eternal creation. Origen is noteworthy here, as is Justin and Athenagoras. 38 
But Irenaeus takes it as axiomatic that God is not only the shaper of the material world, but 
also the originator of the material world. 39 He writes,   
 
The rule of truth which we hold is that there is one God Almighty, who has 
made all things [qui omnia condidit] by his Word, and has fashioned and 
formed, out of that which had so far no existence, all things so that they may 
have existence [et aptavit et fecit ex eo quod non erat ad hoc ut sint omnia]. 
Just as Scripture says: ‘By the Word of the Lord were the heavens 
established, and all the might of them, by the Spirit of his mouth’. And again, 
‘All things were made by him, and without him was nothing made’. There is 
no exception or deduction stated; but the Father made all things by him, 
whether visible or invisible, objects of sense or of intelligence, temporal, on 
account of a certain character given them, or eternal; and these eternal things 
he did not make by angels, or by any powers separated from his thought. For 
God is not in want of all these things [nihil enim indiget omnium Deus], but 
                                                         
37 Theophilus also articulates a doctrine of creation ex nihilo. See his Autol. 2.4, 2.13. So too 
Tatian, Graec. 5. For more on the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in Irenaeus, see Gavrilyuk, ‘Creation 
in Early Christian Polemical Literature’; Fantino, ‘La creation ex nihilo’; O’Neil, ‘How Early is the 
Doctrine of Creation Ex Nihilo?’; and Busher, ‘Joining the End to the Beginning’, 34-73. 
38 See Origen, Princ. 1.4.3. Athenagoras seems to assume the basic Platonic account of 
creation, where the demiurge shapes matter, rather than bringing it into existence. See Leg. 10.2f. 
Scholars are divided about this doctrine in Justin. The relevant passages are 1 Apol. 1.10, 58, where 
Justin speaks of God shaping unformed matter. Notably, Justin does not make a statement one way 
or the other regarding how this unformed matter came to be. Osborne states, ‘If one looks to 
concepts rather than to words…. it is clear that Justin would never have considered the concept of 
unoriginated matter because it contradicted his central belief about God, the sole unoriginate’ 
(Irenaeus, 67).  That Irenaeus so clearly articulates a doctrine of creation ex nihilo where Justin fails 
to do so shows that Irenaeus is willing to push beyond Justin, despite the close association of their 
thought. For a general assessment of this doctrine in early Christian thought, see Gunton, Triune 
Creator, 57-96. For a helpful assessment of this doctrine in Irenaeus see Steenberg, Irenaeus on 
Creation, 38-49, and May, ‘Monotheism and Creation’, 449-50. 
39 Thus Irenaeus’ insistence of creation ex nihilo also served not only to distinguish 
Christianity from Greek thought, such as we find in Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s Physics, but also 





is he who, by his Word and Spirit, makes, and sets up, and governs all things, 
and commands all things into existence [sed et per Verbum et Spiritum suum 
omnia faciens et disponens et gubernans et omnibus esse praestans],—he 
who formed the world, for the world is of all [etenim mundus ex omnibus],—
he who fashioned [plasmavit] humanity,—he [who] is the God of Abraham, 
and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, above whom there is no other 
God, nor initial principle, nor power, nor pleroma; he is the Father of our 




While humans, indeed, cannot make anything out of nothing, but only out of 
matter already existing [quoniam homines quidem de nihilo non possunt 
aliquid facere sed de materia subiacenti], yet God is in this point pre-
eminently superior to humans, that he himself invented the matter of his 
work, since previously it had no existence [eo quod materiam fabricationis 
suae cum ante non esset ipse adinvenit].41 
 
Irenaeus’ doctrine of creation ex nihilo stood in strong contrast to Gnostic thought.42  
For the Gnostics, as we have already seen with the Valentinians, the true Father does not 
willfully create the material world out of nothing, but rather the material world is (even if 
indirectly) ultimately sourced in his own being. The Gnostics’ descending ontological chain 
of being, originating from the Father all the way down the hemorrhage of a wayward Aeon 
(who was herself an emanation ultimately sourced in the Father), requires that the material 
world is ultimately of the same essence as the Father; the account is essentially monistic. 
Thus the demiurge, for his part, does not create matter but only shapes what is already pre-
existent.  None of this, in itself, necessitates the demonization of the demiurge or the 
                                                         
40 Haer. 1.22.1.  
41 Haer. 2.10.4. 
42 The one exception possibly being that of Basilides. ‘God is non-being because he is above 
being, the cosmos pre-existing in the world seed is non-being because it has still to be realized in 
time and space, and the world seed is created out of non-being in the absolute sense, out of nothing’. 
Quoted in Osborne, Irenaeus, 68. Cf. Hippolytus, Haer. 7.22.1.6; 10.14.2. The meaning of the 
passage is unclear. Osborne rightly observes that Basilides’ contention that ‘God is non-being’ 
introduces an element into his thought that makes his expression of creation ex nihilo distinct from 
Irenaeus and Theophilus. What does it mean that creation is out of nothing, when God himself is 
non-being? See Osborne, Irenaeus, 68-69. Notably, Basilides is the one Gnostic sect that neither 




material world. Indeed, in some respects, this is not far off the basic Platonic narrative.43 Yet 
this monistic account creates theodicy problems for the Gnostics. At various points, the 
Gnostics posit that the high God ‘has something subjacent and beyond himself, which they 
style vacuity and shadow [vacuum et umbram]’.44 This vacuity and shadow account for the 
original chaos out of which ignorance has its origin. But if all things are sourced in the 
Father’s own essence, then is not the Father in some way the cause and source of ignorance 
and evil?  
The Gnostics generally attempted to handle this difficulty by positing a vast 
‘geographical’ distance between the true Father and the material world of ignorance. The 
material world, and the demiurge that dwells therein, are pushed to the bottom of the 
ontological ladder. With each step down the ladder, there is a bit of an ‘ontological leak’ 
that accounts for an increasing level of ignorance and chaos. Minns helpfully summarizes 
the effect of all this on Gnostic cosmology, ‘All the distress we suffer is simply part of the 
cosmic rubbish left behind by the primordial near-catastrophe within the divine realm. The 
gnostic knows this, and knows that he or she does not belong to the shadowy world of 
matter and soul, multiplicity and diversity, but to the divine Pleroma of light and spirit…’45 
But as a theodicy goes, this is not entirely successful; 46  Irenaeus seizes the opportunity and 
presses the point: 
 
But whence, let me ask, came this vacuity [vacuitas]? If it was indeed 
produced by him who, according to them, is the Father and Author of all 
things, then it is both equal in honor and related to the rest of the Aeons, 
perchance even more ancient than they are. Moreover, if it proceeded from 
the same source it must be similar in nature to him who produced it, as well 
                                                         
43 The Gnostic scheme (while different) is clearly indebted to the basic philosophical and 
ontological framework found in Plato’s Timaeus. In Timaeus, matter is already pre-existent, and the 
demiurge shapes matter according to the eternal forms which stand above him and are independent 
of him (28b-29d). (In this respect the Gnostic ‘true Father’ stands in for the Platonic ‘forms’.) The 
demiurge creates the gods, who are then told to create humans and beasts, lest humans and beasts, 
created directly by the demiurge, rival the gods (see 41b-d). Thus the Platonic scheme, like the 
Gnostic scheme, assumes some measure of ontological ‘leak’ at each stage of creation. The Gnostics 
lay hold of this basic insight and exploit it, using it to demonize the demiurge and the material world. 
A notable difference, however, between the Timaeus and the Gnostics is that Plato in his Timaeus 
does not suggest a doctrine of emanation that necessitates a strict ontological unity between the 
forms, the demiurge, and the material world. The Platonic tradition, including Neo-Platonism, is 
dualistic, rather than monistic like the Gnostics. 
44 Haer. 2.3.1. 
45 Minns, Irenaeus, 25. 
46 This is, admittedly, a perennial problem for all monist accounts—not just the Gnostics. 
Vast ontological chains of being generally only serve to mask theodicy problems, not resolve them. 
For more on how Gnostic cosmology was driven by theodicy, see Paul Gavrilyuk ‘Creation in Early 




as to those along with whom it was produced [Si autem ab eodem emissum 
est, simile est ei qui emisit, et his cum quibus emissum est]. There will 
therefore be an absolute necessity, both that the Bythus [i.e. Father of all 
things] of whom they speak, along with Sige, be similar in nature to a 
vacuum [vacuo], that is, that he really is a vacuum [vacuum]; and that the rest 
of the Aeons, since they are the brothers of vacuity [vacui], should also be 
devoid of substance [vacuam et substantiam habere]. If, on the other hand, it 
has not been thus produced, it must have sprung from and been generated by 
itself, and in that case it will be equal in point of age to that Bythus who is, 
according to them, the Father of all; and thus vacuity [vacuitas] will be of the 
same nature [eiusdem naturae] and of the same honor with him who is, 
according to them, the universal Father.47 
 
As Irenaeus points out, it is difficult to impugn one aspect of reality without 
simultaneously impugning the Father with whom all things share in essence. But Irenaeus’ 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo avoids the pitfalls of the Gnostics’ monist account. Irenaeus 
does not need to demonize creation or the demiurge in order to articulate a coherent 
theodicy. For Irenaeus, creation is inherently good precisely because it was made by God 
himself. Yet it is made from previously non-existing matter, and thus is ontologically 
differentiated from God.  As such, any defects in the creation need not be ascribed to God’s 
own nature or essence.  
What is more, for Irenaeus, evil is not sourced in ontology, but in the will. At one 
point, the Gnostics critique Irenaeus’ position by arguing that God should not have made 
angels and humans in such a way that they could rebel. This is seen by the Gnostics as 
evidence of weakness on the part of the demiurge, and is proof that the god of the Old 
Testament is not the true Father. Irenaeus responds by saying that if God had made angels 
and humans impeccable by nature, rather than by will, then their goodness would amount to 
nothing. They would in such case be ignorant of goodness and thus not truly possess it. He 
writes,  
 
Thus it would come to pass, that their being good would be of no 
consequence, because they were so by nature [natura] rather than by will 
[voluntate], and are possessors of good spontaneously, but not by choice [sed 
                                                         
47 Haer. 2.4.1. Irenaeus uses the same basic argument in 2.7.2 and 17.1-8. Either the Father 
shares the passion of Sophia (which besmirches the Father), or Sophia is without passion (which 




non secundum electionem]; and for this reason they would not understand 
this fact, that good is a comely thing, nor would they take pleasure in it. For 
how can those who are ignorant of good enjoy it? Or what credit is it to those  
who have not aimed at it? And what crown is it to those who have not 
followed in pursuit of it, like those victorious in the contest? 48  
 
Irenaeus’ doctrine of creation ex nihilo makes it possible for evil to be sourced in 
creaturely will, rather than in God’s own being. Further, the goodness of the material world 
is likewise safeguarded. It is creaturely freedom (not God’s own essence) that has brought 
death into the world; this in turn has distorted the integrity of creation.49 The net effect of all 
of this is that Irenaeus is able simultaneously to maintain the integrity of God’s own 
ontological goodness, while at the same time safe-guarding the original goodness of 
humanity and the material world.  
Along with creating theodicy concerns, the Gnostics’ monism threatened to 
undermine any sense of divine transcendence in Gnostic theology. The Gnostics’ true Father 
cannot achieve transcendence and dignity by ontology, since he ultimately shares his 
essence with all things. Indeed, in some Gnostic accounts, enlightened humans are of the 
same untainted substance as the Father, in so far as they owe their origin to him.50 Again, 
the Gnostics must deploy geography in the place of ontology. For the Gnostics, the 
‘unknowable’ and transcendent Father is unknown and transcendent only because he is so 
far away, not because he is wholly other. In order to make the Gnostic Father worthy of 
worship and adoration, he must be pushed far above and away from the world of materiality. 
Again, this monistic account need not have resulted in a negative view of the material world. 
But the vast distance between the Father and the world served to emphasize and heighten the 
negative cosmology of the Gnostic system. The further one moved away from the world of 
materiality, the closer one drew to God. The implied critique of the material world is 
evident.  
But Irenaeus’ doctrine of creation ex nihilo establishes the transcendence of God by 
highlighting the ontological inequality that exists between Creator and creature. The Creator 
and creature are wholly other—the latter completely dependent on the former for both form 
and being. This ontological gap between Creator and creature allows Irenaeus’ God to draw 
near to his creation without confusion of being, or compromising his transcendence. And 
indeed God does draw near to his creation via the Word and the Spirit. This geographic 
                                                         
48 Haer. 4.37.6. 
49 Epid. 17. 




nearness in turn creates space for a more generous account of the material world; God, while 
remaining completely other, dwells close to the world he has made and lovingly cares for it.  
We might summarize it thus: for both Irenaeus and the Gnostics, God is the ultimate 
source of the material world; but only Irenaeus’ God will admit to it.  
 
 
IV. The Material World Is Given as a Gift to Humanity 
 
Irenaeus’ positive cosmology is evident in the way he frames his account of the 
material world as a gift to humanity. For Irenaeus, humanity is the highpoint of creation, the 
apex of God’s creative artistry—even over and above that of the angels; humanity uniquely 
alone bears the image and likeness of God (for more on Irenaeus’ anthropology see the 
following chapter). As such, Irenaeus emphasizes the human ‘dominion’ aspect of the 
Genesis account,51 and assigns the material world to humanity’s lordship. In the opening 
chapters of Epideixis (a key passage to which we will return numerous times) he writes,  
 
But the man52 he formed [pla,ssw] with his own hands, taking from the earth 
that which was purest and finest [lepto,j],53 and mingling in a measure of his 
own power [du,namij] with the earth. For he traced [periti,qhmi] his own form 
[pla,sma] on the formation, 54 that that which should be seen should be of 
divine form [qeoeidh,j]: 55 for the image of God was the man formed and set 
on the earth. And that he might become living, he breathed on his face the 
breath of life; that both for the breath and for the formation the man should 
be like unto God.56 Moreover he was free [evleu,qeroj] and self-controlled 
[auvtexou,sioj], being made by God for this end, that he might rule all those 
things that were upon the earth.57 And this great created world, prepared by 
                                                         
51 Genesis 1:26-28. 
52 Here the reference is to Adam, the first human, rather than humanity generically. Cf. Gen 
2:7. Eve is not introduced until Epid. 13. The Greek glosses here and throughout are drawn from SC, 
vol. 406.  
53 McKenzie notes the explicit connection made elsewhere by Irenaeus between Adam’s 
creation out of ‘virgin’ soil and Christ’s virgin birth (Haer. 3.18.7, 3.21.10) thus heightening the 
divine and Christological identity of Adam. See MacKenzie, Demonstration, 101-02.  
54 Robinson notes that the Armenian text here is equivalent to the Latin plasma or plasmatio.  
55 Smith glosses the Armenian here as ‘godlike’.  
56 McKenzie appropriately comments, ‘The opening phrase of this Section 11 is forceful in 
setting out that which is peculiar to man by way of contrast with all that has gone before as 
background’. McKenzie, Irenaeus’s Demonstration, 101.  




God before the formation of man, was given to the man as his place 
[cwri,on], with all things whatsoever in it.58 
 
With the above passage we have reached the climax of Irenaeus’ creation narrative 
in Epideixis. Adam is formed from the purest and finest material of the earth, with a mixture 
of God’s own divine power mingled in. The man is then given lordship over the ‘great 
created world’ which has been ‘given to the man as his place’. Irenaeus will go on to note 
that the Devil’s envy of humanity is ignited because of ‘the great gifts of God which he had 
given to humanity’.59 Irenaeus does not specify the nature of these ‘great gifts’ but certainly 
lordship of the world looms large in Irenaeus’ narrative as an obvious gift that God has 
given to humanity.  
Here we see the native connection between Irenaeus’ cosmology and anthropology. 
For Irenaeus, anthropology and cosmology rise and fall together. The goodness of the world 
is seen clearly in the fact that the world has been given to God’s highest creature—
humanity. And the goodness of humanity is seen clearly in the fact that humanity has been 
given the bounty of the good material world. (The Gnostics, of course, use parallel logic to 
disparage both humanity and the material world). The principle point here will be 
strengthened when seen in light of Irenaeus’ ‘high anthropology’, considered in the 
following chapter.  
 
 
V. Pro-Material Eschatology 
 
Irenaeus’ commitment to the goodness of the material world can be seen clearly in 
his pro-material eschatology.60 Irenaeus closely follows the ordering of the eschatological 
                                                         
58 Epid. 11. See Robinson who notes a parallel in Papias, ANF, vol. 1, 52, no.45. With 
respect to the last phrase, ‘with all things whatsoever in it’, I follow Smith’s translation pace 
Robinson. Robinson offers the primary translation of, ‘containing all things within itself’, yet 
recognizes the awkwardness of the rendering; see his no. 44 on the passage. ‘So both the German 
translations; but they transfer the words so as to link them with “this great created world.” What we 
seem to want is, “to have all as his own,” if the words can bear that meaning’. Smith’s primary 
translation ‘with all things whatsoever in it’ and Robinson’s alternate rendering of ‘to have all as his 
own’ are both more intelligible to the context.  Rousseau’s retrograde Latin version reads, ‘habens in 
se omnia’. Regardless the translation, the larger point is clear: the man is given the world as his 
place. 
59 Epid. 16. 
60 For a helpful summary of the main lines of Irenaeus’ eschatology, see Wood, 
‘Eschatology of Irenaeus’. Wood’s focus is on the question of hell and universalism, which is only 




events found in Revelation 20-21.61 For Irenaeus, the defeat of the Anti-Christ ushers in the 
resurrection of the righteous, which is the definitive event that marks the dawn of the new 
age.62 The righteous are raised to co-reign with Christ in a renewed earth for one thousand 
years.63 Then follows the second resurrection and the Great White Throne judgment of 
Revelation 20,64 which is itself followed by the passing away of the ‘fashion of this world’65 
and the ushering in of the new heavens and a new earth of Revelation 21:1-7.66 The eternal 
state then commences, in which the people of God dwell with God in heaven, paradise, or 
the New Jerusalem (each according to their just desserts). Irenaeus offers only the briefest of 
speculations about the eternal state; redeemed humanity will contain and be contained by the 
Word, ‘passing beyond the angels’, and made after the image and likeness of God.67  
Two aspects of this eschatological narrative are especially relevant to his broader 
pro-cosmological outlook: Irenaeus’ chiliastic eschatology68 and his affirmation of an 
eternal ‘new heavens and new earth’ (following Revelation 21:1-7). We begin with 
Irenaeus’ chiliastic eschatology.  
 
A. Irenaeus’ Chiliastic Eschatology 
 
The bulk of Irenaeus’ eschatological thought is found in the last five chapters of 
book five of Adversus haereses.69 In these five dense chapters Irenaeus unpacks his vision 
for the redemption and consummation of the material world. As noted above, Irenaeus 
closely follows the timeline of Revelation 20-21. As such Irenaeus works within the 
                                                         
61 The only significant departure that Irenaeus makes from Rev 20-21 is that he does not 
mention the release of Satan and the subsequent rebellion of the wicked and the great white throne 
(Rev 20:7-15); instead he skips past this to John’s vision of the new heavens and the new earth.     
62 Haer. 5.35.1.  
63 See the whole of Haer. 5.32-35. 
64 Haer. 5.35.2.  
65 Haer. 5.35.2. 
66 Haer. 5.35-36. See also Epid. 61. 
67 Haer. 5.36.3. 
68 ‘Chiliasm’, from the Greek cilia,j, for ‘thousand’. Also referred to as ‘millenarianism’, 
the belief—drawn from a literal reading of Rev 20:1-10—in a thousand year reign of Christ at the 
end of the world before the final judgment, in which the righteous dead are raised to co-reign with 
Christ.   
69 These chapters do not appear in all Latin manuscripts. This need not be grounds to deny 
their authenticity, and is perhaps more easily explained by the fact that the medieval tradition viewed 
chiliastic thought as heretical, and would have been inclined to purge Irenaeus’ writing of such 
ideas. Quotations from these chapters have been collected by Harvey from Syriac and Armenian 
manuscripts (see Coxe, ANF, vol. 1, 561, no. 1), suggesting their authenticity. In support of the 





chiliastic framework of early Christian thought.70 This thousand year span is referred to 
variously as ‘the times of the kingdom’ or more simply ‘the kingdom’.71 Throughout the 
chapters Irenaeus clarifies—in strong contrast to Gnostic teaching—that just as God will 
raise believers bodily from the dead, so too will he bring the material world to life again. He 
begins these five chapters by summarizing his vision of the kingdom: 
 
Inasmuch, therefore, as the opinions of certain [persons] are derived from 
heretical discourses, they are both ignorant of God's dispensations, and of the 
mystery of the resurrection of the just, and of the kingdom which is the 
commencement [principium] of incorruption, by means of which kingdom 
those who shall be worthy are accustomed gradually to partake of God 
[capere Deum]; and it is necessary to tell them respecting those things, that it 
becomes the righteous first to receive the promise of the inheritance which 
                                                         
70 Irenaeus is not without precedent in his view that there will be a literal thousand year reign 
of Christ upon a renewed earth. Justin affirmed a literal thousand year millennium (while 
acknowledging that some Christians reject it). See Dial. 80.  So also Papias, Frag. 3.11-13, 5.1-4. 
Eusebius states that it was due to Papias that ‘many church writers after him held the same opinion, 
relying on his early date: Irenaeus, for example, and any others who adopted the same views’. See 
Hist. eccl. 3.39.11-13. See also Crutchfield, ‘The Apostle John and Asia Minor’ for a detailed look at 
early Christian writers/leaders who held this view.  
71 There is debate about the extent to which Irenaeus maintained a literal thousand year 
reign. A number of recent interpreters of Irenaeus have attempted to distance Irenaeus from 
traditional chiliastic thought by arguing that Irenaeus makes no mention of a literal thousand years in 
Haer. 5.32-36 (or elsewhere). See Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 190-92; Steenberg, Irenaeus on 
Creation, 52-53. For the definitive treatment on this perspective, see Smith, ‘Chiliasm and 
Recapitulation in the Theology of Irenaeus’, 313-20. This claim is only narrowly accurate. While 
Irenaeus does not use the term ‘millennium’ or ‘thousand’ in the Latin text of these chapters, he is 
clearly working within the constraints of the events and timeline found in Revelation 20-21. For 
Irenaeus the ‘kingdom’ has a beginning and an end, and is marked on both sides by the first and 
second resurrections (Rev 20:4 and 20:12, respectively). Thus Irenaeus’ many references to the 
‘kingdom’ throughout Haer. 5.32-36 are most naturally understood as a reference to the millennial 
kingdom of Rev 20:1-10. (Even Wingren notes this point, stating that ‘the regnum is not described as 
being of a thousand years’ duration, but in fact corresponds to the millennium of the Book of 
Revelation’, Man and Incarnation, 191). Further, it is clear that Irenaeus believes himself to be 
faithfully transmitting the chiliasm of Papias, who clearly maintained a literal thousand years (see 
Haer. 5.33.4). Likewise, Eusebius believes Irenaeus to be transmitting Papias, see Hist. eccl. 
3.39.13. Even more convincingly, Minns (as recently as 2010) has shown that the 1910 Armenian 
text of Adversus haereses, does indeed include an explicit reference to the ‘thousand’ years of Rev 
20:1-10. The relevant passage occurs in the last paragraph of the last chapter of the last book of the 
Armenian Adversus haereses, where we find a reference to ‘the seventh thousand years of the 
kingdom of the just’, after which kingdom follows the new heavens and the new earth. See Minns, 
Irenaeus, 143-44. This corresponds to Irenaeus’ view of the ‘kingdom’ as a Sabbath rest, the final 
seventh age where God’s people are rewarded. See Haer. 5.33.2, ‘These [earthly rewards are 
granted] in the times of the kingdom, that is, upon the seventh day’. In any case, whether the 
kingdom is for Irenaeus a literal thousand years, or more abstractly an extended age of time, is a 
question largely tangential to my primary concern, namely that Irenaeus conceives of a future earthly 
kingdom of limited duration preceding the general resurrection of the dead and the eternal age when 




God promised to the fathers, and to reign in it, when they rise again to behold 
God in this creation which is renovated [in conditione hac quae renovatur], 
and that the judgment should take place afterwards. For it is just that in that 
very creation in which they toiled [in qua enim conditione laboraverunt] or 
were afflicted, being proved in every way by suffering, they should receive 
the reward of their suffering; and that in the creation in which they were slain 
[et in qua conditione interfecti sunt] because of their love to God, in that they 
should be revived again; and that in the creation in which they endured 
servitude [et in qua conditione servitutem sustinuerunt], in that they should 
reign. For God is rich in all things, and all things are his. It is fitting, therefore, 
that the creation itself [oportet ergo et ipsam conditionem], being restored to 
its primeval condition [redintegratam ad pristinum], should without restraint 
be under the dominion of the righteous [sine prohibitione servire iustis]; and 
the apostle has made this plain in the Epistle to the Romans, when he thus 
speaks: ‘For the expectation of the creation [creaturae] waits for the 
manifestation of the children of God. For the creation [creaturae] has been 
subjected to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the 
same in hope; since the creation [creaturae] itself shall also be delivered from 
the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God’.72 
 
Three important themes emerge from this passage. First, Irenaeus envisions a 
renewal of the earth during the time of the kingdom. According to Irenaeus, God will 
‘renovate’ creation to ‘its primeval condition’, returning it to its Edenic state. Irenaeus will 
go on to clarify that this ‘primeval condition’ includes the restoration of the animal world, 
and its harmonious subjection to humanity’s benevolent lordship.73 Likewise, days will 
come ‘in which vines shall grow, each having ten thousand branches, and in each branch ten 
thousand twigs, and in each true twig ten thousand shoots, and in each one of the shoots ten 
thousand clusters, and on every one of the clusters ten thousand grapes, and every grape 
when pressed will give five and twenty metretes of wine’.74 Thus for Irenaeus, the 
‘kingdom’ is not merely an earthly kingdom in which the righteous co-reign with Christ, but 
even more an entire (indeed miraculous) restoration of the natural world back into the 
condition that God intended all along.  
                                                         
72 Haer. 5.32.1. The remaining chapters (up until 5.35.2., where he begins to discuss the new 
heavens and earth) are an extended development and apologetic for the claims he has made here.   
73 Haer. 5.33.4. Irenaeus arrives at this conclusion through a literal reading of Isaiah 11:6-9 
and 65:25.   




This raises the interesting question about the extent to which Irenaeus viewed the 
material world as ‘fallen’ in some way. In Epid. 17 Irenaeus notes the curse of the ground 
from Genesis 3:17, writing ‘For under the beams of this sun man tilled the earth, and it put 
forth thorns and thistles, the punishment of sin’. Yet he does not press this idea throughout 
his writings, no doubt in part because of his anti-Gnostic context. Denigrating the material 
world would have played too much into the Gnostic’s hands. But in Haer. 5.32.1, Irenaeus 
does seem to imply that Adam’s failure in the garden prevented the material world from 
becoming all that God had intended it to be. It is only after the perfection of humanity and 
the overthrow of the Devil that creation is able to flourish. Irenaeus’ perspective on 
patience, growth and gradual maturity seems to be at work here. Just as Adam was perfect 
yet infantile, so too Adam’s world was perfect yet infantile. The maturing trajectory of both 
was forestalled by sin. In redemption, both are together brought to full maturity in the 
millennial kingdom. 
Throughout these last five books of Adversus haereses Irenaeus shows a tenacious 
refusal to adopt an allegorical interpretation of the biblical texts that speak of a renewed 
earth and an earthly kingdom. Irenaeus is aware that other Christian writers have adopted 
allegorical approaches to the prophetic visions of a renewed earth, but he views such 
interpretations as inadequate.75 Those who do not leave room for a literal renewed earth are 
‘ignorant of God’s dispensations’ and have derived their opinions from ‘heretical 
discourses’. No doubt the heretical discourse Irenaeus has in mind here is the Gnostic 
variety, which maintained the ultimate destruction of the material world (including human 
bodies) in a cosmic conflagration.76  But he also has in mind other Christian writers who—
                                                         
75 Haer. 5.33.4. Minns appropriately remarks, ‘So much of Irenaeus’ fight had been in 
favour of the positive value of the material creation, and especially of the human body, that he could 
not countenance so spiritualizing an interpretation’. Minns, Irenaeus, 142. Though see also Epid. 61, 
where Irenaeus is understood by some scholars to have changed his mind in favor of the allegorical 
interpretation of these passages. So Smith, Proof, 196, no. 270. But Epid. 61 need not be read in this 
way. Rather Irenaeus seems to be affirming both interpretations. He begins Epid. 61 by stating that 
‘the elders say that it really will be even so at the coming of Christ’. The key interpretive phrase then 
follows: ‘Indeed, even now this symbolically signifies the gathering together in peaceful concord 
people of dissimilar races and dissimilar customs through the name of Christ’. (The Latin retrograde 
reads, ‘Iam enim symbolice significat dissimilis generis et[dis]similium morum hominum per nomen 
Christi congregationem concordem in pace’.) If Irenaeus intends the reader to understand that he is 
rejecting the elder tradition, he is too subtle. The passage is more naturally read as a development 
and further application of the elder tradition. For Irenaeus, it need not be ‘either or’. The future 
literal concord of the animals is symbolically portrayed by the human concord that has already been 
achieved by the work of Christ in the present.   
76 On this point Irenaeus complained that according to Gnostic thought, there would be 
nothing left of humans to enter the pleroma. See Haer. 2.29.3. This vision also set Irenaeus apart 
from much of the later Christian tradition. Eusebius, for instance, rejects Irenaeus’ chiliasm by 
saying that Irenaeus received it from Papias, who according to Eusebius, was ‘a man of very limited 
intelligence’, see Hist. eccl. 3.39.13. The general movement of Christian theology in Platonic 




perhaps nervous about such ‘crass’ interpretations—have adopted allegorical approaches. 
He writes,  
 
If, however, any shall endeavor to allegorize [allegorizare] these [passages], 
they shall not be found consistent with themselves at all points, and shall be 
confuted by the teaching of the very expressions… For all these and other 
words were unquestionably spoken in reference to the resurrection of the just, 
which takes place after the coming of Antichrist, and the destruction of all 
nations under his rule; in [the times of] which [resurrection] the righteous 
shall reign in the earth, waxing stronger by the sight of the Lord.77 
 
Irenaeus’ commitment to a literal reading of the biblical prophecies can be seen 
throughout Haer. 5.32-36. With repeated force, Irenaeus links together the scriptural 
promises of earthly reward with the ‘times of the kingdom’.  Notably, Irenaeus views the 
restoration of the material world as a fulfillment of God’s promise to Abraham in Genesis 
12-15 regarding his seed inheriting the land of Canaan. Insofar as Abraham’s seed had not 
yet inherited the land, we are to understand this promise as literally fulfilled in the church at 
the end of the age, when the Antichrist has been defeated and the world restored.78 Likewise 
Isaac’s prophecy concerning Jacob and his seed (Genesis 27: 27-29), Isaiah’s vision of a 
pacified animal kingdom (Isaiah 65:25), 79 Jeremiah’s prophecy about God’s people 
inheriting the land (Jeremiah 23:7-8), Ezekiel’s vision of God’s people dwelling securely 
with houses and vineyards (Ezekiel 28:25-26), Daniel’s promise that the whole kingdom 
under heaven should be given to God’s people (Daniel 7:27), Jesus’ promise that the meek 
shall inherit the earth (Matthew 5:5), Jesus’ promise to drink again from the cup of the vine 
in the age to come (Matthew 26:27), and the apostle Paul’s vision of creation being set free 
into the glory of the children of God (Romans 8:19-22)—all of these are linked to the 
‘kingdom’ rather than symbolically portraying the eternal age. ‘Now all these things being 
such as they are, cannot be understood in reference to super-celestial matters’.80 
                                                         
doubt responsible for much of the demise of early chiliasm. For more here, see Minns, Irenaeus, 
140-42. 
77 Haer. 5.35.1. 
78 Haer. 5.32.2. See also the same in Epid. 91-95. 
79 Throughout this section of Adversus haereses Irenaeus leans most heavily upon Isaiah’s 
prophetic vision of earthly salvation. The references to Isaiah are many throughout these four 
chapters of Adversus haereses (e.g. Isaiah 6:11, 11:6-9, 26:19, 30:35-26, 31:9, 56:17-25, 58:14, etc.).  




Second, Irenaeus’ recapitulation theme is at work here.81 For Irenaeus, it is iustos 
and necessary that the same creation in which humanity suffered should be the same 
creation in which humanity is restored. And likewise, it is just and proper that creation itself, 
insofar as it is the reward of the righteous, should be renewed before it is returned to 
humanity. Such recompense is the vindication of God’s people and God’s plan. Later in 
Haer. 5.34.2 (quoting Isaiah 30:35-2682), Irenaeus remarks, ‘Now the “pain of his stroke” is 
that inflicted at the beginning upon disobedient humanity in Adam, that is, death; which 
stroke the Lord will heal when he raises us from the dead and restores the inheritance of the 
fathers’.83 As we have already seen, for Irenaeus the ‘inheritance of the fathers’ is the 
promise to Abraham that the church would inherit the land and rule the nations. Thus the 
pain of God’s ‘stroke’ brought not only death, but the loss of humanity’s intended 
inheritance (i.e. possession of the earth). As such, the healing of the stroke brings not only 
life, but a restoration of humanity’s earthly inheritance. What humanity lost in Adam, God 
has given back to humanity in Christ.  
Thus recapitulation is not merely an interpretive lens through which Irenaeus 
exegetes the relevant biblical passages.84 For Irenaeus, the eschatological recapitulation of 
creation is the great and necessary telos of God’s redemptive activity that has been ever at 
work since the fall of humanity in Adam.85 Irenaeus’ eschatological interpretation is 
                                                         
81 Irenaeus’ recapitulation theme is a well-tread aspect of Irenaeus scholarship. Much of the 
discussion centers around its overall place and import in Irenaeus’ thought, as well as its origin; is it 
the unhelpful product of Hellnistic thought (Harnack and other earlier interpreters), or a deeply 
biblical and important theme (Wingren, Lawson, and other more recent interpreters). The 
conversation merits discussion, but need not detain us. It is enough to observe, that here and 
throughout, Irenaeus views the redemption secured in Christ as a ‘summing up’ and eschatological 
fulfilment of God’s original intent for creation. For more on the theme of recapitulation in Irenaeus, 
see Holsinger-Friesen, Irenaeus and Genesis, 1-41, where he helpfully details the history of 
interpretation of Irenaeus on this theme, from Harnack to the present; also Osborn, who identifies 
eleven ideas contained within Irenaeus’ use of the term—unification, repetition, perfection, 
inauguration and consummation, totality, triumph of Christus Victor, ontology, epistemology and 
ethics. See his Irenaeus, 97-98, and all of Chapters Five and Six. An effective summary of 
recapitulation and its function in Irenaeus can be found in Minns, Irenaeus, 108-110. 
82 ‘And there shall be upon every high mountain, and upon every prominent hill, water 
running everywhere in that day, when many shall perish, when walls shall fall. And the light of the 
moon shall be as the light of the sun, seven times that of the day, when he shall heal the anguish of 
his people and do away with the pain of his stroke’. 
83 Haer. 5.34.2. 
84 Smith ably makes this point in his ‘Chiliasm and Recapitulation’.  
85 This is a point that was obscured in much nineteenth and early twentieth century Irenaeus 
scholarship, but has more recently been acknowledged and expounded by contemporary Irenaeus 
scholars. See Smith, ‘Chiliasm and Recapitulation’, 313-15. Smith highlights the trend in Irenaeus 
scholarship to dismiss or downplays this aspect of Irenaeus’ thought. It is variously ‘ignored’, treated 
as an ‘unfortunate mistake’, an ‘over-reaction’ to Gnosticism, or a ‘regrettable but inevitable 
consequence of [Irenaeus] insisting too strongly in the idea of recapitulation’. Smith argues 
persuasively and correctly that such approaches to Irenaeus’ chiliasm fail to do justice to the import 




soteriological to the core, and integral to his overall project. To remove or minimize this 
aspect of his thought is to do violence to his overall cosmological and soteriological 
framework. The restoration of the material world is the necessary means by which God 
makes good on his promises of ‘reward’, and thus serves as a climactic moment in Irenaeus’ 
broader soteriological narrative.  
And finally, for Irenaeus there is strong continuity between the ‘times of the 
kingdom’ and the eternal age to come. For Irenaeus, the restoration of creation that takes 
place in the ‘times of the kingdom’ marks the ‘commencement of incorruption’; it is the 
dawn of the eternal age (which as we will see, is also an earthly age). It is in the ‘times of 
the kingdom’ that the redeemed of God ‘become accustomed to partake in the glory of God 
the Father, and shall enjoy in the kingdom intercourse and communion with the holy angels 
and union with spiritual beings, and those whom the Lord shall find in the flesh awaiting 
him from heaven’.86 This partaking of God is learned ‘gradually’ and over time.87 Notably 
Irenaeus does not mention the rebellion and defeat of Satan contained at the end of the 
chiliastic vision found in Revelation 12:7-10.88 Instead he moves from his chiliastic vision 
immediately to the Great White Throne judgment of Revelation 12:11-15, which marks the 
dawn of the eternal age. It is impossible to know if this omission is intentional, or merely an 
oversight. In any case, by leaving out this cosmic conflict, Irenaeus conveys a smoother 
continuity between ‘the times of the kingdom’ and the ‘new heavens and the new earth’.89 
This strong continuity can likewise be seen in the way Irenaeus applies Isaiah’s prophetic 
eschatological vision to both the ‘times of the kingdom’ (with its vision of harmonious 
animal relations) and the ‘times after the kingdom’ (with its vision of a new heavens and a 
new earth).90 
                                                         
49-60; Osborne, Irenaeus, 138-40; Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 181-92; Lawson, Biblical 
Theology, 279-91; and most especially Minns, Irenaeus, 141-47.  
86 Haer. 5.35.1. 
87 This is consistent with Irenaeus’ emphasis on growth as a key component of being made 
into the likeness and image of God. See Haer. 4.11.1-2, 4.38.1-3, and 5.36.3. 
88 In Revelation 20:7-10, Satan is released from the abyss and marshals the wicked to his 
side. Fire comes from heaven and consumes the wicked and Satan is thrown into the lake of fire.  
89 The continuity between these two ages is so strong in Irenaeus that some scholars have 
suggested that Irenaeus completely conflates the two into a single epoch, thus denying his chiliasm 
altogether. Smith’s work has been most influential here (see Smith, ‘Chiliasm and Recapitulation’). 
Yet however much Irenaeus posits continuity between the ‘times of the kingdom’ and the ‘new 
heavens and new earth’, he is indeed careful to distinguish the two. See in particular his comments in 
Haer. 5.35.2, where he states, ‘But in the times of the kingdom’, and then a few sentences later, ‘For 
after the times of the kingdom’—with the former a clear reference to the millennium and the latter a 
clear reference to the new heavens and new earth.  
90 Notably, however, Irenaeus is careful to apply Isaiah 11 (which makes no mention of a 
new heavens and earth, but does include a reference to a pacified animal kingdom) to the ‘times of 
the kingdom’ (Haer. 5.33.4), while applying Isaiah 65 (where there is a reference to the new heavens 





Thus Irenaeus’ vision of a renewed creation in the millennium marks the 
inauguration of a progression toward a cosmic perfection that is naturally and (almost) 
seamlessly brought to completion in the new heaven and the new earth of Revelation 21. For 
Irenaeus, the resurrection of the just and the renewal of their creation is the climax of his 
soteriological story; to limit this renewal to a thousand years would undercut the full 
redemptive scope of God’s salvific activity. (More on this in the following section). 
Ultimately, Irenaeus’ chiliasm is entirely consistent with his broader soteriological 
narrative and should not be viewed as a mere appendage. For Irenaeus, the material world is 
itself the reward that God gives to the righteous, for the material world was intended as their 
possession all along. Were God to fail in restoring creation, or fail to restore it to his people, 
he would fail in redeeming his people. Further, it is in the kingdom that God’s people learn 
to live with him and are nurtured into the fullness of the image and likeness of God. All of 
this serves to highlight the innate connection between Irenaeus’ anthropology and 
cosmology, and necessarily underscores the goodness of creation. Creation is the place in 
which humanity comes to know and learn that God is good. As such, creation itself is 
destined for renewal and redemption every bit as much as humanity.  
 
 
B. An Eternal New Heaven and an Eternal New Earth 
 
Our understanding of Irenaeus’ pro-material cosmological framework is likewise 
informed by his eschatological vision of an eternal new heaven and earth. In the final two 
chapters of Adversus haereses, Irenaeus turns his attention away from the millennial 
kingdom of Revelation 20:1-11, and begins to speak about the eternal state. In doing so he 
explicitly draws upon the ‘new heavens and new earth’ language of Revelation 21 (and 
Isaiah 65:17-18). He writes,  
 
For after the times of the kingdom [Post enim regni tempora], [John] says, ‘I 
saw a great white throne, and him who sat upon it, from whose face the earth 
fled away, and the heavens; and there was no place for them’. And he sets 
forth too, the things connected with the general resurrection and the judgment, 
mentioning the ‘dead, great and small’….And after this, he says, ‘I saw a new 
heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed 
away’… and Isaiah also declares the very same: ‘For there shall be a new 




neither shall the heart think about them, but they shall find in it joy and 
exultation’.91  
 
Here we see the full expression of Irenaeus’ confidence in God’s cosmic redemption. 
The earth and heavens will indeed pass away92 (as the Gnostic and Stoics declare), but they 
will pass away only to be replaced by an eternally fixed new heaven and an eternal new 
earth.93 The holy city, the New Jerusalem, which is the anti-type of the old earthly city94, 
will descend from above and ‘then all things will be made new, and [the righteous] will 
truly dwell in the city of God’.  
This vision is in keeping with Irenaeus’ larger cosmological outlook. He cannot cede 
the Bible’s vision a of new heaven and earth without undermining the integrity of the 
argument that he has made throughout the whole of Adversus haereses. This is perhaps even 
more fundamentally true with respect to the eternal state than his chiliasm. Creation is good 
because it has been made directly by God; and God is good because he has made such a 
great and good creation. To end his soteriological narrative with a super-celestial vision that 
does away with the cosmos would call into question the very integrity of God and his 
faithful commitment to humanity. In the final chapter of Adversus haereses, Irenaeus again 
connects anthropology and cosmology, insisting that the ‘loyalty’ of God is contingent upon 
the ‘real establishment’ of creation. He writes,  
 
For since there are real [veri] humans, so must there also be a real 
establishment [veram plantationem], that they not vanish away among non-
existent things, but progress among those which have an actual existence. For 
neither is the substance nor the essence of the creation annihilated [Non enim 
substantia neque materia conditionis exterminatur], for true [verus] and 
steadfast [firmus] is he who has established it. But ‘the fashion [figura] of the 
world passes away;’ that is, those things among which transgression has 
occurred, since humanity has grown old in them [quoniam veteratus est homo 
in ipsis]. And therefore this fashion has been formed temporary [temporalis], 
God foreknowing all things; as I have pointed out in the preceding book, and 
have also shown, as far as was possible, the cause of the creation of this world 
                                                         
91 Haer. 5.35.2. 
92 Here Irenaeus references Paul’s comment in 1 Corinthians 7:31, ‘The fashion of this world 
passes away’, and Christ’s words in Matthew 26:35, ‘Heaven and earth shall pass away’.  
93 See Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology, 80-85, who notes Irenaeus’ unique emphasis in 
the Eastern Orthodox tradition regarding the salvation of the material world.  




of temporal things. But when this fashion passes away, and humanity has been 
renewed [renovato], and flourishes in an incorruptible state, so as to preclude 
the possibility of becoming old ever again [ut non possit iam veterescere] 
there shall be the new heaven and the new earth, in which the new humanity 
shall be remaining [in quibus novus perseverabit hom], always holding fresh 
converse with God. And since these things shall ever continue without end [Et 
quoniam haec semper perseverabunt sine fine], Isaiah declares, ‘For as the 
new heavens and the new earth which I do make, continue in my sight, says 
the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain’.95  
 
For Irenaeus, ‘real’ humans require a ‘real’ creation, so that they do not vanish away. 
Here Irenaeus takes it as axiomatic that human beings are by nature tangible, embodied 
creatures. As such, humans will always require a material creation in which to live.  Were 
God not to provide humans with a material creation, this would prove their undoing, and he 
would prove himself less than ‘true’ and ‘loyal’ to his children. Irenaeus’ eschatological 
vision here eclipses even that of the renewed earth of the preceding chapters. The chiliastic 
kingdom is indeed a renovation of creation, but this final stage of cosmic salvation 
represents the ultimate perfection of God’s creative and redemptive work. No longer will 
humanity be able to ‘grow old’ but will continue eternally ever young, ‘holding fresh 
converse with God’ in the new creation that ‘shall continue without end’. 
Notably Irenaeus goes on in the next two paragraphs to argue for a three-tiered 
eschatological reward system that seems to suggest a preference for a celestial (rather than 
terrestrial) redemption. He writes, ‘And as the presbyters say, then those who are deemed 
worthy of an abode in heaven shall go there, others shall enjoy the delights of paradise, and 
others shall possess the splendor of the city; for everywhere the Savior shall be seen 
according as they who see him shall be worthy’.96 Irenaeus ascribes this system to the 
‘presbyters’, who ‘affirm that this is the gradation and arrangement of those who are saved, 
and that they advance through steps of this nature’.97 In many respects this move seems 
surprising and runs somewhat counter to his strong terrestrial eschatology; it is, one might 
have thought, too perilously close to the Gnostic three fold division of humans as ‘spiritual’, 
‘ensouled’ and ‘fleshly’—each of whom have different experiences in the afterlife.98 Yet 
                                                         
95 Haer. 5.36.1.  
96 Haer. 5.36.1. 
97 Haer. 5.36.2. 
98 See Haer. 1.6-7, where the ‘spiritual’ enter into the pleroma, the ‘ensouled’ dwell halfway 





Irenaeus is consistent in his dependence on the traditions that have been handed to him; the 
‘presbyters’ gave him his chiliasm and his vision for a new heaven and earth; he adopts their 
three-tiered reward system as well. Perhaps Irenaeus senses the ill-fit of this system; he does 
not spend much time discussing the three-tiered system, and even seems to suggest a certain 
fluidity between these three realms, with the saints moving back and forth throughout 
eternity. In any case, he immediately returns to the theme of cosmic and terrestrial renewal, 
which is how he finishes his book.  
In the final chapter of book five, Irenaeus sums up the preceding chapters by again 
stressing the non-allegorical nature of the Scripture’s promise for terrestrial redemption and 
God’s people inheriting an earthly kingdom. Here again he blurs the lines between his 
chiliasm and the eternal state, with the former passing naturally and seamlessly into the 
latter without an earth shattering apocalypse. He ends his work with a moving vision of 
cosmic and terrestrial redemption.   
 
And in all these things, and by them all, the same God the Father is 
manifested, who fashioned humanity, and gave promise of the inheritance of 
the earth to the fathers [et hereditatem terrae promisit patribus], who brought 
it forth at the resurrection of the just, and fulfills the promises for the kingdom 
of his Son [et promissiones adimplet in Filii sui regnum]; subsequently 
bestowing in a paternal manner those things which neither the eye has seen, 





Irenaeus’ pro-material cosmology is consistent throughout his work. He never 
vacillates about the goodness of creation, and his insistence on the inherent integrity of 
creation provides a clear coherence to his system. For Irenaeus, the creation is inherently 
good because it has been given by a good God to a good humanity. More aspects of 
Irenaeus’ cosmology could be marshalled in defense of this assertion,100 but the salient point 
                                                         
99 Haer. 5.36.3. 
100 One might also note here the fascinating way that Irenaeus connects the Eucharistic meal 
with the goodness of creation. He writes, ‘But our opinion [regarding the goodness of creation] is in 
accordance with the Eucharist, and the Eucharist in turn establishes our opinion’ (Haer. 4.18.5; see 
all of 4.16.5-18.6; also 5.2.2). For more on the connection between the Eucharist and Irenaeus’ 




has been made. All of this provides an important context for understanding Irenaeus’ Devil 
narrative. For Irenaeus, creation is not merely a temporary backdrop for an otherwise 
celestial narrative. Indeed, creation itself (the earth most especially) is the gift that God has 
given to humanity. It is the royal prize awarded to creation’s lord and lady. This then 
informs our understanding of the Devil’s motivation in his temptation of Adam and Eve. If 
we do not begin with this understanding of Irenaeus’ pro-material cosmology, the Devil’s 
aims will be viewed as out of synch with Irenaeus’ broader soteriological narrative.  
But before we examine Irenaeus’ narrative, we must turn our attention to his 
anthropology. As with Irenaeus’ cosmology, an understanding of Irenaeus’ anthropological 
framework informs our understanding of his Devil narrative, as well as his larger 










‘The heavens are the Lord’s heavens, but the earth he has given to the  





Irenaeus’ anthropology is richly textured. It is this aspect of his thought that has 
perhaps received the most attention from contemporary theologians. Irenaeus’ anthropology 
is highly developed precisely because it is organically and deeply linked to his cosmology, 
Christology, soteriology, and eschatology; quite arguably, it lies at the heart of his thought.1 
For Irenaeus, humanity is the ‘beginning of creation’ [initium facturae], the chief conduit 
through which God’s glory is expressed to all of creation. And so for Irenaeus, Gloria Dei 
est vivens homo (‘the glory of God is a living human’).2 This is said most truly with respect 
to the Son, who is the true human. Insofar as God has revealed himself in Jesus, and insofar 
as Jesus is typologically revealed by humanity,3 humanity thus becomes the focal point and 
pinnacle of God’s self-revelation in creation through the Son. This central insight was 
forged in conflict with the Gnostics (who generally viewed human being and fleshly 
embodiedness as ontological deficits—something to be overcome), and proved a formidable 
weapon against them.  
Irenaeus’s anthropology has been the focus of much Irenaean scholarship, and a 
great deal can be said here. Yet given the aim of my thesis, my goal in this chapter is not to 
provide an exhaustive analysis of Irenaeus’ broader anthropology—fascinating as it is— nor 
is it my goal to offer a revisionist or ‘fresh’ account of Irenaeus’ anthropology. Rather my 
aim is to highlight briefly those aspects of Irenaeus’ thought that have the most direct 
relevance for understanding his Devil narrative. Accordingly, we here focus our attention on 
six well-known aspects of Irenaeus’ anthropology, and show how these aspects of Irenaeus’ 
                                                         
1 Thus Wingren, ‘For Irenaeus, the central problem of theology is man and the becoming-
man, or man and the incarnation’. Man and the Incarnation, ix.  
2 Haer. 4.20.7. The rest of the sentence reads, ‘vita autem hominis visio Dei’—‘the life of the 
human is the vision of God’. There are echoes here and elsewhere throughout Irenaeus of 1 John 3:2, 
‘but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is’.  For 
Irenaeus (like Athanasius) human existence is stabilized and perfected in the vision and knowledge 
of God. The results are an anthropology of radical dependence on God as Creator, and the rejection 
of human autonomy. Mary Ann Donovan offers a helpful analysis of this sentence in Irenaeus, 
showing that within its context the statement refers to human fulfillment in God, rather than human 
fulfillment independent of God. See her ‘Alive to the Glory of God’, 283-97.  




thought—taken together—inform our understanding of his demonology. The six aspects are: 
1) Irenaeus’ concept of the ‘image and likeness’ of God, 2) the typological relationship 
between Irenaeus’ Christology and anthropology, 3) the inevitability of the incarnation, 4) 
Irenaeus’ ‘human infancy’ theme, 5) the ultimate destiny of humanity as co-rulers with 
Christ of the material and angelic worlds, and 6) the notable absence of ‘angelic soteriology’ 
in Irenaeus’ anthropology and soteriology.  
 
 
I. The Image and Likeness of God 
 
Central to Irenaeus’ anthropology is the idea that humanity was created in the ‘image 
and likeness of God’ [imago et similitudo Dei].4 This basic anthropological insight is rooted 
in the opening chapters of Genesis, and is central to Jewish and Christian anthropologies.5 A 
wide range of opinions can be found in both traditions about the exact meaning of this 
phrase. Very often in both traditions, the human body does not factor as part of the divine 
image stamped on humanity.6 Such is not the case however, for Irenaeus. In his treatment of 
the Genesis creation account, Irenaeus clearly links the image of God to the visible, material 
‘form’ of humanity. He writes,  
 
But the man he formed [pla,ssw] with his own hands, taking from the earth 
that which was purest and finest [lepto,j], and mingling in a measure of his 
own power [du,namij]with the earth. For he traced [periti,qhmi] his own form 
[pla,sma] on the formation, that that which should be seen should be of divine 
form [qeoeidh,j]: for the image of God was the man formed and set on the 
earth. And that he might become living, he breathed on his face the breath of 
                                                         
4 This aspect of Irenaeus’ thought has been the focus of much Irenaean scholarship. See 
Minns, Irenaeus, 72-76; Steenberg, Of God and Man, 29-54; Cartwright, Image of God, 173-181; 
Osborne, Irenaeus, 211-16, Purves, ‘The Spirt and the Imago Dei’, and especially Wingren, Man 
and Incarnation, 14-26.  
5 The use of Genesis 1:25-27 is found in Gnostic writings as well. See for example the 
thought of Saturninus and Basilides as detailed by Irenaeus in Haer. 1.24.1 and the Valentinians in 
Haer. 2.30.3. See Bouteneff, Beginnings, for Patristic readings of Genesis 1-3, and especially pp. 82-
83 for Irenaeus on the image of God.  
6 See for example, Philo, Opif. 69. So too Tatian, who explicitly states that the body does not 
constitute an aspect of the image of God, but rather is that part of humanity which humanity shares 
with the animals. See his Graec. 15. Purves rightly notes the theological limitations of this emphasis, 
but never gets around in his treatment of Irenaeus’ view of the imago Dei to noting that it points 




life; that both for the breath and for the formation the man should be like 
unto God.7 
 
And again,  
 
Now humanity is a mixed organization of soul and flesh [Homo est enim 
temperatio animae et carnis], who was formed after the likeness 
[similtudinem] of God, and molded by his hands, that is, by the Son and Holy 
Spirit, to whom also he said, ‘Let us make humanity’…. For whatsoever all 
the heretics may have advanced with the utmost solemnity, they come to 
this at last, that they blaspheme the Creator, and disallow the salvation of 
God’s workmanship [plasmatis Dei], which the flesh truly is [quod quidem 
est caro].8  
 
The connection between the human body and the ‘image and similitude’ of God is an 
important polemical counter to the Gnostics, who generally saw all of materiality—
including (perhaps especially) the human body—as the dregs of creation, insofar as it is 
sourced in the ignorant and evil demiurge. Irenaeus, in order to defend the integrity of the 
Creator, must likewise defend the integrity of creation.9 The material world must necessarily 
be good—the human body not least—since it was created by a good and beneficent God.10 
Linking the human body to the image of God underscores and preserves the goodness of 
creation more generally, and thus the goodness of the Creator.  
Irenaeus is not always consistent in his use of the terms imago and similitudo. Often 
the terms are used as synonyms (as we see above) to include both the material and 
                                                         
7 Epid.11. See Smith, Proof, 148-49, no. 65 for the connection between the body and the 
image of God.  
8 Haer. book 4, preface, 4. For additional passages in Irenaeus, see Haer. 1.24.1, 2.30.3, 
3.22.1. 
9 Along these lines, Holsinger-Friesen, in his Irenaeus and Genesis, 119, 216, suggests that 
we see in Irenaeus a non-Platonic form of Christianity. O’Keefe concurs, ‘Irenaeus represents a 
nonphilosophical refutation of Gnosticism distinctly different from the overtly Platonic anti-
Gnosticism characteristic of Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Thus, Irenaeus might most 
adequately be characterized as representing an anti-Platonic, or perhaps pre-Platonic, form of 
Christianity that was deeply committed both to a positive and celebratory cosmology and to a 
physicalist eschatology…” O’Keefe, ‘The New Irenaeus’, 118-19. Irenaeus’ main opponents were 
the Gnostics, not the Platonists; but Holsinger-Friesen and O’Keefe are certainly right that much of 
Irenaeus’ critique of the Gnostics represents an indirect critique of Platonic notions of materiality 
and eschatology.  
10 So Minns, ‘Irenaeus also proposes the much more striking and daring idea that a two-fold 
similarity between us and God is to be found in the human body’. Irenaeus, 74. For more 




immaterial part of humanity.11 But sometimes he distinguishes between the terms, using 
imago to refer to that part of humanity which physically or visually resembles the incarnate 
Word, and more narrowly, similitudo to designate that part of humanity which resembles the 
immaterial divine nature and character of God (or, more specifically, the Word).12 In this 
way, the ‘image of God’ for Irenaeus speaks to humanity’s physical appearance, and is thus 
something possessed by all living people—pagan or Christian; whereas the ‘likeness of 
God’ is something possessed only by Christians. In an illustrative passage in Adversus 
haereses, Irenaeus makes a distinction between image and likeness; both the image and 
likeness of God were given at the time of creation. But when Adam and Eve sinned, though 
they retained the image of God (i.e. the form, appearance of God), they lost the likeness of 
God. Irenaeus writes,  
 
For in times long past, it was said that humanity was created after the image 
of God, but it was not shown; for the Word was as yet invisible, after whose 
image humanity had been created [cuius secundum imaginem homo factus 
fuerat]. Wherefore also [humanity] did easily lose the likeness 
[similitudinem]. When, however, the Word of God became flesh, he 
confirmed both these: for he both showed forth the image truly, since he 
became himself what was his image [ipse hoc fiens quod erat imago eius]; 
and he re-established the likeness [similitudinem] after a sure manner, by 
assimilating humanity to the invisible Father through means of the visible 
Word.13 
 
Note here that it is only the likeness that was ‘easily lost’ when humanity sinned. But 
when Christ appeared, being the true image of God, he reoriented humanity back to God and 
restored both the image and likeness of God in humanity. We see the same distinction again 
in Adversus haereses, where Irenaeus writes,   
 
                                                         
11 See Osborn’s helpful discussion of these terms in his Irenaeus, 211-16.  
12 Steenberg sees the ‘likeness’ of God for Irenaeus as, ‘the personal appropriation of the 
divine image that is the foundation principle of human existence…brought about only through the 
anointing of the Holy Spirit…’ Steenberg, Of God and Man, 43. Irenaeus does not press ‘reason’ or 
‘rationality’ into service as the core basis of the image of God, a move that will be made later in the 
Christian tradition. Yet he does make a connection between the two in Haer. 4.4.4, ‘But humanity, 
being endowed with reason, and [is] in this respect like to God [homo vero rationabilis, et secundum 
hoc similis Deo]…’ 




Now God shall be glorified in his handiwork [plasmate], fitting it so as to be 
conformable to, and modeled after, his own Son [conforme illud et 
consequens suo puero adaptans]. For by the hands of the Father, that is, by 
the Son and the Holy Spirit, [all of] humanity, and not [only] a part of 
humanity, was made in the likeness of God [fit homo secundum 
similitudinem Dei, sed non pars hominis]. Now the soul and the spirit are 
certainly a part of the human, but certainly not the human; for the perfect 
human consists in the comingling and the union of the soul receiving the 
spirit of the Father, and the admixture of that fleshly nature which was 
molded after the image of God [et admixtae ei carni quae est plasmata 
secundum imaginem Dei]….But when the Spirit here blended with the soul 
is united to [God’s] handiwork, the human is rendered spiritual and perfect 
because of the outpouring of the Spirit, and this is the one [i.e. the human] 
who was made in the image and likeness of God [secundum imaginem et 
similitudinem factus est Dei]. But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who 
is such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an 
imperfect being, possessing indeed the image [of God] in his formation 
[imaginem quidem habens in plasmate], but not receiving the likeness 
through the Spirit [similitudinem vero non assumens per Spiritum]; and thus 
is this being imperfect.14 
 
Here the imperfect human [i.e. the human devoid of the Spirit of God] is ‘of an 
animal nature,’ possessing the ‘image of God’ in his appearance, but not having the 
‘likeness’ of God through the Spirit.15  
Yet, as noted above, Irenaeus is not entirely consistent in his use of these terms. 
Elsewhere in Adversus haereses, Irenaeus states that Christ was made incarnate, ‘…so that 
what we lost in Adam—namely, to be according to the image and likeness of God—we 
might recover in Christ Jesus’.16 As seen in the preceding, Irenaeus will often use the term 
‘image’ as a catchall to denote both concepts, or he will use both terms interchangeably 
without the fine distinction noted above. Regardless, he nonetheless maintains humanity’s 
likeness to God as both a material and immaterial reality. His polemic against the Gnostics 
                                                         
14 Haer. 5.6.1.  
15 So Cartwright, ‘Irenaeus often emphasizes the body in order to establish that the whole 
person is in God’s image, contra “Gnostic” spiritualizing tendencies. Nonetheless, this strategy 
signifies the belief, not only that people are properly physical but that human flesh is part of what 
resembles God’.  From, ‘“The Image of God” in Irenaeus’, 175. 




is greatly served by linking the image of God to human flesh; yet he wants to push beyond 
this to insist that Christ restores in humanity our potential to partake of the divine ‘likeness’ 
beyond mere appearance.17  
Much could be said here, but two points are particularly salient. First Irenaeus’ 
emphasis on humanity as made in the image and likeness of God serves to underscore the 
high place in creation that humanity occupies in Irenaeus’ broader cosmology.  For Irenaeus, 
humanity is the pinnacle of creation, the supreme created being; no angel or archangel or 
power or throne is greater than humanity, for only humanity was made according to the 
image and likeness of God. In a telling passage where Irenaeus speaks of Christ’s overthrow 
of the Devil, Irenaeus asks, 
 
How, too, could he [Jesus] have subdued him [the Devil] who was stronger 
than humanity [adversus hominem fortis erat], who had not only overcome 
[vicit] humanity, but also retained humanity under his power, and [how could 
Jesus have] conquered him who had conquered, while he set free humanity 
who had been conquered, unless he had been greater than humanity who had 
thus been overcome [nisi superior fuisset eo homine qui fuerat victus]? But 
who else is better [melior], and more preeminent [praecellentior] than, 
humanity who was formed after the likeness of God [similitudinem Dei], 
except the Son of God, after whose likeness [similitudinem] humanity was 
created?18   
 
The release of humanity from the captivity of the Devil requires a savior with more 
strength than humanity. But who could possibly have more strength than humanity, which 
has been made according to the image of God? Irenaeus’ answer is the Son, who is himself 
the image of God after whom humanity has been made.19 This logic shows not only 
                                                         
17 Irenaeus will also at times speak eschatologically of the image and likeness of God—as a 
reality to be obtained in the last day. He writes, ‘He [God] knew the infirmity of human beings, and 
the consequences which would flow from it; but through love and power, he shall overcome the 
substance of created nature. For it was necessary, at first, that nature should be exhibited; then, after 
that, that what was mortal should be conquered and swallowed up by immortality, and the 
corruptible by incorruptibility, and that humanity should be made after the image and likeness of 
God…’ Haer. 4.38.4. This eschatological focus is best understood in light of Irenaeus’ concept of 
human maturation (more on which below), and shows that he has a category for realized 
eschatology; humanity has now in seminal form what it will have in full at the end of the age.   
18 Haer. 4.33.4. 
19 One might wonder here how humanity ever came under the power of the Devil to begin 
with. Irenaeus will answer that it was because humanity was yet infantile when tempted by the Devil 
(see Epid. 12). Thus for Irenaeus, humanity is ontologically superior to the Devil (and the rest of the 





humanity’s innate superiority over the Devil (obviously relevant for my thesis), but over the 
whole of creation. As we will take up again in Chapter Four, this helps us to understand the 
Devil’s envy of humanity.  
Second, Irenaeus is keen to stress the connection between the body and the image of 
God. Human embodiment is not something to be overcome, or a sign of creaturely 
weakness. Indeed it is what distinguishes humanity from the angelic realm, and 
demonstrates human superiority. It is precisely because humans are embodied that they can 
be said to be made according to the image of God.20 Again, we will pick this up below in 
Chapter Four, but we can briefly note here that Irenaeus’ emphasis on human embodiment 
informs our understanding of the Devil’s envy, and gives us an indication of what, for 
Irenaeus, motivated the Devil in his temptation of Adam and Eve. In some way, the Devil’s 
envy is linked to human embodiedment. Which leads us to the next salient aspect of 
Irenaeus’ anthropology—its connection to his Christology.  
The connection between the body and the image of God only makes sense when 
considered in relation to the human Jesus Christ, who is simultaneously the very Son of 
God. For Irenaeus, humanity is made according to the image of God insofar as humanity is 
made according to the image of the incarnate Son. To Irenaeus’ Christology we now turn.  
 
 
II. Anthropology as Christology 
 
As becomes quickly evident, the interpreter of Irenaeus cannot go far into Irenaeus’ 
anthropology without encountering his Christology. These two aspects of Irenaeus’ thought 
mutually inform the other, and cannot be properly understood in isolation. Central to 
Irenaeus’ anthropology is the idea that the Son is the image and likeness of God after which 
humanity is made. While humanity is made according to [secundum] the image and likeness 
of God, the Son is the likeness and image of God. Irenaeus writes, ‘For he made humanity in 
the image of God; and the image of God is the Son, after whose image humanity was made: 
                                                         
20 Here Behr helpfully notes the effect of this on Irenaeus’s overall anthropology by 
comparing the anthropology of Irenaeus with Clement of Alexandria. Behr observes that for 
Irenaeus, since the body is part and parcel of the imago Dei, bodily pleasure is not castigated in 
Irenaeus, nor reduced to a necessarily evil. Clement, on the other hand, given his prioritization of the 
mind as the locus of the imago Dei, is far more given to an anti-body asceticism. See all of Behr’s 
Asceticism and Anthropology, but especially his helpful summary, pp. 209-24. See also Behr, 




and for this cause he [the Son] appeared in the end of the times that he might show the 
image [i.e. humanity] to be like unto himself’.21 
Humanity is made according to image of the Son, who is himself the image of God. 
This helps us understand how Irenaeus conceives of the body as related to the image of God. 
Insofar as humanity is made according to the image of the Son of God, thus far must 
humanity have a body, since the Son himself is embodied.22  
It is precisely at this point that we must recall that for Irenaeus the Son’s existence as 
the image of God is not an abstraction independent of the man Jesus Christ. The Son who is 
the image of God is the Son who ‘appeared in the end of times’ and who manifested God 
through the flesh. Steenberg presses this point forcefully throughout his work on the 
Christology of early Christianity—specifically focusing on Irenaeus. Steenberg insists that 
for much of early Christianity generally, and Irenaeus in particular, ‘What it means for 
humanity to be “after the image and likeness of God” is apprehended in the one “who dwelt 
among us”, the very Word of the Father’.23 An accurate reading of Irenaeus’s Christology, 
then, must begin with the man Jesus Christ who is also the eternal Son, rather than the 
reverse. ‘To abstract the Son, or the divinity of the Son, from the person of Jesus Christ … 
is to disfigure the language of Christianity’s earliest testimony…’24 ‘The one after whose 
image humanity is fashioned, is the one who is the Image in flesh in Galilee’.25 For 
Irenaeus, humanity is made according to the image of the Son insofar as the Son himself is 
enfleshed humanity.26 This emphasis on the Son’s incarnation is seen clearly in a passage 
where Irenaeus discusses how Christ was God’s means of self-revelation to both Old 
Testament and New Testament saints. We examine the passage in two separate sections, 
with comment in between:  
 
                                                         
21 Epid. 22. See also 11 and 55 where Irenaeus speaks of humanity as made in the image of 
and likeness of God.  
22 Irenaeus’ conceptual link between the body and the image of God the Son is clarified 
when set alongside the sort of logic one finds in the work of Gordon Clark (to cite just one example). 
Clark writes, ‘God has created man after his image and likeness. This image cannot be man’s body... 
God is spirit or mind and has no body. Hence a body would not be an image of him’. Clark, ‘The 
Image of God in Man’, 216. Clark clearly has his horizons limited to the image of God as it relates to 
God the Father, and has not linked the image of God with God as Son. So too Tatian, Graec. 15.      
23 Steenberg, Of God and Man, 8.  
24 Steenberg, Of God and Man, 4.  
25 Steenberg, Of God and Man, 8-9. See his whole work, but especially 1-54. Wingren also 
makes this point in his, Man and the Incarnation, 14-26.  So too Cartwright, ‘The Image of God in 
Irenaeus’, 173-76. 
26 So Minns, ‘When God fashioned the earth creature from mud he did so after the pattern of 
the body of Christ (Dem 22; AH V.16.2). Thus we are in the image of God because our bodies have 




But the Son, administering all things for the Father, works from the 
beginning even to the end, and without him no one can attain the knowledge 
of God [et sine illo nemo potest cognoscere Deum]. For the Son is the 
knowledge of the Father; but the knowledge of the Son is in the Father, and 
has been revealed through the Son [et per Filium revelata]; and this was the 
reason why the Lord declared: ‘No one knows the Son, but the Father; nor 
the Father, save the Son, and those to whomsoever the Son shall reveal 
[him]’. For ‘shall reveal’ was said not with reference to the future alone, as if 
then [only] the Word had begun to manifest the Father when he was born of 
Mary, but it applies indifferently throughout all time [sed communiter per 
totum tempus positum est]. For the Son, being present with his own 
handiwork from the beginning, reveals the Father to all; to whom he wills, 
and when he wills, and as the Father wills. Wherefore, then, in all things, and 
through all things, there is one God, the Father, and one Word, and one Son, 
and one Spirit, and one salvation to all who believe in him.27 
 
Here Irenaeus insists that the Son is the sole means of the Father’s revelation; no one 
can see the Father except the Son, and the one to whom the Son chooses to reveal the 
Father. And lest one think that the Son’s ministry of revelation began when he was born of 
Mary, Irenaeus states that the Son has been revealing the Father ‘throughout all time’. This 
might seem to suggest, against what I have argued above, that the Son reveals the Father 
independent of the incarnation. Yet Irenaeus’ commitment to the Son’s incarnational 
identity is seen in the remainder of the passage. We pick up the passage from where we left 
off above. He continues,  
 
Therefore Abraham also, knowing the Father through the Word, who made 
heaven and earth, confessed him to be God; and having learned by an 
announcement that the Son of God would be a human among humans [inter 
homines homo], by whose advent his seed should be as the stars of heaven, 
he desired to see that day, so that he might himself also embrace Christ; and, 
seeing it through the spirit of prophecy, he rejoiced. Wherefore Simeon also, 
one of his descendants, carried fully out the rejoicing of the patriarch, and 
said: ‘Lord, now let me, your servant, depart in peace. For my eyes have seen 
your salvation, which you prepared before the face of all people: a light for 
                                                         




the revelation of the Gentiles, and the glory of the people Israel’. And the 
angels, in like manner, announced tidings of great joy to the shepherds who 
were keeping watch by night. Moreover, Mary said, ‘My soul doth magnify 
the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my salvation’;—the rejoicing of 
Abraham descending upon those who sprang from him,—those, namely, who 
were watching, and who beheld Christ, and believed in him; while, on the 
other hand, there was a reciprocal rejoicing which passed backwards from the 
children to Abraham, who did also desire to see the day of Christ’s coming. 
Rightly, then, did our Lord bear witness to him, saying, ‘Your father 
Abraham rejoiced to see my day; and he saw it, and was glad’.28 
 
Abraham experienced the revelatory ministry of the Son prior to the Son’s 
incarnation, but only insofar as Abraham prophetically looked forward ‘through the spirit of 
prophecy’ and saw the day of Christ’s incarnation. Abraham, even prior to the Son’s 
incarnation, does not know the Son except in the incarnation. Thus Abraham saw the Father 
through the Son in the same way that Simeon, the shepherds, Mary and the Angels saw the 
Father—namely through the incarnation. In this way, Irenaeus maintains the centrality of the 
incarnation in the Son’s identity and God’s revelatory actions. For Irenaeus, Jesus Christ the 
embodied human, who is also the Son of God, is the one who ‘showed forth the image 
truly’. 29 Humanity knows no other Son than the embodied Son, the Word made flesh.30  
This blending together of anthropology and Christology is deepened further when 
we consider the typological relationship between Adamic humanity and Christ’s humanity. 
For Irenaeus, it is only insofar as Adamic humanity participates in Christ’s humanity that 
Adamic humanity becomes truly human. To this point we now turn.  
 
 
III. The Typological Nature of Humanity 
 
Our explication of Irenaeus’ anthropology takes us yet deeper into Irenaeus’ 
Christology. The resemblance of humanity to the incarnate Son must be understood with 
                                                         
28 Haer. 4.7.1. Note the future aspect of Irenaeus’ statement in this passage that the Son 
‘would be a man among men’. Irenaeus’ insistence that we only know the Son as incarnate Son 
should be understood epistemologically, rather than ontologically. That we can only know the Son as 
incarnate does not mean that the Son has been eternally incarnate. 
29 Haer. 5.16.2.  
30 This strongly materialist conception of the image of God (both for Christ and humanity) is 
woven throughout Irenaeus’ anthropology and Christology, and establishes a formidable defense 




respect to Irenaeus’ typological anthropology; or again, Adamic humanity is typologically 
oriented toward Christ’s humanity. For Irenaeus, Christ’s incarnation forms the pattern for 
humanity’s creation, rather than the reverse. As Minns aptly states, ‘Adam was consequent 
on Christ, and not the other way around’.31 In like manner to the typological logic of the 
Apostle Paul,32 Irenaeus insists that Adam’s humanity is made according to the image of 
Christ’s humanity, not the other way around. He writes, 
 
For in times long past, it was said that humanity was created after the image 
of God, but it was not shown; for the Word was as yet invisible, after whose 
image humanity was created [cuius secundum imaginem homo factus fuerat]. 
Wherefore also [humanity] did easily lose the likeness [similitudinem]. 
When, however, the Word of God became flesh, he confirmed both these: for 
he both showed forth the image truly, since he became himself what was his 
image [ipse hoc fiens quod erat imago eius]; and he re-established the 
likeness [similitudinem] after a sure manner, by assimilating humanity to the 
invisible Father through means of the visible Word.33 
 
And again he writes, ‘For he made humanity in the image of God; and the image of 
God is the Son, after whose image humanity was made: and for this cause he appeared in the 
end of the times that he might show the image [to be] like unto himself’.34 
 For Irenaeus, embodied humanity is made according to the image of the embodied 
Christ. Though humanity was first in order of time, Christ’s humanity was first in order of 
divine intent and pre-eminence. Irenaeus’ typology here is helpfully clarified by setting it in 
parallel with the New Testament’s typological reading of the Passover lamb. For the New 
Testament, the Passover Lamb of the Exodus was first in order of time, but was nonetheless 
understood by the New Testament writers to be patterned after the future sacrifice of Christ; 
the lamb of the Passover is but a shadow of the Lamb of God, and the lesser (historically 
earlier) lamb finds its meaning and identity in the fact that it points to and participates in the 
greater (historically later) Lamb.35 In the same way, Irenaeus understands humanity, though 
historically earlier than Christ, to be typologically pointing toward the true human, Jesus. 
                                                         
31 Minns, Irenaeus, 100.  
32 In Rom 5:14, Paul speaks of ‘Adam, who was a type [tu,poj] of the one who was to come’. 
Irenaeus quote this passage with commentary in Haer. 3.22.3.  
33 Haer. 5.16.2. 
34 Epid. 22. See also 11 and 55 where Irenaeus speaks of humanity as made in the image and 
likeness of God.  
35 See John 1:29; 1 Cor 5:7. This example is not used by Irenaeus, but it helpfully illustrates 




For Irenaeus, Adamic humanity is made according to the image of Christ’s humanity. It is 
this typological relationship between humanity and Christ that for Irenaeus provides the 
basis of humanity’s value and worth.  
Notably, the typological relationship between humanity and Christ underscores the 
value of not only Adam’s humanity, but even more so, Christ’s humanity—an important 
point in Irenaeus’ larger polemic against the Gnostics. Christ’s humanity, indeed Christ’s 
flesh, is the arch-type according to which fleshly humanity is made. For Irenaeus, since 
Christ’ incarnation precedes (logically, even though not temporally) the creation of Adam, it 
is valuable in its own right, and part of the Son’s identity. Yet until Christ’s incarnation, it 
was not clear in what way humanity was made according to the image of God. But the 
coming of the Word reveals the typological relationship between humanity and Christ. 
Humans possess the image of God insofar as they resemble the incarnate Son.  
Fascinatingly, Irenaeus states that Christ ‘became himself what was his image’. Here 
we might conceive of Adam as a living pencil sketch, a self-portrait drawn by Christ himself 
as a prophetic witness pointing toward his own incarnation. Or again, using a modern 
analogy to illustrate the point: in the popular 1940 Disney adaptation of Carlo Collodi’s The 
Adventures of Pinocchio, Pinocchio is a wooden puppet who dreams of becoming a real 
boy. At his creation, Pinocchio occupies a middle space between not real and real. He is 
more than an inanimate doll, but less that a real boy. He is stuck between non-being and full 
being. Thus what he is at creation is not a fulfillment of his real destiny, but only a shadow 
(or a type) of what he has the potential to become, i.e. a real boy. As the story unfolds, 
Pinocchio falls in with some bad characters and through his naiveté and bad choices 
becomes even less than what he was when he began. His resemblance to a real boy is 
marred by the addition of donkey ears and a tail. But through his repentance and the love of 
his maker Geppetto, the effects of his poor choices are taken away and he becomes what he 
typologically pointed toward on the day of his creation—a real boy. Thus the redemption 
story of Pinocchio (at least in the Disney adaptation36) is not a story about a return to an 
original condition, but rather a story about a progression into the archetype. This in a way is 
also true for Irenaeus’ conception of humanity. Humanity on the day of creation is like 
Pinocchio—more than mere creatures, but not yet fully human. In Christ (and ultimately our 
participation in his resurrection) we become what we were typologically pointing toward; 
which is to say we become full human beings.37 
                                                         
36 In Collodi’s original novel Pinocchio is hanged and killed! 
37 Thus Behr rightly observes, ‘It is only in the eschatological event…that the full perfection 
of man is manifested. Thus the truth of man is eschatological, not protological’. Asceticism and 
Anthropology, 57. Fantino makes the same basic point in ‘Le Passage du Premier Adam au Second 




Yet the above analogies fail to convey the complexity of Irenaeus’ thought in its 
entirety. For Irenaeus, the movement from creation to new creation is not a movement from 
natural to supernatural (as the above analogies might suggest). Irenaeus’ conception of 
human ‘infancy’ must be taken into account. This topic will be taken up later in the chapter, 
and thus I will postpone a detailed exposition until then.38 But this much bears stating at 
present: for Irenaeus, humanity at creation possessed in toto, even if in seminal form, all that 
was necessary to grow fully into the image and likeness of the Word. Wingren helpfully 
uses the illustration of a child who has not yet learned to talk, but who possesses the 
inherent native resources to grow into this skill (baring unusual circumstance or injury).39 
Unlike the pencil sketch and Pinocchio, both of which must undergo a change in ontology to 
realize their full transformation into the archetype, Irenaeus conceives of humans moving 
forward in growth into what they already are in seminal form.40 Thus Irenaeus can affirm 
that those who are redeemed in Christ regain the ‘likeness’ of God—the very likeness which 
humanity had at creation before the fall. ‘Wherefore also [humanity] did easily lose the 
likeness [similitudinem]. When, however, the Word of God became flesh, he confirmed both 
of these: for he both showed forth the image truly, since he became himself what was his 
image [ipse hoc fiens quod erat imago eius]; and he re-established the likeness 
[similitudinem] after a sure manner’.41 Yet the likeness humanity is restored to is not the 
seminal likeness of infant humanity, but rather the mature, perfect likeness of the incarnate 
Son. In this way, the return is not simply a return to original perfection, but a return to the 
future, a return to the end toward which original perfection typologically pointed from the 
start.42 
This way of conceiving of Christ and humanity serves to collapse Irenaeus’ 
Christology and anthropology into each other. For Irenaeus, the only true human is the 
divine human—the archetype. He writes, ‘How, then, shall he be a God, who has not as yet 
                                                         
possessed by Adam at his creation was not strictly speaking a spiritual life’ (420). This life of the 
Spirit was typologicaly portrayed in Adam, but only eschatologically fulfilled in Jesus.  
38 See section V of this chapter. 
39 Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 20, and 27.  
40 Here Wingren rightly observes, ‘Those who make a distinction in Irenaeus between the 
natural and the supernatural always fail to interpret…[Irenaeus] satisfactorily’. Man and 
Incarnation, 24.   
41 Haer. 5.16.2. 
42 Both types of illustrations—Wingren’s ‘speech’ illustration and my sketch/Pinocchio 
illustration are important for capturing the full scope of Irenaeus’ thought. Wingren’s illustration of 
speech development accurately reflects Irenaeus’ emphasis on a return to original perfection. And 
the sketch/Pinocchio illustration helpfully captures the movement from type to archetype in 
Irenaeus’ soteriology. These two concepts are compatible, and we need not, like Loof, resort to 
speculations about different sources as a way of explaining these complementary emphases. See also 
Lawson, Biblical Theology, 211-13, who likewise notes this ‘return to the future’ motif in Irenaeus’ 




been made a human?’43 The remark is fascinating, and underscores the deep connection in 
Irenaeus’ between anthropology and Christology. Insofar as humanity is typologically 
related to Jesus Christ—the true human being, humanity is not yet fully human. So 
Cartwright astutely comments, ‘[For Irenaeus] Christ not only reveals Adam but also fulfills 
Adam; he is, in a sense, more Adam than Adam’.44 Thus human beings are such only in 
hope—only insofar as we come to fully participate in the likeness of true human being, 
Jesus. The full and final realization of the imago Dei in humanity is accomplished at the 
resurrection.  Drawing upon the language of 1 Corinthians 15—Paul’s extended discussion 
about bodily resurrection—Irenaeus writes,  
 
For after his great kindness he graciously conferred good [upon us], and 
made human beings like to himself regarding his own power [et similes sibi 
suae potestatis homines fecit]; while at the same time by his prescience he 
knew the infirmity of human beings, and the consequences which would flow 
from it; but through love and power, he shall overcome the substance of 
created nature. For it was necessary, at first, that nature should be exhibited; 
then, after that, that what was mortal should be conquered and swallowed up 
by immortality, and the corruptible by incorruptibility, and that humanity 
should be made after the image and likeness of God [secundum imaginem et 
similitudinem Dei], having received the knowledge of good and evil.45 
 
Here also we see the basic form of Irenaeus’ concept of divinization. For Irenaeus, it 
is only insofar as humanity participates in Christ’s divine humanity that we become fully 
human.46 Or again, it is only when the pencil sketch becomes a fully living, three 
                                                         
43 Haer. 4.39.2. This same basic sentiment, even if left undeveloped, can be found in 
Ignatius:  ‘Suffer me to receive the pure light [of martyrdom]; when I shall have arrived there, I 
shall become a human being. Suffer me to follow the example of the passion of my God’. Rom. 6. 
For Ignatius, to become like Christ in his death is to become, at last, a true human being.  
44 Cartwright, ‘“The Image of God” in Irenaeus’, 175. So too Osborn correctly observes that 
for Irenaeus, ‘Other men are not true men because they have not yet reached the likeness of God’. 
Osborne, Irenaeus, 213.  
45 Haer. 4.38.4 
46 Irenaeus’ account of divinization could be treated at length as a topic in its own right. I 
have however, treated this theme adequately enough for our present purposes under the headings of 
‘the image of God’ and ‘typological anthropology’. For a helpful look divinization in Irenaeus, see 
Litwa, ‘The God “Human” and Human Gods’, 70–94. Litwa helpfully demonstrates that Irenaeus’ 
clear Creator-creature distinction pushes his divinization motif in a substantially different direction 
than the Gnostic Apocryphon of John. For Irenaeus, true deity is not native to human nature. Thus 
humans can become god-like only insofar as God first becomes human. But for the Apocryphon of 
John (consistent with other Gnostic texts), human nature is already divine insofar as it is an 








IV. The Inevitability of the Incarnation 
 
Irenaeus’ typological anthropology raises a question that is perhaps the first salvo in 
a debate that will emerge in the later Christian tradition regarding the necessity of the 
incarnation.47 Would the Son have incarnated if Adam had not fallen? Theologians who 
answer this question negatively typically view the incarnation solely as a response to sin. 
But Irenaeus foreshadows the logic of Athanasius and seems to view the incarnation as 
inevitable due to human mutability, and not solely a result of sin.48  It is because humanity is 
inherently (even prior to the fall) ontologically contingent that the Son—who is not 
ontologically contingent—must incarnate. In an extended passage that draws upon Irenaeus’ 
‘human infancy’ motif (more on which below), Irenaeus argues for the necessity of the 
incarnation of the Son based primarily upon the creaturehood of humanity. Irenaeus writes,   
 
If, however, anyone says, ‘What then? Could not God have exhibited 
humanity as perfect [τέλειον] from the beginning?’ let him know that, 
inasmuch as God is indeed always the same and unbegotten as respects 
himself, all things are possible to him. But created things must be inferior to 
him who created them, from the very fact of their later origin [ta. de. gegono,ta 
kaqo. Mete,peita gene,sewj ἀrxhn ἰdi,an e;sce]; for it was not possible for 
things recently created to have been uncreated. But inasmuch as they are not 
uncreated, for this very reason do they come short of the perfect [ùsterou/ntai 
tou/ τελείου]. Because, as these things are of later date, so are they infantile 
[νήπια]; so are they unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline. 
For just as it certainly is in the power of a mother to give strong food to her 
infant [bre,fei], but the [infant] is not yet able to receive substantial 
nourishment; so also it was possible for God himself to have made humanity 
                                                         
the outer shell of materiality so that one’s ‘real’ humanity—that part of one which has always been 
divine—can shine through unsullied.  
47 John Duns Scotus argues for the necessity of the incarnation apart from sin. Robert 
Grosseteste, the first Chancellor of Oxford tentatively suggests the same. See his De Cessatione 
Legalium,1.8.7-13.  
48 For Athanasius, human nature occupies a place of inherent ‘ontological poverty’ (a phrase 
coined by Khaled Anatolios) quite apart from sin. See Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius, 58. For an 




perfect from the first, but humanity could not receive this, being as yet a 
child [nh,pioj].49  
 
Irenaeus is here providing a theodicy against the accusations of the Gnostics who 
claim that God was somehow impotent because he did not create humanity perfect at the 
beginning. Irenaeus is thus keen to maintain both God’s unlimited power to do anything, 
and yet offer an apologetic for the necessity of God not creating humanity perfect at the 
beginning. The problem, Irenaeus’ argues, is with the inherent limitations of the finite 
creature, not with any deficiency in the power of the Creator. He continues in the same 
passage,  
 
And for this cause our Lord, in these last times, when he had summed up all 
things into himself, came to us, not as he might have come, but as we were 
capable of beholding him. He might easily have come to us in his immortal 
glory, but in that case we could never have endured the greatness of the 
glory; and therefore it was that he, who was the perfect bread of the Father, 
offered himself to us as milk, [because we were] as infants [ẁj nhpi,oij]. He 
did this when he appeared as a human, that we, being nourished, as it were, 
from the breast of his flesh, and having, by such a course of milk-
nourishment, become accustomed to eat and drink the Word of God, may be 
able also to contain in ourselves the bread of immortality [ἀqanasi,aj], which 
is the Spirit of the Father. 
And on this account does Paul declare to the Corinthians, ‘I have fed 
you with milk, not with meat, for hitherto ye were not able to bear it’….so, in 
like manner, God had power at the beginning to grant perfection to the man 
[dido,nai to. teleion τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ]; but as the latter was only recently created, 
he could not possibly have received it, or even if he had received it, could he 
have contained it, or containing it, could he have retained it. It was for this 
reason that the Son of God, although he was perfect [te,leioj ὢν], passed 
through the state of childhood [sunenhpi,azen] in common with the rest of 
humanity, partaking of it [i.e. human infancy] thus not for his own benefit,50 
but for that of the infantile stage of humanity’s existence [avlla. dia. to. tou/ 
                                                         
49 Haer. 4.38.1.  
50 I take the phrase ‘not for his own benefit’ to be referring to Christ’s participation in human 
infancy, not the incarnation generally. In other words, Christ did not pass through human infancy for 




avnqrw,pou  nh,pion ou[tw cwrou,menoj], in order that humanity might be able to 
receive him [ẁj a;nqrwpoj auvto.n cwrei/n hvdu,nato]. There was nothing, 
therefore, impossible to and deficient in God that humanity was not an 
uncreated being; but this merely applied to those who were lately created, 
[namely] human beings.51 
 
Thus for Irenaeus, the incarnation is first a response to human contingency, before it 
is a response to human sinfulness. Only the one who is inherently perfect, namely the Son, 
can grant perfection to those who are inherently imperfect, namely creatures.  Of course for 
Irenaeus the incarnation overcomes human sinfulness just as much as it overcomes human 
contingency; it is not a zero sum game. But Irenaeus’ atonement theology takes seriously the 
question of human contingency in ways that later atonement theories will not.52 And the 
overall effect is to position the incarnation as a necessity.53  
Here we can fruitfully revisit Irenaeus’ Christological typology. Deepening and 
solidifying Irenaeus’ position on the incarnation is the manner in which he typologically 
links the image of God in humanity to the incarnate Son. Those theologians who argue 
against the necessity of the incarnation tend to link the image of God in humanity to the 
non-embodied Father. From this perspective, humanity can exist fully in the image of God 
quite apart from the incarnation.  But this is not possible for Irenaeus. For Irenaeus, 
humanity is made according to the image of the incarnate Son. As such, the Son’s 
incarnation logically, even if not temporally, comes first in the divine plan. From this 
typological starting point, the incarnation becomes a necessary fulfillment of the type—even 
apart from sin. Christ’s identity as incarnate savior precedes those on whose behalf Christ 
would incarnate in order to save. Commenting on Paul’s typological connection between 
Adam and Christ in Romans 5:14, Irenaeus writes,   
 
                                                         
51 Haer. 4.38.1-2. See Brown, ‘Necessary Imperfection’, who finds Irenaeus’ logic 
hopelessly flawed at this point. For my part, I am sympathetic to Irenaeus’ basic point. Very simply, 
he is arguing that not even God can create God, for being ‘uncreated’ is precisely what it means to 
be ‘God’. As such, whatever God creates is, by nature of it being created, contingent and passable 
and in need of divine aid. This is the same basic logic one finds in Athanasius’ De incarnatione. 
52 The atonement theories that emerge out of Anselm, and on through the Protestant 
reformers, tend to focus on sin and the satisfaction of divine justice, rather than on death and 
overcoming the inevitable contingency of human creature-hood.   
53 MacKenzie, in his commentary on Irenaeus’ Epideixis, likewise suggests that Irenaeus’ 
logic here pushes strongly toward the inevitability of the incarnation. ‘Incarnation, therefore, is not 
only the conclusion of the work of creation, but the very initial purpose of it, the terminus a quo and 




Hence also was Adam himself termed by Paul ‘the figure [typus] of him that 
was to come’, because the Word, the maker of all things, had formed 
beforehand for himself the future dispensation of the human race, connected 
with the Son of God [quoniam futuram circa Filium Dei humani generis 
dispositionem in semetipsum Fabricator omnium Verbum praeformaverat]; 
God having predestined [praedestinante] that the first man [hominem] should 
be of an animal nature, with this view, that he might be saved by the spiritual 
One. For inasmuch as he had a pre-existence as a saving being [Cum enim 
praeexsisteret salvans], it was necessary that what might be saved should 
also be made [oportebat et quod salvaretur fieri], in order that the he who 
saves should not exist in vain [uti non vacuum sit salvans].54 
 
For Irenaeus, Christ had a ‘pre-existence as a saving being’. Here Irenaeus pushes, 
almost to the limit, not only the necessity of the incarnation—but indeed the necessity of 
humanity! In logic similar to Origen (i.e. that an eternal Creator requires an eternal 
creation),55 Irenaeus seems to be positing that God is in some way—however mysteriously 
and freely—bound up eternally and necessarily in the existence of creation and the salvation 
of that creation.56 Again, it is important to point out here that Irenaeus’ soteriology is not 
limited to salvation from sin. Christ’s identity as a pre-existent saving being has significance 
for Irenaeus independent of human sinfulness; humanity must necessarily be saved from its 
innate ontological contingency.  
Yet even given the above, Irenaeus does not explicitly address the question of the 
incarnation’s necessity. Whether he followed his own logic to its end remains uncertain. In 
any event, the overall effect of Irenaeus’ incarnational theology underscores the significance 
of humanity in the divine economy. Even more, one is left with the strong impression, 
                                                         
54 Haer. 3.22.3.  
55 Origen, Princ. 1.2.10. 
56 See Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation, 33-36, who argues in this direction, focusing on the 
goodness of God as God’s inevitable motivation in creating. Minns rejects Steenberg’s interpretation 
of Irenaeus on the grounds that it raises significant problems for Irenaeus’ perspectives on divine 
freedom and goodness, and further, that it suggests a co-eternality of creation—a position that 
Irenaeus explicitly rejects (see Haer. 2.28.3). See Minns, Irenaeus, 44. In my estimation, it seems 
likely that Irenaeus’ thought at this point is not fully systematized. Steenberg’s reading of Irenaeus 
follows naturally from much of Irenaeus’ thought. But Minns is right to caution us from reading 
more into Irenaeus than he intended, however logically such a reading might follow. As Minns 
rightly observes, ‘There are, no doubt, problems about time, freedom and necessity bound up in all 
this, but they are not problems that Irenaeus addresses’. Minns, Irenaeus, 102. Likewise MacKenzie, 
reads Haer. 4.20.4 as seemingly indicating the inevitability of the incarnation, even apart from sin, 
yet resists the temptation to speculate about what Irenaeus may have thought on this matter, minus 
an explicit statement. ‘It is better to leave such questions unanswered, for only conjecture upon 




especially in passages like that quoted above, that for Irenaeus, the incarnation was not 
ultimately a detriment to the person of Christ—a medieval hair shirt, worn perpetually as a 
testimony of divine condescending love—but rather humanity was a gift from the Father to 
the Son and the very means by which the Son is exalted. Though certainly the Son’s 
incarnation of mortal flesh was an act of divine condescension, the ultimate victory of the 
Son over sin, death, and the Devil leads to the Son’s final and eternal exaltation. In this 
sense, Adam’s humanity was created for the sake of Christ’s future humanity, rather than 
the other way around. Thus for Irenaeus, the humanity by which we are human is God’s 
own humanity.  Such logic serves in Irenaeus to simultaneously underscore the massive 
significance of humanity in creation, while likewise repositioning humanity in a typological 
and subordinate role that undercuts human pride and independence.57  
All of this will be relevant to our examination of the Devil’s envy. Whatever place 
the angels have in the divine economy, for Irenaeus, it pales in comparison to the 
preeminence of humanity-in-the-Son.  
 
 
V. The Infancy of Humanity at Creation 
 
As can be seen in Irenaeus’ typological anthropology, Irenaeus conceives of 
salvation as a process of maturation; the created being must grow and increase in capacity to 
receive the uncreated God. This basic theme is woven throughout Irenaeus’ corpus. He 
writes,   
 
For he formed him for growth and increase [Plasmavit enim eum in 
augmentum et incrementum], as the Scripture says: ‘Increase and multiply’. 
And in this respect God differs from humanity, that God indeed makes, but 
humanity is made; and truly, he who makes is always the same [Et quidem qui 
facit semper idem est]; but that which is made must receive both beginning, 
and middle, and addition, and increase [quod autem fit et initium et 
                                                         
57 The debate regarding the centrality of humanity in Irenaeus’ theology is often unhelpfully 
polarized as an ‘either-or’. Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 91, points to Mark Werner as one who 
argues strongly that Irenaeus’ soteriology must be understood as primarily anthropocentric, as 
opposed to theocentric. See Werner, Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas, 275, 390, 477. But 
Wingren rightly challenges this binary interpretation and insists that we need not pit Irenaeus’ 
anthropocentrism against his theocentrism. See Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, 91-96. It is in 
Irenaeus’ Christology that both anthropology and theology come together. Humanity finds its 




medietatem et adiectionem et augmentum accipere debet]. And God does 
indeed create after a skillful manner, while [as regards humanity] it is created 
skillfully. God also is truly perfect in all things, himself equal and similar to 
himself, as he is all light, and all mind, and all substance, and the fount of all 
good; but humanity receives advancement and increase towards God [homo 
vero profectum percipiens et augmentum ad Deum].58 
 
This soteriological theme of human maturation is not unique to Irenaeus;59 however, 
it takes unique shape in Irenaeus with his idea of the infancy of Adam and Eve at the time of 
creation.60 Irenaeus, with the exceptions of Theophilus (and possibly Clement) is the only 
extant early Christian writer to speak about the infancy of humanity at the time of creation.61 
The idea is likewise absent in early Jewish or Gnostic writings.62 According to Irenaeus, the 
first human pair was created as infantes—as children who needed to grow into physical 
adulthood. This idea occurs five times in Irenaeus—two times in Epideixis and three times 
in Adversus haereses.63 For Irenaeus, the physical growth of the first human pair 
underscores their need for spiritual and mental growth.64  Irenaeus writes,  
 
                                                         
58 Haer. 4.11.1-2. For more on this same theme see also Haer. 4.38.1-3. 
59 See Balthasar’s account of Gregory of Nyssa, in his Presence and Thought. 
60 See Steenberg, ‘Children in Paradise’ for the definitive treatment on this theme.  
61 For this idea in Theophilus, see his Autol. 2.25, where he writes, ‘But Adam, being yet an 
infant in age, was on this account as yet unable to receive knowledge worthily. For now, also, when 
a child is born it is not at once able to eat bread, but is nourished first with milk, and then, with the 
increment of years, it advances to solid food. Thus, too, would it have been with Adam; for not as 
one who grudged him, as some suppose, did God command him not to eat of knowledge. But he 
wished also to make proof of him, whether he was submissive to his commandment. And at the same 
time he wished man, infant as he was, to remain for some time longer simple and sincere’. See also 
Clement, Prot. 11 where Clement refers to Adam as a paidi,on tou/ Qeou/ prior to his fall, and then 
remarks that through the fall he became a grown man, o` pai/j avndrizo,menoj avpeiqei,a|. The reference 
is suggestive, but only passing, and therefore difficult to associate with Irenaeus’ concept of human 
infancy. See also Clement’s comment in Strom. 3.17, likewise passing and suggestive. Behr sees a 
clear connection between Irenaeus, Theophilus, and Clement on this point. See his Asceticism and 
Anthropology, 135, 143-44.  
62 See Steenberg, ‘Children in Paradise’, 20-21. 
63 Epid. 12, 14; Haer. 3.22.4, 3.23.5, 4.38.1-2. 
64 In his commentary, Ian MacKenzie rightly notes the link between human infancy and 
Irenaeus’ maturation theme, ‘This idea of the potential of growth of Adam from infancy to the 
fullness of human stature in the Word, and therefore in perfect community of union with God, 
whereby Adam will be made like unto God points to an integral characteristic of Irenaeus’ theology; 
namely that humanity is given the opportunity to grow and advance in the knowledge of God’. See 




And Adam and Eve…‘were naked, and were not ashamed’,65 for there was in 
them an innocent and infantile mind,66 and they thought or understood 
nothing whatsoever of those things that are wickedly born in the soul through 
lust [hešt c’ankut’iwnk’]67 and shameful desires [amawt’ali c’ankut’iwn]68. 
For at that time they preserved their nature intact, since that which was 
breathed into the handiwork was the breath of life; and while the breath 
remains in its order and strength, it is without comprehension or 
understanding of what is evil. Thus ‘they were not ashamed’, kissing and 
embracing each other in holiness in the manner of children.69 
 
The focus in this passage is on the pre-pubescence of Adam and Eve, and their lack 
of awareness of sex and sexual desire.70 Thus Irenaeus’ concept of infancy does not equate 
to a literal baby, but rather seems to have something more like ‘young child’ in mind.71  
This same basic idea is also found in Adversus haereses, where the infancy of Adam and 
Eve is again identified as a pre-pubescent state.  
                                                         
65 Gen 2:25. 
66 Smith’s translates the Armenian, ‘for their thoughts were innocent and childlike.’ 
Robinson, ‘for there was in them an innocent and childlike mind’. Rousseau, ‘car il y avait en eux un 
esprit ingénu et enfantin’. 
67 The Armenian is literally ‘pleasurable desire, concupiscence’; often a translation for 
h̀donai,. See Smith, Proof, 151, no. 81.  
68 The Armenian is literally, ‘shameful desire’. See Smith, Proof, 151, no. 81.   
69 Epid. 14. The translation of Epid. 12 and 14 used in this section follows the work of 
Steenberg in his essay, ‘Children in Paradise’, 1-22. 
70 The phrase ‘in the manner of children’ introduces a certain amount of ambiguity regarding 
the exact nature of this infancy. Are Adam and Eve only acting like children, but are not really such 
themselves? Or are they acting ‘in the manner of children’ because they are indeed themselves 
children? I take Irenaeus to mean the latter. See the note below.  
71 Commentators of Irenaeus are divided about how to interpret Irenaeus at this point, with 
the majority of Irenaeus scholars interpreting Irenaeus as speaking of Adam and Eve as spiritual 
children, not literal children. See for example, Orbe, Antropología, 210-14. But of the five passages 
that reference the infancy of Adam and Eve, only one seems more naturally read as spiritual infancy. 
The passage is found in Haer. 3.23.5, where Irenaeus writes, ‘For [Adam] showed his repentance by 
his conduct, through means of the girdle [which he used], covering himself with fig-leaves, while 
there were many other leaves, which would have irritated his body in a less degree. He, however, 
adopted a dress conformable to his disobedience, being awed by the fear of God; and resisting the 
erring, the lustful propensity of his flesh (since he had lost his natural disposition and child-like 
mind, and had come to the knowledge of evil things), he girded a bridle of continence upon himself 
and his wife, fearing God, and waiting for his coming’. It is difficult to suppose of Adam here as a 
literal young child, for his sin makes him immediately aware of sexual lust and a desire—a post-
pubescent reality. But this passage notwithstanding, the other four passages seem difficult to 
interpret as anything other than a reference to physical childhood. For a detailed analysis of the 
infancy motif in Irenaeus, along with an examination of the relevant Latin and Greek terms, see 
Matthew Steenberg, ‘Children in Paradise’, 1-22. Steenberg himself leans strongly toward a literal 
interpretation, while noting that some of the ambiguities in Irenaeus make a final assessment 
difficult. He concludes, ‘One can be certain that Irenaeus did not mean “children” to imply [merely] 
adults with a simple lack of experience…but this is as far as one can go with any attempt at a 





…and even as she, having indeed a husband, Adam, but being nevertheless 
as yet a virgin [virgo tamen adhuc exsistens]. For in Paradise ‘they were both 
naked, and were not ashamed’, inasmuch as they, having been created a short 
time previously [quoniam paulo ante facti], had no understanding of the 
procreation of children: for it was necessary that they should first come to 
adult age [opportebat enim primo illos adolescere], and then multiply from 
that time onward.72 
 
As noted above, the introduction of Adam and Eve as children serves Irenaeus’ 
larger maturation motif. The linking of these two themes finds full expression in an 
extended passage of Adversus haereses (a portion of which we have already seen above). 
Irenaeus writes,  
 
But created things must be inferior to him who created them, from the very 
fact of their later origin [ta. de. gegono,ta kaqo. Mete,peita gene,sewj ἀrxhn 
ἰdi,an e;sce]; for it was not possible for things recently created to have been 
uncreated. But inasmuch as they are not uncreated, for this very reason do 
they come short of the perfect [ùsterou/ntai tou/ τελείου]. Because, as these 
things are of later date, so are they infantile [νήπια]; so are they 
unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline. For just as it 
certainly is in the power of a mother to give strong food to her infant 
[bre,fei], but the [infant] is not yet able to receive substantial nourishment; so 
also it was possible for God himself to have made humanity perfect from the 
first, but humanity could not receive this, being as yet a child [nh,pioj]… 
And on this account does Paul declare to the Corinthians, ‘I have fed 
you with milk, not with meat, for hitherto ye were not able to bear it’….so, in 
like manner, God had power at the beginning to grant perfection to humanity 
[dido,nai to. teleion τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ]; but as the latter was only recently created, 
                                                         
72 Haer. 3.22.4. Notably Irenaeus does not associate procreation with human sinfulness. 
Procreative sexuality is the destiny of Adam and Eve when they reach adulthood. Irenaeus, unlike 
many of the later Christian writers, does not rail against sex and sexual desire; what we find in Epid. 
14 above is about as critical as he gets—which is to say, not very critical. Irenaeus’ desire to 
preserve the goodness of the human body and of the material world prevents him from becoming 
overly critical of sexuality. See Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology, 209, who rightly observes, ‘For 
Irenaeus, sexuality is a fundamental characteristic of human existence as a fleshly being, a 





he could not possibly have received it, or even if he had received it, could he 
have contained it, or containing it, could he have retained it. It was for this 
reason that the Son of God, although he was perfect [te,leioj ὢν], passed 
through the state of childhood [sunenhpi,azen] in common with the rest of 
humanity, partaking of it thus not for his own benefit, but for that of the 
infantile stage of humanity’s existence [avlla. dia. to. tou/ avnqrw,pou  nh,pion 
ou[tw cwrou,menoj], in order that humanity might be able to receive him [ẁj 
a;nqrwpoj auvto.n cwrei/n hvdu,nato]. There was nothing, therefore, impossible 
to and deficient in God, [implied in the fact] that humanity was not an 
uncreated being; but this merely applied to them who were lately created, 
[namely] humanity.73 
 
For Irenaeus, the concept of human infancy explains how humanity is simultaneously 
good and in need of growth; complete and yet moving toward completion. As Lawson rightly 
observes, the human infancy motif in Irenaeus ‘lights up his work’, 74 and allows us to see 
how Irenaeus is able to both preserve the goodness of the original creation, while at the same 
time making room for genuine progress beyond original perfection.    
But most salient for our purposes, this theme also shapes the opening of Irenaeus’ 
biblical narrative. Here, direct relevance regarding the role of the Devil comes into focus. 
The infancy of Adam and Eve becomes for Irenaeus an explanation for the occasion of 
Genesis 3 and the success of the Devil in his temptation of Adam and Eve. For Irenaeus, it is 
because Adam and Eve were infants at the time of creation that they were so easily deceived 
by the Devil. Irenaeus writes, 
 
Therefore, having made the man75 lord [kurioj] of the earth and of 
everything that is in it, [God] secretly appointed him as lord over those 
[angels] who were servants [dou/loi] in it. They, however, were in their full 
development, while the lord, that is the man, was very little, for he was an 
infant, and it was necessary for him to reach full development [karelut’iwn] 
                                                         
73 Haer. 4.38.1-2.  
74 Lawson, Biblical Theology, 213. Lawson helpfully continues, ‘Irenaeus does not indeed 
explicitly say that there is one perfection of the infant, innocent, and complete in every faculty 
appropriate to infancy, and another perfection, which is the crown of the saint who has contended 
with sin and triumphed. This vital distinction is, however, not far from being implied by what is said 
of Adam as on the one hand perfect, and on the other hand, as possessed only of the destiny and 
equipment to perfection’. 
75 ‘Man’ in this passage is a reference to Adam specifically, rather than a general reference 




by growing 76….But the man was a little one, and his discretion still 
underdeveloped, wherefore also he was easily misled by the deceiver.77 
 
The infancy of humanity at creation serves to highlight the egregious nature of the 
Devil’s assault upon humanity. The Devil (as we will see in the following chapters) was 
appointed by God to care for and steward the material world on behalf of humanity—the 
world’s rightful lords. Rather than faithfully fulfilling this stewardship, the Devil took 
advantage of humanity’s weakness and exploited it for his own gain. Irenaeus will go on to 
assign the fall of the world and the birth of sin most fully to the Devil, for the Devil was in 
his full development, while Adam and Eve were mere children. As such, Irenaeus interprets 
the divine cursing of Genesis 3 to be directed chiefly at the Devil; Adam and Eve are only 
cursed indirectly via the curse of the ground and childbearing.78  
The significance of this infancy narrative vis-à-vis the Devil is helpfully elucidated 
when set in contrast to John Milton’s later retelling of the Devil’s fall in his Paradise Lost. 
For Milton the Devil’s envy is directed toward Christ—a power mightier than himself. The 
initial conflict in heaven—short as it is—results in the Devil’s expulsion from Paradise and 
banishment to hell. From hell, the Devil plots his futile war against the greater divine power. 
This narrative has resulted in a long history of interpreters who view Milton’s Devil as a 
tragic and sympathetic figure—a Spartacus against the immovable might of the Roman 
Empire.79 He is doomed to failure, yet bravely contends for his autonomy and self-rule. God 
is the indomitable Creator who crushes the smaller creature beneath his feet. It is doubtful in 
my estimation that Milton intended his account of the Devil to be read in such a way; in any 
case, it is certain that Irenaeus did not. There is nothing tragic in Irenaeus’ account of the 
Devil, nothing admirable. For Irenaeus, the Devil betrayed his charge and took advantage of 
those who were weaker than himself—the very persons who were depending upon him. The 
Devil is the greater power crushing the lesser power, unprovoked and unjustly.80  
                                                         
76 Smith remarks, ‘The [Armenian] word so rendered is karelut’iwn, which would mean 
“possibility”. See his Proof, 150. 
77 Epid. 12. Steenberg’s translation does not include the last sentence of this paragraph. Here 
we follow Robinson’s translation.   
78 Haer. 3.23.5. 
79 Forsyth comments, ‘A sign of Satan’s power [in Paradise Lost] is the way some editors 
fill their commentaries with anxious notes warning us against deciding it in his favor’. See Forsyth, 
‘Satan’ in the Cambridge Companion to Paradise Lost, 17. For such sympathetic readings, see 
Steadman, ‘The Idea of Satan as the Hero of “Paradise Lost”’, 253-294. For a concise summary of 
sympathetic interpretations of the Devil in Milton, see Shawcross, ‘An Early View of Satan as Hero 
of Paradise Lost’, 104-5; also Russell, Mephistopheles, 97-99.  C. S. Lewis argues persuasively 
against a sympathetic reading in his Preface to Paradise Lost, 73-81, 94-103. 
80 Irenaeus’ account stands in contrast with Tertullian on this point. For Tertullian, humanity 
was created in power and glory, as bearers of the image of God. The Devil resorts to subterfuge 




VI. Humanity as Ruler of the World and Angels 
 
Fundamental to our understanding of Irenaeus’ account of humanity is the manner in 
which Irenaeus frames up humanity as the original and eschatological rulers over the 
material world and the angelic realm. In the opening chapters of Epideixis, Irenaeus 
introduces Adam (and thus humanity) as the appointed ruler of the material world and the 
angels in it. He writes,  
 
Moreover he [Adam] was free and self-controlled, being made by God for 
this end, that he might rule all those things that were upon the earth. And this 
great created world, prepared by God before the formation of humanity, was 
given to the man as his place, with all things whatsoever in it.81 And there 
were in this place also with [their] tasks the servants of that God who formed 
all things; and the steward, who was set over all his fellow-servants received 
this place. Now the servants were angels, and the steward was the archangel. 
Therefore, having made the man lord [kurioj] of the earth and of everything 
that is in it, [God] secretly appointed him [i.e. Adam] as lord over those 
[angels] who were servants [dou/loi] in it’.82 
 
Irenaeus begins his creation account with a statement that Adam was lord of the 
earth, and likewise lord of the ‘steward’ and the other servants (i.e. the Devil and his 
angels).83 As we have seen above, this lordship was not fully realized at the beginning of 
creation, due to humanity’s infancy. Yet the clear trajectory of humanity in Irenaeus’ 
narrative is toward exaltation and lordship over both the material world and the steward 
(soon to be Devil).84 
                                                         
the seducer; but then the victim of that seduction was free, and master of himself; and as being the 
image and likeness of God, was stronger than any angel; and as being, too, the afflatus of the divine 
being, was nobler than that material spirit of which angels were made’, Tertullian, Marc. 2.8. And 
again in 2.9, ‘Undoubtedly, when you demand for it [the soul] an equality with God, that is, a 
freedom from fault, I contend that it is infirm. But when the comparison is challenged with an angel, 
I am compelled to maintain that the head over all things is the stronger of the two, to whom the 
angels are ministers, who is destined to be the judge of angels, if he shall stand fast in the law of 
God—an obedience which he refused at first’. 
81 See no. 58 in Chapter One for the translation of this phrase.  
82 Epid. 11-12. 
83 For the Devil as ‘steward’ in this passage see the following chapter of this dissertation.  
84 Thus Wingren rightly remarks, ‘There was no creature within creation who stood over 
man—and it was this pre-eminent life which Satan had succeeded in obtaining by false pretense and 




This positioning of humanity will serve as an organizing principle in the rest of 
Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative. Though humanity is the rightful ruler of both the material 
and celestial realms,85 the first human pair is deceived by the Devil and forfeits their rule.  
Immediately following the Devil’s assault upon humanity God sets about to undo the 
Devil’s work; the divine plan will not be thwarted by the Devil’s apostasy. For Irenaeus, it is 
absolutely essential that humanity becomes what God intended it to be from the start—
namely the ruler of the earth and all things in it.86 Irenaeus writes,  
 
For it is just [iustum] that in that very creation in which they toiled or were 
afflicted, being proved in every way by suffering, they should receive the 
reward of their suffering; and that in the creation in which they were 
slain because of their love to God, in that they should be revived [vivificari] 
again; and that in the creation in which they endured servitude [servitutem], in 
that they should reign in it [in ipsa regnare eos]. For God is rich in all things, 
and all things are his. It is fitting, therefore, that the creation itself, being 
restored to its primeval [pristinum] condition, should without restraint be 
under the dominion of the righteous [sine prohibitione servire iustis].87  
 
Irenaeus goes on in the above passage to quote Paul in Romans 8:19-21, clearly 
linking together the exaltation of humanity with the renewal of the material world. The 
restoration of humanity to the world’s throne means the restoration of creation.  
Likewise for Irenaeus, the restoration of humanity coincides with humanity’s victory 
over the Devil. The scope of humanity’s original lordship was not merely terrestrial, but 
extended into the celestial realm. Just as humanity must once again assume dominion over 
the material world, so too over the angelic world. In this vein, for Irenaeus it is not sufficient 
that God qua God defeat the Devil and undo the curse of death. The Devil had defeated 
humanity, and by humanity must be defeated. ‘For if humankind had not overcome the 
enemy of humankind, the enemy would not have been justly overcome’ [Si enim homo non 
                                                         
85 For Irenaeus, the original scope of humanity’s rule over the angels seems limited to those 
angels specifically tasked with caring for the material world. Irenaeus acknowledges other angelic 
‘powers’ and ‘thrones’ beyond the Devil and his angels, but it does not seem that Irenaeus intends 
humanity’s initial lordship to extend beyond the domain of the earth into the whole of the ‘seven 
heavens’. See Epid. 9-10. Of course, the final mature lordship of humanity-in-Christ would extend as 
far as Christ’s earthly and heavenly rule, to include the whole of the angelic realm.  
86 So Wingren, ‘When man becomes man and reaches his destination, God’s decree for 
Creation is fulfilled. And it is an integral part of this original decree that man is to “rule” all other 
living creatures on earth’. Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 184. 




vicisset inimicum hominis, non iuste victus esset inimicus].88 And with specific reference to 
humanity’s future conquest of the Devil, Irenaeus writes,  
 
For this end did he put enmity between the serpent and the woman and her 
seed, they keeping it up mutually: he,89 the sole of whose foot should be 
bitten, having power also to tread upon the enemy's head; but the other biting, 
killing, and impeding the steps of humanity, until the seed did come appointed 
to tread down his head, [the seed] which was born of Mary, of which the 
prophet speaks: ‘Thou shalt tread upon the asp and the basilisk; thou shalt 
trample down the lion and the dragon’;90 indicating that sin, which was set up 
and spread out against humanity, and which rendered them subject to death, 
should be deprived of its power, along with death, which rules; and that the 
lion, that is, Antichrist, rampant against humanity in the latter days, should be 
trampled down by him; and that he should bind ‘the dragon, that old serpent’91 
and subject him to the power of humanity, who had been conquered so that all 
his might should be trodden down [et subiciens potestati hominis qui fuerat 
victus ad calcandam eius omnem virtutem].92 
 
This victory, of course, is accomplished in Christ—the perfect human being. But it 
must be noted that for Irenaeus, Christ’s lordship over the material world and the angelic 
                                                         
88 Haer. 3.18.7. Beyond this passage, Irenaeus speaks of  the Devil being ‘justly’ overcome 
in Haer. 3.23.1, 5.1.1, 5.2.1, 5.21.1, 5.21.3. It is generally agreed that Irenaeus did not hold to a 
ransom theory of atonement, wherein Christ’s death constituted payment to the Devil. See Rivière, 
‘La mort du Christ et la justice envers le démon’, 57-60, and Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 173-
74. The idea that Satan had a just claim upon humanity because of sin is not found in Irenaeus. For 
Irenaeus, the Devil is an imposter, an unlawful tyrant who unjustly stole what did not belong to him. 
Thus Haer. 5.24.4., ‘Just as if any one, being an apostate, and seizing in a hostile manner another 
man's territory, should harass the inhabitants of it, in order that he might claim for himself the glory 
of a king among those ignorant of his apostasy and robbery; so likewise also the Devil, being one 
among those angels who are placed over the spirit of the air, as the Apostle Paul has declared in his 
Epistle to the Ephesians, becoming envious of man, was rendered an apostate from the divine law’. 
God owes Satan nothing, for Satan is a thief and a robber; the Devil possesses humanity ‘unjustly’ 
(Haer. 5.1.1, 5.21.3). It was fitting and proper that since the Devil was the cause of humanity’s 
undoing, humanity would be the cause of the Devil’s undoing. Steenberg rightly comments, ‘There 
can be no doubts that for Irenaeus the devil possessed the human race and ruled over it unjustly, 
holding no genuine rights over humanity, and God was not obliged to him in any way’. Steenberg 
goes on to effectively show that here and throughout such passages, iustum has the meaning of 
‘proper’ or ‘fitting’. See Steenberg’s comments in volume 64 of ACW, 173-75, no. 42. See also 
Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 128-29, who similarly argues that for Irenaeus, the Devil had no just 
claim over humanity; Christ’s death is not a ransom paid to the Devil.  
89 Lat. illo, a reference to Jesus Christ and Gen 3:15.  
90 Psa 91:13.  
91 Rev 12:9.  




realm is not in place of humanity’s lordship. Rather it is in and through Christ that humanity 
regains its place of dominion. Indeed Adam himself must become all that God intended, lest 
Paul’s prophetic word in 1 Corinthians 15:54-55 regarding Christ’s victory over death fall to 
the ground.93  
We are, of course, getting ahead of ourselves in Irenaeus’ narrative. I will press this 
point further in the next chapter when we discuss Irenaeus’ soteriology. But for now, it is 
sufficient to note that humanity’s lordship over the material and angelic realms serves as the 
backdrop for the Devil’s envy of humanity. Humanity was created ‘higher’ than the angels, 




VII. Absence of ‘Angelic Soteriology’ 
 
Following closely on the heels of the above point is the notable absence of what one 
might call ‘angelic soteriology’ in Irenaeus. By ‘angelic soteriology’ I here refer to the idea, 
especially prevalent in Irenaeus’ Gnostic opponents as well as the later Christian tradition, 
that the soteriological goal of humanity is to become like the angels.94 This idea has no place 
in Irenaeus’ soteriology precisely because it has no place in his anthropology.95 
Undoubtedly Irenaeus’ fierce contest with the Gnostics, who aggressively and explicitly 
maintained an ‘angelic soteriology’, helped push his anthropology in anthropocentric and 
terrestrial directions. For Irenaeus, the soteriological goal of redemption is not to become 
like the angels, but rather to transcend the angels—as God intended all along—and to 
become fully human.  
While stopping short of the full blown Gnostic account, examples of angelic 
soteriology can be found all throughout the writings of Tertullian, Clement, Origen, 
Augustine, and beyond—all the way to Anselm (who, like Augustine, speculates that 
                                                         
93 See Haer. 3.23.7. 
94 I am using the term ‘angelic soteriology’ to refer primarily to ontology, i.e. that the goal of 
salvation is for human beings to shed or modify their humanity such that they become ontologically 
like the angels. But it is important to distinguish between ontology and function with respect to the 
term ‘angel’. Irenaeus on a number of occasions (most especially with reference to Isa. 9:6) refers to 
Christ as an ‘angel’. Here he has in mind Christ’s function as a divine ‘messenger’, rather than any 
ontological status. See Junker, ‘Christ as Angel’, 238-45. The Gnostics, however, most typically 
seem to use the term ‘angel’ in an ontological sense to denote ontological superiority of angels over 
humans. It is this latter sense that underlies my use of the phrase ‘angelic soteriology.’  
95 Thus Behr rightly notes, ‘Neither in protology nor in eschatology does Irenaeus ever 




humans were created to make up for the number of fallen angels). 96  Short samples from 
Tertullian and from the Martyrdom of Polycarp are sufficient to illustrate the point: 
Tertullian writes, ‘Wherefore we can now recall to our own minds, and remind the heretics 
also, that he has promised that he will one day form humans into angels, who once formed 
angels into humans’.97 Tertullian again: ‘You are about to pass through a noble struggle, in 
which the living God acts the part of superintendent, in which the Holy Ghost is your 
trainer, in which the prize is an eternal crown of angelic essence, citizenship in the heavens, 
glory everlasting’.98  
The same sort of sentiment can be found in the Martyrdom of Polycarp. ‘For they 
kept before their view escape from that fire which is eternal and never shall be quenched, 
and looked forward with the eyes of their heart to those good things which are laid up for 
such as endure; things “which ear hath not heard, nor eye seen, neither have entered into the 
heart of man,” but were revealed by the Lord to them, inasmuch as they were no longer 
men, but had already become angels’.99  
The entire thrust of Irenaeus’ anthropology runs against such sentiments. For 
Irenaeus, the pinnacle of God’s creation is humanity. The creature made in the image and 
likeness of God knows no equal save the one after whose image he is fashioned. Angels, 
however exalted, fall short of human glory, indeed cannot even comprehend it. Irenaeus 
writes,  
 
For there is the one Son, who accomplished his Father’s will; and one human 
race also in which the mysteries of God are wrought, ‘which the angels desire 
to look into’;100 and they [i.e. the angels] are not able to search out the 
wisdom of God, by means of which his handiwork [i.e. humanity], confirmed 
and incorporated with his Son, is brought to perfection; that his offspring, the 
first-begotten Word, should descend to the creature, that is, to what had been 
                                                         
96 For examples of angelic soteriology, see Herm. 3.9.25, 27; Tertullian, Res. 36, 42, An. 56; 
Clement, Paed. 2.10, Strom. 6.13, 7.10, 12, 14; Origen, Cels. 4.29, Comm. Jo. 2.16; Comm. Matt. 
12.30; Augustine, Civ. 11.15, 12.16, 22, 22.1; Aquinas, Sum. 1.62.5, and 1.93.3, where Aquinas 
states that angels, insofar as they are endowed with a higher intellect than humans, are in some ways 
more in the image of God than humanity; and Anselm Cur. 1.16-18. 
97 Tertullian, Marc. 3.9.  
98 Tertullian, Ad mart. 3. Tertullian's idea that we become like angels at the resurrection is 
not a denial of the resurrection of the body. He affirms the resurrection of the flesh throughout his 
writings, and is more careful elsewhere to insist that we do not actually become angels (see Res. 62). 
But his repeated emphasis that the highpoint of salvation is to become like the angels pushes his 
soteriology in a celestial rather than terrestrial direction. Irenaeus’ anthropology prevents this 
soteriological direction at the outset.  
99 Mart. Pol. 2.  




molded [plasma], and that it should be taken hold of by him; and, on the 
other hand, the creature should take hold of the Word [capiat Verbum], and 
ascend to him, [et ascendat ad eum] passing beyond the angels 
[supergrediens angelos], and be made after the image and likeness of God.101  
 
Being created according to the image and likeness of God gives humanity its exalted 
status with respect to the rest of creation. Humanity, in so far as it ‘takes hold of’ the Word 
of God, ascends beyond the angels. Here we probably read Irenaeus correctly if we interpret 
him to teach that humanity transcends the entire angelic host, not merely the ‘steward and 
his angels’. And again, in a striking passage that we have already seen, Irenaeus positions 
Adam as ontologically superior to the Devil. He writes,  
 
How, too, could he [Christ] have subdued him [the Devil] who was strong 
against the human [qui adversus hominem fortis erat], who has not only 
overcome the human, but also retained him under his power [qui non solum 
vicit hominem, sed et detinebat eum sub sua potestate], and conquered him 
who had conquered, while he set free humankind who had been conquered, 
unless he had been greater than the human who had been vanquished [nisi 
superior fuisset eo homine qui fuerat victus]? But who else should be 
superior to, and more eminent than that human who was formed after the 
likeness of God [Melior autem eo homine qui secundum similitudinem Dei 
factus est et praecellentior quisnam sit alius], except the Son of God, after 
whose likeness the human was created [nisi Filius Dei, ad cuius 
similitudinem factus est homo]?102  
 
A lofty anthropology indeed! Only the Son of God himself is ‘superior to, and more 
eminent’ than the human who was formed after the likeness of God. While the Devil was 
‘strong against the human’ in the beginning, due to humanity’s infancy, this superior 
strength was short lived and destined to be eclipsed. This exalted view of humanity as 
ontologically superior to the angels has obvious relevance for Irenaeus’ Devil narrative, 




                                                         
101 Haer. 5.36.3. 






Irenaeus’s anthropology is remarkable for its consistent affirmation of the 
goodness—indeed preeminence—of humanity. For Irenaeus, humanity is the highest of all 
of God’s creatures, uniquely sharing in the image and likeness of God. This exalted status is 
not merely positional, but is ontological. The human being is not merely a lowly creature 
treated as though he or she were something special; in the divine ordering of creation 
humanity is truly special, for only humanity participates in the divine life via union with the 
Word.  
The relevance of all of this for our examination of Irenaeus’ Devil narrative becomes 
plain when we understand that for Irenaeus, the Devil’s fall takes place due to envy of the 
first man and woman. Without an awareness of Irenaeus’ anthropology, the Devil’s envy of 
humanity seems out of place. But once we consider the high status of humanity in Irenaeus’ 
divine economy, the cohesiveness of Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative becomes plain.  




















































The Devil’s Pre-Fall Identity: Temporary Angelic Steward of Creation 
 
‘What is man, that you are mindful of him, or the son of man, that you care for him? You 





Having surveyed the basic contours of Irenaeus’ cosmology and anthropology, we 
are now positioned to see how Irenaeus’ account of the Devil coheres with his doctrine of 
Creation. For Irenaeus, the Devil was not always the Devil. Irenaeus, like other early 
Christian writers, posits a ‘fall’ in which the Devil loses his place in the heavens and 
becomes the enemy of God, of the good angels, and of humanity. Irenaeus does not offer us 
an exhaustive portrait of the Devil’s pre-fall identity, which is consistent with his general 
anti-speculative posture. Yet given the paucity of scriptural information available on the 
topic, he has more to say on this matter than we might otherwise expect.1   
Here in this chapter I provide an overview of the Devil’s identity prior to his fall, as 
described by Irenaeus, with particular attention to those aspects of the Devil’s pre-fall 
identity and status that influence the overall direction of Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative. 
Irenaeus’ account of the pre-fall Devil includes five notable features: 1) The Devil began as 
an archangel, 2) the Devil was a servant of God, 3) the Devil was the chief steward of the 
material world, 4) the Devil was limited in power and knowledge, and most significantly, 5) 
the Devil was destined to be subject to humanity. 
Insofar as the Devil is a vital character in Irenaeus’ soteriological plotline, these five 
elements of the Devil’s pre-fall identity provide the necessary backstory for understanding 
the Devil’s subsequent motivation and activity in Irenaeus’ narrative—especially with 
respect to the Devil’s assault upon humanity.  
We begin with a general account of Irenaeus’ angelology.   
 
                                                         
1 Whatever the origins of Irenaeus’ narrative, it is clear that he has not constructed it whole 
cloth; significant pieces of Irenaeus’ pre-fall account of the Devil can be found in earlier Christian 
writers. See Ignatius, Rom. 5, Trall. 4.2; Papias, Frag. 11, 24; Justin, 2 Apol. 5; Tatian, Graec. 7; 
Anthenagoras, Leg. 10, 24, 25; and Theophilus, Autol. 2.28-29. No single one of these authors 
mirrors exactly Irenaeus’ account of the pre-fall Devil, yet the similarities are too alike to be a 
coincidence. The extent to which Irenaeus was immediately aware of these works, or only 
derivatively influenced, is difficult to determine. See Appendix B of this thesis for an extended 
discussion about the possible influences that shaped Irenaeus’ account of the Devil, as well as the 





I. Irenaeus’ Angelology 
 
Fundamental to Irenaeus’ perspective on the Devil is the idea that the Devil began as 
one of the angelic host, a ‘creature of God, like the other angels’.2 Insofar as the Devil began 
as an angel, all that Irenaeus says regarding angels has application by extension to the Devil. 
In what follows, I offer a detailed account of Irenaeus’ larger angelology, with particular 
attention to how this shapes Irenaeus’ understanding of the Devil’s pre-fall identity. This 
general analysis of Irenaeus’ angelology is followed by a narrower examination of the Devil 
as pre-fallen archangel. Four general features of Irenaeus’ angelology can be observed: 1) 
excessive speculation about the nature of angels should be avoided, 2) the angels are 
expressions of God’s great power, 3) the angels are servants of God, and 4) the angels are 
caretakers of the material world.3  
 
A. Excessive Speculation about the Nature of Angels Should Be Avoided 
 
For Irenaeus, angels are spiritual beings, created by God to reside in the heavens. 
‘Now this world is encompassed by seven heavens, in which dwell powers and angels and 
archangels, doing service to God, the Almighty who created all things’.4 The angels, then, 
are spiritual beings made directly by God.5 Their primary abode is the heavens, and their 
primary function is to perform service to God. Beyond this, Irenaeus is not particularly 
interested in explicating the mysteries of the heavenly beings or their realm, and he roundly 
criticizes the Gnostics for their excessive speculation about the Pleroma.6   
Yet Gnostic fascination with the Pleroma compels Irenaeus to comment on the 
nature of the angelic beings and their relationship to the Creator.7 In doing so, he 
                                                         
2 Haer. 4.41.1. For a list of references about the Devil as an angel in Irenaeus, see the chart 
in the Appendix B. The idea that the Devil began as an angel is not original to Irenaeus. See Justin, 
Dial. 79; Tatian, Graec. 7; Athenagoras, Leg. 24; and Theophilus, Autol. 2.28. Russell, Satan, 78 
notes that this view was fixed in the Christian tradition from Theophilus onward (c. 170). Russell’s 
comment implies that there were alternative early Christian perspectives on the Devil’s origin. 
However, I am not aware of any ancient Christian writer (here we exclude Gnostic writings) before 
or after Irenaeus who offered an alternative understanding of the Devil’s original ontology. 
3 Irenaeus’ angelology is generally consistent with late Jewish and early Christian thought. 
See Thackeray, St. Paul, 172-79; Anderson, Genesis of Perfection, 21-41.  
4 Epid. 9.  
5 That God himself directly created the angels, see also Haer. 2.28.7, 2.30.3. This is in 
contrast to many Gnostic accounts, wherein the angels come into being only indirectly by the 
‘Father’, and apart from his will.  
6 Haer. 1.11.4. 
7 In many Gnostic systems, the angels were the framers of the material world, and the 




underscores his primary point that detailed information about the angelic hosts lies outside 
the purview of human knowledge. In an extended section of the second book of Adversus 
haereses, Irenaeus critiques the Gnostic quest for secret knowledge. Some things, Irenaeus 
tell us, are known only to God. Questions such as, ‘What was God doing before he made the 
world?’8 or, ‘How was the Son produced by the Father?’9 are questions about which 
‘Scripture has not informed us, nor has an apostle told us, nor has the Lord taught us. It 
becomes us, therefore, to leave the knowledge of [such matters] to God…’10 
 
In like manner, also, we must leave the cause why, while all things were 
made by God, certain of his creatures sinned and revolted [transgressa sunt 
et abscesserunt] from a state of submission to God, and others, indeed the 
great majority, persevered, and do still persevere, in subjection to him who 
formed them, and also of what nature [naturae] those are who sinned, and 
of what nature [naturae] those who persevere,—[we must, I say, leave the 
cause of these things] to God and his Word, to whom alone he said, ‘Sit at 
my right hand, until I make your enemies your footstool’. But as for us, we 
still dwell upon the earth, and have not yet sat down upon his throne.11 
  
For Irenaeus, we should not be surprised that we cannot penetrate the mystery of 
heavenly things—such as the nature of the angels who fell, and the nature of those who 
persevered—when we have not yet mastered earthly things. ‘And there is no cause for 
wonder if this is the case with us as respects things spiritual and heavenly, and such as 
require to be made known to us by revelation, since many even of those things which lie at 
our very feet (I mean such as belongs to this world, which we handle, and see, and are in 
close contact with) transcend our knowledge, so that even these we must leave to God’.12  
That the Scriptures declare the existence of angels is plain enough, but substantive 
knowledge of the angelic realm has not been revealed by God, and thus is not to be a matter 
of speculation. MacKenzie aptly summarizes Irenaeus’ approach: ‘…to indulge in such 
                                                         
Saturninus, and Basilides; see Haer. 1.23.3-4, 24.4). But Gnostic accounts could also depict the 
angels in a positive light. In the Valentinian system, at least some angels are portrayed positively as 
the ‘body guards’ of Jesus, having the same nature as Jesus. See Haer. 1.2.6. And some angels were 
associated with the seven heavens, with each heaven being an intelligent being. See Haer. 1.5.2.  
8 Haer. 2.28.3. 
9 Haer. 2.28.6.  
10 Haer. 2.28.7. Here Irenaeus follows the spirit of Deuteronomy 29:29 without quoting it: 
‘The secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the things revealed to us and to our children 
forever…’ 
11 Haer. 2.28.7.  




speculations, even if they were within his theological priorities and approval, which they 
were not, would give opportunity for gnostic exploitation, the very tendency which he 
opposed’.13 We who dwell upon the ‘footstool’ should not expect to understand all that 
happens upon the throne. Those who presume to know more than is possible in this age (i.e. 
the Gnostics) cast themselves headlong into error, arrogance, and ultimately judgment.  
This epistemically modest approach to the angelic realm helps to temper excessive 
speculation by Irenaeus regarding the Devil. The bulk of what Irenaeus has to say about the 
Devil finds its origin in various New Testament passages—especially the gospels and 
Revelation. And for the most part, Irenaeus’ comments do not attempt to ‘go beyond’ the 
scriptural content. Like knowledge of the angels, knowledge of the Devil belongs to the 
world above the footstool. Only with respect to the Devil’s origin and motivation for 
tempting humanity do we see Irenaeus reaching beyond Scripture. And even here Irenaeus 
seems to be drawing upon an already established tradition within early Christianity (more on 
this to follow in Appendix B).   
 
 
B. Angels as Expressions of God’s Power 
 
While it is impossible to arrive at an exhaustive knowledge of the angels, Irenaeus 
nonetheless views them as significant manifestations of God’s greatness and power. In his 
polemic against the Gnostics, Irenaeus offers the angelic hosts as evidence of the Creator’s 
superiority over the ‘enlightened’ Gnostic teachers. The Gnostics maintained that they had 
achieved a state of enlightenment that was superior to the earthly demiurge. Irenaeus 
recounts their scheme: 
 
For they themselves, in as far as they are souls, remain in the intermediate 
place; while, in as far as they are body, they will be consumed with the rest 
of matter. Such being the state of the case, these infatuated men declare that 
they rise above the Creator [demiurgum]; and, inasmuch as they proclaim 
themselves superior to that God who made and adorned the heavens, and the 
earth, and all things that are in them, and maintain that they themselves are 
spiritual, while they are in fact shamefully carnal on account of their so great 
impiety,—affirming that he, who has made his angels spirits [angelos suos 
spiritus], and is clothed with light as with a garment, and holds the circle of 
                                                         




the earth, as it were, in his hand, in whose sight its inhabitants are counted as 
grasshoppers, and who is the Creator and Lord [demiurgum et Dominum] 
also of all spiritual substance [et universae spiritalis substantiae], is of an 
animal nature,—they do beyond doubt and verily betray their own madness.14  
 
Irenaeus concludes this passage with the following challenge to the Gnostic teachers: 
‘The superior person is to be proved by his deeds. In what way, then, can they show 
themselves superior to the Creator?’ In answering his own question, Irenaeus provides a 
litany of God’s accomplishments, not unlike what we find in the latter chapters of Job. 
Throughout, Irenaeus appeals to the wonders of creation. God has made the earth and called 
into existence the stars and planets; he brings rain and snow and frost, each of which is 
suited to its season; likewise, he brings heat and dryness. He has made the rivers and the 
fountains, the flowers and the trees. He has created the multitude of animals—some rational 
and others irrational, but all adorned with beauty.15 Notably, Irenaeus’ defense of God’s 
power reaches its climax with a description of the heavenly hosts. Irenaeus writes,  
 
And who can enumerate one by one all the remaining objects which have 
been constituted by the power of God, and are governed by his wisdom? Or 
who can search out the greatness of that God who made them? And what can 
be told of those existences which are above heaven, and which do not pass 
away, such as Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Dominions, and Powers 
innumerable [Angeli, Archangeli, Throni, Dominationes, Potestates 
innumerabiles]? Against what one of these works, then, do they [the 
Gnostics] set themselves in opposition? What have they similar to show, as 
having been made through themselves, or by themselves, since even they too 
are the workmanship and creatures of this [Creator]?16   
 
For Irenaeus then, the angelic powers have been created by God as a high expression 
of his divine power. Though they are not to be objects of worship, or of excessive 
speculation, the angels nonetheless clearly convey God’s greatness and transcendence—
                                                         
14 Haer. 2.29.3-2.30.2.  
15 It is not likely that Irenaeus’ logic here would have been immediately convincing to the 
Gnostics, who viewed the material world as inherently corrupt. For the Gnostics, the fact that 
Irenaeus’ God was the Creator and Lord of the material world was not a mark in his favor, but rather 
evidence of his corruption. Irenaeus attempts to tightens his argument in 2.30.6, but it is doubtful any 
but the already convinced would have found his logic compelling. 
16 Haer.  2.30.3. See also 3.8.3, where Irenaeus again uses the angels as evidence of God’s 




especially over and against the Gnostic teachers. It is from this class of beings that the Devil 
emerges. As such, the Devil once possessed in himself the capacity to show forth God’s 
great power. And he still does after his rebellion—even if not to his credit. Just as God 
shows forth his power through the creation of the angels, he will show forth his power 
though the destruction of the Devil and those who fell with him.  
 
 
C. Angels Are Servants of God 
 
Yet despite the greatness of angelic power, the angels, insofar as they are creatures, 
are subordinate to God. ‘[God] has a vast and unspeakable number of servants. For his 
offspring and his similitude do minister [ministrat] to him in every respect; that is the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, the Word and Wisdom; whom all angels serve [serviunt], and to whom 
they are subject’ [subiecti].17  
Notably, Irenaeus is keen to insist that God is self-subsisting. As such, the service 
rendered by the angels does not fill a vacancy in God. The angels serve God, not because he 
is in need of their service, but because they need to serve him. Irenaeus writes ‘…in [the 
heavens] dwell powers and angels and archangels, doing service to God,18 the Almighty and 
maker of all things: not as to one having need of anything, but lest they too19 be idle and 
useless and accursed’.20 The creature must orient his life around the Creator, for the sake of 
the creature.21  
The exact nature of the angel’s service is not made explicit by Irenaeus.22 Given 
Irenaeus’ adoption of the existing late Jewish/early Christian ‘seven-heaven’ cosmology, 
examples of which can be found in the Testamentum Levi and the Ascensio Isaiae, it is 
possible that he has something in mind similar to what we find in these two works. In the 
Testamentum Levi, the angels in the third heaven (from the bottom) are the angels who will 
execute God’s judgment upon the earth at the time of the apocalypse. In the fourth heaven 
                                                         
17 Haer. 4.7.4. 
18 Smith suggests, ‘giving homage’. Proof, 53. 
19 Smith sees an allusion to the rebel angels in ‘too’. Proof, 146-47, no. 57. Compare with 
Robinson’s translation, which leaves out the adverb, ‘but that they may not be idle…’  
20 Epid. 9. Compare Irenaeus’ logic here with a similar reason given by Justin for the temple 
sacrifices (Dial. 22), namely that offering sacrifices is not for God’s benefit, but for his people 
insofar as it keeps them away from idolatry.  
21 See MacKenzie’s helpful comments about angels as creatures of God. Demonstration, 
112. 
22 MacKenzie suggests that for Irenaeus, ‘the seven forms of service, represented by the 
seven heavens, are primarily and fundamentally the ways of the ministering relation of the Spirit to 




are the ‘thrones and dominions’ which offer hymns to God. At the next level are the angels 
who bear the prayers of the saints up to angels above, who in turn are the angels in the 
highest heaven who are in ‘the presence of the Lord. These highest angels minister and 
make propitiation to the Lord for all the ignorance of the righteous’.23 
Yet as noted above, Irenaeus is keen to avoid any speculation about angelic activity. 
As such, Irenaeus nowhere offers us even a modest level of detail about angelic activity 
such as we find in (for example) the Testamentum Levi. For Irenaeus, at least some of the 
angels were initially assigned to care for the material world (more on which below). And 
Irenaeus often quotes Scripture (typically without comment) that notes angelic activity (e.g. 
Gabriel appearing to Mary, angelic visitations to Peter and Cornelius, etc.). Beyond this, we 
are not told in detail exactly how the angels ‘minister’ to God. Yet the angels’ identity as 
‘servants’ is common throughout Irenaeus, and serves to underscore their subservient 
relationship to the Creator. The nature of this relationship will bear significantly on the 
Devil as one who was created to be a servant of God but who subsequently rebelled.  
 
 
D. Angels Are Caretakers of the Material World 
 
In many Gnostic schemes the angels are the makers and framers of the material 
world, along with the evil demiurge—who is himself one of the angels.24 But for Irenaeus, 
the angels are most certainly not the framers of the material world; as we have already seen, 
this task is reserved directly for God. Irenaeus writes,  
 
For the Son, who is the Word of God, arranged these things beforehand 
from the beginning [ab initio praestruebat], the Father being in no want of 
angels [non indigente Patre angelis], in order that he might call the creation 
into being, and form humanity, for whom also the creation was made; nor, 
again, standing in need of any instrumentality for the framing of created 
things, or for the ordering of those things which had reference to humanity; 
while, [at the same time,] he has a vast and unspeakable number of 
servants.25 
                                                         
23 See T. Levi. 3. Likewise Ascen. Isa.10 classifies the angels of each heaven as distinct, 
though we do not see what function they perform. Both works are dated by scholars between 100-
200 AD. Whether Irenaeus was aware of either is not certain. See Smith, Proof, 146 no. 57, who 
notes a number of similarities between Irenaeus and Ascension of Isaiah.  
24 Haer. 1.24.4. 





The angels are not the framers of the material world. Yet as servants of God, the 
angels do have an important role to play in administering the affairs of the cosmos. Irenaeus 
writes, ‘[God] has established with the Word the whole world, and the angels too are 
included in the world; and to the whole world he has given laws, that each one keep to his 
place and not overstep the boundary laid down by God, each accomplishing the work 
marked out for him’.26 The nature of this angelic ‘work’ is clarified in the next chapter. ‘In 
the domain [i.e. the world] were also, with their tasks, the servants of that God who 
fashioned all, and this domain was in the keeping of the steward,27 who was set over all his 
fellow servants. Now the servants were angels, but the steward the archangel’.28 The picture 
requires some piecing together, but Irenaeus appears to be suggesting that at least some of 
the angels—and the steward in particular—had the unique responsibility to care for the 
material world. The same idea is again mentioned briefly in Adversus haereses,  
 
Just as if any one, being an apostate, and seizing in a hostile manner another 
man’s territory, should harass the inhabitants of it, in order that he might 
claim for himself the glory of a king among those ignorant of his apostasy 
and robbery; so likewise also the Devil, being one among those angels who 
have been placed over the spirit of the air [sic autem et Diabolus, cum sit 
unus ex angelis his qui super spiritum aeris praepositi sunt], as the Apostle 
Paul has declared in his Epistle to the Ephesians’.29  
 
The spiritus aeris here is a reference to the lowest level of heaven, and is a reference 
to Satan and the angels who dwell in the firmament, and who thus presumably, from this 
position in the cosmos, exercise their stewardship over the material world.  
Our understanding of Irenaeus’ position here is informed by other early Christian 
writers, who explicitly taught some form of angelic stewardship over the material world. So 
Papias, ‘Some of them—obviously meaning those angels that once were holy—he assigned 
                                                         
26 Epid. 10. Irenaeus here seems to be making a distinction between terrestrial and celestial 
angels. See Smith, Proof, 148, no. 63.  
27 I am here following Robinson’s translation. Smith glosses the Armenian tnawren 
hazarapet as ‘administrator in chief’, suggesting an equivalent to oikono,moj cili,arcoj (colonel  
manager). See Smith, Proof, 150, no. 68. For the military and political associations with hazarapet, 
see Gignoux, ‘Chiliarch’, 423-24. Wilson and Mekerttschian suggest ‘Steward-Ruler’ here and 
throughout.  See their translation in PO, vol. 12, 668.   
28 Epid. 11.  




to rule over the orderly arrangements of the earth, and commissioned them to rule well’.30 
Likewise Justin, ‘God, when he had made the whole world . . . committed the care of 
humanity and of all things under heaven to angels whom he appointed over them’.31  And 
Athenagoras, Plea, 24, ‘For this is the office of the angels: to exercise providence for God 
over the things created and ordered by him, so that God may have the universal and general 
providence of the whole, while the particular parts are provided for by the angels appointed 
over them…’32 Taken together, it is likely that Irenaeus has something similar in mind when 
he speaks of the angels as serving God by ‘keeping’ the domain of the earth.33  But exactly 
what this care consisted of is not certain. In pre-first century Jewish thought the angels were 
said to have dominion over nations and peoples,34 but Irenaeus seems to suggest something 
different—since for Irenaeus, the angelic stewardship seems to be in effect from the very 
beginning of creation (and thus prior to nations and peoples). Was it the ordering of the 
powers of the natural world—the winds, the snows, the rivers, the oceans, etc.? Or perhaps 
watch-care of the animals?35 Irenaeus does not tell us.  
In any event, this care of the material world was, it appears, temporary. Irenaeus 
insists that the world was ultimately made for humanity. ‘And this world of creation, 
prepared by God before he fashioned the man,36 was given to the man as his domain,37 with 
all things whatsoever in it’.38 Yet the man, at the time of his creation was still a ‘little one’,39 
and not yet able to ‘be master of everything on earth’.40  The angels, however, were ‘in their 
                                                         
30 Papias, Frag. 11. Here it is the ‘earth angels’, i.e. the steward angels, that ‘once were 
holy’. The implication is that it was these angels in particular that fell. This fits neatly with Irenaeus’ 
account of the fall of the angels.  
31 Justin, 2 Apol. 5.  
32 Athenagoras, Leg. 24. See also 10, 25. 
33 However, see MacKenzie who argues for less similarity here between Irenaeus and Justin 
and Papias. For Mackenzie, Irenaeus is hesitant to assign the angels a stewardship role over the 
material world, since such a role would play into Gnostic cosmologies. ‘Irenaeus does not approach 
anything as definite as angelic dominion. Dominion could imply territory, and territory ownership, 
and ownership that the holder had created that domain. Irenaeus deliberately removed himself from 
such a train of thought; it was too near the tenants of the gnostic system’. Demonstration, 113. While 
I am sympathetic to MacKenzie’s point, based on Irenaeus’ comments, it seems he is content to 
work within the ‘angelic stewardship’ framework, even at the risk of it being deployed against him 
by his Gnostic opponents.   
34 See for example Daniel 10:13, 20 which makes reference to the ‘prince of Persia’ and the 
‘prince of Greece’ and to ‘Michael, your prince’ [i.e., Daniel’s]. Justin’s singular comment in 2 
Apol. 5 might point in this direction as well.  
35 Something along this line seems suggested in Herm. 1.4.2. 
36 Eve is not introduced until Epid. 13, indicating that Irenaeus has only Adam in mind when 
he references ‘man’. 
37 Smith views the Armenian vayr [domain] as the equivalent of to,poj. See Smith, Proof, 
149, no. 67.  
38 Epid. 11. See no. 58 in Chapter One for the translation of ‘all things whatsoever in it’. 
39 Epid. 12. See also Epid. 14. Reynders offers νήπιος and infans as the Greek and Latin 
parallels for the Armenian. See Reynders, Vocabulaire de la Demonstration et des Fragments, 52.  




full development’.41 The implication here is that it was the duty of (at least some) of the 
angels to keep and govern the world until such time as humanity came of age.42 
 Here Irenaeus is unique among the other early Christian writers. Papias, Justin, and 
Athenagoras, all who make some mention of angelic stewardship, do not speak of it as a 
temporary stewardship, nor do they mention Irenaeus’ human infancy perspective. Note, 
however, that the relevant passages from Papias, Justin, and Athenagoras comprise the sum 
of nearly all that remains extant regarding their views on angelic stewardship. As such, we 
do not find passages in these authors that explicitly deny the temporary nature of this 
stewardship; the paucity of their comments and their silence on the duration of the angelic 
stewardship cannot be taken as a refutation of Irenaeus’ position. Regardless, this aspect of 
Irenaeus’ angelology has significant implications for how he recounts the Devil’s fall and 
the subsequent conflict between the Devil and humanity.  
All of the above thus deepens our basic understanding of Irenaeus’ account of the 
Devil’s origin and ontology. Insofar as the Devil began as an angel, the Devil, like his 
angelic peers, began as a creature and servant of God, and a high expression of God’s great 
power. Having explored Irenaeus’ angelology more generally, we can now turn our attention 
to his more explicit comments regarding the Devil.  
 
 
II. The Devil Began as an Archangel 
 
For Irenaeus, the Devil began as an archangel over the other angels assigned to care 
for creation. ‘Now the servants were angels, but the steward the archangel’.43 As Irenaeus 
unfolds his narrative in the subsequent chapters of Epideixis, the ‘steward’ is clearly 
identified as the Devil.44 It is against this backdrop that we can understand the Devil as a 
fallen archangel. The Devil, even as an archangel, is not unique in ontology or power. As we 
have already seen in Epid. 9, Irenaeus frames up a ‘seven-heaven’ cosmology in which exist 
                                                         
41 Epid. 12.  
42 Irenaeus’ position on angelic stewardship is consistent with his account of the fall of the 
‘watcher angels’—the idea that the ‘sons of God’ in Genesis 6 were angelic stewards who fell 
because of their lust for human women, and the spirits of whose offspring became ‘demons’ (as 
distinct from fallen angels). See Epid. 18, Haer. 4.16.2, 36.4. The idea is sourced in 1 Enoch 1-36, 
and is likewise affirmed by Justin in 2 Apol. 5; Athenagoras, Leg. 24-25, Clement, Paed. 2.2; and 
Tertullian, Marc. 5.18, Idol. 4, 9, etc. See the chart on page 272 for all references. Notably, Irenaeus 
does not seem to view the Devil as one of these angels, but rather seems to view the Devil as their 
leader. For Irenaeus, the Devil ‘falls’ in Genesis 3 when he tempts Adam and Eve. For the 
relationship between Irenaeus and the Enoch tradition, see Schultz, ‘The Origin of Sin in Irenaeus’; 
for the watcher tradition more generally, see Bauckham, ‘The Fall of the Angels’.  
43 Epid. 11.  




many archangels. For Irenaeus, there ‘dwell powers and archangels, doing service to God’ 
throughout all seven heavens. The lowest heaven for Irenaeus (the seventh) is our 
firmament. It is in this lowest heaven that the Devil and his angels reside. Thus it is by no 
means obvious in Irenaeus that the Devil, prior to his apostasy, occupied a place of exalted 
power above all the heavenly hosts (an idea that emerges later in the Christian tradition). 
Rather the Devil is introduced as one among many of the archangels assigned to various 
tasks by the Creator’s designs.  
Despite the initial introduction of the Devil as an archangel, the identity of the Devil 
as an angel will go on to figure little in Irenaeus’ later narrative. Only seven times in 
Adversus haraeses is the Devil referred to as an angel.45 And four of these seven references 
are associated with his apostasy. For Irenaeus, the Devil is not an angel, but rather the 
‘apostate angel’ (apostata angelus)—highlighting the extent to which the Devil no longer 
occupies his original place.46 The overall effect is to distance the Devil from his association 
with the angelic realm.  
With his fall from grace, the Devil largely ceases to be identified by Irenaeus as one 
of the heavenly hosts, and rather is commonly referred to by Irenaeus in terms that more 
closely associate him with his post-fall identity (i.e. ‘Satan’, ‘the serpent’, ‘the Devil’, etc.).  
 
 
III. The Devil Was a Servant of God 
 
For Irenaeus, the Devil began as a servant of God, like the other angels. We return 
again to the opening chapters of Epideixis where Irenaeus writes,  
 
And this great created world (kti,sij), prepared by God before the formation 
of man, was given to man as his place (cwri,on), with all things whatsoever in 
it.47 And there were in this place also with their tasks the servants (dou/loj) of 
that God who formed all things; and the steward (evpi,tropoj), who was set 
over all his fellow servants (su,ndouloj), received this place. Now the servants 
were angels, and the steward was the archangel.48 
 
                                                         
45 Haer. preface, book 4; 4.40.3; 5.19.1; 5.21.2, 3; and 5.24.3, 4. 
46 Haer. 5.24.4. See also 4.40.3 and 5.21.2, 3. 
47 See Chapter One, no. 58 for the translation of ‘with all things whatsoever in it’.    




For Irenaeus, the Devil was a servant of God insofar as he was a creature made by 
God. Against his Gnostic interlocutors, Irenaeus is keen to insist on God’s direct 
sovereignty over creation, and thus the subservience of all creation—including the angels—
to God. Whereas for the Gnostics, the ‘Father’ is neither the creator of the material world, 
nor its ruler, for Irenaeus, the true Father creates the world via the active agency of the Son 
and the Spirit, and thus is also its rightful ruler. In many Gnostic schemes, the angels are at 
odds with the evil demiurge, and are often themselves evil. In some schemes they owe their 
origin to the demiurge, and in other accounts they are of the same basic nature as the 
demiurge, both owing their origin to a greater Aeon above. But in almost every case, the 
angels do not owe their immediate origin to the eternal ‘Father’.49  
As we have already seen, Irenaeus roundly repudiates this scheme. For Irenaeus, the 
eternal Father and the demiurge are one and the same. This basic truth about the Father is 
central to Irenaeus’ entire polemic against the Gnostics.50 Inasmuch as God is creator, all of 
creation owes its allegiance to him. This is as true of the angelic realm, as it is of humanity. 
The angelic hosts, like humanity, have been created directly by God and have been given 
laws and boundaries that are to govern the limits of their activities. ‘He by his Word has 
created the whole world, and in the world are the angels; and to all the world he has given 
laws wherein each several thing should abide, and according to that which is determined by 
God should not pass their bounds, each fulfilling his appointed task’51. The Devil then, 
insofar as he was once an archangel of God, was likewise a creature created directly by God 
and like the other angels, was a servant of God and subject to God’s laws and decrees.   
However, beyond Irenaeus’ opening comments in Epideixis, the language of 
‘servant’ (servus) in reference to Satan occurs only two other times in Irenaeus, both in 
Adversus haereses. The Devil is the ‘apostate servant’ [servus apostata] who, as the strong 
man, is defeated by Christ.52 And again, the Devil, ‘although a servant [cum sit servus], 
wishes himself to be proclaimed as king’.53 Like Irenaeus’ infrequent use of angelus to refer 
to the Devil, his infrequent use of servus suggests that Irenaeus is more concerned with the 
Devil’s post-fall identity, than with his pre-fall status. The Devil was once an angelic 
servant of God; but having apostatized and forfeited this identity, he has come to be 
identified almost entirely with his sin.   
                                                         
49 For the role of the angels in the Gnostic scheme, see Haer. 1.24.1-2, 4-6; 2.4.2.  
50 ‘God the Father, not made, not material, invisible; one God, the Creator of all things: this 
is the first point of our faith’. Epid. 6.    
51 Epid. 10. 
52 Haer. 3.8.2. See also 4.7.4 for a general reference to angels as servi. 
53 Haer. 5.25.1. The reference here may be to the Antichrist; the Latin is not conclusive. But 
the preceding comments at the end of ch. 24 are clearly a reference to Satan, and thus the beginning 




IV. The Devil Was the Steward of the Material World 
 
The Devil, as an archangel, was by nature (presumably) like the countless other 
archangels that paid homage to God. Yet in Irenaeus, the Devil stands apart from the other 
angels and archangels insofar as he was once the chief steward of the material world.54 This 
was a unique role assigned to the Devil alone.55  ‘And there were in this place also with their 
tasks the servants (dou/loj) of that God who formed all things; and the steward (evpi,tropoj), 
who was set over all his fellow servants (su,ndouloj), received this place. Now the servants 
were angels, and the steward was the archangel’.56 Thus the Devil was the archangel 
assigned to give leadership to the angels who were themselves assigned to care for the earth.  
In some Gnostic schemes, the Devil’s association with the material world is a black 
mark on the Devil’s profile in so far as spirits associated with the material world are viewed 
as less enlightened than those above. Such a perspective is found in the Valentinian system. 
Irenaeus summarizes,  
 
They [the Valentinians] further teach that the spirits of wickedness derived 
their origin from grief [’Ek de. th/j lu,phj ta. pneumatika. th/j ponhri,aj 
dida,skousi gegone,nai]. Hence the Devil, whom they also call Cosmocrator 
[kosmokra,tora kalou/si], and the demons and every spiritual substance of 
wickedness, found the source of their existence. They represent the demiurge 
as being the son of that mother of theirs [Achamoth], however Cosmocrator 
as the creature of the Demiurge [to.n de. kosmokra,tora kti,sma tou/ 
Dhmiourgou/].…Their mother dwells in that place which is above the heavens, 
that is, in the intermediate abode; the demiurge in the heavenly place, that is, 
in the hebdomad; but the Cosmocrator in this our world [evn tῳ kaq’ h̀ma/j 
ko,smῳ]. The corporeal elements of the world, again, sprang, as we before 
remarked, from bewilderment and perplexity, as from a more ignoble source. 
Thus the earth arose from her state of stupor; water from the agitation caused 
by her fear; air from the consolidation of her grief; while fire, producing 
                                                         
54 While Justin and Papias speak of angelic stewardship generally, Athenagoras is the only 
other extant early Christian writer who assigns this role to the Devil specifically. See Leg. 24, ‘…so 
also do we apprehend the existence of other powers, which exercise dominion about matter, and by 
means of it, and one in particular, which is hostile… to the good that is in God, I say, the spirit 
which is about matter, who was created by God, just as the other angels were created by him, and 
entrusted with the control of matter and the forms of matter…’ 
55 Along these lines, Smith observes that for Irenaeus, the ‘steward’ (i.e. the Devil) and the 
‘servants’ under him (i.e. the angels) appear to be uniquely ‘subcelestial’. See Smith, Proof, 150.   




death and corruption, was inherent in all these elements, even as they teach 
that ignorance also lay concealed in these three passions.57 
 
In the Valentinian system, the material world represents the wrong side of town, and 
owes its origins to fear, grief, death, passions, and ignorance; it is certainly not a place for a 
respectable spirit to dwell. Thus for the Valentinians, both the demiurge and the Devil are 
mutually slandered in their association with the material world.  
But for Irenaeus, the material world is inherently good, and serves as a visible 
witness to God’s inherent goodness and wisdom. Thus it would be inappropriate to read 
Irenaeus’ association of the Devil with the material world as a slur against the Devil.58 
Rather, the Devil’s association with the material world serves in Irenaeus to underscore the 
Devil’s uniqueness, and highlights the egregious nature of his rebellion. The Devil had been 
assigned to steward that aspect of creation which housed God’s prized creation—humanity. 
This great responsibility resulted in a great fall.  
 
 
V. The Devil Is a Limited Creature 
 
The Devil’s inherent angelic power—which remains undiminished after the fall—is 
nonetheless limited; he is not God’s equal-opposite, and is neither omniscient nor 
omnipresent, i.e. there is no ontological dualism between God and the Devil.59 The Devil, 
even prior to his fall, is clearly portrayed by Irenaeus as limited and finite. Notably, the 
Devil must learn from Eve about God’s prohibition against eating from the Tree of 
Knowledge. 60 Insofar as ‘knowledge’ was at a premium in Irenaeus’ dialogue with the 
Gnostics, Eve’s greater knowledge in the face of the Devil’s ignorance underscores both 
Irenaeus’ high anthropology and modest angelology. The Devil, great as he was, knew less 
than humanity (at least on this point).  
                                                         
57 Haer. 1.5.4.   
58 MacKenzie rightly cautions against reading a strong hierarchical structure into Irenaeus’ 
cosmology. With respect to Irenaeus’ broader cosmological framework, MacKenzie, Demonstration, 
97 writes, ‘There is no cosmological speculation…neither is there any rumination in questions of 
angelic hierarchy’.  
59 Russell’s four volume work on the Devil traces the themes of theodicy and good vs. evil 
dualism. Russell, Satan, 81 notes, ‘Irenaeus granted Satan less power than did the Gnostics or the 
other fathers, emphasizing human responsibility for sin instead . . . his powers over us are limited, 
for he is only a usurper of authority that legitimately and ultimately belongs to God, and he cannot 
force us to sin’.  




Even more poignantly (and perhaps pathetically), the Devil wrongly supposed that 
he could hide himself from God under the guise of a serpent, thus bringing about humanity’s 
downfall unnoticed. ‘The apostate angel, having affected the disobedience of humankind by 
means of the serpent, imagined that he escaped the notice of the Lord’.61 This naiveté does 
not reflect well on the Devil, and is a useful means by which Irenaeus puts the Devil in his 
proper place. The Devil’s ignorance continues unabated after his fall. He is unaware of the 
prophetic timeline and does not learn of his ultimate end until the time of Christ;  62 he is 
baffled by Christ’s human nature in the wilderness temptation;63 he is unable to know 
anything about God except what the Word of God reveals to him;64 he claims to have the 
kingdom of the worlds at his disposal, but this is a lie, for only God is sovereign.65  
All throughout his writings, Irenaeus is careful to emphasize the limitations of the 
Devil. Great as he is in power, he is less than a shadow when compared to the Creator. This 
positioning of the Devil as a limited creature helps us see that for Irenaeus, the primary 
conflict of his soteriological narrative is not between God and the Devil (a mismatch that 
would not, for Irenaeus, amount to a conflict of significance) but rather between the Devil 
and humanity. Thus the initial conflict is not between the omnipotent Creator and his finite 
creature, but rather between two creatures.  This is where the drama of his soteriological 
narrative lies.  
 
 
VI. The Devil Is Ultimately Destined to be Subject to Humanity 
 
Here we arrive at what is perhaps the most central aspect of the Devil’s pre-fall 
identity. According to Irenaeus, the Devil’s stewardship of the material world was always 
intended to be of limited duration. The stewardship of the angels generally, and the Devil 
specifically, was necessary in light of humanity’s original infancy. Adam was created as 
‘lord of the earth and all things in it’, but it was necessary that ‘humanity grow, and so come 
to perfection’66 before they would be able to properly exercise this lordship.  
Humanity’s lordship over creation extended even to the angels—and most 
importantly—to the steward assigned to care for it. ‘Now, having made the man [Adam] 
                                                         
61 Haer. 5.26.2. See also Haer. preface, book 4.  
62 Haer. 5.26.2. 
63 Haer. 5.21.2. Cf. Origen, Hom. Luc. 6.5. 
64 Haer. 2.30.9. 
65 Haer. 5.22.2, 5.24.1. See the helpful comments from Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 11-
14. 




lord of the earth and all things in it, he secretly appointed him lord also of those who were 
servants in it’.67 Notably, Irenaeus suggests that Adam’s lordship over the angels was 
‘secret’ [zanxlabar].68 Presumably, this means that knowledge of Adam’s lordship over the 
servants was kept from the servants. Along these lines Smith remarks, ‘The “secrecy” is 
probably to be explained by the fact that man, though lord by right, and destined to rule in 
fact, was not yet capable of doing so…, so that his lordship was not yet made known to his 
subjects’.69 This reading makes good sense, given that Irenaeus immediately follows his 
comment about the secrecy of Adam’s lordship with comments about Adam’s infancy and 
the maturity of the angels. Irenaeus will go on to say in Epid. 16 that the steward’s 
motivation in tempting Adam and Eve was one of envy because of ‘God’s many favors 
which he had bestowed on the man’.70  The preceding chapters of Epideixis do not specify 
what these ‘many favors’ might be, but would most naturally be understood to include 
humanity’s lordship over the material world. Thus I take Irenaeus to mean that the steward 
and other angels knew that the man had been made lord of the world, but did not know that 
this lordship extended even to them.  
Even without direct knowledge of Adam’s future lordship over the angels, the 
steward and angels knew themselves to be caring for the world on behalf of humanity.  Thus 
Irenaeus introduces the Devil into the creation narrative as not only a servant of God, but 
more pointedly, as a servant of humanity. The Devil, much like the steward of a child-king, 
is granted only temporary leadership of the earth until such time as the heir can assume the 
full responsibility of his throne, at which time the steward is required to relinquish his 
lordship. This, of course, is precisely what the Devil will refuse to do.   
Ultimately then, the Devil’s rebellion is as much a rebellion against humanity’s 
lordship over the material world, as it is against God’s. The implications here are significant 
for Irenaeus’ larger narrative. As will be developed in the following chapter, this way of 
framing the Devil’s initial relationship to humanity emphasizes the enmity between 
humanity and the Devil as the chief enmity of the Christian narrative. To be sure, Satan is an 
enemy of God; but as concerns the narrative Irenaeus will tell, the Devil is principally an 
enemy of humanity. The resolution of this enmity, and the eventual victory of humanity in 
Christ over the Devil, will figure as the climax of Irenaeus’ narrative.  
 
                                                         
67 Epid. 12. In Epid. 11, Irenaeus refers to the ‘steward’ and his ‘fellow-servants’. As such, I 
take Irenaeus to mean that Adam’s lordship over the ‘servants’ includes lordship over the ‘steward’.   
68 Used only here in Epidixeis. Variously translated elsewhere as ‘in secret’, ‘furtively’, 
‘stealthily’.  
69 Smith, Proof, 150, no. 69.  






As we have seen, Irenaeus’s account of the Devil’s pre-fall identity offers us the 
portrait of an exalted angelic being, unique not in his ontology, but nonetheless unique in his 
role as steward and keeper of the earth.  This stewardship was intended by God to be of a 
temporary nature, and was to be concluded when humanity—the rightful lords of the 
earth—‘came of age’ and were able to take possession of their inheritance. As we will see in 
the following chapter, the Devil’s pre-fall identity as temporary angelic steward of the earth 
provides the necessary context for understanding the Devil’s envy of humanity and his 











The Devil’s Envy and Fall 
 
 
‘But I say to thee, Gandalf Mithrandir, I will not be thy tool! I am Steward of the House of 
Anarion. I will not step down to be the dotard chamberlain of an upstart. Even were his 
claim proved to me, still he comes but of the line of Isildur. I will not bow to such a one, last 
of a ragged house long bereft of lordship and dignity’.1 
 
J. R. R. Tolkien 
  





Having established in the preceding chapter the basic contours of the Devil’s pre-fall 
identity, we may now turn our attention to the Devil’s fall. Central to our examination of the 
Devil’s fall is the idea of the Devil’s envy of humanity. Irenaeus highlights the Devil’s envy 
of humanity as the Devil’s chief motivating impulse in his temptation of Adam and Eve. As 
already observed, the Devil was created to be a steward of the material world on behalf of 
humanity. As we enter into the details of Irenaeus’ soteriological plot, we find that the Devil 
rejects this subservient role; he does not want to be a mere steward, but rather covets 
lordship of the world for himself. This is made explicit in both Adversus haereses and 
Epideixis, and serves as an organizing ‘first scene’ in Irenaeus’ narrative that helps to 
establish his larger soteriological plotline. Importantly, the Devil’s envy of humanity 
constitutes the Devil’s first sin and the occasion for his fall.  
The present chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section of the 
chapter analyzes the occasions of non-Satanic envy in Irenaeus, with a view to establishing a 
larger context in which to examine the Devil’s envy of humanity. The second section of the 
chapter offers a detailed examination of the Devil’s envy of humanity in light of the 
forgoing. And the final section of the chapter examines the timing of the Devil’s fall, 
showing how, for Irenaeus, the Devil’s fall occurs in Genesis 3 when, driven by envy, he 
tempts Adam and Eve. This stands in marked contrast to later Devil accounts which portray 
the fall of the Devil as having occurred in heaven, prior to his temptation of humanity. The 
anthropological and cosmological implications of the Devil’s envy of humanity, as well as 
the timing of his subsequent fall, are noted at the conclusion of the chapter. 
                                                         
1 Tolkien, The Return of the King, 130. 




Our examination of the larger theme of envy in Irenaeus will demonstrate three basic 
patterns of envy. The first pattern of envy is what I refer to as ‘political’ envy. I am here 
using the term ‘political’ to denote power and authority (formal or otherwise) in an 
established governmental, political, or cultural system. ‘Political’ envy is the type of envy 
wherein envy is the attitude of the one in the politically superior position directed toward the 
one in the politically inferior position.3 A key component of ‘political’ envy is that the 
envious party views the object of envy (i.e. the one in the politically inferior position) as a 
threat to the maintenance of their political power; they are afraid that the one in the 
politically inferior position will rise to supplant them. And indeed, the fears are well 
grounded. In Irenaeus, a reversal does take place in all instances of political envy. The 
politically inferior person ultimately supplants (or is destined to supplant) the one in the 
politically superior position. A key secondary feature of political envy in Irenaeus is that the 
politically superior person is often ontologically4 inferior to the person being envied, as will 
be shown in my following analysis. Or again, in terms of political position, the greater 
envies the lesser; but in terms of ontological status, the lesser envies the greater. When the 
secondary feature of ontology is present, the ontologically greater person ascends to the 
politically greater position, supplanting the envious party, and thus harmonizing political 
power and ontological status in a single person.  
The second pattern of envy we encounter in Irenaeus is what is traditionally referred 
to in classical scholarship as the ‘envy of the gods’.5 In the ‘envy of the gods’ motif, the 
ontologically and politically superior gods envy the happiness and successes of the 
ontologically and politically inferior humans.  
                                                         
3 Note the similar categories of ‘ascendant’ and ‘descendant’ envy used by Lanzillotta in his 
essay, ‘The Envy of God in the Paradise Story’, 537-50. Rather straightforwardly, ‘ascendant’ envy 
for Lanzillotta is where the lesser envies the greater, and ‘descendant’ envy is where the greater 
envies the lesser. Lanzillotta’s essay explores the theme of envy in the Greek Life of Adam and Eve, 
and notes both Eve’s envy of God (an example of ascendant envy) and the Devil’s (false) construal 
of God’s envy of humanity (descendant envy). Lanzillotta’s categories of ascendant and descendant 
envy, while accurate, do not specify what makes the ‘greater’ party (i.e. God) superior to the ‘lesser’ 
party (i.e. humanity). Is it God’s power, God’s ontology, God’s political superiority? My use of 
‘political’ as a means of describing the theme of envy in Irenaeus is meant to more specifically note 
the kind of superiority that one agent has over another.  
4 I am here using the term ‘ontological’ in a technical, philosophical sense to denote 
‘essence’ or ‘being’. Thus, by way of example, in classical Christian theism God is ontologically 
superior to humans, in that he is infinite, immutable and uncreated, whereas humans are finite, 
mutable and created. Humans, for their part, are ontologically superior to donkeys, insofar as 
humans are made in the image of God and share potentially in God’s immutability and uncreated 
life, whereas donkeys do not (medieval asinus Christology withstanding!). These same sorts of 
ontological distinctions are consistent with the metaphysics of the Greek philosophical tradition.  
5 Classicists have long recognized this theme in Greek and Roman religion. For examples 
see Herodotus, Hist. 1.32, 3.43, 7.10e; Livy, Ab urbe cond. 5.21.12; Plutarch, Alex. 30.7; etc. For an 
argument against this theme as an aspect of ancient Mediterranean religion, see Lanzillotta, ‘The So-




The final pattern of envy in Irenaeus is what I here refer to as ‘common’ envy. This 
is the sort of run of the mill envy that one finds woven throughout human relationships: one 
land owner envies the property of another; one man envies the wife of another, etc. The 
issues of political and ontological status are not a factor in ‘common’ envy.  
As our examination of the theme of envy in Irenaeus will demonstrate, each pattern 
of envy is present throughout Irenaeus’ writings, with the majority of instances of envy 
taking the form of political envy. The pattern of political envy is particularly relevant for our 
examination of the Devil’s envy of humanity, insofar as the Devil’s envy of humanity 
adheres to this basic pattern. 
 
 
I. Non-Satanic Envy in Irenaeus 
 
In Irenaeus, the Devil is not the only one who casts an invidious gaze. Setting aside 
for a moment the Devil’s envy of humanity, Irenaeus highlights six key sets of relationships 
that are plagued by envy: 1) the demiurge and humanity, 2) the Pharisees and Jesus, 3) God 
and humanity, 4) Cain and Abel 5) the Gnostic Father and humanity, and 6) the Gnostic 
teachers and the orthodox bishops. These six relationships constitute the sum total of non-
Satanic envy in Irenaeus’ corpus. By attending closely to how envy functions in these 
relationships, we are able to establish a larger context for exploring the more particular 
occurrence of the Devil’s envy of humanity.   
 
 
A. The Demiurge Envies Humanity 
The Gnostic heretics whom Irenaeus confronts weave together a dizzying array of 
competing narratives regarding humanity’s history, the history of the gods, and the origin of 
the one true, unknown Father. Many of these narratives utilize canonical references, and we 
often find within Gnostic teaching a recasting (or subversion) of the biblical characters and 
events (e.g. humanity’s eating of the tree results in human enlightenment, rather than death). 
As Michael Williams has rightly argued, a unifying element of nearly all Gnostic teaching is 
the consistent presence of a biblical demiurge.6 As we have already seen in Chapter One, in 
nearly all of the Gnostic systems that Irenaeus recounts (with the exception of the 
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Ebionites)7, the demiurge is the villain of the Gnostic story. And in three of these Gnostic 
systems, the demiurge is said to be envious with respect to humanity.  
 
1. The Demiurge of Simon Magus 
 
Irenaeus, like many of the other early Christian writers, sources all heretical teaching 
in Simon Magus.8  According to Irenaeus, Simon ‘represented himself, in a word, as being 
the loftiest of all powers, that is, the Being who is the father over all’.9  Irenaeus recounts 
that Simon traveled with Helena, a prostitute he had redeemed from the slave market, and 
whom he proclaimed as the ‘first conception of his mind, the mother of all, by whom, in the 
beginning, he conceived in his mind the forming of angels and archangels’.10 This Helena, 
also called by Simon his ‘Ennoea’ (i.e. Understanding), in the beginning comprehended 
Simon’s desire to make the angels and powers. She thus descended to the lower regions and 
generated the angels, who in turn made the material world. (We have here in Simon not a 
single demiurge, but multiple demiurges—though the term is not used in reference to the 
angels). However, the angelic demiurges resented being considered the ‘progeny’ of another 
being; moved by envy, they detain the ‘mother’ (i.e. Helena) who made them and did not let 
her return to the Father. Irenaeus writes, 
 
But after she [Ennoea] had produced them [the angels], she was detained by 
them because of envy [propter invidiam], because they were unwilling to be 
looked upon as the progeny of any other being. As to himself [Simon], they 
had no knowledge of him whatever; but his Ennoea was detained by those 
powers and angels who had been produced by her. She suffered all kinds of 
contumely from them, so that she could not return upwards to her father 
[Simon], but was even shut up in a human body, and for ages passed in 
succession from one female body to another, as from vessel to vessel.11 
 
                                                         
7 See the Introduction, no. 82. Arguably, the Ebionites do not qualify as a Gnostic sect. They 
do not demonize the Creator, and their view of the material world is not negative like the other 
Gnostics. Irenaeus acknowledges as much, but includes them in his list of Gnostic sects. See Haer. 
1.26.2. 
8 Irenaeus connects Simon Magus with the sorcerer of the same name in Acts 8. See Haer. 
1.23.1. 
9 Haer. 1.23.1. 
10 Haer. 1.23.2. 




Simon’s Ennoea, imprisoned by the angels in a female body, has been forced to pass 
from once successive female body to the next (at one time being in the body of Helen of 
Troy), and at last becoming Helena. The suffering of Simon’s Ennoea at the hands of the 
angels is the occasion for Simon’s entry into the world. ‘He had come that he might win her 
first, and free her from slavery, while he conferred salvation upon humanity, by making 
himself known to them. For since the angels ruled the world ill because each one of them 
coveted [concupisceret] the principal power for himself, he had come to amend matters…he 
pledged himself that the world should be dissolved, and that those who are his should be 
freed from the rule of those who had made them’.12  
As is common in Gnostic thought, the makers of the material world are cast in a 
negative light; the material world, and especially the body, is a prison from which humanity 
needs to be delivered. The Gnostic myth associated with Simon inserts the vice of envy 
directly into the beginning of the larger narrative; the creators of the material world (in this 
case the angels), covet primacy for themselves and are driven by envy to rebel against their 
creator and rightful ruler (Simon’s Ennoea).  They take Simon’s Ennoea captive and 
imprison her in a human body. Thus she suffers under their power and can only be delivered 
by the intervention of Simon.  
Notably, we have here an example of the one in the politically superior position 
envying the one who is ontologically greater. The angels have assumed political power over 
Simon’s Ennoea. Yet she is nonetheless ontologically superior to them, in that she created 
the angels and derives her being directly from Simon himself (whereas the angels are made 
by Simon’s Ennoea). Her captivity to the angels is only temporary; Simon has come to 
deliver her from her captors and return her to a politically superior position, thus 
reestablishing the proper order to the cosmos.   
Arguably, the creator-angels’ envy of Simon’s Ennoea extends to humanity. Here we 
need to channel the Valentinian anthropology in order to fill out Simon’s system.13  In the 
Valentinian system, only a certain sub-set of humans will be redeemed. These are the 
‘spiritual’ ones, the ones who are made of the same ontological stuff as the higher heavenly 
beings.14 Even though these spiritually enlightened humans are trapped in fleshly bodies, 
their true essence is superior to that of the demiurge, who is merely an ensouled being. 
Irenaeus does not provide enough detail of Simon’s system for us to determine if Simon 
                                                         
12 Haer. 1.23.3.  
13 There is no explicit justification in Irenaeus to import Valentinian anthropology to Simon 
Magus. Yet the similarities in their respective theological and soteriological frameworks make it 
likely that their anthropology was similar as well, even if not identical. This also suggests that envy 
may have been at work in the Valentinian demiurge, even though it is not explicitly mentioned.  




viewed human nature in the same way. But we do know that Simon has come not only to 
redeem his Ennoea (who is trapped in a human body), but also at least some human beings 
as well. Thus at least some humans will, like Simon’s Ennoea, be released from bodily 
captivity and ascend above the creator-angels. Presumably, the creator-angels’ envy of 
Simon’s Eenoea would, by the same logic, extend to human beings as well. In such a case, 
we would once again have an example of the one in the politically superior position envying 




2. The Demiurge of the Sethians and the Ophites 
 
In Haer. 1.30, Irenaeus summarizes at length the creational and soteriological 
narrative of two more Gnostic sects—the Ophites and the Sethians. Here the reader can 
discern distinct parallels between the Sethian portrayal of the demiurge and Irenaeus’ 
portrayal of the Devil. Notably, the demiurge within the Sethian and Ophites narrative is a 
prideful, negatively cast character who is driven, in part, by jealousy (zelus) of humanity.  
In keeping with the other Gnostic narratives, the Sethians and Ophites postulate a 
true Father who is unknown and above all, and who generates a host of heavenly beings 
who in turn generate lower heavenly beings, in a descending chain, until finally a ‘first 
mother’ generates the demiurge, called Ialdabaoth. Ialdabaoth in turn generates a son 
without the aid of his mother. This son likewise generates a son, and so forth for a total of 
six offspring. The Sethian narrative quickly casts Ialdabaoth in a negative light; Ialdabaoth, 
we are told, ‘holds his mother in contempt, inasmuch as he produced sons and grandsons 
without the permission of anyone’.15  
However, Ialdabaoth’s offspring strive and quarrel with him about the supreme 
power (presumably Ialdabaoth’s offspring insist that he is not the supreme power). This 
‘deeply grieved Ialdabaoth, and drove him to despair’.16 In this frame of mind,  
He cast his eyes upon the subjacent dregs of matter, and fixed his desire upon 
it, to which they declare his son owes his origin. This son is Nous [Nun]17 
himself, twisted into the form of a serpent; and hence were derived the spirit, 
the soul, and all mundane things: from this too were generated all oblivion, 
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16 Haer. 1.30.5. 
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wickedness, jealousy, envy, and death [omnem oblivionem, et malitiam, et 
zelum et invidiam et mortem]. They declare that the father imparted still 
greater crookedness to this serpent-like and contorted Nous of theirs, when 
he was with their father in heaven and Paradise. Whereupon, Ialdabaoth, 
becoming uplifted in spirit, boasted himself over all those things that were 
below him, and exclaimed, ‘I am father, and God, and above me there is no 
one’.18 
Notably zelus and invidia are derived from the twisting of material matter, casting 
both the creator and creation in negative terms. Ialdabaoth’s boasting, however, is checked 
by his mother’s rebuke from above. She calls him a liar and declares that the true father is 
above him. Not to be deterred, Ialdabaoth purposes to make humanity after ‘our own 
image’.19 Ialdabaoth’s mother is behind this impulse, for through the creation of humanity 
she intends to ‘empty’ Ialdabaoth of his power. Ialdabaoth’s offspring create the first man, 
but the result is a tragic figure who is so large he can only writhe upon the ground. The sons 
bring the newly formed man to Ialdabaoth in hope that he can remedy the situation. Herein 
lies the trap, for when Ialdabaoth breathes into the man the breath of life, his power is 
emptied into the man. The first man immediately recognizes the true power over and above 
Ialdabaoth [i.e. the higher aeons], and forsakes Ialdabaoth and his offspring.  
They declare, then, that by breathing into the man the spirit of life, he was 
secretly emptied of his power; that hence the man became a possessor of 
mind and thought; and they affirm that these are the faculties which partake 
in salvation. He [the man] at once gave thanks to the first [heavenly] 
Anthropos, forsaking those [i.e. Ialdabaoth and his offspring] who had 
created him.20 
It is at this point that the theme of jealousy is introduced into the narrative. 
Ialdabaoth, upon seeing that the newly created man possessed the capacity to reconnect with 
the powers above, is filled with jealousy toward the man, and determines to create the first 
woman, by whom he hopes to empty the man of his power. ‘But Ialdabaoth, feeling jealous 
[zelantem], was pleased to form the design of again emptying man by means of woman’.21 
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19 Haer. 1.30.6. 
20 Haer. 1.30.6. 
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This plan ultimately fails, for Ialdabaoth’s mother again intervenes, emptying the woman of 
her power to empty the man (how she does this is unclear from Irenaeus’ text). Ialdabaoth’s 
mother then turns the man and the woman, who are called Adam and Eve, away from 
Ialdabaoth, convincing them to eat from the tree of knowledge, whereby they come to 
recognize the power that is above all and thus depart from Ialdabaoth.22 Ialdabaoth’s mother 
rejoices when she sees that Ialdabaoth and his offspring are baffled by the humans who have 
been made by the angels. Ialdabaoth, in his anger, curses Adam and Eve and casts them out 
of the heavenly paradise into the material world.23 
The narrative continues apace, intersecting at times with various elements of the 
biblical narrative. Adam and Eve beget Cain, who is laid hold of by the serpent and induced 
to kill Abel, and is the ‘first to bring to light jealousy and death [zelum et mortem]’.24 
Ialdabaoth floods the world in anger against humanity; he speaks through the Old Testament 
prophets. The narrative, as recounted by Irenaeus, ends with Christ seated at the right hand 
of Ialdabaoth (who is unaware of Christ’s presence), stealing away the human souls from 
Ialdabaoth such that, ‘in proportion as Jesus enriches himself with holy souls, to such an 
extent does his father [Ialdabaoth] suffer loss and is diminished, being emptied of his own 
power by these souls’.25 (Again, how this emptying actually happens is unclear). 
Here, as in Simon Magus, we see an account of envy wherein the one in the 
politically superior but ontologically inferior position envies the one in the politically 
inferior but ontologically superior position. Ialdabaoth unwittingly empties himself into the 
man and thus loses the qualities that would otherwise fit him for life above. The man is the 
recipient of this emptying; he becomes a possessor of mind and thought, and thus is 
ontologically superior to Ialdabaoth. Yet humanity, though ontologically superior, remains 
under the political power of Ialdabaoth. It is humanity’s future exaltation over the demiurge 
that evokes the envy of the demiurge. The narrative ends with humanity ascending above 
and beyond Ialdabaoth, who remains trapped in the lower heavens. Though the demiurge is 
politically superior to humanity at the outset, the narrative ultimately places humanity over 
the demiurge. Thus ontological superiority and political superiority are brought together as a 
unity in the age to come. 
The above three accounts (Simon, Sethians and Ophites) are the only occasions 
where Irenaeus explicitly notes the demiurges’ envy of humanity. However, the theme of 
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Gnostic writings, envy leads to anger which in turn leads to death.  
22 Haer. 1.30.7. 
23 Haer. 1.30.8. 
24 Haer. 1.30.9. 




envy also shows up tangentially in Irenaeus’ account of the Barbeliotes. The Barbeliotes 
source envy and jealousy in the demiurge (much like the Sethites and Ophites source envy 
in Nous). According to this sect’s teaching, the demiurge formed ‘angels and firmaments 
and all things earthly…’, and being united to Audacity, produced ‘Wickedness, Jealousy 
[ζῆλος], Envy [fqo,noj], Fury, and Lust’.26 Most English translations, following the Latin, 
transliterate these terms from the Greek and thus render these negative character traits as 
proper names.  Though we do not have an explicit statement that the demiurge himself is 
envious, and less, what the object of his envy might be, nonetheless the association of envy 
with the demiurge is suggestive of what we have seen above. 
 
 
3. Demiurgical Envy: Conclusion 
Significantly, at least three Gnostic accounts utilize the theme of envy with respect 
to the demiurge. And when they do, they all follow the same basic pattern of ‘political’ 
envy. The demiurge is in the power-position with respect to humanity. Yet he is earthly and 
trapped within the material realm; humans (at least the ‘spiritual’ humans) are of the same 
substance as the higher Father and his Aeons;27 they are ontologically superior to the 
demiurge and destined to be led out of the material world and into a place of political 
exaltation over the demiurge. Thus the demiurge, with respect to humanity, presently 
occupies the politically superior, but ontologically inferior position. Yet he is destined to 
lose this political advantage and be supplanted by humans, who inherently occupy a position 
of ontological superiority. In this way, cosmic harmony is achieved; ontological power and 
political power are united in the same being. The envy of the demiurge is thus grounded in 
his inferior ontological status, and his fear that his political advantage over humanity will be 
reversed.28 As we will see, the similarities between this basic Gnostic account of the 





                                                         
26 Haer. 1.29.4.  
27 This is made most explicit in the Valentinian system, with its three tiered anthropology of 
fleshly humans, ensouled humans, and spiritual humans. The latter two groups are ontologically 
superior to the demiurge, and able to ascend politically over the demiurge when they die and are 
released from the body. See Haer. 1.6-7, and 1.8.3.  
28 For a helpful treatment of demiurgical envy consistent with my treatment above, see 




B. The Pharisees Envy Jesus 
 
This same basic framework of ‘political’ envy can be observed in Irenaeus’ account 
of the relationship between Jesus and the Pharisees. Referencing the Pharisees’ envy of 
Christ at his triumphal entry into Jerusalem, Irenaeus writes,  
 
And for this cause, upon his entrance into Jerusalem, all those who were in 
the way recognized David their king in his sorrow of soul, and spread their 
garments for him, and ornamented the way with green boughs, crying out 
with great joy and gladness, ‘Hosanna to the Son of David; blessed is he that 
comes in the name of the Lord: hosanna in the highest’. But to the jealous 
wicked stewards [Zelantibus autem malis dispensatoribus], who 
circumvented those under them, and ruled over those things with respect to 
which it was not right that they should do so,29 and for this reason were 
unwilling that the king should come, and who said to him, ‘Do you hear what 
these are saying’? did the Lord reply, ‘Have you never read, Out of the 
mouths of babes and infants you have perfected praise?’—thus pointing out 
that what had been declared by David concerning the Son of God, was 
accomplished in his own person; and indicating that they were indeed 
ignorant of the meaning of the Scripture and the dispensation of God; but 
declaring that it was he himself who was announced by the prophets as 
Christ, whose name is praised in all the earth, and who perfects praise to his 
Father from the mouth of babes and infants; wherefore also his glory has 
been raised above the heavens.30 
 
And again, ‘For while they [the Pharisees] were thought to offer correctly so far as 
outward appearance went, they had in themselves jealousy similar to that of Cain [similem 
zelum Cain habebant]; therefore they slew the Just One, slighting the counsel of the Word, 
as did also Cain’.31 
                                                         
29 The Latin reads, dominabantur eorum, quibus ratio non constabat. Here I follow the 
alternate rendering suggested by Cox, ANF, vol. 1, no. 4. Coxes’ primary reading is ‘…who 
circumvented those under them, and ruled over those that had no great intelligence’. Coxe’s alternate 
rendering (above) fits best with the immediate context, as well as Irenaeus’ overall theme of envy, 
wherein the lesser party unjustly usurps the rightful position of the greater.  
30 Haer. 4.11.3.  




Those who oppose Christ at his triumphal entry are ‘envious, wicked stewards’. It 
was their place to rule until the coming of the King. But unwilling to be displaced by their 
rightful Lord, they enviously covet authority and power for themselves. On this point a 
notable parallel is discerned between the Pharisees and Satan, both of whom are referred to 
by Irenaeus as ‘stewards’, and who both envy the one who has been appointed, from the 
beginning, to supplant them.32  
Here we have again the main lines of Irenaeus’ ‘political envy’ motif.  The 
politically superior but ontologically inferior Pharisees are envious of the politically inferior 
but ontologically superior Jesus. In one sense, for Irenaeus, Jesus shares the same ontology 
as the Pharisees insofar as their mutual humanity is concerned. But the incarnation does not 
set aside Jesus’ eternal existence as the Word of God. Thus Jesus is ontologically superior to 
the Pharisees insofar as he remains the true Word of God. And what’s more, Irenaeus’ 
typological anthropology places the human ontology of Jesus over and above the human 
ontology of the Pharisees. Jesus is the true human, the ultimate expression of God’s intent 
for humanity as made in the image and likeness of God. Adam and his descendants are types 
and shadows of Christ, and do not become fully actualized as true human beings until they 
are made fully into the image and likeness of the Son. As such, even Christ’s humanity is, in 
some sense, ontologically superior to the humanity of the Pharisees.  
And as we have seen with the demiurge, Irenaeus emphasizes that the envy of the 
Pharisees is linked to the ultimate political reversal that will take place between Christ and 
the Pharisees. For now Christ is (in an earthly sense), under their power; they will kill him. 
But Jesus is destined to be raised above the heavens into a position of ultimate political 
power. According to Irenaeus’ reading, the Pharisees sense the danger of Christ’s ascending 
political power, and thus envy and resent him. They are the ‘stewards’ who will not give up 
their rule to the rightful king.  
 
C. God Does not Envy Humanity 
A third instance of the notion of envy appears when Irenaeus discusses God’s 
relationship to humanity and emphasizes God’s complete lack of envy. Here we find the 
same pattern of ‘political envy’, but in the negative. The true God, unlike the Gnostic 
demiurge, is explicitly said not to be envious of humanity. Invidia is always a negative 
character trait, and thus for Irenaeus, God cannot be envious. Irenaeus writes, ‘For the love 
of God, being rich and without envy [sine invidia], confers upon the suppliant more than he 
                                                         




can ask from it’.33 And, ‘God...bestows what is good without envy’ [sine invidia].34 And 
again, ‘But he has increased and widened those laws which are natural, and noble, and 
common to all, granting to human beings largely and without envy [sine invidia], by means 
of adoption, to know God the Father, and to love him with the whole heart...’35  This is a 
direct assault on the Gnostic position, which claims to know God apart from the creator, and 
through means that ‘regular’ Christians in the orthodox church cannot access. Against the 
Gnostics, Irenaeus is keen to insist that God freely discloses himself, making himself openly 
known in Jesus. God does not envy humans their knowledge of God, but rather takes 
measures to broadcast this knowledge to one and all.  
The above comments regarding God’s lack of envy toward humanity are an implicit 
critique of the Gnostic demiurge. Unlike the Gnostic demiurge, the true God is free and 
generous toward his creation. Whereas the Gnostic demiurge is envious of humanity and 
thus drives the first pair of humans out of the Garden, the true God removes Adam and Eve 
from the Garden out of pity, lest humans live perpetually as broken icons.36 And when God 
does limit his creation, it is not because he is envious of humanity or concerned that 
humanity will usurp him. Quite the contrary, God’s ultimate goal is the exaltation and 
deification of humanity. In an extended discussion regarding the deification of humanity, 
Irenaeus writes,  
 
For we cast blame upon him, because we have not been made gods from the 
beginning, but at first merely human, then at length gods; although God has 
adopted this course out of his pure benevolence, that no one may accuse him 
of being envious or grudging  [invidiosum aut impraestantem]. . . . For after 
                                                         
33 Haer. 3. preface.  
34 Haer. 4.38.3.   
35 Haer. 4.16.5. Cf. the Greek LOAE, 18:4, where the Devil suggests to Eve that God has 
withheld the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge because he envies humanity, ‘tou/to de. ginw,skwn o` 
qeo.j o[ti e;sesqe o[moioi auvtou/, evfqo,nhsen u`mi/n kai. ei=pen…’ Beginning with the second temple, 
focus on Adam and Eve began to emerge in Jewish literature. The LOAE represents the basic 
contours of much of this focus, and runs in a direction similar to Irenaeus’ basic account of the 
Devil. In the Latin LOAE, Satan claims that he tempted Adam and Eve out of envy; Michael had 
instructed the angels, including Satan, to worship Adam. When Satan refused, he was cast out of 
heaven. His anger and envy toward Adam on account of this, led him to tempt Adam and Eve in 
order that they might likewise be cast out of their paradise (11:2-16:3). In the Greek LOAE, God 
comforts Adam by promising him that ‘I will return you to your rule and seat you on the throne of 
your deceiver’ (39:2). Scholarship on the LOAE tends to date it later than Irenaeus by two or three 
centuries. For more on the literature of the Adam and Eve tradition, see De Jonge and Tromp, Life of 
Adam and Eve and Related Literature, and Stone, A History of the Literature of Adam and Eve. See 
Tromp, Life of Adam and Eve, for the critical Greek edition. For a side by side comparison of the 
Greek, Latin, Armenian, Georgian and Slavonic accounts of the Adam and Eve tradition, with 
English translation for each, see Anderson and Stone, A Synopsis. 




his great kindness he graciously conferred good, and made humans like to 
himself, in their own power; while at the same time by his prescience he 
knew the infirmity of human beings, and the consequences which would flow 
from it; but through love and power, he shall overcome the substance of 
created nature.37  
 
God did not refrain from making humans as gods in the beginning because he was 
anxious about his own exalted status. Rather he refrained from making humans as gods at 
the beginning because it was necessary, in light of their infirmity, that they grow into this 
reality over time. God’s intent from the very beginning has been to ‘overcome the substance 
of created nature’ by love and power. In short, God loves humanity and desires to share his 
power and glory with us; he does not begrudge humanity a share in his happiness.  
Likewise, in a passage critiquing Marcion, who posits an unjust demiurge and a just 
Father, Irenaeus insists that the Father and the creator are one God, and that he is good, and 
therefore without envy. Toward this end Irenaeus deploys Plato (whom he doesn’t refer to 
often, but when he does he generally treats as an ally) and writes,  
 
Plato is proved to be more religious than these men, for he allowed that the 
same God was both just and good, having power over all things, and himself 
executing judgment, expressing himself thus, ‘And God indeed, as he is also 
the ancient Word, possessing the beginning, the end, and the mean of all 
existing things, does everything rightly, moving round about them according 
to their nature; but retributive justice always follows him against those who 
depart from the divine law’.38 Then, again, he points out that the Maker and 
Framer of the universe is good. ‘And to the good’, he says, ‘no envy [invida] 
ever springs up with regard to anything’;39 thus establishing the goodness of 
God, as the beginning and the cause of the creation of the world, but not 
ignorance, nor an erring Aeon, nor the consequence of a defect, nor the 
Mother weeping and lamenting, nor another God or Father.40 
 
                                                         
37 Haer. 4.38.4. 
38 Cf. Plato, Leg. 4.716a.   
39 Cf. Plato, Tim. 29e.  
40 Haer. 3.25.5; see also 5.24.4 ‘for envy is a thing unbecoming to God’. Athanasius makes 
the same basic point about God’s non-envy in C. Gent. 41 and Inc. 3.  For a discussion of this theme 




The demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus, unlike the demiurge in the Gnostic system, is good 
and benevolent. On this point Irenaeus and Plato are in agreement. Irenaeus’ emphasis on 
the non-envy of God toward humanity is, in negative relief, consistent with his general motif 
of ‘political envy’, wherein the politically superior but ontologically inferior envies the 
politically inferior, but ontologically superior. Given this general framework, it makes good 
sense that for Irenaeus the true God must be without envy. The true Creator is without need; 
he is self-sustaining and the source of all good. He is ontologically superior and as such, can 
rest confidently in his political superiority over humanity. He need fear no reversal and thus 
humanity has nothing for him to envy.  
 
 
D. Cain Envies Abel 
 
The theme of ‘political’ envy is found in Irenaeus’ use of the Cain and Abel story. 
The connection of envy to Cain is found elsewhere in early Christian writings,41 and is 
drawn from Genesis 4, where Cain kills his brother Abel because Abel’s sacrifice was 
accepted by God, while Cain’s was not.42 Irenaeus writes, ‘For at the beginning God had 
respect to the gifts of Abel, because he offered them with single-mindedness and 
righteousness; but he had no respect unto the offering of Cain, because his heart was divided 
with jealousy and malice [cum zelo et malitia], which he cherished against his brother...’43  
In a particularly notable passage, Irenaeus describes Cain's overthrow of Abel in 
terms that are contextually and thematically linked to Satan’s overthrow of humanity. The 
text below begins with a paragraph that describes God’s curse upon the Devil (found in Gen 
3), followed by a paragraph that links Cain’s sin to that of Satan’s. Irenaeus writes,  
 
But the curse in all its fullness fell upon the serpent, which had beguiled 
them. ‘And God,’ it is declared, ‘said to the serpent: Because you have done 
this, cursed are you above all cattle, and above all the beasts of the earth’. 
And this same thing does the Lord also say in the Gospel, to those who are 
found upon the left hand: ‘Depart from me, you who are cursed, into 
everlasting fire, which my Father has prepared for the Devil and his angels’; 
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indicating that eternal fire was not originally prepared for humanity, but for 
him who beguiled humanity, and caused him to offend—for him, I say, who 
is chief of the apostasy, and for those angels who became apostates along 
with him; which [fire], indeed, they too shall justly feel, who, like him, 
persevere in works of wickedness, without repentance, and without retracing 
their steps. 
Just as [quemadmodum] Cain, when he was counselled by God to 
keep quiet, because he had not made an equitable division of that share to 
which his brother was entitled, but with jealousy and malice [zelo et militia] 
thought that he could domineer over him, not only did not acquiesce, but 
even added sin to sin, indicating his state of mind by his action. For what he 
had planned, that did he also put in practice: he tyrannized over and slew 
him; God subjected the just to the unjust, that the former might be proved as 
the just one by the things which he suffered, and the latter detected as the 
unjust by those things which he perpetrated’.44 
 
Cain perpetuates and participates in the same sort of disobedience typified by the 
Devil and his angels. Just as the Devil domineered over humanity, so too Cain ‘with 
jealousy and malice’ domineered over his brother.  
A similar sentiment can be found in Epid. 17 (quoted below), which though an 
indirect reference, further highlights the connection between Cain’s envy of Abel and the 
Devil’s envy of humanity. As in Adversus haereses, Irenaeus again links the Devil’s sin 
against humanity with Cain’s sin against Abel. Immediately following his comments in 
Epid. 16 about the Devil’s envy of humanity, Irenaeus writes,  
 
Now the apostate angel, who led man into disobedience and made him sinful 
and caused his expulsion from Paradise, not content with the first evil, 
wrought a second on the brothers; for filling Cain with his spirit he made him 
a fratricide. And so Abel died, slain by his brother; signifying thenceforth 
that certain ones should be persecuted and oppressed and slain, the 
unrighteous slaying and persecuting the righteous.45 
 
 Notably, the Devil fills Cain ‘with his spirit’. Irenaeus is not explicit about what this 
‘spirit’ is, but given the context we may safely assume it is the spirit of envy. Satan, driven 
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by envy, unjustly conquers humanity. Satan implants this motivation in Cain, who likewise 
driven by envy of his brother’s blessed status in relation to God, unjustly conquers Abel.  
And in a way similar to how Irenaeus links together the envy of Cain with the Devil, 
so too he links together the envy of Cain with the envy of the Pharisees. Just as the jealous 
Cain slew the righteous Abel, so too the jealous Pharisees slew the righteous Christ. ‘For 
while they [the Pharisees] were thought to offer correctly so far as outward appearance 
went, they had in themselves jealousy similar to that of Cain [similem zelum Cain 
habebant]; therefore they slew the Just One, slighting the counsel of the Word, as did 
also Cain’.46  
The connection that Irenaeus makes above between Cain’s envy of Abel and Satan’s 
envy of humanity is obviously relevant for our larger discussion of the Devil’s envy of 
humanity. But noteworthy here is the manner in which, for Irenaeus, the Cain and Abel 
story approaches the same basic model of ‘political envy’ we have already seen in the 
Gnostic demiurge and the Pharisees. Cain is the older brother, and thus occupies a position 
of political power with respect to his younger brother Abel. Yet Abel is uniquely blessed by 
God and this blessing is perceived as a threat by Cain and is thus a source of envy. This is 
consistent with the pattern of reversal that is part of Irenaeus’ ‘political envy’ motif. 
According to Irenaeus, Abel is a prefiguring of Christ insofar as Abel, like Christ, was 
unjustly murdered.47 Just as Christ will rise above his adversaries, so too will Abel.48 As is 
the case with the whole of Irenaeus’ system, the righteous are destined to rise above the 
unrighteous, regardless of the present political advantage of the unrighteous over the 
righteous; the day of resurrection and judgment is the great reversal, the great day of 
vindication for the righteous over the wicked. As with the Gnostic demiurge and the 
Pharisees, an eschatological reversal of political fortunes is destined to take place, wherein 
the older Cain will be supplanted by the younger Abel. Thus the same basic reversal 
framework that we have seen with the Gnostic demiurge and the Pharisees, obtains for 
Irenaeus’ use of the Cain and Abel story. 
Of course, Cain’s envy of Abel is not is not an exact fit with respect to our secondary 
category of ontology. In a technical sense Cain and Abel are ontologically equal. Irenaeus 
goes out of his way elsewhere to insist that there are not two distinct ontological classes of 
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47 Haer. 4.25.2. Christ’s death is the recapitulation of all the righteous prophets who have 
been killed, beginning with Abel. See Haer. 5.14.1, where Irenaeus references Jesus’ quote in 
Matthew 23:35-36: ‘that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed on earth, from the blood of 
innocent Abel to the blood of Zechariah the son of Barachiah, whom you murdered between the 
sanctuary and the altar. Truly, I say to you, all this will come upon this generation’. 




human beings (i.e. the wicked and the sinful); for Irenaeus, against the Gnostics, humans are 
sinful by choice, not by nature.49 In any case, the political disparity and future reversal puts 
Cain’s envy of Abel more in the camp of ‘political’ envy, rather than ‘common’ envy.  
The connection of the Cain and Abel story to the Devil’s envy of humanity (explored 
more fully below), shows the interconnectedness of the envy motif in Irenaeus. Insofar as 
Cain’s envy of Abel is explicitly set in parallel with the Devil’s envy of humanity, as well as 
the Pharisee’s envy of Christ, and insofar as the Devil’s envy of humanity (as we shall see) 
is a near exact parallel of the Gnostic demiurge’s envy of humanity, the connection between 
Cain and Abel, the demiurge and humanity, the Pharisees and Christ, and the Devil and 
Adam, shows that Irenaeus is working within the same basic framework of envy for all four 
sets of relationships.    
 
 
E. The Gnostic Father Envies Humanity 
 
Our fifth instance of relational envy in Irenaeus is the Gnostic Father’s envy of 
humanity. This instance of envy runs more in parallel with the ‘envy of the gods’ motif 
common in the larger Greek and Roman tradition. As we have just seen in Irenaeus, ‘envy is 
a thing unbecoming to God’.50 Irenaeus uses this basic premise as a way of besmirching the 
Gnostic Father. Irenaeus counters the Gnostic narrative by insisting that it is not the 
demiurge who is envious, but rather their unknown ‘Father’. At the beginning of book five 
of Adversus haereses, Irenaeus accuses the Gnostic Father of being either impotent or 
envious. Irenaeus constructs his argument against the Gnostic Father as part of a larger 
discussion regarding the resurrection of the body. The Gnostics (as presented by Irenaeus) 
are universal in their agreement that the material body is of lesser worth than the soul, and to 
be discarded; thus the body will not partake in any type of resurrection. Irenaeus seizes upon 
this as a sign of weakness or, alternately, envy, within the Gnostic Father. He writes,  
 
Those persons who feign the existence of another Father beyond the Creator, 
and who term him the good God, do deceive themselves; for they introduce 
him as a feeble, worthless, and negligent being, not to say spiteful and 
envious [lividum et invidum], inasmuch as they affirm that our bodies are not 
quickened by him. For when they say of things which it is manifest to all do 
remain immortal, such as the spirit and the soul, and such other things, that 
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they are quickened by the Father, but that another thing [the body] which is 
quickened in no different manner than by God granting [life] to it, is 
abandoned by life,— this proves their Father to be weak and powerless, or 
else envious and spiteful [aut invidum et lividum]. For since the Creator does 
even here quicken our mortal bodies, and promises them resurrection by the 
prophets, as I have pointed out; who is shown to be more powerful, stronger, 
or truly good? The Creator who vivifies the whole human, or their Father, 
falsely so called? He feigns to be the quickener of those things which are 
immortal by nature, to which things life is always present by their very 
nature; but he does not benevolently quicken those things which required his 
assistance, that they might live, but leaves them carelessly to fall under the 
power of death. Whether is it the case, then, that their Father does not bestow 
life upon them when he has the power of so doing, or is it that he does not 
possess the power? If, on the one hand, it is because he cannot, he is, upon 
that supposition, not a powerful being, nor is he more perfect than the 
Creator; for the Creator grants, as we must perceive, what he is unable to 
afford. But if, on the other hand, [if he does not grant this] when he has the 
power of so doing, then he is proved to be not a good, but an envious and 
negligent Father [invidus et neglegens Pater].51  
 
Irenaeus takes it for granted in this passage that the immaterial parts of a human being 
(i.e. the soul and spirit) live on into eternity because they are ‘immortal by nature’. Thus the 
fact that the Gnostic Father vivifies the soul and spirit is no credit to the Gnostic Father’s 
power or benevolence. These would live on without the Father’s help. The one place where 
humans really need help is with respect to their bodies, which are not by nature immortal. 
But this is precisely the one area where the Gnostic Father either cannot or will not help. 
According to Irenaeus, the Father of the Gnostics is either powerless, insofar as he is unable 
to resurrect the body although he desires to do so, or ‘envious and spiteful’ (invidum et 
lividum), insofar as he refuses to grant life to that which needs it (i.e. the human body). 
Irenaeus does not make explicit the logic of his charge of envy. Presumably, he means that 
the Gnostic Father refuses to help vivify the human body because he himself does not have a 
body and envies humanity in this respect. Thus the Gnostic father enviously denies 
humanity what he himself wished he had but does not.  
                                                         




Irenaeus’ logic here would not have been particularly compelling to his interlocutors, 
since his argument depends upon the premise that the body is a good thing which the Father 
does not possess (and thus something that he enviously denies humanity). The goodness of 
the body was, of course, a chief ground of contention between the two parties.  
It is difficult to categorize the nature of envy in the Gnostic Father’s relationship with 
humanity, in large part because the relationship in question is partially imaginary for both 
Irenaeus and the Gnostics. The Gnostics do not grant that the Father is envious of humanity 
(such as they do with the demiurge), and Irenaeus does not grant that the Gnostic Father 
exists. As such, it is not possible to examine this relationship from a shared vantage point—
either Gnostic or Irenaean.  
Granting the forgoing difficulty, an examination of the Gnostic Father’s envy of 
humanity does not follow the pattern of ‘political’ envy and reversal we have seen in the 
previous four relationships. The envy of the Gnostic Father, unlike the envy of the Gnostic 
demiurge, is the envy of the one in the greater ontological and political position envying the 
one in the ontologically and politically lesser position. Nor does Irenaeus posit a reversal 
between the Gnostic Father and humans, which of course is to be expected, since Irenaeus 
does not grant the existence of the Gnostic Father. Yet the Gnostic Father’s envy of the 
body (if the human body is indeed the object of envy) seems intended by Irenaeus to call 
into question the Gnostic Father’s contentedness with respect to humanity, for he lacks a 
mode of being that humans alone possess. Here Irenaeus sets the Gnostic Father in contrast 
to the true God. Whereas the true God does not envy the blessing and deification of 
humanity, the Gnostic Father begrudges any happiness to humanity that he himself cannot 
likewise possess.  
In this respect, the envy of the Gnostic Father toward humanity runs in tighter parallel 
with the traditional classical notion of the envy of the gods. Just as the ontologically and 
politically superior pagan gods begrudge humans too much happiness, so to the Gnostic 
Father begrudges humans the happiness of a resurrected body.  
 
 
F. The False Teachers Envy the ‘Orthodox’ Bishops 
 
The final relational instance of envy in Irenaeus is that of the false teachers and the 
‘orthodox’ bishops—an example of what I have called ‘common envy’. Throughout his 
work Irenaeus sets the false teachers in contrast with those of the orthodox party. A chief 
difference between them is that the false teachers, unlike the true teachers (of which 




speak in complex riddles, while a true teacher of God preaches the gospel simply, freely, 
and without envy. Irenaeus writes, ‘Thus did the apostles simply, and without envy towards 
anyone [nemini invidentes], deliver to all what they had themselves learned from the Lord. 
Thus also does Luke, without envy to anyone [nemini invidens], deliver to us what he had 
learned from them, as he has himself testified, saying, “Even as they delivered them unto us, 
who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word”’.52  
In contrast, the false teachers are seductive and envious. ‘And if he [Jesus] did 
indeed teach us to call one Being Father and God, while he does from time to time himself 
confess other fathers and gods in the same sense, then he will appear to enjoin a different 
course upon his disciples from what he follows himself. Such conduct, however, does not 
bespeak the good teacher, but a seducer and envious one [sed seductoris et invidi]’.53   
Irenaeus does not specify precisely what, exactly, the Gnostic teachers envy. But it 
seems likely from the context that Irenaeus believes them to be envious of the attention and 
honor given to the orthodox bishops. The good teacher—exemplified by the apostles and the 
orthodox bishops—stands in a position of bounty. The gospel, the greatest gift one human 
being can pass on to another, has been handed down from the Lord himself through the 
apostles, who have in turn handed it down to the bishops who still hold to the rule of faith. 
In possessing this gospel, the church and her teachers possess everything. Thus there is 
nothing left for the true teacher of God to envy; giving everything, they need nothing, for 
they are confident of their reward from God. But the Gnostic teacher stands in a position of 
need. He is a seducer and envious, desiring to possess through trickery and false teaching 
the attention and devotion that rightfully belongs to the heirs of the apostles, the true 
teachers of God.  
This reading is supported by the parallel found in Philippians 1:15-17, where Paul 
writes, ‘Some indeed preach Christ from envy and rivalry [φθόνον καὶ ἔριν], but others from 
good will. The latter do it out of love, knowing that I am put here for the defense of the 
gospel. The former proclaim Christ out of rivalry [ἐριθείας], not sincerely but thinking to 
afflict me in my imprisonment’. For Paul, the envy of the ‘other’ teachers is clearly directed 
against him. Irenaeus is likely drawing from this passage and extending the point to his 
present context. Irenaeus and his fellow orthodox bishops, like Paul, preach Christ freely 
and are motivated by love. The Gnostic teachers, like Paul’s opponents in Rome, preach 
Christ out of envy and are motivated by rivalry.  
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The categories of ‘political’ and ‘ontological’ that we have been tracking are muted 
between the false teachers and the orthodox bishops. It is not obvious that Irenaeus would 
consider the Gnostic teachers to be politically superior to the orthodox bishops. Although 
Irenaeus adopts a somewhat besieged tone when speaking of the Gnostic teachers, neither 
side could reasonably be said to be in a position of political power vis-à-vis the other. So in 
this sense, the Gnostic teacher’s envy of the orthodox bishops is not a clear case of the 
politically superior envying the politically inferior. The question of ontology is likewise not 
an exact fit, since Irenaeus would not insist on an ontological difference between himself 
and his Gnostic opponents. However, the theme of ascendancy—even if not reversal—while 
not explicit in these passages, is nonetheless woven throughout Irenaeus’ larger polemic 
against the Gnostics. The true bishops will one day be vindicated over their Gnostic 
opponents, who are doomed to be defeated together with Satan and his angels.  
On the whole, there is not enough difference in political power (or ontological 
distinction) between the Gnostic teachers and the orthodox bishops to classify this 
relationship as a case of ‘political envy’. More simply, the envy of the false teachers toward 
the orthodox bishops is best categorized as ‘common envy’.  
 
 
G. Conclusion: Facets of Non-Satanic Envy 
 
We have explored the six instances of non-diabolical relational envy in Irenaeus: the 
demiurge’s envy of humanity; the Pharisees’ envy of Christ; God’s non-envy of humanity; 
Cain’s envy of Abel; the Gnostic Father’s envy of humanity; and the Gnostic teachers’ envy 
of the orthodox bishops. The first four instances of envy follow a general pattern of 
‘political’ envy in which the one in the politically superior position envies the one in the 
politically inferior position, with an ultimate reversal of political power taking place. Thus 
the politically superior demiurge envies humanity, and is eventually subordinated to 
humanity; the politically superior Pharisees are envious of Christ at the occasion of his 
triumphal entry, and fear he will supplant them (which he does); the true God, who is 
politically superior to humanity is, according to Irenaeus, emphatically not envious of 
humans precisely because his political superiority and greatness is unthreatened; and the 
politically superior Cain (being the elder brother), is envious of Abel, the divinely favored 
younger brother, who will eventually supplant Cain at the resurrection of the dead. These 
political reversals, then, bring together into harmony ontological and political power. 
Further, with the exception of Cain’s envy of Abel, our secondary category of ontology is 




in the politically inferior position. Thus the envious demiurge is ontologically inferior to 
humans, the envious Pharisees are ontologically inferior to Jesus, and, in the case of God’s 
non-envy of humanity, God is not envious of humanity (thus the same pattern is seen in the 
negation of God’s envy).   
The last two relational categories do not follow the pattern of political envy. The 
Gnostic Father’s envy of human embodiment maps more closely on to the traditional ‘envy 
of the gods’ motif found throughout the classical world. And the Gnostic teachers’ envy of 
the orthodox bishops mirrors the sort of common envy seen between humans who occupy 
the same ontological status. We can thus summarize as follows: 
 
RELATIONSHIP TYPE OF ENVY 
The Demiurge and Humanity Political Envy (with Ontological Envy) 
The Pharisees and Jesus Political Envy (with Ontological Envy) 
God and Humanity Lack of Political Envy (with Ontological Envy) 
Cain and Abel Political Envy 
The Gnostic Father and Humanity Envy of the Gods 
The Gnostic Teachers and the Orthodox Bishops Common Envy 
 
 
The most relevant of these six relationships for our examination of the Devil’s envy 
is that of the demiurge and humanity. The politically superior but ontologically inferior 
demiurge envies the politically inferior but ontologically superior humanity. The demiurge’s 
political power is eventually subordinated to humanity. As we will see below, the envy and 
reversal that can be seen in the demiurge’s relationship with humanity is a near exact 
parallel of Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s envy of humanity. Indeed, insofar as Gnostic 
exegesis tends to offer a ‘reverse reading’54 of the biblical narrative, it should not surprise us 
to find that the Gnostic demiurge functions as the villain of the Gnostic narrative in the same 
way that the Devil functions in Irenaeus.  As we will see below, Irenaeus’ view of the 
Devil’s envy of humanity, is—like the envy of the demiurge—an instance of political envy 
wherein the one in the politically superior (and ontologically inferior) position envies the 
one in the politically inferior (and ontologically superior) position—all in the context of a 
future reversal of political power between the one envying and the object of envy.55    
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II. The Devil’s Envy of Humanity 
 
In the first two books of Adversus haereses, Irenaeus devotes nearly all of his effort 
to describing the various Gnostic heresies, and very little to explicating Christian doctrine. 
But with books three through five, Irenaeus moves toward a more constructive posture. 
While the Gnostic error figures prominently throughout—and indeed continues to serve as 
an organizing foil—Irenaeus now forcefully advances the ‘biblical’ narrative as an 
alternative to the Gnostic narrative. It is within this context that the theme of the Devil’s 
envy of humanity is developed.56  
In the last two books of Adversus haereses, and again in Epideixis, we find five 
extended passages in which the Devil’s envy of humanity is explicitly discussed. Taken 
together, these five passages comprise the sum of Irenaeus’ comments on the subject. 
Happily, all five passages are consistent with each other and provide substantial context, 
allowing the reader to see clearly the way the Devil’s envy functions in Irenaeus’ larger 
narrative. In what follows I offer a close reading of the five passages, and show how the 
Devil’s envy of humanity parallels the same pattern of ‘political envy’ and reversal of 
political power that we have seen at work in Irenaeus’ writing—most especially in the envy 
of the demiurge.  
As will be observed, the Devil’s envy of humanity is sourced in two key factors, 1) 
humanity’s existence in the image and likeness of God, and, 2) humanity’s lordship over the 
material world.  
 
 
A. Epid. 16 
 
We begin with Irenaeus’ account of the Devil in Epideixis. Though Epideixis was 
written subsequent to Adversus haereses, the systematic and narrative nature of the book 
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56 The theme of the Devil’s envy of humanity is not found in first three books of Adversus 





provides the most complete account of Irenaeus’ Devil narrative and is thus the best lens 
through which to read Irenaeus’ more passing comments in Adversus haereses. Epideixis 
ignores the Gnostic debate altogether and instead serves as an executive summary of the true 
faith as conceived by Irenaeus. The work is arranged mostly chronologically with respect to 
the biblical timeline, and thus follows the same basic sequence of events as the opening 
chapters of Genesis and the subsequent scriptural narrative.  
Irenaeus begins Epideixis with an account of the world’s creation. This account runs 
through Genesis’ six days of creation. In chapter ten Irenaeus notes the creation of the 
angels and the heavenly hosts, making an explicit statement regarding the fact that they have 
boundaries. This reference to angelic boundaries sets the stage for the coming angelic 
crossing of these boundaries. In chapter eleven, Irenaeus details the creation of humanity. 
He writes,  
 
But the man57 he formed (pla,ssw) with his own hands58, taking from the 
earth that which was purest and finest, and mingling in a measure his own 
power with the earth. For he traced his own form on the [man’s] formation 
(pla,sma),59 that that which should be seen should be of divine form 
(Qeoeidh,j)60: for it was as an image of God the man was formed and set on 
the earth. And that he might become living, he breathed on his face the breath 
of life; that both for the breath and for the formation man should be like unto 
God. Moreover he was free and self-controlled, being made by God for this 
end, that he might rule all those things that were upon the earth.61 And this 
great created world (kti,sij), prepared by God before the formation of man, 
was given to man as his place (cwri,on), with all things whatsoever in it.62 
And there were in this place also with their tasks the servants (dou/loj) of that 
God who formed all things; and the steward (evpi,tropoj), who was set over all 
his fellow servants (su,ndouloj), received this place. Now the servants were 
angels, and the steward was the archangel.63 
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61 Smith, ‘in order to be master of everything on earth’.  
62 For the translation of this phrase, see Chapter One, no. 58 of this thesis.    




Here we see Irenaeus’ anthropology and angelology in vivid detail. The world was 
created by God for Adam (and by extension for all of humanity), who is uniquely created by 
God in his image and likeness. The ‘great world’ is thus given to Adam as ‘his place’. The 
angels are then introduced as ‘servants’ of God. The steward (i.e. the Devil) is set over his 
fellow servants and ‘received this place’ (i.e. the world). The role of the angels generally, 
and the steward specifically, is made clear in the following chapter.  
 
Now, having made the man lord (ku,rioj) of the earth and all things in it, he 
secretly64 appointed him lord (ku,rioj) also of those who were servants 
(dou/loj) in it. They however were in their full development;65 but the lord, 
that is, man, was small; for he was a child; and it was necessary that he 
should grow, and so come to his full perfection.66 And, that he might have his 
nourishment (trofh,) and growth with festive and dainty meats, he prepared 
him a place better than this world, excelling in air, beauty, light, food, plants, 
fruit, water, and all other necessaries of life, and its name is Paradise. And so 
fair and good (kalo.j kavgaqo,j) was this Paradise, that the Word of God 
continually resorted there, and walked (peripate,w) and talked with the man, 
figuring beforehand the things that should be in the future (protupo,w), that he 
should dwell with him and talk with him, and should be with humanity, 
teaching them righteousness. But the man was a child, not yet having his 
judgment (boulh,) perfected; wherefore also he was easily led astray by the 
deceiver.67 
 
Irenaeus here describes Adam as a child, perfect yet not come into maturity.68 
Paradise is a distinct place outside the present world,69 an incubator in which Adam is to 
reside while he grows and matures. The angels, however, are already fully grown and have 
fully realized their potential. As such, they are to exercise dominion over the world as 
stewards until such time as Adam comes of age. Most significantly, God has appointed the 
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man as ‘lord of the servants’. Irenaeus then goes on in Epid. 13-15 to briefly discuss the 
creation of the animals and of Eve, as well as the prohibition regarding the tree of 
knowledge. ‘And he laid down for him certain conditions: so that, if he kept the command 
of God, then he would always remain as he was, that is, immortal; but if he did not, he 
would become mortal, melting into earth, whence his frame had been taken’.70  
Having set the stage with the principal actors, Irenaeus thus introduces the reader in 
chapter sixteen to the Eden temptation and the Devil’s envy of humanity.  
 
This commandment the man71 kept not, but was disobedient to God, being 
led astray (plana,w) by the angel who, becoming jealous of the man and 
looking on him with envy (fqone,w)72 because of the great gifts of God which 
he had given to man, both ruined himself and made the man a sinner, 
persuading him to disobey the commandment of God. So the angel, 
becoming by his falsehood the author and originator (avrchgo,j) of sin, himself 
was struck down, having offended against God, and man he caused to be cast 
out (evkba,llw) from Paradise. And, because through the guidance of his 
disposition (kata. gnw,mhn) he apostatized and departed (avfi,stamai) from 
God, he was called Satan, according to the Hebrew word; that is, 
‘apostate’:73 but he is also called Slanderer. Now God cursed the serpent 
which carried and conveyed (basta,zw) the Slanderer; and this malediction 
came on the beast himself and on the angel hidden and concealed in him, 
even on Satan; and man he put away from his presence, removing him and 
making him to dwell on the way to Paradise at that time; because Paradise 
receives not the sinful.74 
 
                                                         
70 Epid. 15.  
71 Irenaeus here (like Paul in Romans 5:12-21) places the failure of humanity on Adam, 
rather than Eve. Eve is not reintroduced into the narrative until Epid. 17, where both she and Adam 
are said to be cast out of Paradise.  
72 ‘Looking on him with envy’ is from the Armenian c’arakneal and is perhaps more 
literally ‘evil-eyeing’. Smith suggests baskai`nwn (envying, grudging) as the underlying Greek for 
this term. See Smith, Proof, 153, no. 88. For more on the ‘evil eye’ and envy in the Christian 
tradition, see Aquaro, Death by Envy.  
73 Cf. Haer. 5.21.2. So too Justin (from whom Irenaeus likely got this linguistically wrong 
idea), Dial. 103.  




Here we have the basic framework for Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s fall. The 
steward is not content to be merely a steward.75 He knows that his political advantage over 
humanity—assigned at creation—is only temporary. What is more, he sees that humanity, 
being made uniquely in the image of God, is ontologically superior to him and thus the 
rightful and destined ruler of the world. This ontological superiority and future political 
superiority evokes the Devil’s envy. He is jealous of the ‘great gifts which God had given to 
humanity’.76 Entering Paradise in the form of a serpent, the Devil assaults Adam and Eve 
while they are yet in their infancy. The impression Irenaeus leaves with us is that the Devil 
knows he must strike while Adam and Eve are young, before they come into their full power 
and become too strong for him. The Devil is successful as it relates to overthrowing 
humanity. The command of God has been broken and the curse of God quickly follows; 
from the dust humanity has been taken, to the dust humanity will return. Adam and Eve are 
cut off from the tree of life and cast out of Paradise. But the Devil’s plan ultimately fails. 
The steward is found out by God, and he too falls under the curse and is cast out of 
Paradise.77 Insofar as he used a serpent to disguise himself, both the serpent and the steward 
are doomed together.78 With this envious act the steward overstepped his boundaries and 
became the apostate angel, a rebel against God and an enemy of humanity. 
This same basic narrative is likewise confirmed and expanded in Adversus haereses.   
 
 
B. Haer. Preface to Book 4 
 
The first occasion in Adversus haereses where Irenaeus discusses the Devil’s envy of 
humanity is the preface to book four. Here, Irenaeus draws a straight line between the 
contemporary apostates (i.e. the Gnostic teachers) and the first apostate (i.e. the Devil). The 
Gnostics are simply following the error of the first apostate, Satan himself, and will suffer 
his same fate. Relevant for our purposes, Irenaeus links together the Devil’s envy of 
humanity with the similitudio Dei. He writes,    
                                                         
75 Note the close parallel with Haer. 4.11.3, where the Pharisees, like the Devil, are the 
‘envious wicked stewards’ who resist Christ as he rides into Jerusalem to assume his kingdom—a 
kingdom that they were to rule until his coming.  
76 Irenaeus does not explicitly identify these ‘great gifts’ but the context strongly indicates 
that they include humanity’s creation in the image of God and humanity’s dominion over the world, 
insofar as these are the only two advantages noted thus far by Irenaeus that humanity is said to have 
over and above the steward and his angels. This reading is confirmed by the other relevant passages 
in Adversus haereses (see below). 
77 Cf. Haer. 4. preface, 4.  




For as the serpent beguiled Eve, by promising her what he had not himself, 
so also do these men, by pretending [to possess] superior knowledge, and [to 
be acquainted with] ineffable mysteries; and, by promising that admittance 
which they speak of as taking place within the Pleroma, plunge those that 
believe them into death, rendering them apostates from him who made them. 
And at that time, indeed, the apostate angel [apostata angelus], having 
effected the disobedience of humanity by means of the serpent, imagined that 
he escaped the notice of the Lord; wherefore God assigned him the form and 
name [of a serpent]. But now, since the last times are [upon us], evil is spread 
abroad among people, which not only renders them apostates, but by many 
machinations does [the Devil] raise up blasphemers against the Creator, 
namely, by means of all the heretics already mentioned. For all these, 
although they issue forth from diverse regions, and promulgate different 
[opinions], do nevertheless concur in the same blasphemous design, 
wounding [people] unto death, by teaching blasphemy against God our 
Maker and Supporter, and taking away the salvation of humanity. Now the 
human being/person [homo] is a mixed organization of soul and flesh, who 
was fashioned [formatus est] after the likeness of God [similitudinem Dei], 
and formed [plasmatus est] by his hands, that is, by the Son and Holy Spirit, 
to whom also he said, ‘Let us make humanity’. This, then, is the aim of him 
who envies our life [Hoc ergo propositum est eius qui vitae nostrae invidet], 
to render people disbelievers in their own salvation, and blasphemous with 
respect to the Creator God [et blasphemos in plasmatorem Deum]. For 
whatsoever all the heretics may have advanced with the utmost solemnity, 
they come to this at last, that they blaspheme the Creator [Fabricatorem], and 
disallow the salvation of God's workmanship [plasmatis Dei], which the flesh 
truly is [quod quidem est caro]; on behalf of which I have proved, in a 
variety of ways, that the Son of God accomplished the whole dispensation [of 
mercy], and have shown that there is none other called God by the Scriptures 
except the Father of all, and the Son, and those who possess the adoption [et 
eos qui adoptionem habent].79  
 
Here Satan is the ‘apostate angel’ and the beguiler of Eve. Like the false teachers, he 
makes promises that he cannot keep. Just as following the false knowledge of the Devil led 
                                                         




Adam and Eve into death, so too the false knowledge of the heretics leads their followers 
and adherents to death. And the chief error of this false knowledge is a denial of the 
goodness of the Creator and of his workmanship (i.e. humanity). The machinations of the 
heretics in the ‘last days’ is a continuation (and perhaps for Irenaeus a recapitulation and 
consummation) of the Devil’s first assault upon humanity. The apostate and envious spirit 
that drove the Devil in the beginning still operates in the heretics of Irenaeus’ day. 
Notably, Irenaeus’ statement regarding the Devil’s envy of human ‘life’ (vita) 
follows immediately on the heels of Irenaeus’ statement about humanity being made in the 
similitudo Dei.80 The connection between the two is not explicit, but near proximity 
suggests a correlation in Irenaeus’ mind between the Devil’s envy and humanity’s creation 
in the likeness of God. The near juxtaposition echoes the logic of Wisdom 2:23-24, which 
likewise suggests a connection between humanity’s possession of the imago Dei and the 
Devil’s envy.  ‘For God created the human [τὸν ἄνθρωπον] for incorruption, and made him 
in the image [εἰκόνα] of his own eternity, but through the Devil's envy [φθόνῳ] death 
entered the world, and those who belong to his party experience it’.81  
In his refutation of the Gnostics, Irenaeus is keen here (and throughout his writing) 
to emphasize both the creaturely and the divine elements of humanity. Humanity is a ‘mixed 
organization of soul and flesh’. Humans, on the one hand, have an immaterial constitution 
fashioned after the ‘likeness of God’; on the other hand they are a part of the material world. 
Yet the material world is not a throwaway husk. The human body has been directly crafted 
by the Creator and constitutes the handiwork of God—caro quidem est plasmatis Dei. And 
humanity uniquely among all created beings—both earthly and heavenly—carries within 
itself the similitudo Dei. It would seem then, that for Irenaeus, the life that the Devil’s envies 
in humanity is the kind of life infused with the similitudo Dei. While the Devil may retain 
political power over humanity, the overall effect here is to position the Devil in an inferior 
ontological position vis-à-vis humanity.82 Because the Devil envies humanity’s privileged 
                                                         
80 As we have already observed in Chapter Two of this thesis, Irenaeus is not always 
consistent in his use of the terms imago and similitudo. He often uses the terms as synonyms to 
include both the material and immaterial part of humanity. But sometimes he distinguishes between 
the terms, using imago to refer to that part of humanity which physically or visually resembles the 
incarnate Word, and more narrowly, similitudo to designate that part of humanity which resembles 
the immaterial divine nature and character of God (or, more specifically, the Word). If Irenaeus is 
following a distinction here, we can take him to mean that the Devil is envious of humanity because 
of that part of humanity which resembles the divine nature. Yet insofar as Irenaeus is not consistent 
in maintaining a strict distinction between the two words, the point should not be over-pressed.  
81 It is worth noting that Irenaeus nowhere directly quotes this passages (nor any passage 
from Wisdom), though his view of the Devil seems obviously indebted to it (directly or indirectly).  
82 Recall that for Irenaeus, human beings retain the imago Dei even after the fall, insofar as 
the imago Dei is a reference to the human body and its likeness to Christ’s human body. And the 
similitudo Dei, though lost at the fall, is regained for the Christian with the indwelling of the Holy 




ontology, it is his aim (propositum) to separate the Creator from his workmanship, thus 
rendering humans incapable of being saved; the ontological degradation of death is the 
inevitable result.  
Yet God is not content to let the apex of his creation fall into dissolution. The last 
sentence of the preface to book four is a rather remarkable statement concerning the scope 
of salvation as Irenaeus conceives it. According to Irenaeus, the Scriptures call Deus only 
the Father, the Son, ‘and those who possess the adoption’ [et eos qui adoptionem habent].83 
Through the redemptive work of Christ, death-pocked humans are adopted into the life of 
God himself and rise above the Devil and his followers, such that they even bear the name 
Deus. It is this high destiny—temporarily scuttled by the Devil, but restored in Christ—that 
evokes the Devil’s envy.  
 
 
C. Haer. 4.40.3 
 
Toward the end of book four, Irenaeus again mentions the Devil’s envy of humanity, 
this time without reference to the similitudo Dei. Yet like the preface of book four, we find 
here a statement about the Devil being jealous (zelavit) of God’s workmanship (plasma). 
The salient passage takes place at the end of a chapter in which Irenaeus is underscoring 
God’s commitment to reward the righteous and to punish the wicked. Irenaeus accuses his 
Gnostic opponents of separating the Creator (who punishes) from the ‘Father’ (who saves). 
Irenaeus is thus burdened to insist that the true God both saves the faithful and punishes the 
wicked; anything less would be unbecoming of God. ‘It is therefore one and the same God 
the Father who has prepared good things with himself for those who desire his fellowship, 
and who remain in subjection to him; and who has prepared the eternal fire for the 
ringleader of the apostasy, the Devil, and those who revolted with him’.84 For scriptural 
support, Irenaeus turns to Christ’s parable of the wheat and the tares. ‘The Father, therefore, 
who has prepared the kingdom for the righteous, into which the Son has received those 
worthy of it, is he who has also prepared the furnace of fire, into which those angels 
commissioned by the Son of Man shall send those persons who deserve it, according to 
                                                         
match. And Christians regain their ontological superiority over the Devil because of the indwelling 
of the Holy Spirit.  
83 Here the ‘third member’ of the divine triad is not the Spirit, but deified humanity. 
Irenaeus, of course, speaks at length in various places about the role of the Holy Spirit, particularly 
with reference to the ‘two hands of God’. But the fact that his soteriological framework allows him 
to place humans alongside of the Father and the Son as worthy of the name Deus shows just how 
robust his anthropology truly is.  




God’s command’.85 Irenaeus then goes on to explain in detail the meaning of the parable. He 
writes,  
The Lord, indeed, sowed good seed in his own field; and he says, ‘The field 
is the world’. But while humanity slept, the enemy came, and ‘sowed tares in 
the midst of the wheat, and went his way’. Hence we learn that this is the 
apostate angel and the enemy [Ex tunc enim apostata est angelus hic et 
inimicus], because he was jealous of God’s workmanship [ex quo zelavit 
plasma Dei] and launched an attack to render this [workmanship] an enemy 
with God [et inimicum illum Deo facere aggressus est]. For this cause also 
God has banished from his presence him who did of his own accord stealthily 
sow the tares, that is, him who brought about the transgression; but he took 
compassion upon humanity, who, through want of care no doubt, but still 
wickedly, became involved in disobedience; and he turned the enmity by 
which [the Devil] had designed to make [humanity] the enemy of God, 
against the author of it, by removing his own anger from humanity, turning it 
in another direction, and sending it instead upon the serpent. As also the 
Scripture tells us that God said to the serpent, ‘And I will place enmity 
between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed. He shall 
bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel’. And the Lord recapitulated 
in himself this enmity [Et inimicitiam hanc Dominus in semetipsum 
recapitulavit], when he was made a human being [homo] from woman, and 
trod upon his head, as I have pointed out in the preceding book.86  
Satan is the apostate angel, the enemy that sows the tares within creation. As such, 
he is the adversary of both God and humanity. Because of the Devil’s treachery, God 
banishes him from his presence. The curse and anger of God is not primarily directed 
toward those who have been deceived, but toward the deceiver.87 The curse is laid upon the 
serpent (and thus the Devil); one—namely Christ—shall arise from the line of Eve who will 
crush the head of the enemy by summing up in himself the enmity that exists between 
humanity and the Devil. The political fortunes of the Devil will be short-lived. Whatever 
                                                         
85 Haer. 4.40.2.  
86 Haer. 4.40.3. 
87 See also Haer. 3.23.3. ‘It was for this reason, too, that immediately after Adam had 
transgressed, as the Scripture relates, God pronounced no curse against Adam personally, but against 
the ground, in reference to his works, as a certain person among the ancients has observed: “God did 
indeed transfer the curse to the earth, that it might not remain in man.”…. But the curse in all its 
fullness fell upon the serpent, which had beguiled them’. See MacKenzie, Demonstration, 123-29 




political advantage he has managed to gain over humanity will be taken away by Christ. 
Humanity will rise to its intended place of political power in keeping with its ontological 
superiority.  
Notably, the Devil’s motivation in assaulting humanity is ascribed to envy.  It is 
because the Devil was jealous (zelavit) of God’s workmanship (plasma) that he turns 
humanity against God. What is it about God’s plasma that evokes the Devil’s envy? Here 
again the cause of the Devil’s envy is not specified. It is not tied directly to humanity’s 
lordship over creation, nor does Irenaeus make a direct reference to the simultudo et imago 
Dei. Yet the imago Dei seems to lurk in the background of this passage. Irenaeus here, as in 
the preface to book four, refers to humanity as God’s ‘workmanship’ (plasma).  The Latin 
noun plasma can be translated generally as ‘creation/workmanship’, but also carries the idea 
of ‘image’ and ‘figure’.88 Given Irenaeus’ oft repeated emphasis on humanity being made in 
the imago Dei, as well as his claim that this image consists of the human body, which in turn 
finds its referent in the bodily and incarnated Word, it is very likely that Irenaeus intends all 
three meanings—creation, figure, image—when he uses plasma.89 Humanity consists of 
material creation which is itself made in the image of the invisible God. Thus, though we do 
not find the expression imago Dei, the concept is present in this passage.  
All this suggests that Irenaeus has in mind in this passage the same basic framework 
for understanding the Devil’s envy as is detailed in the preface to book four: the Devil’s 
recognizes the ontological superiority of humans, and thus their potential political 
superiority. This superiority evokes the Devil’s envy and ignites within him a fear of losing 
his political power. His assault upon humanity follows. A reversal of fortunes is foretold in 
which an ontologically superior humanity will one day triumph politically over the Devil.  
 
 
D. Haer. 5.24.4 
 
Toward the end of book five, Irenaeus discusses in detail the Devil’s temptation of 
Adam and Eve, the coming of the Anti-Christ, and the Devil’s eventual demise.90 By way of 
context, in this larger discussion Irenaeus recounts the Devil’s temptation of Christ in the 
                                                         
88 See the entry for plasma in LSLD, 1385.  
89 Elsewhere Irenaeus uses plasma (Haer 1.24.1), and the closely associated noun plasmatio 
(Haer. 2.30.3, 3.22.1) in close connection with imago et similitudo Dei, as we see here and in the 
preface to book four. It is certainly consistent with Irenaeus’ overall anthropology to posit a close 
connection between plasma and imago et similitudo; humans are uniquely the plasma of God in that 
they are the physical ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ of the invisible God. 




wilderness, specifically the Devil’s statement that all the kingdoms of the world belong to 
him (i.e. the Devil), and that he can give them to anyone he desires. Irenaeus declares this to 
be a lie, asserting that it is not the Devil who dispenses the kingdoms of the World, but 
rather God. Quoting Proverbs 8:15, Irenaeus states, ‘The Word also says by Solomon, “By 
me kings reign, and princes administer justice. By me chiefs are raised up, and by me kings 
rule the earth”’.91 It is God, not the Devil, who has the power to give away kingdoms. What 
is more, the rulers of the world are not angelic powers, nor Satan himself. Rather God has 
given governance of the world to humans.  
 
Now, that he spoke these words, not in regard to angelic powers, nor 
invisible rulers—as some venture to expound the passage—but of those 
actual human authorities, he says, ‘For this cause pay tribute also: for they 
are God’s ministers, doing service for this very thing’. This also the Lord 
confirmed, when he did not do what he was tempted to do by the Devil; but 
he gave directions that tribute should be paid to the tax-gatherers for himself 
and Peter; because ‘they are the ministers of God, serving for this very 
thing’.92  
 
Satan therefore lies when he tells Christ in the wilderness that the world 
governments belong to him (i.e. the Devil). Truly they belong to humanity, and most 
especially to Christ himself, who is the recapitulation of Adam. (According to Irenaeus’ 
reading, Satan is ironically offering to Christ the very thing that Christ already rightfully 
possesses). Satan then, can only hope to deceive humanity into thinking that the world’s 
kingdoms belong not to humanity, but rather to him, and that he can give them out in the 
place of God. ‘The Devil, however, as he is the apostate angel, can only go to this length, as 
he did at the beginning, to deceive and lead astray the mind of the human person [hominis] 
into disobeying the commandments of God, and gradually to darken the hearts of those who 
would endeavor to serve him, to the forgetting of the true God, but to the adoration of 
himself as God’ [ipsum autem quasi Deum adorare].93 Notably, the Devil masquerades as 
God in order to lay claim to what properly belongs to humanity. It is in this context that 
Irenaeus speaks of the Devil’s envy of humanity. He writes,  
 
                                                         
91 Haer. 5.24.1. 
92 Haer. 5.24.1. This argument is carried all the way through 5.24.1-3. 




Just as if any one, being an apostate, and seizing in a hostile manner another 
man's territory, should harass the inhabitants of it, in order that he might 
claim for himself the glory of a king [regis gloriam] among those ignorant of 
his apostasy and robbery [latro est], so likewise also the Devil, being one 
among those angels who have been placed over the spirit of the air [qui super 
spiritum aeris praepositi sunt], as the Apostle Paul has declared in his Epistle 
to the Ephesians, becoming envious of humanity [invidens homini], was 
rendered an apostate from the divine law: for envy is a thing foreign to God 
[invidia enim aliena est a Deo]. And as his apostasy was exposed by the 
human person [hominem], and the human [homo] became the [means of] 
searching out his thoughts, he has set himself to this with greater and greater 
determination, in opposition to the human person [homini], envying his life 
[invidens vitae eius], and wishing to involve him in his own apostate power. 
The Word of God, however, the Maker of all things, conquering him by 
means of human nature [per hominem vincens eum], and showing him to be 
an apostate, has, on the contrary, put him under the power of humanity 
[subiecit eum homini]. For he says, ‘Behold, I confer upon you the power of 
treading upon serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of the 
enemy’, in order that, as he obtained dominion over humanity [homini] by 
apostasy, so again his apostasy might be deprived of power by means of 
humanity returning to God [sic iterum per hominem recurrentem ad Deum 
evacuetur apostasia eius.].94 
 
The Devil has set himself in the place of God in order that he might usurp what 
properly belongs to humanity. As an angel—and an apostate one at that—Satan never had 
true ownership of the world, but only a temporary stewardship. Yet through deception he 
has ‘obtained dominion over humanity’. This dominion is temporary, however. Through 
Christ, humanity is being turned back to God and thus the proper governance of the world 
will be reestablished. 
Notably, although the Devil masquerades as God, it is humanity that he envies.95 
Here Irenaeus states that the Devil envies human life (vita). Though we have here no 
explicit connection to the image or likeness of God, a suggestive connection can perhaps be 
made by looking back to the preface of book four. There too the Devil is said to envy human 
                                                         
94 Haer. 5.24.4. 
95 Contra the reading of the later Christian tradition, Irenaeus’ Devil desires humanity’s 




life (vita), and the context clearly connects human life with the similitudo Dei. Perhaps here 
too the image and likeness of God figures implicitly in this passage as that which evokes the 
Devil’s envy. In any event, it is clear from the larger context that the Devil’s driving 
ambition is to possess what rightfully belongs to humanity. Through deception, he has 
‘seized in a hostile manner another man’s territory’.96 Thus the Devil’s envy here—as in our 
two previous passages—seems explicitly aroused because of humanity’s exalted 
ontological, and future political, status in creation. Humanity, whether presented as the 
likeness and image of God, as God’s unique workmanship, or as the world’s rightful ruler, 
occupies in Irenaeus a place of exaltation over the Devil. It is this place of privilege and 
status that the Devil envies, and which precipitates his ruin.   
 
 
E. Haer. 3.23.3-4 
 
Our final passage in Adversus haereses makes an indirect reference to the Devil’s 
envy of humanity by connecting the Devil and Cain. The connection is similar to what we 
have already seen in Epid. 17, where Satan filled Cain with his spirit, such that Cain slew 
his brother Abel. Irenaeus writes,   
 
And this same thing does the Lord also say in the Gospel, to those who are 
found upon the left hand: ‘Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, 
which my Father has prepared for the Devil and his angels’; indicating that 
eternal fire was not originally prepared for humanity, but for him who 
beguiled humanity, and caused him to offend [sed ei qui seduxit et offendere 
fecit hominem]—for him, I say, who is chief of the apostasy [qui princeps 
apostasiae est], and for those angels who became apostates along with him; 
which [fire], indeed, they too shall justly feel, who, like him, persevere in 
works of wickedness, without repentance, and without retracing their steps, 
as Cain [quemadmodum Cain] when he was counselled by God to keep quiet, 
because he had not made an equitable division of that share to which his 
brother was entitled, but with envy and malice [sed cum zelo et malitia] 
thought that he could domineer over him [suspicatus est posse dominari 
                                                         
96 Here we interpret the ‘territory seized’ as explicitly humanity’s territory, rather than 
God’s. Irenaeus has just established at length in the preceding paragraphs that the ownership of the 
world’s kingdoms belongs to humanity. Additionally, Irenaeus’ larger framework does not readily 





eius], not only did not acquiesce, but even added sin to sin, indicating his 
state of mind by his action.97 
 
In the larger context of this passage, Irenaeus is making the argument that God’s 
wrath was principally directed against the Devil and his angels, rather than against 
humanity. Contra the Gnostics, embodied human beings rank highest in God’s estimation, 
and therefore are special recipients of his mercy and grace. Further, the sin of humanity was 
committed in the ignorance of their infancy. And while not excusable, it is less egregious 
than the sin of the Devil—who fully knew what he was about and who took advantage of 
humanity’s lesser political strength. Further, Adam and Eve showed contrition and remorse 
after their sin; the Devil and his angels, like Cain, made no effort to retrace their steps, but 
instead added to their sin.  
The connection to Cain here in this passage is another statement (albeit indirectly) of 
the Devil’s envy of humanity. Irenaeus notes Cain's jealousy (zelos) of Abel as the cause of 
the murder, intentionally linking Cain’s fratricide with Satan’s assault on humanity. The 
parallel is all the more noteworthy when considered in light of Epid.17. Notably, in Epid. 17 
the Devil is explicitly said to be envious, and Cain is only indirectly ascribed envy through 
his association with the Devil. Here we have the reverse. Cain is explicitly said to be 
motivated by envy, while the Devil is implicitly ascribed the motivation of envy through his 
association with Cain. Taken together, the passages underscore the motivation of envy as the 





All of above passages are consistent with the category of ‘political envy’, and 
includes the secondary element of ‘ontological envy’. The Devil’s envy of humanity—like 
that of the Gnostic demiurge and the Pharisee’s envy of Christ—is an example of the 
politically greater but ontologically lesser person, envying the politically lesser but 
ontologically greater person. Further, an eventual reversal is destined to take place wherein 
the Devil will one day be stripped of his political advantage over humanity, and assume his 
native place (now as conquered) under humanity.  
The most notable parallel in our examination of the Devil’s envy is that of the 
demiurge. Just as the demiurge began with a political advantage over an ontologically 
                                                         




superior humanity, so too did the Devil. And just as the demiurge is destined to be 
subordinated to humanity, and ultimately destroyed, so too is the Devil. The tight parallel 
here is not surprising, given that Gnostic exegesis tended to offer a subversive ‘reverse 
reading’ of the biblical text. The villain of the Gnostic narrative is the demiurge; as a 
consequence, the demiurge is assigned actions and motivations that had come to be 
associated by the orthodox party with the Devil.98   
The implications of this parallel, which will be explored more fully in the coming 
chapters, has significance for our discussion regarding the pervasiveness of Irenaeus’ Devil 
narrative in the early centuries of the Christian communities. The parallels between the 
Gnostics and Irenaeus regarding the envy of the demiurge and the envy of the Devil, 
respectively, are sufficiently tight that it seems evident that both narratives are drawing from 
each other or from a common tradition. It is difficult to assign, with certainty, one narrative 
as the source of the other. But it seems more likely that the Gnostic accounts of demiurgical 
envy are an appropriation of the orthodox teachings on the Devil, rather than the reverse, 
insofar as Gnostic exegesis tends to be a reversal of the orthodox interpretation of biblical 
narratives. In any case, the similarity between the Gnostic account of demiurgical envy and 
Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s envy suggests that Irenaeus’ basic framework regarding the 
Devil was fairly widespread in the early Christian communities—whether Gnostic or 
orthodox. Rather than inventing his own separate Devil narrative as a bulwark against 
Gnostic error, Irenaeus capitalized on the account already in currency. The following figure 
illustrates the parallel relationship between these two narratives. 
 
 
                                                         
98 Williams, in his Rethinking Gnosticism, Chapter Three, insists that Gnostic exegesis is too 
diverse in its posture toward Scripture to be characterized primarily as subversive. Williams likewise 
argues that the reversals are not uniform throughout Gnostic writings. Thus in Williams’ opinion, we 
should not characterize Gnostic exegesis as an exegesis whose sole purpose is to be subversive (60-
63).  Jewish and Christian exegetes (Philo, Clement, Origen, etc.) were already in the business of 
interpreting ‘problem passages’ in allegorical ways. Williams argues that the Gnostics are ‘targeting 
just the sorts of problematic texts that had tested the ingenuity of generations of interpreters’ (67). 
Thus according to Williams, Gnostic exegesis is not best characterized as ‘subversive’ but rather as 
‘an alternate solution to an old problem’ (68). But Williams is too generous toward the Gnostics 
here. His point that not all Gnostic writers engaged in subversive exegesis is fair. But he obscures 
the subversive nature of the reversals when they do occur, by suggesting that the motivation behind 
the reversals is simply a further attempt at solving age old exegetical problems. Equating the God of 
Genesis 1-2 with an evil demiurge is hardly just an ‘alternate solution’. Past exegetes like Philo, 
Clement, Origen, etc., while recognizing the anthropomorphic difficulties in such passages, did their 
best to defend the God of Genesis 1-2. The Gnostics throw him over entirely. Lanzillotta accurately 
captures the revisionist framework of Gnostic exegesis: ‘In the gnostic retelling of the Genesis story 
one finds a wholly different conceptual world. For the first time one can speak of revision in the 
strict sense of the word, since the story is included in a completely new narrative frame’, ‘The Envy 









I. The Devil’s Temptation of Adam and Eve Is the Occasion for His Fall  
 
One of the more striking features of Irenaeus’ Devil narrative is the timing of the 
Devil’s fall. For Irenaeus, the Devil’s fall occurs in Genesis 3 when he tempts Adam and 
Eve. This act of the Devil constitutes the Devil’s apostasy from God, and brings about his 
ruin. This stands in meaningful contrast to the later accounts of the Devil (such as we find in 
Origen and Augustine), wherein the Devil’s fall takes place in the heavens, prior to his 
temptation of Adam and Eve. According to this later account, the Devil’s first sin is pride 
with respect to the Son of God; he will not be subservient to God, and thus he and his angels 
are banished from heaven. The temptation of Adam and Eve thus follows after, and is a 
continuation of, the Devil’s already existing rebellion against God. But Irenaeus only speaks 
of the Devil’s fall with respect to the circumstances described in Genesis 3:15. We return 
again to Haer. 4.30.3, this time with particular attention to the timing of the Devil’s fall. 
Irenaeus writes,   
 
The Lord, indeed, sowed good seed in his own field; and he says, ‘The field 
is the world’. But while humanity slept, the enemy came, and ‘sowed tares in 
the midst of the wheat, and went his way’. Hence we learn that this was the 
apostate angel and the enemy [Ex tunc enim apostata est angelus hic et 
inimicus], because he was jealous of God’s workmanship [ex quo zelavit 
plasma Dei] and launched an attack to render this [workmanship] an enemy 
with God [et inimicum illum Deo facere aggressus est].  For this cause 
[quapropter] also God has banished from his presence [separavit a sua 
conversatione] him who did of his own accord stealthily sow the tares, that 
is, him who brought about the transgression; but he took compassion upon 
humanity, who, through want of care no doubt, but still wickedly, became 
involved in disobedience; and he turned the enmity by which [the Devil] had 
designed to make [humanity] the enemy of God, against the author of it, by 
removing his own anger from humanity, turning it in another direction, and 
sending it instead upon the serpent. As also the Scripture tells us that God 
said to the serpent, ‘And I will place enmity between you and the woman, 
and between your seed and her seed. He shall bruise your head, and you shall 
bruise his heel’. And the Lord recapitulated in himself this enmity [Et 




human being [homo] from woman, and trod upon his head, as I have pointed 
out in the preceding book.99 
 
The notable phrase is ‘for this cause’, signifying that the Devil’s banishment from 
God’s presence takes place on account of the Devil’s temptation of Adam and Eve. 
Likewise, Irenaeus here introduces the proto-gospel promise of Genesis 3:15 as a divine 
response to the Devil’s actions in the Garden; it is because the Devil has tempted Adam and 
Eve, causing them to sin and leading them into death, that he will one day be defeated by 
Christ. In this way, the culmination of Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative—the defeat of the 
Devil by Christ, and the restoration of humanity—is narratively linked to the sin of the 
Devil in the Garden of Eden. Thus Irenaeus’ soteriological conclusion does not redress a 
pre-Adamic fall of Satan in the heavens (disconnected from God’s purposes for humanity), 
but rather solves the problem created by Satan’s original sin in Eden. Irenaeus’ basic 
framework at this point is found in a number of other passages that we have already 
examined at length above, the salient portions of which are extracted below:  
 
…the Devil, being one among those angels who have been placed over the 
spirit of the air [qui super spiritum aeris praepositi sunt], as the Apostle Paul 
has declared in his Epistle to the Ephesians, becoming envious of humanity 
[invidens homini], was rendered an apostate from the divine law [apostata a 
divina factus est lege]: for envy is a thing foreign to God [invidia enim aliena 
est a Deo].100 
 
And again,  
 
This commandment the man kept not, but was disobedient to God, being led 
astray (plana,w) by the angel who, becoming jealous of the man and looking 
on him with envy (fqone,w) because of the great gifts of God which he had 
given to man, both ruined himself and made the man a sinner, persuading 
him to disobey the commandment of God. So the angel, becoming by his 
falsehood the author and originator (avrchgo,j) of sin, himself was struck 
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down, having offended against God, and man he caused to be cast out 
(evkba,llw) from Paradise.101 
 
 The Devil ‘was rendered an apostate’ and ‘ruined himself’ when he tempted Adam 
and Eve in the garden. He became by his ‘falsehood’ in the garden the ‘author and originator 
of sin’ being himself ‘struck down’ by God because of his sin.102 Nowhere in Irenaeus’ 
writings does he speak of a heavenly fall of the Devil, and he seems unaware that such an 
account is even an option.  
 The significance of this timing is seen clearly when Irenaeus’ account is set against 
that of later Christian writers such as Origen and Augustine. Augustine is not dogmatic 
about when the Devil and his angels fell, but he is of the opinion that it took place at the 
very beginning of creation.103 In any case, he is certain that it took place prior to the 
temptation of Adam and Eve. Origen likewise places the fall of the Devil prior to the fall of 
Adam and Eve. And his doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul goes even further, making 
creation in some way a result of the fall, thus placing the fall of the angels prior to the 
creation of the material world.104 Given their respective accounts of the timing of the Devil’s 
fall, both Augustine and Origen highlight pride vis-à-vis God as the first sin of the Devil 
(rather than envy vis-à-vis humanity). 105 This of course makes sense, given that for 
                                                         
101 Epid. 16. See also the similar logic in Haer. 3.23.3, where the Devil’s identity as an 
apostate is linked to his temptation of Adam and Eve. Also 3.23. 8, ‘Just as the serpent gained 
nothing by persuading humanity, except that this showed him to be a transgressor, since he had 
humanity as the beginning and object of his rebellion’. 
102 Unger reveals some of the confusion in Irenaeus scholarship when he asks, ‘How did the 
devil have humanity as the beginning and the object of his own apostasy, which had taken place in 
the heavens prior to the formation of the human creature?’ ACW, vol. 64, 208, no. 43.  The answer of 
course, is that for Irenaeus, the Devil’s apostasy did not take place in the heavens prior to the 
formation of the human creature. Unger (needlessly) tries to harmonize Irenaeus’ statements about 
the Devil’s fall in Genesis 3 with the later Augustinian account, by suggesting that it was the God-
man in the heavens that Satan envied. This envy of Christ is then transferred to humanity when 
humanity eventually enters the scene. But Unger is solving a problem that does not need to be 
solved. Irenaeus knows nothing of a pre-Genesis 3 fall of the Devil. 
103 Gen. litt. 11.16. See Augustine’s extended discussion on this question in his Gen. litt. 
11.1-26. Augustine thinks the most likely answer is that the Devil fell immediately after his creation 
due to pride, never experiencing beatitude with the heavenly angels. Throughout the discussion 
Augustine demonstrates an awareness of the basic elements of Irenaeus’ account (without naming 
him)—namely that the Devil’s first sin was envy, that the Devil was envious of humanity, and the 
idea that the Devil was the archangel of a select group of terrestrial angels. But he generally assesses 
such perspectives as unlikely hypotheses given that they cannot easily be advanced from Scripture 
(Gen. litt. 11.27). See also Civ. 11.15. 
104 Origen is the first to link the fall of the Devil to Ezekiel 18 and Isaiah 14. On the fall of 
Satan and the angels, see Princ. 1.5.5, 8.3. For an extended discussion of Origen’s doctrine of Satan 
and the fall, see Burton, Satan, 125-32.  
105 On the Devil’s first sin as pride, see Origen, Princ. 3.1.12. For Augustine’s preference of 




Augustine and Origen the Devil’s fall takes place prior to humanity’s creation. In both 
accounts humanity cannot be a factor in the Devil’s initial apostasy.106  
But in Irenaeus’ narrative, the Devil’s envy of humanity is the occasion for his fall; 
this positions humanity center stage in Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative. Likewise, insofar 
as it is humanity’s lordship over the earth that is the prime occasion of the Devil’s envy, this 
highlights the goodness of creation in Irenaeus’ soteriological storyline. The primary 
conflict of Irenaeus’ narrative is between the Devil and humanity, and the resolution of the 
narrative, already forecast in Genesis 3:15, will be humanity’s overthrow of the Devil 
through the divine aid of the Word made flesh. In contrast, the later Christian Devil 
narrative leaves humanity entirely to the side at the outset of the narrative. Satan’s ‘fall’ 
takes place independent of humanity, perhaps even prior to the creation of humanity. As 
such, the original conflict in the later Devil narrative is exclusively the God/Satan conflict, 
with the humanity/Satan conflict only brought in as a secondary plot-line. Further, the Devil 
desires God’s throne (or the Son’s, depending on the narrative); he is not interested in 
possessing the material world. The contested territory in this later narrative is heaven, not 
the earth—a view that is more in keeping with the Platonic soteriology that we find in 
Origen and beyond. I will press this point further in the conclusion, but it bears stating here 
that Irenaeus’ account of the Devil is resistant to both Gnostic and Platonic accounts of 





As I have intended to show, the theme of envy runs throughout Irenaeus’ corpus, 
serving as an explanation for the fall of the Devil and his assault upon humanity. Just as the 
demiurge envied humanity, as Cain envied Abel, and as the Pharisees envied Christ, so too 
the Devil envied humanity. As is made clear in Adversus haereses, and most especially in 
Epideixis, it is humanity’s exalted status within God’s created order that provokes the 
Devil’s envy and occasions his fall.  Though younger than the hosts of heaven, human 
beings exist uniquely as God’s form (plasma and plasmatio) and as his imago et simultudo. 
As such they will rule not only the world, but the angels themselves. Though the Devil 
masquerades as God, it is not God’s kingdom he covets and usurps. Rather it is humanity’s 
                                                         
106 Augustine maintains the view that the Devil was envious of humanity, but he does not 
view this envy as the occasion of the Devil’s fall. ‘Envy does not precede pride, but follows it: envy 




world—and the rightful place of humans as lords of that world—that the Devil covets for 
his own.  
Irenaeus’ basic account of the Devil’s envy carries significant anthropological and 
cosmological freight. As we have already seen in chapters one and two, Irenaeus is keen to 
insist throughout his work on the goodness of the cosmos and humanity. The earth is the 
crown jewel of creation, and destined to be redeemed; God will not abandon it to decay. 
Insofar as it is the rightful kingdom of humanity, it must be restored if God’s original intent 
in creation is to succeed. Likewise, humanity is the apex of creation and created superior to 
the angels. Human beings find their identity in the fact that they are made in the image and 
likeness of the incarnate Son. They were created as lords of the earth, the highest of all of 
God’s creatures. And what is more, humanity-in-Christ is growing up into full perfection, 
the very same perfection that Christ himself as the incarnate Word possesses. Unlike what 
one finds in the later Christian tradition, humans do not arrive on the scene as replacements 
for the fallen angels107 (a sort of divine ‘plan B’), nor do humans achieve salvation only 
insofar as they ascend to the angels and become like them. Quite the contrary. In Irenaeus, 
all of creation, including the angelic host—and especially the Devil and his angels—were 
created subordinate to humans.  
From this vantage point, it is easy to see how Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s envy 
of humanity is consistent with his robust anthropology and cosmology. Irenaeus’ recounting 
of the fall of the Devil and humanity as told in Epideixis , and then more fully developed in 
Adversus haereses, sets the stage for his robust anthropology and cosmology. The Devil’s 
envy of humanity clarifies and underscores the greatness of humanity with respect to the 
Devil and his angels. As great as the Devil is, humanity is greater. The Devil recognizes this 
and it provokes his envy. Likewise, the Devil’s envy of humanity due to humanity’s 
lordship over the earth clarifies and underscores the supreme goodness of the earth and the 
material world. The material world is so valuable that the Devil himself desires to possess it.  
In this way, Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s envy and fall is consistent with and 
advances his primary theological agenda—particularly with respect to the Gnostics—of 
insisting that the Creator God is a good God, and that humanity is destined to rule through 
Christ (the Word made flesh) over the good world that God has made.  
This account of the Devil’s envy and how it intersects with Irenaeus’ positive 
anthropology and cosmology can be further developed when we consider the Devil’s post-
fall identity and activity, the subject of the next chapter. God created the good material 
world to be ruled by humanity. The Devil inserted himself as a false god and lord. Christ, as 
                                                         




the true Adam, has been sent by God to undo the work of the Devil and restore humanity to 








The Devil’s Post-Fall Identity 
  
 
‘Can the prey be taken from the mighty, or the captives of a tyrant be rescued?’  
 
Isaiah 49:24  
 
 
The previous chapter explored Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s envy of humanity 
and his subsequent fall. What follows is an exploration of the Devil’s post-fall identity with 
a view to providing a composite sketch of Irenaeus’ general demonology. My analysis will 
pay particular attention to the way in which the Devil’s post-fall identity in Irenaeus is in 
keeping with, and underscores, Irenaeus’ larger cosmological and anthropological 
framework. For Irenaeus, the Devil’s identity shifts from that of an angel of God to an 
apostate from God who has stolen humanity’s throne and thus inadvertently set himself 
against God. The present chapter highlights five key elements of the Devil’s post-fall 
identity: 1) The Devil’s identity as the ringleader of apostasy and sin, 2) the Devil as the 
enemy of humanity, 3) the Devil as the captor and thief of humanity, 4) the Devil as the 
thief of Adam’s throne, and 5) the Devil as an impersonator of God.  
 
 
I. The Devil as the Ringleader of Apostasy and Sin  
 
A label that Irenaeus frequently assigns to the Devil is ‘apostate’ (apostata). The 
Devil is the ‘apostate angel’ (apostata angelus),1 the ‘leader of apostasy’ (princeps 
apostasiae),2 and the ‘apostate slave’ (servus apostata).3 Irenaeus arrives at this label largely 
by following Justin’s incorrect etymological connection of ָשָטן (Satan) with ‘apostate’.4 
Despite the flawed etymology, the label ‘apostate’ is an apt descriptor of Irenaeus’ Devil.  
For Irenaeus, all sin is merely a manifold expression of apostasy or abandonment 
(Irenaeus also uses abscessio [i.e. leaving] as a synonym for apostasy). All sin, then, is a 
form of separation, or leaving. Even sexual sin is considered, fundamentally, a form of 
                                                         
1 Haer.  4.41.1-2; 5.24.4, 5.21.2, 3; Epid. 16.  
2 Haer.  2.20.3.  
3 Haer.  3.8.2. For more on Satan as apostate, see Haer. 5.25.1, 5.26.2. 
4 Irenaeus writes, ‘For the Hebrew word ‘Satan’ signifies an apostate’.  Haer. 5.21.2. See 
also Epid. 16., where Irenaeus again translates the Hebrew ‘Satan’ as ‘avposta,thj’. For this idea in 
Justin, see Dialog. 103. For more on the connection between Justin and Irenaeus, see Appendix B, 




apostasy. Noting Paul’s admonition in 1 Corinthians 7 regarding marital conjugal rights, 
Irenaeus observes that God makes provision for human sexual passions lest we step outside 
his bounds into apostasia. Following immediately from this insight, Irenaeus goes on to 
observe that in the same way, in the Old Testament God,  
 
permitted similar indulgences for the benefit of his people, drawing them on 
by means of the ordinances already mentioned, so that they might obtain the 
gift of salvation through them, while they obeyed the Decalogue, and being 
restrained by him, should not revert to idolatry, nor apostatize from God 
[apostatae fierent a Deo], but learn to love him with their whole heart [sed 
toto corde discerent diligere eum].5  
 
Thus all sins—whether human or angelic—are subsets of the one meta-sin of 
apostasy—an abandonment of the creature’s proper love and adoration of God. The 
connection here between apostasy and love is noteworthy. Sin is not merely the breaking of 
a moral code, but a rejection of the God who is to be loved above all else. 
 
And to as many as continue in their love towards God [custodiunt 
dilectionem], does he grant communion with him [suam his praestat 
communionem]. But communion with God [Communio autem Dei], is life 
and light, and the enjoyment of all the benefits which he has in store. But on 
as many as, according to their own choice, depart from God [autem absistunt 
secundum sententiam suam ab eo], he inflicts that separation [separationem 
inducit] from himself which they have chosen of their own accord. But 
separation from God [Separatio autem Dei] is death, and separation from 
light is darkness; and separation from God consists in the loss of all the 
benefits which he has in store. Those, therefore, who have cast away by 
apostasy [per apostasiam amiserunt] these aforementioned things, being in 
fact destitute of all good, do experience every kind of punishment.6 
 
                                                         
5 Haer.  4.15.2. 
6 Haer. 5.27.2. For more on the connection between sin and love, see Haer. 4.37.7: ‘The 
Lord has therefore endured all these things on our behalf, in order that we, having been instructed by 
means of them all, may be in all respects circumspect for the time to come, and that, having been 
rationally taught to love God, we may continue in his perfect love: for God has displayed long-




Sin therefore is a rejection of communion with God and an abandonment of the love 
of God, the one true source of life. The contrast between Irenaeus and the Gnostics is 
striking at this point. The Gnostics likewise construe the first sin as a form of apostasy 
wherein Sophia, the ‘last and youngest of the Aeons’ falls away from the higher Aeons in 
the Pleroma.7 But in the Valentinian account, Sophia apostatizes from the heavenly Pleroma 
insofar as she abandons her consort (Desired) and strives to comprehend the unknowable 
Father; this knowledge is beyond her grasp. Her passion to know the unknowable causes her 
to fall into grief and despair, out of which the material content of creation springs into being. 
Thus in the Gnostic account, it is a desire to know the Father that brings about sorrow and 
grief and apostasy. In Irenaeus’ account, it is because humanity rejects the knowledge of 
God that apostasy is born.  
The fundamental difference between these two narratives can be explained, at least 
in part, by the ontological assumptions that undergird each account. For the Gnostics, 
Sophia is an emanation from the Father, and thus ontologically one with him. In this sense, 
she need not seek after the unknown father in order to sustain herself. She is already self-
sustaining insofar as she is ontologically equal with the Father. But Irenaeus maintains a 
strong Creator/creature distinction. Creation is finite and not self-sustaining. As such, failure 
to seek after and adhere to God in loving union is failure to adhere to life and light and all 
good things. Humanity is ontologically other than God; the human creature is, by the very 
definition of its creaturehood, a contingent being that must draw its existence from the only 
One who is self-sustaining. The human being who loves and seeks after God properly 
recognizes that God is the ultimate source of life. Sin, then, for Irenaeus is not merely (or 
even primarily) failure to live up to a moral standard (though it is not less than this),8 but 
rather failure to continue to live in loving union with, and thus proper dependence upon, 
God.9  
The Devil, then, as the first sinner, is the first apostate. The Devil, like all created 
beings, owed his allegiance to God, and should have continued in loving union with God. 
                                                         
7 See Haer. 1.5, 1.16.3, 1.18.4, 1.19.1, 1.29.4. 
8 Irenaeus views sin in objective and traditionally moral terms. His ad hominin attacks 
against the Gnostics show that he is concerned with the basic litany of vices found in the Jewish and 
early Christian tradition. See Haer. 1.6.3, 1.29.3, 2.32.1-2, etc. Greed, sensuality, gluttony, idolatry, 
envy, adultery, fornication, avarice and such are all noted as actions and attitudes to be avoided and 
worthy of God’s judgment. But all of these sins for Irenaeus can be summed up under the primordial 
sin of apostasy, insofar as they are manifestations of an abandonment of the love of God. Or again, 
Irenaeus does not insist upon a ‘bare morality’ as an end in itself. Morality for Irenaeus serves the 
higher end of love for God and neighbor.  
9 See Bingham, ‘Christianizing Divine Aseity’, 55-56, where he helpfully lists the 
occurrences in Irenaeus of indigeo and indigens [‘need’, or ‘lack’]  with non, nihil, and nullius, said 
in reference to God, in contrast to the occurrences of indigeo and indigens without the negative 




But the Devil, unwilling to content himself with his divinely appointed station, rebelled 
against the Creator and made himself an apostate. ‘Now the law is the commandment of 
God. The man [i.e. Christ] proves him [i.e. the Devil] to be a fugitive from and a 
transgressor of the law, an apostate also from God [fugitivum eum homo eius et legis 
transgressorem et apostatam Dei ostendens]’.10 For Irenaeus, the Devil’s rejection of God’s 
law constitutes the first occasion of apostasy—whether that of angels or humanity.  
Being the first apostate, the Devil has subsequently become the ‘ringleader of 
transgression’ and the ‘father’ of all who have followed him into apostasy. Interpreting 
Christ’s parable of the wheat and the tares, Irenaeus writes,  
 
Inasmuch as the Lord has said that there are certain angels of the Devil, for 
whom eternal fire is prepared; and as, again, he declares with regard to the 
tares, ‘The tares are the children of the wicked one’, it must be affirmed that 
he has ascribed all who are of the abandonment [qui sunt abscessionis] to 
him who is the ringleader of this transgression [qui princeps est huius 
transgressionis]. But he made neither angels nor humans so by nature. For 
we do not find that the Devil created anything whatsoever, since indeed he is 
himself a creature of God [ipse creatura sit Dei], like the other angels. For 
God made all things, as also David says with regard to all things of the kind: 
‘For he spoke the Word, and they were made; he commanded, and they were 
created’. Since, therefore, all things were made by God, and since the Devil 
has become the cause of abandonment to himself and others [et diabolus 
sibimetipsi et reliquis factus est abscessionis causa], justly does the Scripture 
always term those who remain in a state of abandonment [eos qui in 
abscessione perseverant] ‘sons of the Devil’ and ‘angels of the wicked one’ 
[maligni].11 
 
Irenaeus will go on in this passage to state that humans are ‘sons of God’ by nature, 
in so far as they were created good by God. But ‘with respect to obedience and doctrine we 
are not all the sons of God: those only are so who believe in him and do his will. And those 
who do not believe, and do not obey his will, are sons and angels of the Devil, because they 
do the works of the Devil’.12 Thus Satan at his fall became the ‘chief’ of sinners, and the 
ringleader of all who rebel against God.  
                                                         
10 Haer. 5.21.3. 
11 Haer. 4.41.1-2. 




After this fall, humanity became the chief target of Satan’s deception. Being envious 
of humanity from the start, the Devil now enviously desires—with increasing intensity—to 
pull humanity into his own apostasy. ‘And as his apostasy was exposed by humanity [per 
hominem traducta est apostasia eius], and humanity became the [means of] searching out 
his thoughts [et examinatio sententiae eius, homo factus est], he has set himself to this with 
greater and greater determination, in opposition to humanity, envying our life, and wishing 
to involve us in his own apostate power’.13 The plot gains further intensity with the advent 
of Christ. Until this time, Satan believed himself capable of avoiding damnation. But once it 
was revealed that God had entered the conflict on behalf of humanity in the person of Christ, 
and that humanity-in-Christ could thus no longer be defeated, Satan moved to open 
blasphemy.14  
Irenaeus is perhaps drawing here from Revelation 12, wherein the Devil is said to 
pursue Christ into the heavens after his ascension. War ensues and the Devil is thrown down 
to the earth in defeat. A blessing is proclaimed upon the heavens because the Devil has been 
thrown down, but a woe is proclaimed on the earth and sea, ‘for the Devil has come down to 
you in great wrath, because he knows that his time is short’ (Rev. 12:12). The picture here is 
that of a defeated and bitter tyrant determined to pull others down with him in his defeat.   
The rise of the Gnostic error thus figures prominently in Irenaeus’ emphasis on the 
Devil’s apostasy. The Devil’s motivation in raising up the Gnostics is to pull humans into 
his own apostasy and secure their doom. ‘For as the serpent beguiled Eve, by promising her 
what he had not himself, so also do these men [i.e. the Gnostics], by pretending [to possess] 
superior knowledge, and [to be acquainted with] ineffable mysteries; and, by promising that 
admittance which they speak of as taking place within the Pleroma, plunge those that 
believe them into death, rendering them apostates from him who made them’.15 By 
following the false teaching of the Gnostics, people ‘render themselves heretics and 
apostates from the truth [apostatas faciunt veritatis], and show themselves patrons of the 
serpent and of death’.16  The signs, black magic, and tricks of the false teachers are 
satanically enabled, and expressions of a dark power that is ‘severed from God and 
apostate’.17  
For Irenaeus (as we have already observed), it is the Devil’s envy of humanity that is 
the occasion of the Devil’s apostasy (rather than an angelic fall from the heavens due to 
pride, prior to humanity’s creation). The Devil desires what humanity possesses—namely 
                                                         
13 Haer. 5.24.4. 
14 Haer. 5.26.2. 
15 Haer. 4. preface. 4.  
16 Haer. 3.23.8. See also Haer. 1.10.1, 4. preface. 4. 




humanity’s lordship over the earth. Thus for Irenaeus, the Devil is an apostate not primarily 
because he rebelled against God directly, but because he rebelled against God indirectly 
through his rebellion against humanity, i.e. against humanity’s privileged status instituted by 
God at creation—a status ultimately superior to the Devil’s own. This way of framing the 
Devil’s apostasy is carried forward into Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s post-fall identity. 
The Devil is considered an apostate in the historical present not only because he continues in 
rebellion against God, but also because he continues in rebellion against humanity (more on 
this in the section below). The distinction is subtle, but important. Irenaeus’ account of the 
Devil’s apostasy as centered on his posture toward humanity has the effect of pushing 
Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative in a more anthropocentric direction right from the start.  
 
 
II. The Devil as Enemy of Humanity 
 
Irenaeus frequently refers to the Devil as ‘our enemy’ (inimicum nostrum), 
‘humanity’s opponent’ (contrarium homini), ‘our adversary’ (adversarium nostrum), or 
simply ‘the enemy’ (inimicum).18 This emphasis on the Devil as an enemy of humanity is an 
aspect of Irenaeus’ thought that is somewhat muted in the later Christian tradition by an 
additional emphasis on the Devil as God’s enemy. As noted above, Origen’s and 
Augustine’s accounts of the Devil’s fall tend to place the initial, and thus, primary enmity of 
the biblical narrative as between God and the Devil (rather than between the Devil and 
humanity); for both Origen and Augustine, the Devil was an enemy of God before he was an 
enemy of humanity. But in Irenaeus, the initial, and thus, primary enmity of the biblical 
narrative is between Satan and humanity.19 For Irenaeus, the Devil became an enemy of God 
only insofar as he has set himself against God’s anointed—humanity.  
This basic framework is captured nicely in a poignant passage late in Adversus 
haereses where Irenaeus is arguing for the goodness of the Creator. In this passage Irenaeus 
is pressing the point that Jesus has been sent by the Creator [demiurgus] to redeem humanity 
and destroy the Devil. To underscore his point, Irenaeus connects Jesus to the divine 
                                                         
18 All can be found in Haer. 5.21. See also Haer. 4.24.1. 
19 Against Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, 39, who sees the chief conflict of Irenaeus’ 
narrative as between God and Satan. Wingren properly notes the absence of duality in Irenaeus’ 
thought, contra the Gnostics. For Irenaeus, God is unrivaled and sovereign. For Wingren, this creates 
tension in Irenaeus’ thought when Irenaeus introduces the Devil as God’s opposite. Wingren is 
correct about Irenaeus’ rejection of dualism, but incorrect to pit the Devil and God as opposites in 
Irenaeus. The tension is resolved when we see that for Irenaeus, the chief enmity of the narrative is 
not that of God and Satan, but rather Satan and humanity. It is Satan and humanity that are 




promise of Genesis 3:15, namely that one from the line of Eve will come and destroy the 
serpent. Insofar as this promise was given by the Creator, and insofar as Jesus is the 
benevolent fulfilment of this prophecy, thus far is the Creator validated as a good and 
gracious God (contra the Gnostics). Salient for our purposes is how Satan’s native and 
primary enmity of humanity underscores Irenaeus’ concept of the incarnation and Adamic 
recapitulation. For Irenaeus, the enmity between Satan and humanity is the primary (even if 
not only) occasion for the incarnation. The passage is worth quoting at length.  
 
[Christ] has therefore, in his work of recapitulation, summed up all things, 
both waging war against our enemy [adversus inimicum nostrum bellum], and 
crushing him who had at the beginning led us away captives in Adam [in 
Adam captivos duxerat nos], and trampling upon his head, as you can perceive 
in Genesis that God said to the serpent, ‘And I will put enmity [inimicitiam] 
between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; he shall be 
on the watch for [observabit] your head, and you on the watch for his heel’.4 
For from that time, he who should be born of a woman, [namely] from the 
virgin, after the likeness of Adam, was preached as keeping watch for the 
head of the serpent. This is the seed of which the apostle says in the Epistle to 
the Galatians, ‘that the law of works was established until the seed should 
come to whom the promise was made’. This fact is exhibited in a still clearer 
light in the same epistle, where he thus speaks: ‘But when the fullness of time 
was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman’. For indeed the enemy 
would not have been justly vanquished [neque enim iuste victus fuisset 
inimicus], unless it had been a human [born] of woman who conquered him. 
For it was by means of a woman that he got the advantage over humanity at 
first, setting himself up as humanity’s opponent [contrarium statuens homini]. 
And therefore does the Lord profess himself to be the Son of humanity, 
comprising in himself that original human [principalem hominem] out of 
whom the woman was fashioned [ex quo ea quae secundum mulierem est 
plasmatio facta est], in order that, as our species went down to death through a 
vanquished human [per hominem victum descendit in mortem], so we may 
ascend to life again through a victorious one; and as through a human death 
received the palm [of victory] against us, so again by a human we may receive 
the palm against death. Now the Lord would not have recapitulated in himself 
that ancient and primary enmity against the serpent [antiquam illam et primam 




[Demiurgi], and performing his command, if he had come from another 
Father. But as he is one and the same, who formed us at the beginning, and 
sent his Son at the end, the Lord did perform his command, being made of a 
woman, by both destroying our adversary [destruens adversarium nostrum], 
and perfecting humanity after the image and likeness of God. And for this 
reason he did not draw the means of confounding him from any other source 
than from the words of the law, and made use of the Father’s commandment 
as a help towards the destruction and confusion of the apostate angel 
[destructionem et traductionem apostatae angeli].20 
 
The passage is uniquely instructive for our purposes, in that Irenaeus presupposes 
throughout his discussion of Christ’s recapitulating work the priority of satanic/human 
enmity in his reading of the bible’s soteriological plotline. Christ, as the second Adam has 
come to resolve the enmity that exists between humanity and the Devil. According to the 
logic of this passage, the reason for Christ’s incarnation is not because God and the Devil 
are at odds (or even because God and humanity are at odds), but because humanity and the 
Devil are at odds. 21 The Devil had vanquished humanity; it was necessary that humanity 
vanquish the Devil in return. ‘For indeed the enemy would not have been justly vanquished 
[Neque enim iuste victus fuisset inimicus], unless it had been a human [born] of woman who 
conquered him’.22 Thus Jesus did not come primarily as God to destroy God’s enemy, as 
much as he came as a human to destroy humanity’s enemy. He is the second Adam, 
succeeding where the first Adam failed. Of course, Jesus’ capacity to destroy the Devil 
comes from the fact that he is also divine; he has a power that the first Adam lacked. But it 
is Jesus’ identity as human that Irenaeus is most concerned with when he references the 
Devil’s defeat at the hands of Jesus,23 precisely because it is humanity that has been 
overcome by the Devil.24 Thus for Irenaeus, the basic logic of the incarnation presupposes 
that the primary enmity of the biblical narrative is between Satan and humanity.    
                                                         
20 Haer. 5.21.1-2. 
21 Here we might think of Irenaeus, Augustine, and Anselm as representatives of the three 
primary ways that the Christian tradition has emphasized the main enmity of the Christian 
soteriological narrative. In Irenaeus the primary enmity is between Satan and humanity; in Augustine 
the primary enmity is between God and Satan. In Anselm the primary enmity is between God and 
humanity.  
22 Irenaeus is not here espousing a ransom form of the atonement. For more on this, see 
Chapter Two, no. 88 of this dissertation.  
23 Compare with Athanasius in his De incarnatione, who does not use Satan as a primary 
justification to explain why God became human in Christ.  
24 See also Haer. 4.24.1. ‘As I have pointed out in the preceding book, the apostle did, in the 
first place, instruct the Gentiles to depart from the superstition of idols, and to worship one God, the 




Irenaeus’ prioritization of human/satanic enmity is further seen in the way he 
articulates the Devil’s use of the serpent as the vehicle of temptation. ‘…in the beginning 
[the Devil] led humanity astray through the instrumentality of the serpent, concealing 
himself as it were from God’.25 And again, ‘The apostate angel, having affected the 
disobedience of humanity by means of the serpent, imagined that he escaped the notice of 
the Lord’.26 And, ‘He [the Devil] disputed with her [Eve] as if God were not there, for he 
was ignorant of the greatness of God’. 27 For Irenaeus, the Devil does not conceive of his 
actions in Genesis 3 as a direct and public challenge to God’s authority. Using the serpent as 
a disguise, he imagines that his actions will go unnoticed by God. To be sure, he knows that 
his actions run contrary to God’s decree, which is why he takes cover within the serpent. 
But he hopes to avoid making his Creator his enemy, and instead directs his subterfuge 
toward humanity. The hope is vain. In his ignorance the Devil fails to understand that God is 
everywhere present, and thus God is fully aware of all that happens in his creation. As we 
have already observed, the Devil’s assault upon humanity’s lordship is the cause of the 
Devil’s banishment from God’s presence.28 Thus it is because of the Devil’s (temporarily) 
successful assault against human authority (rather than a failed assault against God’s 
authority) that Satan is estranged from God.  In making himself an enemy of God’s 
chosen—and in being found out—the Devil has made himself any enemy of God. The 
Devil, ‘in advising things contrary to God’s commandment…was shown to be an enemy of 
God’.29 In the end, the coup against humanity resulted in the Devil’s doom and his 
estrangement from God.     
All of this underscores Irenaeus’s basic anthropological framework, and the way this 
framework fits into his larger soteriological narrative. For Irenaeus, humanity is the apex of 
creation and the primary protagonist of the biblical narrative. The Devil is the primary 
enemy and antagonist. God enters the story from above (as it were), and wades in to the 
conflict on the side of humanity. Notably, God’s entrance into the conflict does not displace 
humanity as the primary protagonist, but rather serves to underscore (particularly through 
the incarnation) that humanity remains the central object of God’s creative and redemptive 
                                                         
by whom he founded all things; and that he, in the last times, was made a human among humans; 
that he re-formed the human race, but destroyed and conquered the enemy of humanity, and gave to 
his own handiwork victory against the adversary [destruxisse autem et vicisse inimicum hominis et 
donasse suo plasmati adversus reluctantem victoriam]’. 
25 Haer. 5.26.2.  
26 Haer. 4. preface. 4.  
27 Haer. 5.23.1. 
28 Haer.  4.40.3; also 3.28.8. 
29 Haer. 5.21.2. The reference here is to the Devil’s wilderness temptation of Christ (Cf. 
Luke 4:1-12, Matt 4:1-11). The backdrop of Haer. 5.21 is the Garden Temptation of humanity by the 




work. This positioning of the conflict as primarily between humanity and the Devil thus 
pushes Irenaeus’ narrative in a strongly anthropocentric direction. For Irenaeus, humanity is 
not a supporting character or collateral victim in a story about a war between heaven and 
hell. Rather humanity is the main character in a drama of redemption that ends with the 
Word-of-God-as-Human defeating the ancient enemy of humanity.  
 
 
III. The Devil as Captor and Thief of Humanity 
 
The Devil’s coup against humanity is, at least initially, a smashing success. He 
strikes the first human couple while they are still in the frailty of their infancy, when they 
are not yet an even match for his strength.  Humanity’s potential to grow into maturity and 
assume functional lordship over the earth has been short-circuited. The divine curse of 
physical death has rendered the divine life unattainable for humanity. Estranged from God, 
humanity has fallen prey to death and to the Devil’s power. In this sense, the ontological 
integrity of humanity has been compromised. For Irenaeus, the body is not merely a shell, a 
throw-away husk. It represents an integral aspect of humanity. As we have already seen, the 
dissolution of the body into death is the dissolution of the image of God in humanity—i.e. 
the image of the incarnate, embodied Son who is the true human and Lord over God’s good 
created world.  Thus to lose the integrity of the material body—to die—is to lose the 
integrity to rule the material world.  
Yet the ontological integrity of the Devil remains undiminished. Irenaeus gives us no 
indication that the Devil’s power is in anyway lessened by his sin; the Devil’s punishment 
waits for him on the horizon of Irenaeus’ narrative. Indeed, the compromise due to death of 
humanity’s ontological superiority over the Devil has (seemingly) guaranteed the Devil’s 
political superiority over humanity. Thus the Devil is not simply the enemy of humanity; 
more than that, he has become the captor of, and victor over, humanity.  
 
For at the beginning Adam became a vessel in [the Devil’s] possession 
[Primum enim possessionis eius uas Adam factus est], whom he did also hold 
under his power [quem et tenebat sub sua potestate], that is, by bringing sin 
on him iniquitously, and under color of immortality entailing death upon 
him. For, while promising that they should be as gods, which was in no way 
possible for him [i.e. the Devil] to be, he wrought death in them.30  
                                                         




Irenaeus continues in this passage to speak of Adam as being ‘led captive’, ‘deeply 
injured’, and ‘suffering captivity’. What is more, all those begotten by Adam in his captivity 
have likewise been born into captivity—up until the present day.31 Just as the children of 
slaves become the property of their parent’s master, so too the children of Adam and Eve 
remain under the power of the Devil. Death—the great Achilles’ heel of humanity—has 
marked all of humanity sprung from ‘Adam’s stock’, and thus rendered humanity powerless 
against the Devil.   
Irenaeus frequently uses the imagery of imperial conquest and servitude to describe 
the post-fall relationship between humanity and the Devil. The Devil has taken possession 
of humanity in the same way that a conqueror takes possession of those he has defeated in 
battle. Following the Gospel writers, Irenaeus speaks of Satan as the ‘strong man’ who has 
enticed humanity away from God and now holds humanity ‘under his power’. He writes,  
 
For as in the beginning [the Devil] enticed humanity to transgress his 
Maker’s law, and thereby got them into his power [et eum habuit in sua 
potestate]; yet his power consists in transgression and apostasy, and with 
these he bound humanity [et his colligavit hominem]; so again, on the other 
hand, it was necessary that through humanity itself he should, when 
conquered, be bound with the same chains with which he had bound 
humanity, in order that humanity, being set free, might return to its Lord, 
leaving to [Satan] those bonds by which he himself had been fettered, that is, 
sin. For when Satan is bound, humanity is set free; since ‘none can enter a 
strong man’s house and spoil his goods, unless he first binds the strong man 
himself’.... 32  Afterwards, the Word bound him securely as a fugitive from 
himself, and made spoil of his goods—namely, those people whom he held in 
bondage [hoc est eos qui ab eo detinebantur homines], and whom he unjustly 
was using for his own purposes [quibus ipse iniuste utebatur]. And justly 
indeed has he been led captive [Et captivus quidem ductus est iuste is], who 
had led humans unjustly into bondage [qui hominem iniuste captivum 
                                                         
31 Haer. 3.23.2. This is Irenaeus’ notion of ‘original sin’—anticipating the later articulation 
that is made explicit in Augustine and beyond. Irenaeus’ focus is less on inherited guilt, and more on 
inherited corruption. Of course, these twin aspects of this doctrine are not mutually exclusive and 
Irenaeus affirms both at various points. But his focus is on the transmission of sin as a state of 
ontological corruption (i.e. death). Or again, for Irenaeus, with respect to the transmission of sin, the 
connection between Adam and his descendants is ontological, not merely judicial. In this Irenaeus 
anticipates Augustine.  
32 The Devil as the ‘strong man’ (drawn from Jesus teaching in Matt 12:29, Mark 3:27, Luke 
11:21-22) is a favorite image of Irenaeus, and one that occurs frequently in Adversus haereses. See 




duxerat]; while humanity, who had been led captive in times past [qui autem 
ante captivus ductus fuerat homo], was rescued from the control of its 
possessor [extractus est a possessoris potestate], according to the tender 
mercy of God the Father.33 
 
The passage moves us forward into Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s defeat, the 
subject of the next chapter. Yet it captures well the way in which Irenaeus conceives of the 
Devil’s initial victory over humanity. The metaphor used here and elsewhere by Irenaeus, 
common enough in the ancient world, is that of a foreign tyrant taking control of a city that 
is not his own.34 Irenaeus’ framework in this passage is striking. Apart from the redemptive 
work of Christ, humanity is ‘conquered’ and ‘bound in chains’ of ‘transgression and 
apostasy’; humanity has become the ‘spoils’ of war, and the Devil now ‘uses humanity for 
his own purposes’.  
When set in the larger context of the Devil’s envy, humanity is not merely an enemy 
for the Devil to destroy, but a valuable city to be captured. The Devil seeks to possess 
humanity not because he esteems humanity little, or because he hates God, but because he 
envies humanity greatly. But the Devil has stolen something that he is unable to sustain. 
Humanity’s alienation from God, if left unresolved, would ultimately lead to the destruction 
of humanity. The Devil, for all his power, is unable to sustain the treasure he has stolen, 
showing himself to be a false ruler and imposter.  
In a similar vein, Irenaeus also speaks of the Devil as a thief, with humanity as the 
stolen property of God. He writes,   
 
And since the apostasy tyrannized over us unjustly [Et quoniam iniuste 
dominabatur nobis apostasia], and, though we were by nature property of the 
omnipotent God [et cum natura essemus Dei omnipotentis], alienated us 
contrary to nature, rendering us its own disciples, the Word of God, powerful 
in all things, and not defective with regard to his own justice, did righteously 
turn against that apostasy, and redeem from it what is his own [ea quae sunt 
sua redimens ab ea], not by violent means, as the [apostasy] had obtained 
dominion over us at the beginning [initio dominabatur nostril], when it 
insatiably snatched away [insatiabiliter rapiens] what was not its own, but by 
means of persuasion, as became a God of counsel, who does not use violent 
                                                         
33 Haer. 5.21.3. Elsewhere in Irenaeus, the Devil is the arch-type of the great whale of 
Jonah, swallowing the whole of humanity and bringing it down into death. See Haer. 3.20.1. 




means to obtain what he desires [non vim inferentem accipere quae vellet]; so 
that neither should justice be infringed upon, nor the ancient handiwork of 
God go to destruction [neque antiqua plasmatio Dei deperiret].35 
 
Humanity is the ancient handiwork and property of God—God’s prize possession. 
The Devil has stolen humanity and rendered humanity his own disciples. The Devil’s power 
over humanity is complete and total. The image of Roman slavery lurks in the background 
of this passage. Humans were once the ‘property’ of God; slaves owned by the benevolent 
and loving master. But the Devil has stolen God’s property, and unjustly made us his own.36 
He has ‘insatiably snatched away what was not his own’.  
As can already be seen in the above passage, the salvation that Christ secures for 
humanity will necessarily involve—as its central feature—an overthrow of the Devil and a 
breaking of the Devil’s political power over humanity. What is more, it is not sufficient for 
Irenaeus that humanity simply gets out from under the power of the Devil; but even more 
that humanity ascend back to its proper and destined place of political superiority over the 
Devil (more on this in the next chapter). In this way the Devil’s captivity of humanity sets 
the stage for the subsequent development of Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative. Thus the 
fortunes of humanity vis-à-vis the Devil are central to Irenaeus’ soteriology, with the 
general effect of moving Irenaeus’ soteriological plotline in an anthropocentric direction.  
 
 
IV. The Devil as Thief of Adam’s Throne 
 
The Devil is a thief who has stolen the property of God, namely humanity. But the 
Devil is also a thief who has stolen the property of humanity, namely the kingdoms of the 
world. The world’s throne belonged to humanity—a gift from God—but the Devil has set 
himself up as a tyrant king, claiming for himself the inheritance that properly belongs to 
Adam and his descendants. This ‘Devil-as-thief’ motif is worked out in Irenaeus’ 
commentary on Christ’s wilderness temptation (found in Matthew 4 and Luke 4). Christ’s 
obedience in the wilderness recapitulates Adam’s failure in the garden, and shows the Devil 
to be an imposter. Irenaeus writes,  
 
                                                         
35 Haer. 5.1.1. See also the similar language of 5.2.1. Regarding the idea that God overcame 
the Devil ‘justly’ see Chapter Two, no. 88 of this dissertation. 
36 See also Haer. 3.17.3, where Irenaeus likens the Devil to the two robbers in the parable of 




As therefore he [the Devil] lied at the beginning [in principio mentitus est], 
so did he also in the end [ita et in fine mentiebatur], when he said, ‘All these 
are delivered unto me, and to whomsoever I will I give them’. For it is not he 
who has appointed the kingdoms of this world, but God [Non enim ipse 
determinavit huius saeculi regna, sed Deus]; for…. ‘Be subject to all the 
higher powers; for there is no power but of God: now those which are have 
been ordained of God’…. Now, that [Paul] spoke these words, not in regard 
to angelic powers, nor of invisible rulers [non de angelicis potestatibus nec 
de invisibilibus principibus dixit]—as some venture to expound the 
passage—but of those who are actual human authorities [sed de his quae sunt 
secundum homines potestates], he says, ‘For this cause pay tribute also [to 
earthly rulers]: for they are God’s ministers, doing service for this very 
thing’. This also the Lord confirmed, when he did not do what he was 
tempted to by the Devil; but he gave directions that tribute should be paid to 
the tax-gatherers for himself and Peter; because ‘they are the ministers of 
God, serving for this very thing’.37 
 
The Devil is an imposter and fake, an illegitimate king. This can be seen by his false 
promise to give the kingdoms of the world to Jesus. As in the Garden temptation of Adam, 
the Devil promises Christ what is not his to rightfully give. The kingdoms of the world 
belong first to God, and then have been given by God to humanity. Notably, Irenaeus 
explicitly asserts that the kingdoms of the world have been given to human rulers, not 
angelic rulers, an assertion consistent with his comments in Epideixis where Adam is 
appointed lord of the world and the Devil and his angels as mere stewards.38  
Here we can see a certain tension in Irenaeus’ articulation of the Devil’s sovereignty 
over humanity and the world. On the one hand Irenaeus wants to insist that the Devil has 
stolen humanity by force and violence and has become a tyrant over humanity and 
humanity’s world. He is the strong man who has overthrown Adam and absconded with 
Adam’s throne. Yet on the other hand Irenaeus wants to insist that the Devil is not really in 
charge—that God remains in possession of the kingdoms of the world and has given them to 
human rulers, who to this present day exercise sovereignty on God’s behalf. Nor indeed can 
the Devil actually deprive God of the possession of humanity. In both these respects, the 
                                                         
37 Haer. 5.24.1. For a brief, yet helpful discussion on Irenaeus’ interpretation of the 
wilderness temptation, see Wingren, God and Man, 11-12. 
38 See Epid. 12. Here in Adversus haereses the context of human rule is for the containment 
of sin. But the general sense is the same in both Adversus haereses and Epideixis. In both cases God 




Devil’s claim to sovereignty is an empty claim. ‘For the creation is not subjected to [the 
Devil’s] power, since indeed he is himself but one among created things. Nor shall [the 
Devil] give away the rule over humans to humans; but both all other things, and all human 
affairs, are arranged according to God the Father’s disposal’.39 
The tension at this point seems related to the Gnostic polemic that shapes the context 
for Irenaeus’ articulation of the Devil. The Gnostics, with virtual uniformity, demonize the 
demiurge—whom they view as the inferior god of the material world. Irenaeus will not 
grant their assertion that there exist two different gods—the lesser ‘god of this world’ and 
the greater ‘Father’ of the Pleroma. So committed is Irenaeus to linking the God of the Bible 
to the Creator of the world, that he offers a unique40 interpretation of Paul’s comment in 2 
Cor. 4:4 about the ‘god of this world’ blinding the minds of unbelievers. The Gnostics use 
this passage as a Pauline proof text for showing how there are two gods—the ‘god of this 
world’, who is an evil demiurge, and the ‘Eternal Father’ of the Pleroma. The lesser ‘god of 
this world’ does evil things, like blinding minds, while the Eternal Father illuminates 
humanity and leads humanity to salvation. According to the Gnostics, Irenaeus’ God is the 
lesser ‘god of this word’.  The easiest way past this Gnostic exegesis of 2 Cor. 4:4 would be 
to link the ‘god of this world’ to Satan (as seems the most likely referent in Paul’s mind, and 
as became the customary exegesis of the passage).41 But Irenaeus will not concede that 
Satan has any real ownership over the world; to do so would run the risk of separating God 
from the world, thus playing into the Gnostics’ hands. He writes,  
 
As to their affirming that Paul said plainly in the Second [Epistle] to the 
Corinthians, ‘In whom the God of this world has blinded the minds of them 
that believe not’, and maintaining that there is indeed one God of this world 
[et alterum quidem esse Deum saeculi huius dicunt], but another God who is 
beyond all principality, and beginning, and power [alterum uero qui sit super 
omnem principatum et initium et potestatem], we are not to blame if they, who 
                                                         
39 Haer. 5.22.2. 
40 At least unique with respect to what became the standard interpretation of this passage in 
the later Christian tradition. See note below.  
41 See Tertullian, Marc. 5.17, who is aware of this Gnostic reading, but associates the 
passage with Satan. Tertullian’s interpretation is consistent with Jesus’ comments in John 16:11 
about the Devil as the ‘ruler of this world’. Irenaeus does not offer an interpretation of John 16:11. 
Irenaeus’ unwillingness to ascribe to the Devil any type of rulership over the world makes him 
unique from the other early Christian writers. Ignatius, Athenagoras, Clement, Tertullian, and 
Hippolytus all, in various ways, refer to the Devil as the ruler of the age/world (see the chart at the 
end of Appenix B). This is the one element of Irenaeus’ Devil narrative that stands in contrast to the 
other early Christian writers. Undoubtedly Irenaeus’ intense polemic against the Gnostics (as noted 




give out that they do themselves know mysteries beyond God, do not know 
how to read Paul. For if any one reads the passage thus—according to Paul’s 
custom, as I show elsewhere, and by many examples, that he uses 
transposition of words – ‘In whom God’, then pointing it off, and making a 
slight interval, and at the same time reads also the rest [of the sentence] in one 
[clause], ‘has blinded the minds of them of this world that believe not’, he 
shall find out the true [sense] that it is contained in the expression, ‘God has 
blinded the minds of the unbelievers of this world’. And this is shown by 
means of the little interval [between the clauses]. For Paul does not say, ‘the 
God of this world’, as if recognizing any other beyond him; but he confessed 
God as indeed God [sed Deum quidem Deum confessus est]. And he says, ‘the 
unbelievers of this world’, because they shall not inherit the future age of 
incorruption…. So therefore, in such passages, the hyperbaton must be 
exhibited by the reading, and the apostle’s meaning following on, preserved; 
and thus we do not read in that passage, ‘the god of this world’, but, ‘God’, 
whom we do truly call God [sed Deum quidem iure Deum dicimus]; and we 
hear [it declared of] the unbelieving and the blinded of this world, that they 
shall not inherit the world of life which is to come.42 
 
For Irenaeus, the Devil is decidedly not ‘God of this world’ (or even ‘god of this 
world’), but an imposter. Irenaeus’ Gnostic context compels him to disassociate Satan and 
ownership of the world, even if it requires a rather forced exegesis. 
It is not clear that Irenaeus is aware of the tension he has created at this point. In any 
case, he resolves the tension somewhat by suggesting that the Devil is in charge only insofar 
as he has deceived humanity into thinking so.  
 
As, then, ‘the powers that be are ordained of God’, it is clear that the Devil 
lied when he said, ‘These are delivered unto me; and to whomsoever I will, I 
give them’ …. The Devil, however, as he is the apostate angel, can only go to 
this length, as he did at the beginning, [namely] to deceive and lead astray the 
mind of humanity into disobeying the commandments of God, and gradually 
to darken the hearts of those who would endeavor to serve him, to the 
forgetting of the true God, but to the adoration of himself as if he were God 
[ipsum autem quasi Deum adorare]. Just as if any one, being an apostate, and 
                                                         




seizing in a hostile manner another territory [regionem aliquam hostiliter 
capiens], should harass the inhabitants of it, in order that he might claim for 
himself the glory of a king among those ignorant that he is an apostate and a 
robber [et regis gloriam sibi vindicet apud ignorantes quod apostata et latro 
est]; so likewise also the Devil.43 
 
Here the Devil’s power over humanity and the world is real, but only because 
humanity has fallen prey to the Devil’s false claim of sovereignty. The great power that 
Satan wields over humanity is the same from first to last: the power to deceive. Humanity in 
right relation with God is too great for the Devil. But humanity alienated from God is 
powerless. Because of the Devil’s deception in the garden, humanity chose to live against 
the laws of God, thus inviting the divine punishment of death.  The way back for humanity 
is offered in Christ, but the Devil continues to deceive humanity, keeping humanity from 
embracing this second chance. The Devil’s war policy then, is to use deception to keep 
humanity in rebellion against the Creator. ‘This, then, is the aim of him who envies our life, 
to render people disbelievers in their own salvation, and blasphemous against God the 
Creator’.44 The Devil has power only insofar as humanity is deceived by the Devil into 
thinking that the Devil is the rightful owner of creation. The kingdoms of the world belong 
to God, and he has given them to humanity, whatever the Devil may claim.  
Tension still remains in this aspect of Irenaeus’ thought. Irenaeus is too insistent 
throughout his writings that the Devil has real (not just imagined) power over humanity. 
Humanity’s slide into sin and death makes humanity genuine captives of the Devil. 
Throughout Irenaeus’ writings, the Devil’s power over humanity is not presented as a state 
of mind, or imagined, or only real insofar as humanity believes it to be so (like the prisoner 
in an unlocked cell, who does not believe the cell is unlocked). Yet the debate with the 
Gnostics compels Irenaeus to neuter the Devil’s power and to distance the Devil from 
ownership of the material world, lest the true God be seen as somehow disconnected from 
his creation. Here it seems that Irenaeus might have more easily and simply contended, 
along with the other early Christian writers, that the Devil’s power over creation is not 
absolute, nor does his power operate independent of God’s greater sovereignty. It is real 
power over humanity and the world, but one that will be broken by Christ in the last day. In 
                                                         
43 Haer. 5.24.3-4. 




any case, this is the general sense that Irenaeus gives throughout his writings, his 
interpretation of the wilderness temptation withstanding. 45  
 
 
V. The Devil as Impersonator of God 
 
Notably, the Devil’s usurpation of Adam’s throne is predicated on the Devil’s claim 
to be God. As we have seen above, the Devil secures his tyranny over humanity by 
presenting himself as God.  
 
The Devil, however, as he is the apostate angel, can only go to this length, as 
he did at the beginning, [namely] to deceive and lead astray the mind of 
humanity into disobeying the commandments of God, and gradually to 
darken the hearts of those who would endeavor to serve him, to the forgetting 
of the true God, but to the adoration of himself as if he were God [ipsum 
autem quasi Deum adorare].46 
 
For Irenaeus, the Devil’s impersonation of God takes center stage during the 
apocalypse and the rise of Antichrist.  
 
…by means of the events which shall occur in the time of the Antichrist is it 
shown that he [the Devil], being an apostate and a robber [apostata et latro], 
is anxious to be adored as if he were God [quasi Deus vult adorari]; and that, 
although a mere slave, he wishes himself to be proclaimed as a king [regem 
se vult praeconari]. For he [Antichrist] being endued with all the power of 
the Devil, shall come, not as a righteous king, nor as a legitimate king in 
subjection to God, but as an impious, unjust, and lawless one; as an apostate, 
iniquitous and murderous; as a robber, concentrating in himself [all] satanic 
apostasy, and setting aside idols to persuade [humans] that he himself is God 
[ad suadendum quod ipse sit Deus], raising up himself as the only idol, 
having in himself the multifarious errors of the other idols.47 
 
                                                         
45 Wingren rightfully observes that for Irenaeus, while the Devil may claim to have at his 
disposal all the kingdoms of the world ‘it is an impossibility for him to get the whole created order 
into his control’. God and Man, 12.  
46 Haer. 5.24.4. 




Here Irenaeus’ articulation of the Devil has touch points with what will emerge in 
the later Christian tradition, namely that the Devil masquerades as God and presents himself 
as the sole great power. Yet Irenaeus’ larger anthropological and cosmological framework 
needs to be kept in mind. For Irenaeus, the Devil masquerades as God to humanity precisely 
because he wishes to present himself as the legitimate king of the material world, not 
because he wishes to present himself as the legitimate king of the celestial world. Or again, 
the Devil’s false claim to deity is driven by a desire to possess Adam’s throne, not God’s. 
Irenaeus nowhere suggests that the Devil is motivated by a desire to steal God’s throne in 
heaven. Again, this aspect of Irenaeus’ thought underscores and affirms Irenaeus’ larger 
cosmological and anthropological framework. The material world and its kingdoms are 
sufficiently good that the Devil presents himself as God in order to possess them. 
With a certain irony, the Devil’s attempt to present himself as God is a sort of 
recapitulation of the Devil’s temptation of Adam and Eve. In the Garden of Eden, the Devil 
deceived Adam and Eve into believing that they were equal to God, and thus worthy to eat 
from the Tree of Knowledge. He writes,  
 
…humans should never adopt an opposite opinion with regard to God, 
supposing that the incorruptibility which belongs to them is their own 
naturally [propriam naturaliter arbitrans eam quae circa se esset 
incorruptelam], and by thus not holding the truth, should boast with empty 
superciliousness, as if they were—as  it were—naturally like to God [quasi 
naturaliter similis esset Deo]. For he [i.e. the Devil] thus rendered humanity 
more ungrateful towards their Creator, obscured the love which God had 
towards humanity, and blinded their minds not to perceive what is worthy of 
God, comparing themselves with, and judging themselves equal to, God 
[comparans et aequalem se iudicans Deo].48  
 
The first great sin of humanity was a vain belief in humanity’s independence 
from God. Humans believed themselves to be like God, and thus not in need of God. 
So too the Devil presents himself as independent of God. Yet there is a difference 
between humanity and the Devil at this point. Unlike humanity, the Devil was not 
deceived in to thinking himself equal to God. The Devil knows that he is only 
masquerading as God. Here again we see touch points with the later Christian Devil 
narrative (such as we find in Origen and Augustine), but not direct continuity. In 
                                                         




Irenaeus it is Adam and Eve who are deceived into mistakenly thinking they can be 
equal to God. In the later Christian tradition, it is the Devil who is mistakenly (self) 
deceived into thinking he can be equal to God. Or again, humanity’s sin in Irenaeus 
is the Devil’s sin in the later Christian tradition.  
Thus we see the same diabolical and human sin in the early and late 
traditions, but ascribed to different parties. In both the early and later Devil 
narratives, it is the creature just below God that mistakenly assumes ontological 
independence from God. In Irenaeus’ tradition, it is humanity that makes this 
mistake. In the later tradition it is the Devil. This differing order makes sense as we 
consider the implicit anthropology and angelology of the early and later Devil 
narratives. In the historically later Devil narrative (such as one find in Augustine and 
later medieval Christianity), angels and the Devil occupy a higher ontological place 
than humanity within the order of creation. Thus it makes sense that they would be 
most likely to mistakenly assume independence from God. But in Irenaeus, it is 
humanity that occupies pride of place next to God, and thus it makes sense that 
humanity would be most likely to mistakenly assume ontological independence from 
God. All of this once again underscores the basic coherence between Irenaeus’ Devil 





For Irenaeus, the Devil is the first and great sinner, the ringleader of all those who 
have been seduced into apostasy and sin. In particular, the Devil is the enemy of and victor 
over humanity. Having deceived humanity, the Devil has stolen humanity’s throne like a 
foreign tyrant who has stolen a city from its legitimate and native rulers. What is more, the 
Devil’s deception of humanity has plunged humanity into death; the Devil has subtly used 
God’s own verdict against humanity, bringing about the dissolution of the image of God in 
humanity. Humanity, in falling under the divine curse of death, has fallen under both the 
political and ontological power of the Devil. Left to their own devices, humans have no way 
to extract themselves from the Devil’s grasp and reclaim their place in God’s world. The 
Devil is the ‘strong man’ that can only be defeated by a yet stronger man. The Devil 
perpetuates his dominion over humanity and the material world by continuing to deceive 
humanity and by alienating humanity from God. Central to this deception, particularly in the 
last days, is the Devil’s masquerading of himself as God and claiming for himself the 




This entire narrative is consistent with Irenaeus’ positive anthropology and 
cosmology. For Irenaeus, humanity occupies pride of place over and above the angels in 
God’s good creation. And the material world—humanity’s native home—is the crown jewel 
of all that God has made. Thus the Devil’s assault on humanity in Irenaeus is an implicit 
statement about the goodness and greatness of humanity and humanity’s world. The Devil 
desires what rightfully belongs to humanity precisely because what humanity has is so good; 
the Devil presents himself as God in order to lay claim to the kingdoms of the world, 
precisely because the kingdoms of the world are full of glory. Notably, the Devil is not 
motivated by visions of celestial grandeur; he does not desire to replace God in heaven. 
Instead he desires to replace Adam on earth. All of this sets the stage for Irenaeus’ account 
of the incarnation and the advent of Christ, who will come as the stronger man to break the 










The Devil’s Power Is Broken 
 
‘For thus says the LORD: “Even the captives of the mighty shall be taken, and the prey of 





Irenaeus informally frames up the Devil’s defeat in a sort of two-step process—the 
initial breaking of Satan’s power over humanity which occurs with the first advent of Christ, 
and then Satan’s final destruction in the fires of hell which occurs with the second advent of 
Christ. In this chapter we will explore the first step in this two-step process, paying 
particular attention to Irenaeus’ articulation of how the Devil’s power over humanity has 
been broken with Christ’s first coming.  
Throughout his writings, Irenaeus often speaks of the Devil’s defeat without 
articulating the mechanisms by which the Devil is defeated. But in Haer. 5.19-23 Irenaeus 
goes further. In this extended passage Irenaeus highlights three unique instances of human 
obedience, each set in contrast to an occasion of original disobedience: 1) Mary’s obedience 
in the place of Eve’s disobedience, 2) Christ’s obedience in the wilderness in the place of 
Adam’s disobedience in the garden, and 3) Christ’s obedience at the cross in the place of 
Adam’s disobedience at the Tree of Knowledge. In each instance, Irenaeus explicitly links 
the new act of obedience to the defeat of the Devil.1  
Irenaeus’ focus on human obedience toward God as the means by which humanity 
overcomes the Devil is particularly noteworthy for it shows the extent to which Irenaeus 
foregrounds the conflict between the Devil and humanity as the primary conflict of his 
soteriological narrative, as well as the key role that humanity has in defeating the Devil. 
Insofar as human disobedience toward God resulted in captivity to the Devil, human 
obedience is the means by which humanity is freed from this captivity. The aim of this 
chapter is to highlight these three acts of obedience and to show how and why these events 
serve for Irenaeus as the means by which the Devil’s power over humanity is broken, and 
how Irenaeus’ focus on these events undergirds his broader anthropological framework.   
                                                         
1 I am not aware of any other place in Irenaeus’s writings where he specifies, in an explicit 




We examine each occasion of obedience in turn, following the same ordering as 
Irenaeus in Haer. 5.19-23.2 
 
 
I. Mary, the Obedient Un-tier of Knots 
 
The Eve-Mary connection is a well-trodden aspect of Irenaeus scholarship.3 It has 
likewise made its way into the arts. Ferdinand Max Bredt’s 1921 painting, Eve et Marie, 
depicts the contrasting relationship between Mary and Eve in the Christian tradition. In 
Bredt’s painting of Eve and Mary, Eve stands nude, next to the Tree of Knowledge. She is 
facing the viewer and posed sensually with one arm overhead and the other reaching up to 
take hold of the forbidden fruit. Her look is brazen and seductive. The serpent’s head hovers 
next to Eve’s legs, its body coiled around her feet and then stretched beyond her up the 
trunk of the tree. Mary, in contrast, is the anti-Eve, standing on the other side of the tree, 
clothed in modest robes, hands clasped together at her waist, looking chastely and humbly 
toward heaven. Bredt’s painting thus highlights the contrast between Eve as the sensual 
sinner and Mary as the chaste and humble saint. Bredt is drawing upon a tradition, begun as 
early as Justin, and continued with Irenaeus, that highlights the relationship and contrast 
between Eve and Mary.4 For Irenaeus, just as Christ recapitulates Adam, so also does Mary 
recapitulate Eve. The connection between Adam/Christ and Eve/Mary is explicit in 
Irenaeus, as can be seen by the proximate location of both themes in Irenaeus’ writings. Just 
prior to an extended treatment of the typological relationship between Eve and Mary, 
Irenaeus expounds the typological relationship between Adam and Christ, thus signaling 
that he intends his readers to view both sets of relationships in the same typological 
                                                         
2 The whole of this section is devoted to theme of human obedience, with the exception of 
Haer. 5.20. This chapter serves as a parenthetical chapter in which Irenaeus briefly notes the 
consistency of the Church’s teaching contrary to the Gnostics, and the role of the bishops and 
presbyters in preserving the truth of God. Upon concluding the chapter he returns to the theme of 
human obedience in 5.21-23. 
3 Such that Jean Plagnieux could write in 1970, ‘All, it would seem, has been said, and for a 
very long time, about the Marian doctrine of Irenaeus’, Plagnieux, ‘La doctrine mariale de saint 
Irénéé’, 179. This of course, has not stopped scholars from saying things. For just a few of the many 
examples, see MacKenzie, Irenaeus, 161, Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 46, 123-24, Lawson, 
Biblical Theology, 151-52, Steenberg, ‘The Role of Mary as Co-Recapitulator’, 117-37; Kinsella, 
‘The Tangled Thread of Creation’, 92;  and Maria Del Fiat Miloa, ‘Mary as Un-tier of Knots’, 337-
61. 
4 For examples see Justin Martyr, Dial. 100; Tertullian, Carn. Chr. 17; Gregory the Wonder-
Worker, Hom. sanc. Mat. 1; Jerome, Epist. 21, 22; Ephrem, Hom. nos. Dom. 3 and Hymn. nat., 15; 
Augustine, Agon. 2.24. In Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Ephrem a specific connection is made 




framework.5 Just as Adam can only fully be understood in light of Christ, so too Eve’s 
‘betrothed’ status can only be fully understood in light of Mary’s. Irenaeus writes,  
 
In accordance with this design [i.e. the design of the incarnation], Mary the 
virgin is found obedient, saying, ‘Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it 
unto me according to thy word’. But Eve was disobedient; for she did not 
obey when as yet she was a virgin. And even as she, having indeed a 
husband, Adam, but being nevertheless as yet a virgin…having become 
disobedient, was made the cause of death, both to herself and to the entire 
human race [inobaudiens facta, et sibi et universo generi humano causa facta 
est mortis]; so also did Mary, having a man betrothed [to her], and being 
nevertheless a virgin, by yielding obedience, become the cause of salvation, 
both to herself and the whole human race [obaudiens, et sibi et universo 
generi humano causa facta est salutis]. And on this account does the law 
term a woman betrothed to a man, the wife of him who had betrothed her, 
although she was as yet a virgin; thus indicating the back-reference from 
Mary to Eve [eam quae est a Maria in Evam recirculationem significans], 
because what is joined together could not otherwise be put asunder than by 
an inversion of the process by which these bonds of union had arisen [nisi 
ipsae compagines adligationis reflectantur retrorsus]; so that the former ties 
be canceled by the latter, that the latter may set the former again at liberty. 
And it has, in fact, happened that the first compact is loosed from the second 
tie, but that the second tie takes the position of the first which has been 
canceled…. And thus also it was that the knot of Eve’s disobedience [Evae 
inobaudientiae nodus] was loosened by the obedience of Mary [solutionem 
accepit per obaudientiam Mariae]. For what the virgin Eve had bound fast 
through unbelief, this did the virgin Mary set free through faith.6 
 
Irenaeus’ logic of betrothal is, admittedly, somewhat difficult to follow.7 Irenaeus 
seems to be making a play on the concept of betrothal and union as it relates to the binding 
of two things together. Eve as betrothed binds humanity to death, Mary as betrothed binds 
                                                         
5 See Rousseau, SC vol. 406, 271, who helpfully comments, ‘The “recapitulation”, which is 
for Irenaeus the work par excellence performed by God at the end of time, is here at the same time 
that of Adam in Christ and of Eve in Mary’. 
6 Haer. 3.22.4.  





humanity to life. Most basically, Eve is a type of Mary, who is the full expression of 
betrothal. Just as Christ preceded Adam in divine logic, even if not in order of time, so too 
Eve as ‘betrothed’ can only be understood through a ‘back reference’ from Mary to Eve. 
Eve has created an inseparable bond of union between humanity and death; she has wed 
humanity to sin and death. Only the obedience of Mary as the second Eve can invert this 
union and ‘cancel the former ties’. Mary loosens the knot of death that Eve has tied.8 In a 
similar vein Irenaeus writes,  
 
That the Lord then was manifestly coming to his own things, and was 
sustaining them by means of that creation which is supported by himself, and 
was making a recapitulation [recapitulationem] of that disobedience which 
had occurred in connection with a tree, through the obedience which was 
[exhibited by himself when he hung] upon a tree, [the effects] also of that 
deception being done away with, by which that virgin Eve, who was already 
espoused to a man, was unhappily misled,—was happily announced, through 
means of the truth [spoken] by the angel to the virgin Mary, who was [also 
espoused] to a man. For just as the former was led astray by the word of an 
angel, so that she fled from God when she had transgressed his word; so did 
the latter, by an angelic communication, receive the glad tidings that she 
should sustain God [portaret Deum], being obedient to his word. And if the 
former did disobey God, yet the latter was persuaded to be obedient to God, 
in order that the virgin Mary might become the advocate [advocata] of the 
virgin Eve. And thus, as the human race fell into bondage to death by means 
of a virgin, so is it rescued by a virgin; virginal disobedience having been 
balanced in the opposite scale by virginal obedience. For in the same way the 
sin of the first created man [protoplasti] receives amendment [emendationem 
accipiente] by the correction of the First-begotten, and the cunning of the 
serpent [et serpentis prudentia] is conquered by the harmlessness of the dove, 
those bonds being unloosed by which we had been fast bound to death.9 
 
Both Eve and Mary received angelic communication. The virgin Eve, through her 
disobedience, led humanity astray into disobedience, while the virgin Mary, through her 
obedience, has led humanity back to God. Mary did what Eve failed to do and thus undoes 
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wider Greco-Roman context, see Del Fiat Miloa, ‘Mary as Un-tier of Knots’, 337-61.  




the consequences of Eve’s sin. Just as the human race fell into bondage by a virgin, so too 
the human race is rescued by a virgin. A kind of trifold redemption is seen at the end of this 
passage: Christ overcomes Adam’s failure; the harmlessness of the dove—i.e. the Holy 
Spirit—overcomes the cunning of the serpent; and Mary’s obedience overcomes Eve’s 
disobedience. Everything that went wrong in the Garden with Adam, Eve and the serpent is 
put right through Jesus, Mary and the Dove. Adam, Eve, and the Devil brought death; Jesus, 
Mary, and the Holy Spirit bring life. The same sentiment is conveyed again Epid. 33,  
 
And just as through a disobedient virgin humanity was stricken down and fell 
into death, so through the virgin who was obedient to the Word of God 
humanity was reanimated and received life. For the Lord came to seek again 
the sheep that was lost; and humanity it was that was lost: and for this cause 
there was not made some other formation [pla,sma], but in that same which 
had its descent from Adam he preserved the likeness of the (first) formation. 
For it was necessary that Adam should be summed up [avnakefalaio,omai] in 
Christ, that mortality might be swallowed up and overwhelmed [katapi,nw] 
by immortality; and Eve also in Mary, that a virgin should be a virgin’s 
intercessor, and by a virgin’s obedience undo and put away [evklu,w] the 
disobedience of a virgin.10 
 
Here, as in the above, Mary is not merely a contrast to Eve—a success where Eve 
failed, a stark reminder of the first woman’s sin. Irenaeus’ posture is more redemptive. Just 
as Irenaeus vigorously defends the salvation of Adam through the redemptive work of 
Christ,11 so too Irenaeus affirms the salvation of Eve through the redemptive obedience of 
Mary. Mary is the advocate and intercessor of Eve. In this respect, Sr Grace Remington’s 
crayon and pencil drawing from 2005, Virgin Mary Consoles Eve is more faithful than 
Bredt’s to the spirit of Irenaeus.  Remington’s drawing depicts Eve from the side view, 
standing sorrowfully, head bowed, eyes downcast. Her body is fully covered by her long 
brown hair, thus eliminating the sensuality of Bredt’s Eve. She holds the bitten apple to her 
breast while the tail of the serpent is intertwined around her feet. A pregnant Mary, dressed 
in a simple white robe and long blue head dress, stands facing Eve in a posture of comfort 
and solace. Mary has taken Eve’s free hand and placed it on her womb, connecting Eve to 
                                                         
10 See Smith, Proof, 169-171 for an extended discussion on the translation of this passage.  
11 This was a point of contention between Irenaeus and the Gnostics, who insisted that Adam 
could not be saved. Irenaeus argues for the salvation of Adam as a sign of God’s commitment to 




her redeemer. Mary’s other hand is on Eve’s cheek in a sign of tenderness and affirmation. 
Most poignantly, the head of the serpent is overturned and crushed under Mary’s 
outstretched foot. The poem O Eve, written by Sr Columba Guare to accompany 
Remington’s drawing, captures well the spirit that permeates Irenaeus’ basic recapitulative 
soteriology.12  
 
My mother, my daughter, life-giving Eve, 
Do not be ashamed, do not grieve. 
The former things have passed away, 
Our God has brought us to a New Day. 
See, I am with Child, 
Through whom all will be reconciled. 
O Eve! My sister, my friend, 
We will rejoice together 
Forever 
Life without end.13 
 
Benjamin Dunning, in his essay on the Eve-Mary connection in Irenaeus, helpfully 
asks the question, ‘Why Mary?’—what was it about Mary that caused Irenaeus to utilize 
Mary as a key pivot point in his soteriology? 14  Dunning lists some of the possibilities 
offered by Irenaeus scholars: Irenaeus’ aesthetic sensitivities, coupled with his Adam 
typology pushed him to insist upon a symmetry that included Eve; Irenaeus was concerned 
to show the reestablishment of human social integrity; Irenaeus desired to affirm and 
reestablish virginal integrity.15 Dunning himself suggests that Irenaeus utilizes the Eve-
Mary connection because he is concerned to demonstrate the restoration of sexual difference 
between male and female. Notably all of these suggestions focus on Mary’s ontological 
status as the new Eve (be it aesthetic, social, virginal, or sexually differentiated). In each 
                                                         
12 This in contrast to Vladimir Tumanov, ‘Mary Versus Eve’, 507-21. Tumanov asserts 
strong discontinuity between Eve and Mary in the Christian tradition (Irenaeus included). For 
Tumanov, Eve is the sexually unchaste, a mythical creation of males, representing male evolutionary 
anxiety regarding paternal uncertainty of identifying their legitimate offspring. Mary the ever-virgin 
represents the male mythical solution to such anxiety. Whatever one thinks about evolutionary 
anthropology, Tumanov’s assertion about the Eve/Mary contrast in the Christian tradition is 
overblown, at least with respects to Irenaeus. While many early Christian writers note a contrast 
between Eve and Mary, the pair do not stand in Irenaeus as perpetual and equal opposites. Rather 
Mary’s obedience embraces and redeems Eve. A harmony is achieved in Irenaeus that Tumanov 
does not account for.  
13 O Eve! by Sr Columba Guare.  
14 Dunning, ‘Virgin Earth, Virgin Birth’. 




instance, Mary is, in her being, what Eve failed to be. Such readings have merit, but miss the 
way Mary’s obedience functions in Irenaeus. Mary is not merely the recapitulative, 
typological fulfilment of Eve, as though her mere existence as a new Eve (however 
construed) had salvific merit in itself. For Irenaeus, Mary is not merely a result of God’s 
recapitulative activity in Christ, but the means by which it comes about. As such, Mary’s 
contribution to the plan of redemption is not her existence in the place of Eve, but her 
conscious act of obedience.16  
Irenaeus’ focus on the redemptive obedience of Mary emphasizes an aspect of his 
soteriology that will be made plainer as we continue our analysis, namely that it is primarily 
obedience, not sacrifice as such, that undoes the work of the Devil and redeems humanity. 
Irenaeus’ conception of the atonement, taken up in more detail below, is most concerned 
with reversing the curse through a recapitulation of what brought it about in the first place—
an act of disobedience. Eve’s disobedience had real consequence. The curse is not atoned 
for by skirting around human obedience, or even through sacrifice as a substitute for human 
obedience, but rather by ‘going back’ and redoing—correctly this time—the initial point of 
failure. Eve’s disobedience introduced death into the world; Mary’s obedience brings life 
into the world, namely the life that is the Word of God made flesh.  
So strongly does Irenaeus press the salvific nature of Mary’s obedience in the face of 
Eve’s disobedience, that these passages, if read in isolation, could almost leave one with the 
impression that Mary’s act of obedience was sufficient in itself to undo the whole of the 
curse and overthrow the Devil. Here we must keep in mind that the incarnation lies in the 
backdrop of Irenaeus’ thinking. Mary defeats the serpent insofar as her obedience is the 
means by which she serves as a necessary component in the work of bringing life back to 
humanity via Christ’s incarnation.17 But contra the Gnostics, she is not merely a conduit 
though which divinity is once again united to humanity ‘as if through a tube’.18 Christ takes 
                                                         
16 As Osborn states, ‘The disobedience of Adam and Eve was corrected by the obedience of 
Mary and Jesus. The obedience and faith of Mary are contrasted with the disobedience of Eve’. See 
Osborn, Irenaeus, 101. 
17 See Lawson, Irenaeus, 151-52, for a brief but helpful discussion of the extent to which 
Irenaeus views Mary as a co-operator in redemption. Lawson (rightly in my estimation) concludes 
that Irenaeus lays the ground work for later developments in Marian theology, but does not himself 
teach that Mary—after her initial ‘Fiat mihi secundum verbum tuum’—maintains a continuing role 
in Irenaeus as intercessor or co-redemptrix, such as will emerge in the later Christian tradition.  
Contra Lawson, see Steenberg, ‘The Role of Mary as Co-Recapitulator’, 117-37, and Del Fiat Miloa, 
‘Mary as Un-tier of Knots’, 341-42. The conclusion of such debate is, in the end, only tangentially 
relevant to my primary point—a point that both sides of the debate affirm, namely that it is through 
Mary’s obedience that the Devil is defeated.  
18 Haer. 1.7.2, 3.11.3, 16.1. Irenaeus’ reading of Mary is in service of his anti-Gnostic 
polemic and he chastises those who claim that Jesus received nothing from Mary. For Irenaeus, the 
fleshly connection from Jesus to Mary to Eve to Adam is all important for his broader soteriological 




from Mary his own humanity, such that he is born of her flesh, which in turn is Eve’s flesh, 
which in turn is Adam’s flesh. Through Mary’s obedience, Christ’s work of recapitulation is 
carried forward, and Adam’s flesh is once again reintroduced to divinity.   
Here we can see that obedience serves a function in Irenaeus distinct from how 
obedience will come to function in primarily merit-based accounts of salvation (such as we 
find emerging in earnest in Western medieval theology). For Irenaeus, it is not merely that 
God imputes Mary’s obedience to humanity, as though Mary’s obedience stands in the stead 
of Eve’s disobedience (a sort of quasi-proto-Lutheran view of imputation). Rather Mary’s 
obedience itself is the means by which the world is reintroduced to life, for it is through 
Mary’s actions that Christ takes upon himself Adam’s flesh, thus making it possible to 
endow Adam’s corruptible flesh with the divine life of incorruptibility. In a beautiful 
reciprocity, Mary as human takes on the divine in order to allow the divine to take on the 
human.  
Irenaeus’ soteriological categories are fundamentally ontological, rather than legal.  
Thus the need for human obedience in God’s redemptive plan is not to satisfy a divine 
standard of merit, but rather human obedience is the action by which the tri-fold tyranny of 
sin, death, and the Devil is overcome. Irenaeus’ imagery of Mary as the ‘un-tier of knots’ is 
apt, for it shows that sin creates a real condition that must be undone. Mary’s obedience 
undoes the curse of God that fell upon humanity through Eve’s disobedience, and 
overthrows the power of the Devil by bringing life into the world. 
The salient point to make in all of this is that for Irenaeus, the defeat of the Devil is 
accomplished through human obedience—in this case Mary’s. God does not sidestep 
humanity in order to defeat the Devil. He does not, through sheer force and power, directly 
and personally overthrow the Devil.19 The world was humanity’s to loose, and it remains 
humanity’s to win back. Humanity lost the world through disobedience; humanity reclaims 
the world through obedience. God does indeed defeat the Devil, but he does so only through 
the agency of obedient humanity. This human obedience is, of course, embodied most fully 






                                                         
19 Thus rightly Lawson comments, ‘Christ did not save the world automatically, but was 
dependent to a certain extent upon the moral goodness of the men and women who lived about Him’. 




II. Jesus’ Obedience in the Wilderness 
 
If Mary is the means through which the life of God re-enters the world, Jesus is that 
life.  Notably, Irenaeus does not locate the whole of his atonement theology in the 
ontological dimensions of the incarnation. It is not simply that humanity must once again be 
united to the immortal life of God. This is no doubt true (and a subject to which we will 
return below), but Irenaeus is keen to show that what went wrong in Genesis 3 has been put 
right in the Gospels. Where Adam failed in disobedience to the divine command, Jesus 
succeeded in obedience to the divine command. In particular, Irenaeus devotes a good deal 
of attention to Jesus’ wilderness temptation (recounted in the Gospels in Matthew 4 and 
Luke 4). Here we see a direct confrontation between Jesus and the Devil—the over-thrower 
of the first Adam attempting to overthrow the Second Adam. In the wilderness Jesus 
‘recapitulated in himself [in semetipso recapitulatus fuisset] that ancient and primary enmity 
against the serpent, fulfilling the promise of the Creator [Demiurgi]’.20 The extended 
discussion, spanning an entire chapter (and following immediately after Irenaeus’ account of 
Mary’s obedience, discussed above), recounts each temptation in turn, noting that in each 
instance Jesus uses the Law (i.e. the Mosaic Law) to defeat the logic of the Devil—a feat 
that Adam was not able to manage.21 In this context Irenaeus stresses Christ’s obedience to 
the divine command as a recapitulation of Adam’s disobedience. 
 
And thus, vanquishing [vincens] him for the third time, he spurned him from 
him finally as being conquered [victum] out of the law; and there was done 
away with that infringement of God’s commandment which had occurred in 
Adam [et soluta est ea quae fuerat in Adam praecepti Dei praevaricatio], by 
means of the precept of the law [per praeceptum legis], which the Son of 
humanity observed, by not transgressing the commandment of God [quod 
servavit Filius hominis non transgrediens praeceptum Dei]. Who, then, is 
                                                         
20 Haer. 5.21.2. The ‘promise’ referred to here is the promise of Gen 3:15 that an ‘offspring’ 
of Eve will crush the serpent’s head.  
21 The Gnostic context factors significantly in Irenaeus’ reading of the wilderness 
temptation. The Gnostics stressed discontinuity between the Old Testament God and Jesus. Irenaeus 
counters this claim by showing that Jesus responds to Satan’s three temptations with the use of Old 
Testament Law, specifically three passages out of Deuteronomy, thus showing that Jesus affirms and 
legitimizes the God of Moses and the Old Testament. ‘Thus then does the Lord plainly show that it 
was the true Lord and the one God who had been set forth by the law; for him whom the law 
proclaimed as God’, Haer. 5.22.1. Christ’s obedience to the Law, then, has a two-fold significance 
for Irenaeus—it shows Christ’s obedience in the face of Adam’s failure, and it shows Christ’s 
obedience to the God of Moses and the Old Testament, which validates the Demiurge in the face of 
the Gnostic critique. The first is a general feature of Irenaeus’ recapitulative soteriology; the latter is 




this Lord God to whom Christ bears witness, whom no one shall tempt, 
whom all should worship, and serve him alone? It is, beyond all manner of 
doubt, that God who also gave the law. For these things had been predicted in 
the law, and by the words [sententiam] of the law the Lord showed that the 
law does indeed declare the Word of God from the Father; and the apostate 
angel of God is destroyed by its voice [apostata autem Dei angelus per illius 
destruitur vocem], being exposed in his true colors, and vanquished by the 
Son of humanity keeping the commandment of God [et victus a Filio hominis 
servante Dei praeceptum]. For as in the beginning he enticed humanity to 
transgress their Maker’s law, and thereby got them into his power [quoniam 
enim in initio homini suasit transgredi praeceptum factoris ideo eum habuit 
in sua potestate]; yet his power consists in transgression and apostasy 
[potestas autem eius est transgressio et apostasia], and with these he bound 
humanity [et his colligavit hominem]; so again, on the other hand, it was 
necessary that through humanity himself he should, when conquered, be 
bound with the same chains with which he has bound humanity [per 
hominem ipsum iterum oportebat victum eum contrario colligari iisdem 
vinculis, quibus alligavit hominem], in order that humanity, being set free, 
might return to their Lord [ut homo solutus revertatur ad suum Dominum], 
leaving to him [Satan] those bonds by which he himself had been fettered, 
that is, sin.22 
 
Through Jesus’ obedience to the law, Adam’s infringement is ‘done away with’. The 
Devil is ‘destroyed’ and ‘vanquished by the Son of humanity keeping the commandment of 
God’. The Devil entrapped humanity by enticing Adam into transgression, and humanity is 
loosed from the Devil when Christ remains faithful to God. What is more, not only is 
humanity set free from the Devil, but a reversal takes place. The Devil is bound by the very 
chains of apostasy with which he had bound humanity. Sin has ‘back-recoiled’ (to quote 
Milton) upon Satan; his own weapon has been turned against him.  
The language here is vivid and encompasses all aspects of redemption. Christ’s 
breaking of the Devil’s power seems to take place completely in the wilderness as a result of 
Christ’s obedience to the law of God (rather than later through Christ’s sacrifice on the 
                                                         
22 Haer. 5.21.2-3. The passage quoted here is the conclusion of Irenaeus’ account of the 
wilderness temptation. The same basic framework represented in this passage is carried throughout 
the whole of Irenaeus’ treatment of the wilderness temptation (too long to quote) and is worth 




cross). In the following chapter of Adversus haereses Irenaeus again speaks of Jesus’ victory 
in the wilderness as though it were a completed act: ‘Then in the gospel [of Matthew], 
casting down the apostasy by means of these expressions, he did overcome the strong 
man…’23 Read in isolation, these passages seem to paint a picture of victory that is complete 
in itself. To what extent, and in what way, was the Devil ‘vanquished’, ‘destroyed’, and 
‘bound’ through Christ’s obedience in the wilderness?  
Irenaeus does not quite work out all of the details. But the answer to such questions 
lies, at least in part, with a full appreciation of Irenaeus’ strong emphasis on recapitulation 
as a controlling motif in his soteriology, particularly Jesus’ recapitulation of Adam’s failure 
in the Garden. As we have already seen with the Eve and Mary pairing, Irenaeus is 
concerned to show that Jesus and Mary, through their obedience, undo the mess than Adam 
and Eve have made. Salvation comes through human obedience in the stead of human 
failure. But we can say more.  
For Irenaeus, obedience is not accrued to humanity in some sort of arbitrary merit 
based system, but rather as a virtual ontological requirement. Humans are contingent 
creatures, not independent beings. Humanity, by its very nature as creature, finds its life in 
obedience to God. ‘But being in subjection to God is continuance in immortality’.24 As we 
have already seen,25 it is through patient and trusting obedience that humanity is meant to 
grow up into God and thus become over time all that God intended for human beings to be. 
This growth is an ontologically necessary process that takes time and cannot be rushed. 
Obedience along the path that leads to immortality is the necessary steps that finite creatures 
must tread if they are to share in God’s innate immortality. To disobey is to abandon the 
only One who is able to grant humanity life. Treading this path of obedience requires 
patience and trust that God’s ways are the best ways.   
The logic of Irenaeus’ polemic against the Gnostics at this very point helps us to 
understand why Christ’s obedience in the wilderness was instrumental in overcoming the 
Devil. A lack of patient obedience is for Irenaeus a chief error of the Gnostics. The Gnostics 
try to rush ahead and lay hold of immortality apart from walking the path of obedience 
established by God. Humans must first be content to be mere creatures if they are ever to be 
raised up to be gods. This the Gnostics are not willing to do. Irenaeus writes,    
 
Irrational, therefore, in every respect, are they who await not the time of 
increase, but ascribe to God the weakness of their nature [naturae 
                                                         
23 Haer. 5.22.1. 
24 Haer. 4.38.3.  




infirmitatem26]. Such persons know neither God nor themselves, being 
insatiable and ungrateful, unwilling to be at the outset what they have also 
been created—humans subject to passions [homines passionum capaces]; but 
go beyond the law of the human race, and before they become humans [et 
antequam fiant homines], they wish to be even now like God their Creator, 
and they who are more destitute of reason than dumb animals [insist] that 
there is no distinction between the uncreated God and a human, a creature of 
today. For these, [the dumb animals], bring no charge against God for not 
having made them humans; but each one, just as he has been created, gives 
thanks that he has been created. For we cast blame upon him, because we have 
not been made gods from the beginning [nos enim imputamus ei, quoniam non 
ab initio Dii facti sumus], but at first merely humans, then at length gods [sed 
primo quidem homines, tunc demum Dii]; although God has adopted this 
course out of his pure benevolence, that no one may impute to him envy or 
grudgingness. He declares, ‘I have said, you are gods; and you are all sons of 
the Highest’. But since we could not sustain to carry the burden of the power 
of divinity [nobis autem potestatem divinitatis baiulare non sustinentibus], he 
adds, ‘But you shall die like human beings’, setting forth both truths—the 
kindness of his free gift, and our weakness [infirmitatem], and also that we 
were possessed of power over ourselves. For after his great kindness he 
graciously conferred good [upon us], and made humans like to himself, [that 
is] in their own power; while at the same time by his prescience he knew the 
weakness of human beings [hominum infirmitatem], and the consequences 
which would flow from it;27 but through love and power, he shall overcome 
the substance of created nature [vincet factae naturae substantiam]. For it had 
been necessary, at first, that nature should be exhibited [oportuerat autem 
primo naturam apparere]; then, after that, that what was mortal should be 
conquered and swallowed up by immortality, and the corruptible by 
incorruptibility [post deinde vinci et absorbi mortale ab immortalitate, et 
                                                         
26 Here I take infirmitatem to denote simply ‘lack of strength’. Irenaeus’ point here is not 
that something is broken in human nature as such, but that human nature, even on its best day, is 
weak with respect to immortality. Or again, the naturae infirmitatem here is not due to sin, but due 
to the fact that humanity is created. The use of infirmitas in classical Latin bears this meaning, where 
infirmitas is used to denote the physical weakness of women and children vis à vis men. See the 
entry for infirmitas in LSLD and OLD. 
27 Here a reference to humanity’s fall, thus confirming that the ‘weakness’ of human nature 




corruptibile ab incorruptibilitate], and that humanity should be made after the 
image and likeness of God, having received the knowledge of good and evil.28 
 
God has great things in store for his creatures. Through the redemptive work of 
Christ, the mortal creature grows and matures into the true image and likeness of God and 
thus becomes like the immortal Son. As such, the human need for patient obedience is not 
an arbitrary test placed upon humanity by God, with immortality granted as a reward. Rather 
patience, faith and obedience are the very means by which contingent creatures stay 
connected to the nourishing life of God and thus grow to become fully human partakers of 
the divine life. ‘If, then, you are the work of God, await the Hand of God, who does 
everything at the appropriate time—the appropriate time for you, who are being made….If, 
therefore you offer to him what is yours, that is faith in him and subjection, you will receive 
his art and become a perfect work of God’.29 But this is the very thing Adam and Eve failed 
to do in the garden. Under the sinister tutelage of the Devil, they rushed forward and tried to 
lay hold of immortality before the appointed time. In so doing they killed in themselves the 
whole of human nature.30  
The need for humanity to be obediently patient was not lessened or eliminated by 
Adam’s and Eve’s failure. Indeed, the need for obedience is made more acute precisely 
because Adam and Eve failed. The growth of human nature in Adam and Eve stagnated and 
stalled. The only way forward for humanity into maturity remains patient obedience and 
trusting submission to God. Jesus does not return humanity to God primarily through a 
propitiatory sacrifice,31 but rather by taking human nature upon himself and (re)connecting 
humanity back to God by growing up humanity within himself through successfully 
navigating each successive stage of human maturation. ‘It was for this reason that the Son of 
God, although he was perfect, passed through the state of infancy in common with the rest 
of humankind, partaking of it thus not for his own benefit, but for that of the infantile stage 
                                                         
28 Haer. 4.38.4. In the same vein, Irenaeus strikingly asks in 4.39.2, ‘How then will you be a 
god, when you are not yet made a human?’ 
29 Haer. 4.39.2. Minns captures the sentiment well when he states, ‘What the earth creature 
[i.e. man] needs to learn above all is to relax in the hands of God, to let God be the Creator’, 
Irenaeus, 64. See also Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology, 116-27, for an extended and helpful 
discussion on the relationship in Irenaeus between obedience and human growth.  
30 For more on the theme of patience, see Vogel, ‘Haste of Sin’.  
31 Here interpreters of Irenaeus who read an Anselmic atonement theology back into 
Irenaeus will miss the logic of Irenaeus’ soteriology, and thus fail to appreciate why Irenaeus can 
speak with such totality about Christ’s victory over the Devil in the wilderness. Christ defeats the 
Devil by maturing humanity within himself, not primarily by sacrifice per se. As we will see below, 
the same logic that Irenaeus uses to interpret the wilderness temptation is followed in how he 




of humanity’s existence, in order that humanity might be able to receive him’.32 Christ 
grows up humanity within himself, walking humanity through the appropriate and 
successive stages that God has necessarily ordained for contingent creatures. This newly-
found human maturity secured through Christ’s obedience breaks the Devil’s power over 
humanity and reconnects humanity back to the immortality of the divine life.33 It was only 
because of human infancy that the Devil got the upper hand in the first place; now that 
humanity has come of age, the tables have been turned.  
Here it is helpful to underscore the difference in Irenaeus between Christ’s 
obedience and Mary’s obedience. For Irenaeus, Mary’s obedience provides an occasion for 
the divine life to reenter the world; Mary’s obedience is a reversal of Eve’s failure. But 
Mary is not, for Irenaeus, tasked with growing and maturing humanity within herself. This 
is Christ’s role.34 Mary’s act of obedience makes the incarnation possible; but it is the 
incarnation itself that makes possible the growth and maturity of humanity-in-Christ. Or 
again, Mary’s obedience gives Christ his humanity; but it is Christ’s patient obedience 
which gives humanity-in-Christ maturity and perfection.  
In this way, the wilderness temptation is not for Irenaeus a minor event in Jesus’ 
recapitulative mission, since the wilderness temptation takes place toward the end of 
Christ’s life, just as he is reaching his full human maturity. Christ has taken humanity nearly 
all the way through life; only the last great test of obedience at the cross remains. Further, 
Christ’s victory over the Devil in the wilderness is the undoing of the very event that led to 
humanity’s downfall in the first instance (i.e. Adam and Eve’s failure and disobedience in 
the garden). Through Jesus’ patient obedience, he has matured humanity past the obstacle 
over which Adam stumbled.   
Here again we see that Irenaeus stresses human agency as the means by which the 
Devil is overcome.35  For Irenaeus, it is ‘necessary’ that humanity defeat the Devil. 
                                                         
32 Haer. 4.38.2. Here we can see an allusion to Irenaeus’ idea that humanity was created in a 
state of infancy. Adam and Eve killed human nature while it was yet infantile. Christ picks up the 
aborted humanity of Adam and Eve, revives it, and carries it forward on into the maturity that God 
all along intended.  
33 My reading of the efficacy of Christ’s obedience stands in contrast to Loewe, ‘Irenaeus’ 
Soteriology’, who argues that Christ’s obedience in the wilderness and on the cross has atoning 
efficacy primarily because it contains noetic power to unmask the Devil and reveal him as a liar. 
This is true enough, but Loewe’s perspective does not deal most basically with the problem of death 
and the need for ontological maturation which serve as the dilemma that Irenaeus’ soteriology must 
address. Ontological renewal into full maturation, not merely more information, is Irenaeus’ solution 
to his doctrine of sin.   
34 See Rousseau, SC, vol. 406, 271, who helpfully distinguishes between ‘recapitulation’ in 
Adam/Christ and the ‘reversal’ in Eve.  
35 So too Wingren, though with a slightly different (yet complementary) focus, helpfully 
notes the importance of Christ’s humanity for Irenaeus in the wilderness temptation. See Wingren, 




Certainly it is Jesus’ faithful connection to the true God that gives him his power over the 
Devil. Yet this divine power is manifest and unleashed through Jesus’ humanity. It is Jesus 
as the Son of humanity [filius hominis] who defeats the Devil in the wilderness.  
Irenaeus does not specify here or elsewhere in what way it is ‘necessary’ that 
humanity defeat the Devil. But it seems best to understand this necessity in light of 
Irenaeus’ recapitulation paradigm. The divine demands upon humanity for obedience are not 
arbitrary, but ontologically necessary. Humanity must grow to maturity, and part of this 
maturity inevitably means learning to trust God’s ways above human passions and desires. 
Adam and Eve failed to be patient when tempted by the serpent; Jesus did not fail. What is 
more, it was Adam’s destiny to surpass the steward. This destiny must be accomplished if 
human beings are to become all that God intended. Thus there can be no skirting a human 
victory over the Devil, for such victory is integral to human growth and maturity. The 




III. Jesus’ Obedience at the Cross 
 
Jesus’ death on the cross has long been a focal point of Christian soteriology, even if 
not uniformly so.36 While not all Christian theologians have agreed about how Christ’s 
crucifixion affects salvation, the main lines of the Christian tradition have generally agreed 
that Jesus’ death on the cross was not merely an ancillary or accidental aspect of God’s 
redemptive work (like, say, Jesus turning water into wine). In this respect, Irenaeus is 
situated well within the main lines. It would be an overstatement to say that Irenaeus is a 
‘theologian of the cross’, but not by much. Irenaeus’ soteriology makes significant room for 
the cross of Christ as a primary instrument of redemption. For Irenaeus, the soteriological 
efficacy of Christ’s cross is understood primarily through the lens of recapitulative 
obedience.37 This can be seen clearly in the way Irenaeus continues his discussion regarding 
human obedience in Haer. 5.19-23.  
                                                         
36 Jesus’ crucifixion received varied emphasis in the earliest post-New Testament writings. 
See for example Diognetus 9, where the author speaks at length of Christ’s death as a means of 
affecting ransom from sins, compared with the Shepherd of Hermas, where Christ’s sacrifice carries 
little (if any) soteriological significance. The New Testament epistles likewise offer a varied 
emphasis. But the inclusion of Christ’s death in all four Gospels, and the emphasis in the writings of 
Paul, Peter, the letter to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse did much to cement the death of Christ as 
a fixed feature in Christian soteriology. Christian theologians may occasionally drift away from this 
New Testament emphasis, but the whole of the Christian tradition has not escaped it.   
37 Paul’s comments in Romans 5:18-19 seem to be a primary lens through which Irenaeus 




Having discussed Mary’s obedience in the stead of Eve’s disobedience (Haer. 5.19), 
followed by a discussion of Christ’s obedience in the wilderness in the stead of Adam’s 
disobedience in the Garden (Haer. 5.21-22), Irenaeus continues his discussion by noting 
Christ’s obedience at the cross in the stead of Adam’s disobedience at the Tree of 
Knowledge (Haer. 5.23). Christ’s two acts of obedience (i.e. in the wilderness and then 
again at the cross) undo the same one act of Adamic disobedience, thus rendering the Devil 
powerless over humanity. Just as the Devil showed himself to be a liar when he asserted that 
the kingdoms of the worlds were his to give, so too he lied to Adam and Eve in the Garden 
when he told them they would become like God if they ate from the Tree of Knowledge. In 
both cases, Satan promised to give something he himself did not possess.    
 
In the first place, then, in the garden of God [the Devil] disputed about God, 
as if God was not there, for he was ignorant of the greatness of God; and 
then, in the next place, after he had learned from the woman that God had 
said that they should die if they tasted the aforesaid tree, opening his mouth, 
he uttered the third falsehood, ‘You shall not die by death’. But that God was 
true, and the serpent a liar, was proved by the result, death having passed 
upon them who had eaten. For along with the fruit they did also fall under the 
power of death, because they did eat in disobedience [quoniam inobedientes 
manducabant]; but disobedience to God entails death [inobedientia autem 
Dei mortem infert]. Wherefore, as they became forfeit to death [debitores 
mortis effecti], from that [moment] they were handed over to it.38 
 
Satan makes a claim about the efficacy of the fruit—that it will give wisdom and 
eternal life like unto God. But the result of eating the fruit proves Satan to be a liar. 
Disobedience brings about death. Notably, Irenaeus stresses that Adam and Eve died not 
simply because they had eaten from the tree, but because they had eaten from the tree ‘in 
disobedience’. As Irenaeus remarks elsewhere,39 God did not begrudge Adam and Eve the 
Tree of Knowledge; it was his plan all along for them to eat from the tree. But they needed 
to grow into their full maturity before partaking. To reach out impatiently and disobediently 
ahead of time resulted not in the increased knowledge of the divine life (as the Devil had 
                                                         
man's act of righteousness leads to acquittal and life for all men. For as by one man's disobedience 
many were made sinners, so by one man's obedience many will be made righteous’.  
38 Haer. 5.23.1. 




promised) but rather in death.40 Irenaeus then connects Adam’s disobedience at the Tree of 
Knowledge, with Christ’s obedience at the cross.  
 
Now in this same day that they did eat, in that also did they die. But 
according to the cycle and progress of the days, after which one is termed 
first, another second, and another third, if anybody seeks diligently to learn 
upon what day out of the seven it was that Adam died, he will find it by 
examining the dispensation of the Lord [dispositione Domini]. For by 
recapitulating in himself the whole human race from the beginning to the end 
[Recapitulans enim universum hominem in se ab initio usque ad finem], he 
has also recapitulated its death [recapitulatus est et mortem eius]. From this it 
is clear that the Lord suffered death, in obedience to his Father, upon that day 
on which Adam died while he disobeyed God [quoniam in illa die mortem 
sustinuit Dominus obediens Patri, in qua mortuus est Adam inobediens Deo]. 
Now he died on the same day in which he did eat. For God said, ‘In that day 
on which you shall eat of it, you shall die’. The Lord, therefore, 
recapitulating in himself this day, underwent his sufferings upon the day 
preceding the Sabbath, that is, the sixth day of the creation, on which day the 
man was created; thus granting him a second creation by means of his 
passion, which is that [creation] out of death [secundam plasmationem ei, 
eam quae est a morte, per suam passionem donans]…. For they died who 
tasted of the tree; and the serpent is proved a liar and a murderer, as the Lord 
said of him: ‘For he is a murderer from the beginning, and the truth is not in 
him’.41 
 
Here we see again Irenaeus’ recapitulation theme. Through a retrospective logic, 
Irenaeus argues that Adam ate from the tree and died on the sixth day of the week, since that 
is the day that Christ died. Through his death, Christ ‘sums up’ in himself the whole of the 
human race. Insofar as humanity died in Adam, this ‘summing up’ necessarily involves 
Christ entering into death. Christ, taking all of humanity upon himself, rescued humanity 
from death by entering himself into humanity’s death. But it was not enough for Christ 
simply to die. Whereas Adam entered death through disobedience, Christ entered death 
through obedience. Adam and Eve entered death naively and uninvited by God, and thus 
found themselves trapped in death. But Christ entered into death knowingly and through 
                                                         
40 For more here, see the helpful comments in Minns, Irenaeus, 76-78.  




obedience to the Father, and thus was able to successfully exit the grave, bringing fallen 
Adam and Eve, and the fallen human nature, with him. This way of thinking about the cross 
primarily through the lens of obedience can be seen throughout Irenaeus’ writing.  
 
And the trespass which came by the tree was undone by the tree of 
obedience, when, hearkening unto God, the Son of humanity was nailed to 
the tree; thereby destroying the knowledge of evil and bringing in and 
establishing the knowledge of good: now evil is disobedience to God, even as 
obedience to God is good….So then by the obedience wherewith he obeyed 
‘even unto death’,42 hanging on the tree, he put away the old disobedience 




And not by the aforesaid things alone has the Lord manifested himself, but 
also by means of his passion. For doing away with that disobedience of 
humanity which had taken place at the beginning by the occasion of a tree 
[Dissolvens enim eam quae ab initio in ligno facta fuerat hominis 
inobedientiam], ‘He became obedient unto death, even the death of the 
cross’;44 healing that disobedience which had occurred by reason of a tree, 
through that obedience which was upon the tree [eam quae in ligno facta 
fuerat inobedientiam, per eam quae in ligno fuerat obedientiam sanans]. 
Now he would not have come to do away, by means of that same, the 
disobedience which had been incurred towards our Maker if he proclaimed 
another Father. But inasmuch as it was by these things that we disobeyed 
God, and did not give credit to his word, so was it also by these same that he 
brought in obedience and consent as respects his Word; by which things he 
clearly shows forth God himself, whom indeed we had offended in the first 
Adam [quem in primo quidem Adam offendimus], when he did not perform 
his commandment [non facientes eius praeceptum]. In the second Adam, 
however, we are reconciled, being made obedient even unto death [evn de. Tw/| 
deute,rw| Ada.m avpokathlla,ghmen, u`ph,kooi me,cri qana,tou geno,menoi]. For we 
were debtors to none other but to him whose commandment we had 
                                                         
42 An allusion to Philip 2:8.  
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transgressed at the beginning [ouvde. ga.r a;llw| tini. h=men ovfeile,tai avll v h; 
evkei,nw| ou= kai. th.n evntolh.n pare,bhmen avp v avrch/j].45 
 
Adam and Eve’s primary failure was disobedience. As such, this failure can only be 
set right by going back (as it were) and undoing their original act of disobedience. The 
‘debt’ of disobedience can only be paid through an act of obedience.46 Christ succeeds in 
faithful obedience at every stage of his life, undoing the effects of Adam and Eve’s 
disobedience. The significance of Christ’s cross then, is that he was obedient unto death, 
obedient at the one place where Adam failed.   
Irenaeus’ emphasis on the cross as an act of obedience is further seen in the way 
Irenaeus views propitiation through the lens of obedience. Irenaeus maintains that 
humanity’s sin in the Garden was a personal affront to God, making humanity enemies of 
God. As such, Christ ‘propitiates indeed for us the Father against whom we had sinned’.47 
But it is important to note that it is Christ’s obedience unto death that propitiates the Father 
on behalf of humanity, not simply Christ’s death as an innocent sacrifice.   
 
Now this being is the Creator [Demiurgus], who is, in respect of his love, 
the Father; but in respect of his power, he is Lord; and in respect of his 
wisdom, our Maker and Fashioner; by transgressing whose commandment 
we became his enemies [cuius et praeceptum transgredientes, inimici facti 
sumus eius]. And therefore in the last times the Lord has restored us into 
friendship through his incarnation, having become ‘the Mediator between 
God and men’;48 propitiating indeed for us the Father against whom we had 
sinned [propitians quidem pro nobis Patrem, in quem peccaveramus], and 
cancelling our disobedience by his own obedience [et nostram 
inobedientiam per suam obedientiam consolatus]; conferring also upon us 
the gift of communion with, and subjection to, our Maker. For this reason 
also he has taught us to say in prayer, ‘And forgive us our debts’; since 
                                                         
45 Haer. 5.16.3. See also the lengthy passage at Haer. 3.18.7. 
46 The primary soteriological framework for Irenaeus is ontological. Fiduciary and legal 
language functions as metaphors for the ontological dilemma of sin. Thus I take the language of 
‘debt’ here and elsewhere in Irenaeus to be a metaphor for ‘death’. To be in ‘debt’  to God because 
of sin means that humanity has fallen into death and cannot extract itself, just as a financial debtor 
falls into insurmountable financial debt and cannot extract himself. This is in contrast to the later 
Anselmic framework, where fiduciary and legal language is not viewed as a metaphor, but as the 
literal basis for explaining the dilemma of sin. Wingren rightly comments, ‘The key to the whole of 
Christ’s dominion is His conquest of evil and death. When evil has been eliminated and death put to 
flight, the property of the vanquished belongs to the victor’, Wingren, Man and Incarnation, 132.  
47 Haer. 5.17.1. 




indeed he is our Father, whose debtors we were, having transgressed his 
commandment [cuius eramus debitores, transgressi eius praeceptum].49  
 
Christ, through his obedience, ‘propitiates’ the Father on behalf of humanity, 
canceling Adam’s disobedience. As noted above, the idea here is not that Christ’s obedience 
at the cross is imputed to humanity in a sort of forensic imputation, nor is it quite right to 
say that Irenaeus conceives of Jesus ‘paying the penalty’ for human sin, as though his death 
satisfied an unmet standard of divine justice.50 Rather, in the incarnation Jesus takes human 
nature upon himself and successfully matures human nature into what God had all along 
intended: a submissive, trusting creation that, when fully grown, becomes capable of sharing 
in the divine life of God. ‘The Lord would not have recapitulated these things in himself 
[nec insemetipsum recapitulatus esset haec Dominus], unless he had himself been made 
flesh and blood after the way of the original formation [nisi et ipse caro et sanguis 
secundum principalem plasmationem factus fuisset], saving in his own person at the end that 
which had in the beginning perished in Adam’.51 Adam killed human nature, estranging 
humanity from God and making humanity God’s enemy. Christ has undone Adam’s failure, 
picking up fallen humanity where Adam had dropped it, and then carrying it forward in his 
person on to maturity. Adam’s disobedience brought death to the whole of the human 
nature. The obedience of Christ undoes Adam’s sin and thus undoes the consequences of 
Adam’s disobedience.52  Human nature, now reborn in Christ and securely anchored to the 
divine life through Christ’s faithful and perfect obedience, becomes a sort of ark of salvation 
that sinful humans can flee to in order to be saved.  
                                                         
49 Haer. 5.17.1. 
50 In Haer. 4.17, Irenaeus goes to great length to explain why God did not need the Old 
Testament sacrifices and oblations. To imply that God required such things would be to lessen God 
and make him stand in need. Irenaeus then goes on to discuss in 4.17.6-5 the new oblation of the 
Eucharist. Even here God does not stand in need of it, but has given it to us to give for our sake, 
because we have need of giving it. For Irenaeus, neither the Levitical sacrifices nor Christ’s sacrifice 
were viewed primarily as payment to satisfy a standard of justice to which God himself is bound to 
uphold qua God. The whole discussion shows the extent to which Irenaeus is moving in a different 
direction than what one finds in Anselm and the later Reformed emphasis on penal substitutionary 
atonement. Loewe astutely observes, ‘Irenaeus’ review of the Old Testament ceremonial law, for 
example (4.17.1), offers an obvious occasion to present its sacrifices as types of that of Christ, but 
Irenaeus lets the opportunity pass’, ‘Irenaeus’ soteriology’, 8. 
51 Haer. 5.14.1.  
52 This emphasis on obedience as a defining characteristic of the people of God can be seen 
as well in Haer. 4. 41.2, ‘According to nature, then—that is, according to creation, so to speak—we 
are all sons of God, because we have all been created by God. But with respect to obedience and 
doctrine we are not all the sons of God: those only are so who believe in him and do his will. And 
those who do not believe, and do not obey his will, are sons and angels of the Devil, because they do 




Given this framework, propitiation in Irenaeus tends to have a corporate and 
ontological dimension (rather than a personal and forensic dimension). For Irenaeus, Christ’ 
redemptive work directly secures the salvation of human nature, and then indirectly and 
subsequently secures the redemption of individual human persons insofar as individual 
persons choose to enter into this divinely restored human nature. To repent and enter into 
union with Christ means new life; failure to do so means remaining in Adam’s wrecked and 
dead humanity.  
Irenaeus’ corporate emphasis can also be seen in the way he discusses the remission 
of sin in connection with Christ’s death. Irenaeus occasionally notes the connection between 
Christ’s death and the remission of sin.53 Yet the language of forgiveness is infrequent in 
Irenaeus. When it does it occur, it is largely introduced with respect to humanity’s 
primordial sin in the Garden, rather than with respect to individual personal sins.54 For 
Irenaeus, personal sin is not necessary as an explanation for why every human since Adam 
has been plagued by death;55 the sin of Adam and Eve is sufficient to explain why humanity 
is estranged from God and subject to death. Thus the sin that Christ remits through his death 
on the cross is Adam and Eve’s sin in the garden. Adam and Eve sinned and wrecked all 
humanity with them. Christ’s obedience undoes this first sin, and creates a new humanity 
now united to God and thus a recipient of God’s divine life.  Christ’s obedience unto death 
undoes the effects of humanity’s first sin, creating a new reality in which personal sins can 
be remitted through personal repentance and faith.   
And perhaps most saliently for our purposes, just as Mary’s obedience at the divine 
conception, and Jesus’ obedience in the wilderness, secured victory over the Devil, so too 
Jesus’ obedience at the cross is the final and ultimate means by which the Devil is defeated.  
 
This also does likewise refute [the argument] of those who maintain that he 
suffered only in appearance. For if he did not truly suffer, no thanks to him, 
since there was no suffering at all; and when we shall actually begin to suffer, 
he will seem as leading us astray, exhorting us to endure buffeting, and to 
turn the other cheek, if he did not himself before us in reality suffer the same; 
                                                         
53 See Haer. 5.14.3, 17.1-3. 
54 See for example, Haer. 5.17.1. 
55 This is similar to Athanasius, who states that saints such as Jeremiah and John were 
‘hallowed from the womb’ and thus ‘holy and clean from all sin…nevertheless, “death reigned from 
Adam to Moses even over those that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression”; 
and thus humanity remained mortal and corruptible as before, liable to the affection proper to their 
nature’. C. Ar. 3.33. Jeremiah and John underwent death, not for their own personal sin, but because 
their nature was subject to death through Adam’s disobedience. For both Irenaeus and Athanasius, 




and as he misled them by seeming to them what he was not, so does he also 
mislead us, by exhorting us to endure what he did not endure himself. [In that 
case] we shall be even above the Master, because we suffer and sustain what 
our Master never bore or endured. But as our Lord is alone truly Master, so 
the Son of God is truly good and patient, the Word of God the Father having 
been made the Son of humanity. For he fought and conquered; for he was a 
human [homo] contending for the fathers, and through obedience unraveling 
disobedience completely [et per obedientiam, inobedientiam persolvens]: for 
he bound the strong man [alligavit enim fortem], and set free the weak, and 
endowed his own handiwork [plasmati suo] with salvation, by destroying sin. 
For he is a most holy and merciful Lord, and loves the human race 
[humanum genus].56 
 
And again,  
 
For the Lord, through means of suffering [passionem], ‘ascending into the 
lofty place, led captivity captive, gave gifts to men’, and conferred on those 
that believe in him the power ‘to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and on 
all the power of the enemy’,2 that is, of the leader of apostasy [principis 
apostasiae]. Our Lord also by his passion destroyed death [per passionem 
mortem destruxit], and dispersed error, and put an end to corruption, and 
destroyed ignorance, while he manifested life and revealed truth, and 
bestowed the gift of incorruption [et incorruptionem donavit].57  
 
And perhaps one of the clearest statements of Irenaeus’ soteriological framework can 
be found in Haer. 3.18.7. The passage interweaves the key elements of Irenaeus’ 
soteriology—the incarnation, recapitulation, obedience, union with God, the cross, defeat of 
the Devil, and victory over sin and death—into a single unified vision.  
 
Therefore, as I have already said, he caused humanity to cleave to and to 
become one with God [h[nwsen ou=n kaqw.j proe,famen to.n a;nqrwpon tw/| 
qew/|]. For unless humanity had overcome the enemy of humanity, the enemy 
would not have been legitimately vanquished [Eiv ga.r mh. a;nqrwpoj evni,khsen 
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th.n avnti,palon tou/ avnqrw,pou ouvk a;n dikai,wj evnikh,qh o` evcqpo,j]. And again, 
unless it had been God who had freely given salvation, we could never have 
possessed it securely. And unless humanity had been joined to God, we could 
never have become a partaker of incorruptibility. For it was incumbent upon 
the Mediator between God and humanity, by his relationship to both, to bring 
both to friendship and concord, and present humanity to God, while he 
revealed God to humanity. For, in what way could we be partakers of the 
adoption of sons, unless we had received from him through the Son that 
fellowship which refers to himself, unless his Word, having been made flesh, 
had entered into communion with us? Wherefore also he passed through 
every stage of life, restoring to all communion with God. Those, therefore, 
who assert that he appeared putatively, and was neither born in the flesh nor 
truly made human, are as yet under the old condemnation, holding out 
patronage to sin; for, by their showing, death has not been vanquished, which 
‘reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the 
similitude of Adam’s transgression’.58 But the law coming, which was given 
by Moses, and testifying of sin that it is a sinner, did truly take away his 
kingdom [regnum quidem eius abstulit]59, showing that he was no king, but a 
robber; and it revealed him as a murderer. It laid, however, a weighty burden 
upon humanity, which had sin in itself, showing that it was liable to death. 
For as the law was spiritual, it merely made sin to stand out in relief, but did 
not destroy it. For sin had no dominion over the spirit, but over humanity. 
For it behooved him who was to destroy sin, and redeem humanity under the 
power of death, that he should himself be made that very same thing which 
he was, that is, human; who had been drawn by sin into bondage, but was 
held by death, so that sin should be destroyed by humanity, and humanity 
should go forth from death [ut peccatum ab homine interficeretur, et homo 
exiret a morte]. For as by the disobedience of the one man [quemadmodum 
enim per inobedientiam unius hominis] who was originally molded from 
                                                         
58 Rom 5:14. 
59 The intended referent of eius here is not clear and could be death, sin, or the Devil. Coxe 
glosses the Latin pronoun as ‘death’ (ANF) and Unger glosses it as ‘sin’ (see ACW, vol. 64, 176, no. 
47). But the language of ‘murder’ ‘robber’ and false ‘king’ are all connected to the Devil elsewhere 
in Irenaeus. See Haer. 3.17.3, and especially 5.1.1, where Irenaeus refers to the Devil as a robber 
tyrant and false king. It seems that Irenaeus is himself not aiming for precision and slides smoothly 
from death, to the Devil, to sin throughout the passage. Ultimately, we need not concern ourselves 
with the exact referent, since Irenaeus’ conception of sin, death, and the Devil forms a sort of unholy 
‘trinity’ of evil. While the three can be distinguished, for Irenaeus there is a perichoretic relationship 




virgin soil, the many were made sinners, and forfeited life; so was it 
necessary that, by the obedience of one man [per obedientiam unius 
hominis], who was originally born from a virgin, many should be justified 
and receive salvation. Thus, then, was the Word of God made human, as also 
Moses says, ‘God, true are his works’. But if, not having been made flesh, he 
did appear as if flesh, his work was not a true one. But what he did appear, 
that he also was: God recapitulated in himself the ancient formation of 
humanity [Deus, hominis antiquam plasmationem in se recapitulans], that he 
might kill sin, deprive death of its power, and vivify humanity; and therefore 
his works are true.60 
 
At the first, the Devil deceived Adam and Eve and gained the upper hand over 
humanity. Through his act of envious treachery, Adam and Eve were severed from the 
immortal life of God and human nature was plunged into death. But Christ came as the new 
and second Adam, bringing in his divine nature the divine life, thus reconnecting humanity 
back to God. This ‘reconnecting’ of humanity back to God necessitated that Jesus enter into 
every facet of human experience, recapitulating in himself the whole of Adamic humanity. 
Through Jesus’ faithful obedience from birth to death, humanity has been set free from 
death and thus set free from the tyranny of the Devil. Humanity, now securely united with 
God through Christ, has the power to ‘tread upon serpents and scorpions, and all the power 
of the enemy’. Jesus, as the ‘stronger man’, has destroyed through his incarnation and 
faithful obedience, the power of the ‘strong man’ and has bound the Devil with his own 
chains of disobedience and apostasy. Christ’s victory at the cross ‘destroys our adversary 





For Irenaeus, the Devil’s power over humanity was initially derived from human 
disobedience, insofar as human disobedience disconnected humanity from the divine life 
and thus prevented humanity from reaching full maturity. Infantile humanity, under the 
sway of death and unable to grow to maturity, was rendered impotent in the face of the 
Devil’s greater power. The child-king could not grow to supplant the steward. But through 
Christ’s (and Mary’s) obedience, humanity is once again carried forward past the initial 
                                                         
60 Haer. 3.18.7. For another summarizing passage, see Haer. 5.1.1. 




point of stumbling on into maturity. Christ ‘grows up’ humanity in himself and thus neuters 
the Devil’s power over humanity.  
The notable point in all of this is that, for Irenaeus, the Devil’s defeat must be 
accomplished by humanity. Human obedience, not God’s direct power, was the cause of the 
Devil’s overthrow; God did not simply step in and squash the Devil (as well he could). 
Rather, insofar as humanity was destined to rule the steward and his angels, it was necessary 
that humanity rise to overthrow the Devil through a recapitulation of the initial failed 
obedience. All of this keeps humanity center stage and underscores that the primary conflict 
in Irenaeus’ narrative is between Satan and humanity.  
Thus far the Devil’s defeat through Christ’s first advent. What remains to be 
examined is the Devil’s final overthrow at Christ’s second advent, and the corresponding 
anthropological and cosmological payout that stems from this overthrow, the subject of our 












The Devil’s Final Defeat 
 
‘Meanwhile 
The world shall burn, and from her ashes spring 
New heaven and earth, wherein the just shall dwell; 
And, after all their tribulations long, 
See golden days, fruitful of golden deeds, 
With joy and love triumphing, and fair truth’.1 
 
John Milton  
 
 
As we have already seen in Epid. 16, the Devil’s initial attempt to overthrow Adam 
was carried out in subterfuge, in the hope of escaping God’s notice; he had not dared open 
war against God.2 But his assault upon Adam and Eve inevitably and necessarily brought 
him into open rebellion against God. God entered the conflict between Satan and humanity 
on the side of humanity. With Christ’s first advent, the power of the Devil was broken. 
Humanity’s final victory over the Devil was assured, and even the Devil became a believer 
in his own demise.3 But now in his hatred against God and humanity he carries his apostasy 
forward to a final, even if futile, climax. If he must be damned, then let the world be damned 
with him. The words of Seneca’s despairing and raging Medea could be the words of 
Irenaeus’ Devil: ‘Peace can only be mine if I see everything ruined along with me. Let fall 
the world with me. How sweet to destroy when you die’.4 
Humanity’s final victory over the Devil will be realized with the coming of Christ at 
his second advent. Irenaeus’ draws upon the New Testament prophetic writings, in 
particular the Apocalypse, to give us an account of the Devil’s final defeat. Central to this 
account are a number of features that are relevant for our examination of the connection 
between Irenaeus’ anthropology, cosmology, and his Devil narrative: 1) the rise of 
Antichrist is seen as the recapitulation of all evil, 2) the Devil and his angels are destroyed 
in hell, 3) the flesh of humanity is redeemed, 4) the world of humanity is renewed, 5) the 
sovereignty of humanity is restored.    
 
                                                         
1 Milton, Paradise Lost, 3.333-38. 
2 Haer. 5.26.2. 
3 See Haer. 5.25.2, where Irenaeus states that the Devil did not know of his own ultimate 
defeat until the advent of Christ.  




I. The Anti-Christ is the Recapitulation of all Evil  
 
The conclusion of Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative begins with the rise of the 
Antichrist. Irenaeus follows closely the New Testament account of the Antichrist, quoting 
large portions of Revelation, and citing frequently Paul’s letters. For Irenaeus, the Antichrist 
is the vessel of the Devil, raised up by the Devil to deceive the world into believing that he 
(the Devil) is God, thus leading humanity astray from the true God. 
 
And not only by the particulars already mentioned, but also by means of the 
events which shall occur in the time of Antichrist is it shown that he [i.e. the 
Devil], being an apostate and a robber [apostata et latro], is anxious to be 
adored as if he were God [quasi Deus vult adorari]; and that, although a 
mere slave, he wishes to proclaim himself king [regem se vult praeconari]. 
For he [Antichrist] being endued with all the power of the Devil, shall come, 
not as a righteous king, nor as a legitimate king in subjection to God, but as 
an impious, unjust, and lawless one; as an apostate, iniquitous and 
murderous; as a robber, concentrating in himself [all] satanic apostasy, and 
setting aside idols to persuade [humans] that he himself is God [ad 
suadendum quod ipse sit Deus], raising up himself as the only idol, having in 
himself the multifarious errors of the other idols. This he does, in order that 
they who worship the Devil by means of many abominations [ut hi qui per 
multas abominationes adorant diabolum], may serve himself by this one idol 
[hi per hoc unum idolum serviant ipsi], of whom the apostle thus speaks in 
the second epistle to the Thessalonians: ‘Unless there shall come a falling 
away first, and the man of sin shall be revealed, the son of perdition, who 
opposes and exalts himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; 
so that he sits in the temple of God, showing himself as if he were God’. The 
apostle therefore clearly points out his apostasy, and that he is lifted up above 
all that is called God, or that is worshipped—that is, above every idol—for 
these are indeed so called by humans, but are not gods; and that he will 
endeavor in a tyrannical manner to set himself forth as God [et quoniam ipse 
se tyrannico more conabitur ostendere Deum].5  
 
                                                         




The Devil’s vain ambition to supplant Adam reaches its climax with the coming of 
the Antichrist. Through the Antichrist, the Devil will seek to concentrate all the multifarious 
service and worship rendered to the Devil into a single idol. Here we can see where the 
headwaters of the two Devil narratives (the early Irenaean account, and the later 
Augustinian account) mingle together. As in the later Devil tradition, Irenaeus views the 
Devil as seeking to set himself forth as God. Yet unlike what one finds in the later Devil 
tradition, Irenaeus does not suggest that the Devil intends to supplant God in heaven.6 
Notably, the throne the Devil has stolen, and which he will openly claim for his own in the 
last days, is the throne God originally gave to Adam.7 It is from the Adamic throne that the 
Devil will present himself as God to humanity. The implications of all of this are in keeping 
with Irenaeus’ larger positive anthropological framework. The Devil presents himself as 
God by supplanting Adam, thereby implicitly indicating the native glory of humanity.  
Not only does Irenaeus view the rise of the Antichrist as a means of concentrating all 
satanic apostasy, but the rise of the Antichrist is also the recapitulation of all apostasy from 
the first days of creation until the present.  
 
And there is therefore in this beast [i.e. the Antichrist], when he comes, a 
recapitulation made of all sorts of iniquity and of every deceit 
[avnakefalaiwsij gi,netai pa,shj avdiki,aj kai. panto.j do,lou] in order that all 
apostate power, flowing into and being shut up in him, may be sent into the 
furnace of fire [ἵνα evn αὐτῷ  survr`eu,sasa kai. sugkleisqei/sa pa/sa du,namij 
avpostatikh. kata. th.n ka,minon ovlisqh/| tou/ puro,j]. Fittingly, therefore, shall 
his name possess the number six hundred and sixty-six, since he recapitulates 
in his own person all the commixture of wickedness [avnakefalaiou,menoj evn 
auvtw/| th.n pro. tou/ kataklusmou/ pa/san kaki,an] which took place previous to 
the deluge, due to the apostasy of the angels. . .8  
 
Here again we see Irenaeus’ recapitulation theme at work. The apostasy that began 
with the Devil in Eden reaches its climax with the apostasy of the Antichrist. For Irenaeus, 
the Antichrist ‘recapitulates’ in himself the apostasy of the Devil and of the other apostate 
                                                         
6 Origen is the first to link the fall of the Devil to Ezekiel 18 and Isaiah 14. On the fall of 
Satan and the angels, see Princ. 1.5.5, 8.3. For an extended discussion of Origen’s doctrine of Satan 
and the fall, see Burton, Satan, 125-32. See also the Introduction, no. 6 of this dissertation.  
7 Epid. 11. 
8 Haer. 5.29.2. Following this passage is Irenaeus’ rather creative explanation for why the 
number of the Antichrist is 666. He combines the six hundred years of Noah at the time of the flood, 




angels. Just as the Devil deceived Adam and Eve in the Garden, so too the Antichrist, under 
the guidance and power of the Devil, will deceive humanity away from the divine life by 
presenting himself as Christ. What happened in seminal form with Adam and Eve will 
happen in full flower with the Antichrist.  
The Antichrist will initially succeed. He will ‘devastate all things in the world’ and 
will ‘reign for three years and six months, and sit in the temple at Jerusalem’. Yet his 
success will be short lived. ‘The Lord will come from heaven in the clouds in the glory of 
the Father, sending this man and those who follow him into the lake of fire’. 9   
While the Devil intends to raise up the Antichrist as a means of concentrating service 
to himself, God has his own purposes. The concentration of all apostate power into the 
Antichrist brings everything into one place ‘in order that all apostate power, flowing into 
and being shut up in him, may be sent into the furnace of fire’ for a final apocalyptic 
judgment. All apostasy is concentrated into the Antichrist, so that the judgment and 
destruction of the Antichrist constitutes the judgment and destruction of all apostasy.10 With 
this final cataclysmic apostasy human history draws to its apocalyptic close.   
 
 
II. The Devil’s Final Destruction in Hell 
 
The defeat of the Antichrist is the defeat of the Devil. The fires of hell have been 
prepared by God for just this purpose—to swallow up the Devil and his angels. It is 
instructive to first consider Irenaeus’ overall framework for hell when considering the 
Devil’s place in it. For Irenaeus, submission to God is eternal rest. This is a law that flows 
of necessity from the Creator/creature distinction. All creatures must ultimately find rest in 
God or be destroyed. There can be no middle way. As such, hell is not an arbitrary judgment 
of a capricious and self-absorbed God. Irenaeus writes,  
 
And to as many as continue in their love towards God, does he grant 
communion with him. But communion with God is life and light [Koinwni,a 
de. Qeou/, zwh. kai. fw/j] and the enjoyment of all the benefits which he has in 
                                                         
9 Haer. 5.30.4. 
10 See also Haer. 5.28.2. Irenaeus’ logic here is similar to Jesus’ words in Matthew 23:33-
35, where he rebukes the scribes and the Pharisees: ‘You serpents, you brood of vipers, how are you 
to escape being sentenced to hell? Therefore I send you prophets and wise men and scribes, some of 
whom you will kill and crucify, and some you will flog in your synagogues and persecute from town 
to town, so that on you may come all the righteous blood shed on earth from the blood of innocent 





store. But on as many as, according to their own choice, depart from God, he 
inflicts that separation from himself which they have chosen of their own 
accord [ὅσοι . . . . avfi,stantai kata. th.n ghw,mhn auvtw/n tou/ Qeou/, tou,toij 
to.n avp vauvtou/ cwprismo.n evpa,gei]. But separation from God is death, and 
separation from light is darkness; and separation from God consists in the 
loss of all the benefits which he has in store. Those, therefore, who cast away 
by apostasy these aforementioned things, being in fact destitute of all good, 
do experience every kind of punishment. God, however, does not punish 
them immediately of himself [tou/ Qeou/ me.n prohghtikw/j mh. kola,zontoj], 
but that punishment falls upon them because they are destitute of all that is 
good [evpakolouqou,shj de. evkei,nhj th/j kola,sewj, dia. to. evsterh/sqai pa,ntwn 
tw/n avgaqw/n]. Now, good things are eternal and without end with God, and 
therefore the loss of these is also eternal and never-ending. It is in this matter 
just as occurs in the case of a flood of light: those who have blinded 
themselves, or have been blinded by others, are forever deprived of the 
enjoyment of light. It is not, [however], that the light has inflicted upon them 
the penalty of blindness, but it is that the blindness itself has brought 
calamity upon them: and therefore the Lord declared, ‘He that believeth in 
me is not condemned’, that is, is not separated from God, for he is united to 
God through faith. On the other hand, he says, ‘He that believeth not is 
condemned already, because he has not believed in the name of the only-
begotten Son of God’, that is, he separated himself from God of his own 
accord [id est, separavit semetipsum a Deo voluntaria sententia].11  
 
The judgement of hell, is in one sense, self-inflicted. To refuse communion with God 
is to refuse communion with life. To move into apostasy is to move into an empty space 
devoid of all that is good. Only through the immortal life of God can created things find 
sustenance and rest. To fully and finally reject God is to reject forever all good things. Hell, 
then, is the inevitable result of turning away from God. God does not need to inflict 
punishment directly upon those who reject him, since their chosen alienation from him, and 
the consequent loss of all good things, is itself their punishment.12 This same basic 
framework applies equally to the Devil. The Devil too is a creature like the other creatures. 
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He too is innately dependent on, and in need of, communion with God. But he rejected the 
reality of his contingency and thus became the chief apostate, the chief agitator and the first 
among God’s creatures to refuse submission to the Creator. As such, there can only be one 
end for the Devil.  
Irenaeus makes it clear that the fires of hell were created first and foremost for the 
Devil and his angels. Hell is a judgment designed for apostate angels, and only inadvertently 
for those human beings who follow after them.   
 
But the curse in all its fullness fell upon the serpent [omnis autem maledictio 
decurrit in serpentem], which had beguiled them. ‘And God’, it is declared, 
‘said to the serpent: Because you have done this, cursed are you above all 
cattle, and above all the beasts of the earth’. And this same thing does the 
Lord also say in the Gospel, to those who are found upon the left hand: 
‘Depart from me, you who are cursed, into everlasting fire, which my Father 
has prepared for the Devil and his angels’; indicating that eternal fire was not 
originally prepared for humanity, but for him who beguiled humanity and 
caused humanity to offend [significans quoniam non homini principaliter 
praeparatus est aeternus ignis, sed ei qui seduxit et offendere fecit 
hominem]—for him, I say, who is chief of the apostasy, and for those angels 
who became apostates along with him; which [fire], indeed, they too shall 
justly feel, who, like him, persevere in works of wickedness, without 
repentance, and without retracing their steps.13 
 
Yet humans, too, will fall under the Devil’s judgment if they align themselves with 
his apostasy.  The Devil, in choosing apostasy, chose his own path of destruction. Those 
who choose to follow him into his apostasy likewise follow him into destruction. 
 
It is therefore one and the same God the Father who has prepared good things 
with himself for those who desire his fellowship, and who remain in 
subjection to him; and who has prepared the eternal fire for the ringleader of 
the apostasy, the Devil, and those who revolted with him, into which [fire] the 
Lord has declared those human beings shall be sent who have been set apart 
                                                         




on his left hand [ei.j o] pemfqh,sesqai e;fh o` Ku,rioj tou.j ei.j ta. avristera. 
diakriqe,ntaj].14  
 
Yet somewhat surprisingly, as Irenaeus concludes Adversus haereses, he does not 
utilize the primary passage in Revelation that speaks of the Devil’s final destruction in 
hell—Revelation 20:7-15. This is all the more surprising since Irenaeus draws heavily upon 
Revelation 19-20 throughout book five of Adversus haereses, and largely tracks along the 
timeline of John’s apocalyptic vision. According to Revelation, the destruction of the 
Antichrist in hell (Revelation 19:11-21) is a distinct event that occurs prior to the millennial 
kingdom, and prior to the Devil’s final defeat. At the time of the Antichrist’s defeat, the 
Devil is bound with a great chain and thrown into a bottomless pit, to be kept in captivity for 
the duration of the millennial kingdom (Revelation 20:1-3). After the thousand years are 
ended, the Devil is released from prison, whereupon he gathers together an evil horde of 
humanity and leads a rebellion against the saints. Revelation 20:7-10 recounts the Devil’s 
final defeat in hell:   
 
7And when the thousand years are ended, Satan will be loosed from his 
prison 8and will come out to deceive the nations which are at the four corners 
of the earth, that is, Gog and Magog, to gather them for battle; their number 
is like the sand of the sea. 9And they marched up over the broad earth and 
surrounded the camp of the saints and the beloved city; but fire came down 
from heaven and consumed them, 10and the devil who had deceived them was 
thrown into the lake of fire and sulphur where the beast and the false prophet 
were, and they will be tormented day and night for ever and ever. 
 
Thus the Devil meets his final end. Notably, it is only after this act of divine 
judgment that John gives us a vision of the general resurrection, the great white throne 
judgment, the wedding supper of the Lamb, the Holy City descending from heaven, and the 
creation of the new heaven and the new earth (Revelation 20:11-21:27). But Irenaeus moves 
from his discussion about the defeat of the Antichrist into a lengthy defense of his chiliasm, 
and then concludes Adversus haereses with a description of the eternal age. The omission of 
Revelation 20:7-10 is striking, given that John’s vision of the Devil’s judgment would have 
served neatly as an exclamation point on the Devil’s defeat. It is impossible to know for 
certain why Irenaeus does not make use of Revelation 20:7-10, or why he does not speak 
                                                         




more definitively in his concluding chapters about the Devil’s judgment in hell. The Devil’s 
ultimate defeat in hell is portended, of course, in the destruction of the Antichrist; Irenaeus 
has recounted the defeat of the Antichrist, the Devil’s proxy, and he apparently deems this 
sufficient to underscore that the Devil is on the losing end of history.  And of course, as we 
have already seen above, Irenaeus has mentioned elsewhere in his writings that the Devil 
will be cast into the lake of fire.15 But he does not explicitly mention this event or draw from 
Revelation 20:7-10 in the last chapters of Adversus haereses. Two reasons for this omission 
present themselves.  
First, as noted in Chapter One of this thesis, Irenaeus sees strong continuity between 
the ‘times of the kingdom’ (which for Irenaeus is a literal one thousand year reign of Christ 
upon a renewed earth) and the eternal age of the new heaven and new earth. In Irenaeus’ 
retelling of the apocalypse, all judgment and destruction take place prior to the millennial 
kingdom, thus allowing for a smooth transition between the ‘times of the kingdom’ and the 
‘new heaven and the new earth’. Only a careful reading of Irenaeus allows us to see much 
distinction between these two ages. But John (rather inconveniently for Irenaeus) places the 
Devil’s final rebellion and apocalyptic defeat between the ‘times of the kingdom’ and the 
final age. This runs against the grain of Irenaeus’ seamless eschatological vision. By 
ignoring Revelation 20:7-10, and its great moment of terrestrial upheaval and divine 
judgment, Irenaeus is able to cast stronger continuity between the millennial kingdom and 
the final age.16    
Second, Adversus haereses is not written as an explication of the Devil and his 
activities. As we have seen, the Devil makes frequent appearances throughout Irenaeus’ 
work. Yet such appearances occur only insofar as the Devil is relevant for Irenaeus’s larger 
anti-Gnostic polemic. The focus of Irenaeus’ work is primarily dedicated to defending the 
Creator of the material world as the true God, and refuting the anti-materialism of the 
Gnostics. As such, Irenaeus does not find it necessary to emphasize and make explicit every 
aspect of his Devil narrative. He has already commented in passing that the Devil and his 
angels will be cast into the lake of fire. Irenaeus does not feel it is necessary to defend or 
state this point again as he details his eschatology. As we have already seen in Chapter One, 
the more pressing issue for Irenaeus as he concludes Adversus haereses is the material 
nature of his eschatological vision (against a Gnostic, quasi Platonic vision of celestial, 
disembodied bliss). 
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In any case, even if Irenaeus’ account of the Devil’s final demise is less satisfying 
than one might prefer (especially for one writing a dissertation on Irenaeus’ account of the 
Devil), the Devil is nonetheless defeated. The Devil’s final defeat in hell spells the final end 
of sin and death, and marks humanity’s ultimate redemption. The defeat of the Devil and the 
dawn of the eternal age brings with it three key aspects of Irenaeus’ soteriology—the 
redemption of humanity’s sovereignty, the redemption of humanity’s flesh, and the 
redemption of humanity’s world. Each of these three aspects of redemption is consistent 
with, and reinforces, the connection between Irenaeus’ anthropology, cosmology and his 
Devil narrative. 
   
 
III. The Restoration of Humanity’s Sovereignty  
 
God had made humanity the lords of the world, a lordship which extended over the 
angelic stewards appointed by God to help care for the earth. The first sin in Irenaeus’ 
soteriological plotline was the Devil’s envy of Adam and his refusal to submit to humanity’s 
dominion. The Devil sought to come out from under human sovereignty by tempting Adam 
and Eve to disobey God and bring about their own death. His plan, it would seem, 
succeeded. With humanity’s fall into sin and death, human dominion over God’s creation 
was compromised. The Devil then set himself up as a tyrant king, as an imposter ruler who 
claimed sovereignty for himself. In his guise as legitimate king, the Devil took humanity 
captive. Redemption then, must necessarily involve a reversal of this development, i.e. 
humanity’s release from the Devil’s grasp back into its proper position of lordship over the 
world and the angels as God originally intended.  
Again we see Irenaeus’ recapitulation theme at work. God does not step in and 
simply ‘make up’ for human failure. To rule over the angelic stewards was the task of 
humanity. Humanity forfeited this rule when it was deceived into sin by the Devil’s 
entrapment. The only way to move forward is for humanity to once again assert lordship 
over the Devil. But such a task has slipped beyond the power of mortal humanity; death has 
made human sovereignty impossible. Yet in Christ—the perfect immortal human—
humanity is able to once again establish lordship over the angelic tyrant king. Jesus is the 
stronger man who is able to overcome the ‘strong man’—a task too great for fallen 
humanity. ‘How indeed did he subdue him who was stronger than humans [i.e. the Devil], 
who not only overcame humanity, but also retained humanity under his power [quomodo 
autem eum qui adversus homines fortis erat, qui non solum vicit hominem, sed et detinebat 




quidem qui vicerat vicit], while he set free humanity who had been conquered, unless he had 
been greater than humanity who had thus been vanquished?’17 Jesus does as a human, what 
humanity was unable to do for itself. Yet the salvation that Jesus brings does not absolve 
humanity of its obligation and privilege to mature into the image of God; rather through 
Christ’s incarnation, humanity-in-Christ is at last able to do what it could not do apart from 
Christ.18 As such Jesus’ victory over the Devil is not in place of humanity’s victory, but 
rather is humanity’s victory. Irenaeus writes,  
 
But as our Lord is alone truly Master, so the Son of God is truly good and 
patient, the Word of God the Father having been made the Son of humanity. 
For he fought and conquered [luctatus est enim, et vicit]; for he was a human 
contending for the fathers [erat enim homo pro patribus certans], and 
through obedience doing away with disobedience completely: for he bound 
the strong man, and set free the weak, and endowed his own handiwork with 
salvation, by destroying sin. For he is a most holy and merciful Lord, and 
loves the human race.19 
 
Jesus was ‘a human contending for the fathers’. Through his obedience to God, Jesus 
carried humanity forward into the maturity that God had all along intended. This obedience 
was the means by which Jesus fought and conquered the Devil, showing that true human 
sovereignty is achieved and maintained, not by human power alone, but by submission to 
God. It is through reliance upon God, the proper posture of the creature, that humans are set 
free from the Devil’s captivity.  
Christ’s obedience to God re-anchored humanity back to the divine life of God, thus 
throwing off the Devil’s yoke. The apostate slave, i.e. the Devil, is returned to his rightful 
position as subordinate to humanity-in-Christ. And now that Christ has been raised from the 
dead, all of humanity-in-Christ awaits the time when Christ’s victory over the Devil will 
fully and finally become the victory of humanity-in-Christ. ‘And being raised from the dead 
and exalted at the Father’s right hand, he [Jesus] awaits the time appointed by the Father for 
the judgment, when all enemies shall be put under him. Now the enemies are all those who 
were found in apostasy, angels and archangels and powers and thrones, who despised the 
truth’.20 When the Lord returns in glory with the power of God and accompanied by the 
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elect angels, Jesus will put a final and decisive end to the Devil’s tyranny; humanity-in-
Christ will once again achieve sovereignty over the world and the angels.  
 
For it is just that . . . in the creation in which they endured servitude, they 
should reign [in ipsa regnare eos]. For God is rich in all things, and all things 
are his. It is fitting, therefore, that the creation itself, being restored to its 
primeval condition, should without restraint be under the dominion of the 
righteous [sine prohibitione servire iustis].21 
 
The righteous, having been set free from the tyranny of the Devil are ushered into 
the reward of the righteous. For Irenaeus, part of this reward is clearly the reclamation of the 
dominion of the world. What had been lost in Adam has now been regained in Christ. The 
proper order of creation is restored, namely that righteous humanity-in Christ—as the living 
image and likeness of God—sits at last in a seat of dominion over the world and the angels.  
 
 
IV. The Redemption of Humanity’s Flesh  
 
The overthrow of the Devil and the reestablishment of human sovereignty coincide 
with the redemption of humanity’s flesh. For Irenaeus, the goodness of God is at stake in the 
redemption of the whole human person—material and immaterial. Irenaeus’ God is neither 
too impotent to save, nor too malignant.22 Rather he is powerful and willing to redeem 
humanity from sin, death, and the Devil. Central to this redemption is the resurrection of 
human bodies. ‘For if he does not vivify what is mortal and does not bring back the 
corruptible to incorruption, he is not a God of power’.23 The resurrection of the body is not 
ancillary in Irenaeus’ polemic against the Gnostics. ‘Vain, therefore, and truly miserable, are 
those who do not choose to see what is so manifest and clear [i.e. the resurrection of the 
body], but shun the light of truth, blinding themselves like the tragic Oedipus’.24 The 
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Gnostic heretics who deny the resurrection of the body are denying the ‘entire dispensation 
of God’;25 though they do not realize it, the Gnostics are denying their own salvation.26  
The first twenty chapters of book five of Adversus haereses are dedicated to proving, 
exegetically and theologically, the resurrection of the body. Throughout this section, 
Irenaeus marshals a variety of arguments in support of bodily resurrection. He notes the 
logic of a material Eucharist, the fruit of Christ’s resurrected body (‘we are nourished by 
means of the creation’);27 he points to the example of Christ’s bodily incarnation28 and 
resurrection;29 he notes the Old Testament and apostolic prophetic testimony regarding 
bodily resurrection;30 he emphasizes humanity’s three-fold nature of Spirt, soul, and flesh;31 
he points to the examples of Enoch and Elijah as preludes to fleshly immortality;32 and he 
argues that Jesus’ healing ministry is best understood as a foreshadowing of ultimate 
eschatological bodily resurrection.33  
Irenaeus’ proofs are unrelenting and persuasive and show effectively that the entire 
canon of Scripture points toward a bodily resurrection.  A select passage from this section of 
Adversus haereses serves to illustrate Irenaeus’ pro-bodily polemic against the Gnostics.  
 
For the heretics, despising the handiwork of God, and not admitting the 
salvation of their flesh [et non suscipientes salutem carnis suae], while they 
also treat the promise of God contemptuously, and pass beyond God 
altogether in the sentiments they form, affirm that immediately upon their 
death they shall pass above the heavens and the demiurge, and go to the 
Mother or to that Father whom they have feigned. Those persons, therefore, 
who disallow a resurrection affecting the whole human person [universam 
reprobant resurrectionem], and as far as in them remove it from the midst [of 
the Christian scheme], how can they be wondered at, if again they know 
nothing as to the plan of the resurrection? For they do not choose to 
understand, that if these things are as they say, the Lord himself, in whom 
they profess to believe, did not rise again upon the third day; but immediately 
upon his expiring on the cross, undoubtedly departed on high, leaving his 
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body to the earth. But the case was that for three days he dwelt in the place 
where the dead were, as the prophet says concerning him . . . . This, too, 
David says when prophesying of him, ‘And Thou hast delivered my soul 
from the nethermost hell’ . . . . If, then, the Lord observed the law of the dead 
[si ergo Dominus legem mortuorum servavit], that he might become the first-
begotten from the dead, and tarried until the third day ‘in the lower parts of 
the earth’; then afterwards rising in the flesh, so that he even showed the 
print of the nails to his disciples,6 he thus ascended to the Father, how must 
these people not be put to confusion, who allege that ‘the lower parts’ refer to 
this world of ours, but that their inner person, leaving the body here, ascends 
into the super-celestial place [in supercoelestem ascendere locum]? For as 
the Lord ‘went away in the midst of the shadow of death’, where the souls of 
the dead were, yet afterwards arose in the body, and after the resurrection 
was taken up, it is manifest that the souls of his disciples also, upon whose 
account the Lord underwent these things, shall go away into the invisible 
place allotted to them by God, and there remain until the resurrection, 
awaiting that event; then receiving their bodies, and rising in perfection, that 
is bodily [et perfecte resurgentes, hoc est corporaliter], just as the Lord 
arose, they shall come thus into the presence of God [sic venient ad 
conspectum Dei].34 
 
Central to Irenaeus’ resurrection logic is the idea that humanity, insofar as it is true 
humanity, is embodied humanity. Irenaeus insists that the promised resurrection must ‘affect 
the whole human being’, thus affirming that human bodies are a necessary and substantial 
(rather than accidental) component of what it means to be human. For Irenaeus, anything 
less than a resurrected flesh would result in a subhuman humanity.35 The Gnostic account of 
the soul’s release from the prison of the body (so in vogue in Stoic and Platonic accounts) is 
not sufficient for Irenaeus as a description of salvation.  
Irenaeus dedicates Haer. 5.9-14 to a refutation of the Gnostic interpretation of 1 
Corinthians 15:50 (‘flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God’), a key Gnostic 
proof-text against the idea of bodily resurrection. For Irenaeus, the future life is the life of 
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the uncreated God, mediated to humanity by the Holy Spirit. Thus it is the Holy Spirit that 
most properly has the power to inherit the kingdom of God, not the created flesh. But this 
does not mean for Irenaeus that created flesh is incapable of participating in the Kingdom of 
God, only that the right of inheritance in the human person belongs to the Holy Spirit in that 
person. Analogously, when a wife inherits from a rich father, her husband, who is united to 
her, likewise participates in the blessing of the inheritance. But the right and power of 
inheritance comes to husband through the wife. In the same way, flesh and blood participate 
in the kingdom of God because of their union to the Holy Spirit.  
While it is true for Irenaeus that human beings can exist independent of their bodies, 
the specific referent of the imago Dei in humanity is the visible image of the incarnate, 
embodied Son; 36 which is to say, that without a human body to reflect the human body of 
the incarnate Son, human beings do not convey the imago Dei and thus fall short of what it 
means to be fully human. Irenaeus insists that disembodied existence is temporary, and that 
all human beings follow the same pattern as Jesus: Jesus died; his soul went to the place of 
the dead; he was raised bodily; he ascended to God. So too human souls, when they leave 
their bodies at death, ‘go to an invisible place allotted to them by God’ where they wait until 
the resurrection of their bodies, and then ‘rising in their entirety’, ‘come into the presence of 
God’.  
And most saliently for our purposes, God’s redemption of humanity from physical 
death is his consummate act of victory over the Devil.  
 
For if humankind, which had been made by God that it might live [si enim 
qui factus fuerat a Deo homo ut viveret], but which lost that life when it was 
injured by the serpent who had corrupted it [hic amittens vitam laesus a 
serpente qui depravaverat eum], would no longer return to life but would be 
altogether abandoned to death, God would have been overcome [victus esset 
Deus] and the serpent's wickedness would thus have prevailed over God's 
will [et superasset serpentis nequitia voluntatem Dei].37  
 
God appointed humans to be the lords of the earth. Satan, through subterfuge, had 
killed humanity and set himself up as a tyrant king. The Devil’s assault upon humanity 
struck hardest at human embodiment. This was the immediate casualty of the conflict. 
Tragically, because of physical/bodily death, the image of the incarnate Son contained 
within the human body was on its way to dissolution. Were God to abandon humans to their 
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deserved bodily death, the serpent’s wickedness would have prevailed against God’s will; 
his image on earth would have been destroyed.  
But God would not suffer the loss of his image; human bodies must be saved from 
the Devil’s assault. For Irenaeus, any soteriological account that failed to include bodily 
resurrection was a truncated and insufficient view of redemption. Ultimately then, Christ’s 
victory over the Devil needs to be understood in light of human (re)embodiment. The bodily 
resurrection of the righteous is the undoing of the Devil’s work, a putting to rights of the 
anthropological wrongs that the Devil’s tyranny and apostasy had introduced into God’s 
good created order.  
 
V. The Redemption of Humanity’s World  
 
Finally, the overthrow of the Devil results in the redemption of humanity’s world. 
The restoration of humanity’s world occurs for Irenaeus in a two-step process. We have 
already examined this in detail, so we need only touch upon the salient points briefly by way 
of reminder.38 First will come the ‘times of the kingdom’ during which the righteous dead 
are raised to live upon a renewed earth for one thousand years. This is the ‘seventh day’ of 
creation, when humanity at last enters into its rest. Here Irenaeus has in mind the present 
earth, brought forward into the maturity that God had intended for it all along. The bulk of 
Irenaeus’ eschatological vision in Adversus haereses is focused on the millennial kingdom, 
i.e. the time during which ‘the whole creation shall, according to God’s will, obtain a vast 
increase, that it may bring forth and sustain fruits’.39 Most relevant for the purpose of this 
study, Irenaeus connects the restoration of the world with the defeat of the Antichrist (and 
by extension, the defeat of the Devil). He writes,  
 
But when this Antichrist shall have devastated all things in this world, he will 
reign for three years and six months, and sit in the temple at Jerusalem; and 
then the Lord will come from heaven in the clouds, in the glory of the Father, 
sending this man and those who follow him into the lake of fire; but bringing 
in for the righteous the times of the kingdom [adducens autem iustis regni 
tempora], that is, the rest, the hallowed seventh day; and restoring to Abraham 
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the promised inheritance [et restituens Abrahae promissionem haereditatis],40 
in which kingdom the Lord declared, that ‘many coming from the east and 
from the west should sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob’.41 
 
The overthrow of the Devil’s Antichrist marks the end of the old age, and the dawn 
of the ‘hallowed seventh day’ of creation—the eschatological Sabbath rest of God that is 
realized in the millennial kingdom. During this final seventh ‘day’ of redemptive history, 
God will restore all of creation back to its pristine condition, so that humanity can live in 
harmony with the world as God had all along intended. In a subsequent passage, Irenaeus 
clarifies the connection between the defeat of the Devil and the restoration of the world. He 
writes,  
 
Inasmuch, therefore, as the opinions of certain [orthodox persons] are derived 
from heretical discourses, they are both ignorant of God’s dispensations, and 
of the mystery of the resurrection of the just, and of the kingdom which is the 
commencement of incorruption, by means of which kingdom those who shall 
be worthy are made accustomed to partake gradually of the divine nature 
[capere Deum]; and it is necessary to tell them with respect to those things, 
that it behooves the righteous first to receive the promise of the inheritance 
which God promised to the fathers, and to reign in it [et regnare in ea], when 
they rise again to behold God in this creation which is renovated, and that the 
judgment should take place afterwards. For it is just that in that very creation 
in which they toiled or were afflicted, being proved in every way by suffering, 
they should receive the reward of their suffering [recipere eos fructus 
sufferentiae]; and that in the creation in which they were slain because of their 
love to God, they should be revived again; and that in the creation in which 
they endured servitude, they should reign [in ipsa regnare eos]. For God is 
rich in all things, and all things are his. It is fitting, therefore, that the creation 
itself, being restored to its primeval condition, should without restraint be 
under the dominion of the righteous [sine prohibitione servire iustis].42 
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Irenaeus does not explicitly mention the Devil in this passage, but the Devil’s 
oppressive tyranny serves as the backdrop for Irenaeus’ comments. For Irenaeus, it is ‘just’ 
and fitting that righteous humanity should receive their reward in the very same creation 
where they had been forced to ‘endure servitude’. Ultimately, the tyranny of the Devil must 
be brought to an end in order that creation ‘should without restraint be under the dominion 
of the righteous’.  
Irenaeus’ logic here makes sense given his overall recapitulation framework. 
Redemption for Irenaeus is not bypassing God’s original plan, but rather a ‘going back’ and 
redoing what went wrong in the first place. The world had been made for humanity’s 
enjoyment and dominion. This divine design was foiled by the Devil’s rebellion and Adam 
and Eve’s subsequent sin. With the entrance of sin and death, humanity was unable to live 
into the good created world that God had made. The overthrow of the Devil undoes the 
curse and releases creation into the glory God had all along intended. 
For Irenaeus, the millennial kingdom is the ‘commencement of incorruption’ that 
flows naturally into the eternal age of the ‘new heaven and the new earth’. Both the 
millennial kingdom and the eternal age, are for Irenaeus, ages of embodiedment.43 In the 
eternal kingdom, the glory of the created world will at last achieve full flower ‘when this 
[present] fashion passes away, and humanity has been renewed, and flourishes in an 
incorruptible state, so as to preclude the possibility of becoming old, [then] there shall be the 
new heaven and the new earth, in which the new humanity shall remain, always holding 
fresh converse with God’.44  
This final creative act of God marks the dawn of the eternal age. Humanity will live 
with God, without any fear of ‘becoming old’—of regressing back toward death and sin. 
Human maturity in Christ will at last have been achieved, and human dominion over the 
world will at last have been restored. And thus will come true Irenaeus’ famous maxim: 





We have reached the conclusion of Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative. The destiny of 
humanity and humanity’s world has at last reached the maturity that God intended from the 
beginning. In the person of Christ, humanity has grown up without ‘growing old’. The good 
                                                         
43 For Irenaeus’ views on an eternal material world, see Chapter One, V. B of this 
dissertation.  




world that God made for humans has, in the end, come once again under their dominion. 
The Devil—the tyrant and false king—has been thrown down, and humanity’s throne 
restored.  
It is fitting to conclude our study of Irenaeus’ account of the Devil with the final 
words of the last chapter of Adversus haereses—words which aptly summarize the heart of 
Irenaeus’ soteriological project, and likewise clarify the place of humanity and humanity’s 
world with respect to the angels—both fallen and unfallen.  
 
John, therefore, did distinctly foresee the first ‘resurrection of the just’, and 
the inheritance in the kingdom of the earth; and what the prophets have 
prophesied concerning it harmonize [with his vision]. For the Lord also taught 
these things, when he promised that he would have the mixed cup new with 
his disciples in the kingdom. The apostle, too, has confessed that the creation 
shall be free from the bondage of corruption, [and pass] into the liberty of the 
sons of God. And in all these things, and by them all, the same God the Father 
is manifested, who fashioned humanity, and gave promise of the inheritance 
of the earth to the fathers, who brought it forth at the resurrection of the just, 
and fulfills the promises for the kingdom of his Son; subsequently bestowing 
in a paternal manner those things which neither the eye has seen, nor the ear 
has heard, nor has arisen within the heart. For there is the one Son, who 
accomplished his Father’s will; and one human race also in which the 
mysteries of God are wrought, ‘which the angels desire to look into;’ and they 
are not able to search out the wisdom of God, by means of which his 
handiwork, confirmed and incorporated with his Son, is brought to perfection; 
that his offspring, the First-begotten Word, should descend to the creature 
[descendat in facturam], that is, to what had been molded [plasma], and that it 
should be contained by him; and, on the other hand, the creature should 
contain the Word [et factura iterum capiat Verbum], and ascend to him [et 
ascendat ad eum], passing beyond the angels [supergrediens angelos], and be 
made after the image and likeness of God.45 
 
 
                                                         






‘Passing Beyond the Angels’ 
 
 
‘But God, who is rich in mercy, out of the great love with which he loved us, even when we 
were dead through our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ (by grace you have 






The burden of the forgoing thesis has been to show the strong continuity that exists 
between Irenaeus’ cosmology, anthropology, and demonology, and, more specifically, to 
show how Irenaeus’ account of the Devil undergirds and supports his overall 
anthropological and cosmological framework —a burden I hope has been faithfully carried 
forward (in the spirit of Irenaeus) on to maturity. It remains therefore to briefly summarize 
the salient points of the argument, and to note three wider implications.  
 
 
I. Summary of the Argument 
 
Irenaeus’ robust pro-material theology in the face of Gnostic anti-materialism has 
received a good deal of attention in Irenaen scholarship. This thesis has attempted to build 
upon that good work, and show how Irenaeus’ cosmology and anthropology is consistent 
with, and supported by, his account of the Devil. As the careful reader of Irenaeus will 
observe, Irenaeus is working from a storyline—a storyline drawn primarily from Scripture 
and the earlier traditions of the Christian and Jewish communities. This storyline provides 
the baseline for his theological framework—especially his anthropology, soteriology, 
cosmology, and eschatology. Specifically, my primary aim has been to show how Irenaeus’ 
account of the Devil shapes and influences Irenaeus’ storyline, and most especially the story 
he tells about humanity and humanity’s world. Irenaeus’ account of the Devil carries 
significant import for his larger project precisely because it lies at the very beginning of his 
soteriological account and thus sets in motion the trajectory of the larger narrative.  
In Irenaeus’ view, Adam and Eve were created as infants, made in the image of the 
incarnate Son of God (thus establishing human embodiment as a perpetual and 
eschatological reality for humanity) and destined to grow into the full likeness of Christ. 




given lordship over the material world. But since they were created as infants, the Devil was 
appointed by God to be a steward of the material world until such time as humanity could 
come of age and assume its proper lordship. This lordship of humanity extended not only to 
the material world, but also over the Devil and those angels under his stewardship. But the 
Devil was not content with his subordinate position with respect to humanity.  
Most significantly, Irenaeus offers us an account of the Devil’s fall in which the 
Devil was motivated by envy of humanity. The world was the prize that Adam and Eve 
possessed and that was the object of the Devil’s desire. The Devil wished to be worshipped 
as God, not by supplanting God in heaven, but by supplanting Adam on earth. In short, the 
Devil sought humanity’s throne, not Christ’s. What is more, in Irenaeus’ account, Satan was 
(at least initially) a successful usurper of Adam’s throne, rather than a failed usurper of 
Christ’s. In this account, the earth is the royal prize, not merely the battle ground. While 
Irenaeus views God and the Devil as rivals, he does so by grounding this conflict in the 
more primary contest between the Devil and humanity. The Devil became an enemy of God 
because he first became an enemy of humanity. All of this is consistent with and supports 
Irenaeus’ high anthropology, and places a strong emphasis on the material creation as 
central to the biblical narrative.  
Humanity’s loss of the world’s throne via sin and subsequent death thus sets the 
stage for the outworking of the soteriological narrative that Irenaeus tells. Not content with 
the Devil’s rebellious actions, God enters the war between the Devil and humanity on the 
side of humanity, and reclaims the world’s throne via Christ, the God-man. Through 
Christ’s faithful obedience to God, Jesus does what Adam failed to do. Christ, through his 
obedience, carries humanity forward to maturity—a maturity that is consummated and 
finalized at the Lord’s second coming and the resurrection of the dead. Humanity-in-Christ 
is thus delivered from the captivity of the Devil and is raised above the angels as God had 
all along intended.  
In short, Irenaeus offers us an anthropocentric, terrestrial eschatology that 
necessarily climaxes with the overthrow of the Devil and the re-enthronement of humanity 
upon a renewed earth. It is particularly noteworthy that for Irenaeus, the terrestrial focus of 
his redemptive narrative carries on into the new heavens and the new earth; the millennial 
kingdom is not merely a pen-ultimate and earthy transition point on the way to a strictly 
angelic, heavenly destiny. For Irenaeus, the reestablishment of human dominion over the 
world and the angels is central to Irenaeus’ soteriological narrative; it is not merely an 
accidental aspect of his soteriological account. Irenaeus’ narrative can be set in strong 
contrast with the soteriological narratives of his Gnostic opponents, which culminate in the 




salvific escape into an angelic, immaterial heaven. Likewise, Irenaeus’ basic soteriological 
account can be set in contrast with Platonized Christian accounts such as one finds a 
generation or two later in Origen, and to a lesser extent and much later, Augustine. Irenaeus, 
rather uniquely among the early Christian writers, is able to capture the terrestrial and 
anthropocentric nature of the canonical story line. This is not related solely to his account of 





The implications of Irenaeus’ account of the Devil are no doubt many, and for future 
scholarship to explore further, but my final remarks will focus on three: 1) the overall 
coherence of Irenaeus’ thought; 2) how a detailed look at the connection between Irenaeus’ 
account of the Devil and his doctrine of creation provides a fresh methodology for assessing 
the doctrine of creation found in other early Christian writers; and 3) how Irenaeus’ account 
of the Devil reaffirms the pro-terrestrial focus of the canonical storyline of the Bible. 
 
 
A. The Overall Coherence of Irenaeus’ Thought 
 
Perhaps one of the more salient implications of this thesis, specifically as it relates to 
Irenaean scholarship, is that it argues in favor of the overall coherence and intelligibility of 
his theological project. My aim has been to demonstrate consistency between Irenaeus’ 
anthropology, cosmology and his account of the Devil. But I believe this dissertation has 
also pointed in the direction of a broader internal coherence in Irenaeus’ thought.  
This is in keeping with the growing number of contemporary Irenaeus scholars (such 
as Wingren, Steenberg, and Behr)1 who have effectively argued in favor of a general 
coherent program in Irenaeus, pace interpreters such as Loofs and Benoit who have argued 
(to varying degrees) for broad incoherence in Irenaeus. The debate has swung more in favor 
of Irenaean consistency in recent years, but doubts still remain.2 While Irenaeus is certainly 
not a systematic theologian in any modern sense, he demonstrates a remarkable ability to 
                                                         
1 Wingren, Man and Incarnation; Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology; Steenberg, Irenaeus 
on Creation. See Presley, ‘The Intertextual Reception of Genesis 1-3 in Irenaeus of Lyons’, who 
effectively shows the intertextual coherence of Irenaeus’ use of scripture, and Jacobsen, ‘Importance 
of Genesis 1-3’ who shows the larger coherence between Irenaeus’ reading of the early chapters of 
Genesis and his anthropology, soteriology and eschatology.  




construct a singularly coherent soteriological narrative from beginning to end, with the end 
tying up the crises and plot dilemmas laid out at the beginning. A detailed study of Irenaeus’ 
account of the Devil highlights this narrative and compositional coherence.  
Likewise, Irenaeus’ account of the Devil reveals strong theological coherence in his 
thought. Irenaeus’ account of the Devil is freighted with insights from his Christology, 
anthropology, cosmology, and eschatology, all of which come together to form his 
soteriology. Each of these aspects of his thought has touch points with his account of the 
Devil, and they are all woven together harmoniously with each other, and the whole. 
Irenaeus’ Christology, in particular, is remarkably well developed and integrated into his 
overall pro-material posture. His prioritization of the incarnate, embodied Son (rather than 
more abstractly the non-embodied Father) as the telos of the imago Dei in humanity is 
worked out with consistency in his overall project. Certainly Irenaeus’ account of the Devil 
coheres nicely with this Christological framework; and likewise Irenaeus’ Christology fits 
neatly with his larger cosmological, anthropological, and eschatological framework. 
Contemporary standards of theological systemization are only anachronistically forced upon 
Irenaeus. But even granting these standards, Loof’s suggestion that Irenaeus was a muddled 
and careless theologian,3 or that Irenaeus is only ‘dimly aware’4 of the foundational 
inconsistency of his central ideas, is hardly deserved. Irenaeus’ account of the Devil argues 
to the contrary.  
 
 
B. A Fresh Methodology for Assessing the Doctrine of Creation 
 
Theological studies on the role of the Devil in the Christian tradition have tended to 
explore the theological subjects of theodicy and evil. Certainly this line of study is a 
historically interesting and theologically meaningful approach to the Devil. But (as noted in 
the introduction) the role of the Devil has not been explored as a way of assessing the larger 
doctrine of creation. I trust that I have demonstrated the appropriateness of such an approach 
with respect to Irenaeus. But my larger hypothesis is that a similar methodological approach 
to the study of other early Christian writers would yield similar results.  
It is my working hypothesis (one that I hope to demonstrate in future research) that a 
consistent (even if not perfect) correlation can be identified between a given early Christian 
theologian’s account of the Devil and his or her larger doctrine of creation. The decisive 
elements of Irenaeus’ account, in my estimation, are the Devil’s envy of unfallen humanity, 
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and the idea that the Devil’s fall takes place in Genesis 3 when he tempts Adam and Eve. It 
is these two elements of Irenaeus’ account of the Devil that have the most influence on his 
larger doctrine of creation. Justin, Tatian, Cyprian, Ephraim, and Tertullian are the only 
writers I have so far discovered who affirm both of these elements. Would a similar study of 
their respective doctrines of creation reveal a general pro-material, pro-anthropological 
framework that culminates in a material eschatology, such as we find in Irenaeus? My 
provisional analysis suggests this might be so, but not in every instance. In Tertullian’s case, 
the answer is almost certainly ‘no’. Tertullian embraces, for the most part, Irenaeus’ basic 
Devil narrative. But his general posture toward human embodiment and materiality is not so 
nearly as congenial as that of Irenaeus. In this case it would be rewarding to explore the 
reasons for, and the ramifications of, the way that Tertullian’s Devil narrative might differ 
from that of Irenaeus. 
On the other side, Origen and Augustine explicitly reject both of the key Irenaean 
elements regarding the Devil.  My provisional study of both theologians suggests that there 
is a correspondence between their movement away from Irenaeus’ position, and their 
embrace of Platonic anti-materialism and eschatology. The prioritization of the spiritual 
over the material, the valorization of heaven over earth, and the assumed superiority of the 
angels over humanity are all in keeping with the later Devil narrative and theologically 
consistent with basic Platonic commitments.  
 
 
C. Reaffirming the Pro-Terrestrial Focus of the Biblical Storyline  
 
While the university context does not typically encourage a Classics scholar to 
foreground the existential impulses that drive his or her scholarship, such impulses 
nonetheless exist. Objectivity is better achieved by explicitly stating these impulses, rather 
than pretending they do not exist. Toward that end, it will be helpful for the reader to know 
that the entirety of this dissertation was researched and written while serving a congregation 
in full-time pastoral ministry. The concerns and questions that have arisen out of that 
context have provided the ‘way in’ for my study of Irenaeus.5 However historically 
interesting, sociologically revealing, culturally influential, or intellectually stimulating the 
                                                         
5 Here I am persuaded by Hans-George Gadamer’s basic epistemic insight that neutrality is 
not only impossible, but undesirable. For Gadamer, it is our unavoidable prejudices that provide the 
very means by which we access a particular field of study. In fact, attempts to gain personal remove 
from the subject at hand—what Gadamer calls ‘controlled alienation’—work against our ability to 
know as we ought. ‘What kind of understanding does one achieve through ‘controlled alienation’? Is 




Christian religion may be as a matter of academic inquiry, it remains a very real source of 
hope, meaning, and purpose for (quite literally) billions of people. My study of Irenaeus was 
undertaken as a participant of this community, and was conducted with a view to servicing 
Christians who look to their faith for meaning and purpose in this life and the life to come. 
In particular, I believe Irenaeus’ account of the Devil offers the Christian community an 
inoculation against unhelpfully anti-material currents present in some streams of the 
Christian tradition.    
While Platonizing early Christians such as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, et al. are 
careful to leave a place for the body and creation, the overall effect of their synthesis tends 
to be dismissive of materiality in ways not faithful to the broad concerns of the biblical 
canon. An Augustinian-like account of the Devil enables this basic Platonic narrative, 
insofar as it sidelines humanity’s relationship with creation. Irenaeus’ account of the Devil 
resists this Platonizing direction and provides a more terrestrially focused narrative.  To the 
degree that Christian theologians are willing to work with the idea of ‘narrative’ as a 
theological category,6 Irenaeus’ account of the Devil provides ample fodder for constructing 
a soteriological narrative that does not climax in an anti-material eschatology.   
And in a remarkably biblical way, Irenaeus’ pro-material account of the Devil both 
affirms the goodness of the material world against pagan Greek philosophy, while at the 
same time it undercuts the temptation to make an idol of the good world that God has made 
(the opposite error on the other side of the sub-Christian cosmology coin). In some ways, 
Irenaeus’ strong affirmation of the material world may seem a counterintuitive way to 
combat the idolization of it. We might expect that the surer way forward is to chastise 
creation, following the route of the Platonists and the Stoics. Irenaeus is not naïve about the 
dangers of idolatry. But he would have Christians break free from idolatry not by dismissing 
God’s good creation, but rather by giving thanks for it.  
 
...all [things] have been created for the benefit of that human nature which is 
saved [pro eo qui salvatur homine facta sunt]…And therefore the creation is 
devoted to humanity [Et propter hoc conditio insumitur homini]; for humanity 
was not made for its sake, but creation for the sake of humanity. Those nations 
however, who did not of themselves raise up their eyes unto heaven, nor 
returned thanks to their Maker [neque gratias egerunt factori suo], nor wished 
to behold the light of truth, but who were like blind mice concealed in the 
                                                         




depths of ignorance, the word justly reckons ‘as a drop in the bucket, and as 
the [negligible] movement of the scales—in fact, as nothing’.7 
 
Creation has been made by a good God. It has been ‘devoted’ to humanity, and thus 
is to be enjoyed by humanity. The problem, Irenaeus tells us, is not that human beings like 
these good gifts too much, but that we have forgotten to ‘return thanks to our Maker’. 
Irenaeus here is following the logic of Paul in Romans 1:18-25, where Paul states that the 
things that are made ‘reveal God’s eternal power and divine nature’. For Paul (and 
Irenaeus), creation has an iconic function—it is a gift from God that points beyond itself to 
the giver. And as with any ‘icon’, creation derives its value and meaning from that to which 
it points, namely God. But humanity, rather than viewing creation as an icon—a spring 
board—that led to a knowledge of God, instead severed the connection between the icon and 
the Creator. Humanity fixated on the gift and lost sight of the Giver. But how did this 
breakdown occur? The answer is found in Romans 1:21, which serves as the fulcrum of 
Paul’s logic in this passage. ‘For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or 
give thanks to him’. The problem is not that humanity did not recognize the iconic nature of 
creation, but rather that humanity failed to give thanks for the icon.  
To give genuine thanks for creation is to acknowledge that there is One above and 
beyond humanity who has given it.  To give thanks for the world and our bodies necessarily 
compels us to acknowledge that the Lord is, and that he is good, and that he gives. It 
reminds us that we ourselves are not the good God, but that we stand in a posture of 
humility and need; that we are recipients of grace. Thankfulness rightly orders human self-
understanding with respect to the creation of which we are a part, and with respect to the 
God who made and gave it to us. This is why a refusal to give thanks to God for the good 
world he has given and a refusal to acknowledge the iconic nature of creation go hand in 
hand. To thankfully acknowledge creation as a good gift, is to acknowledge that there is 
necessarily a good Giver. At its core, thankfulness establishes the relationship between the 
gift, the giver and the one who is given the gift. To quote Seneca’s Thyestes, ‘When you 
look at the gift, look at the giver too’.8 It is impossible to give genuine thanks to God for the 
good things of the world while idolizing these things at the same time.  
The basic contours of Irenaeus’ Devil narrative do not encourage us to view the 
material world as a throw-away husk, a ladder to be climbed and then kicked away once we 
have reached the angelic top. Irenaeus’ pro-material account of the Devil reminds us, right 
at the beginning of the Christian soteriological narrative, that creation is a good gift, given to 
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us by a good Creator. It encourages us to view the materiality of creation as a great blessing 
that God has given to humanity, and our world as the crown jewel of all the worlds that God 
has made. Irenaeus’ Devil narrative tells us that our home is a prize so rare that one of the 
high arch-angels of heaven has waged war to possess it. It reminds us that Christ has come 
not only to save our souls, but to save our home. Indeed, to save his home, insofar as he too 










 A Brief Word Study on Invidia and Zelus 
 
 
The two most relevant Latin terms in Irenaeus’ corpus related to the Devil’s envy of 
humanity are invidia (envy) and zelus (jealousy, zeal). These terms occur with some 
frequency throughout Adversus haereses and are used regularly to explain the Devil’s 
motivation in tempting humanity. Zelus is derived from the Greek ζῆλος, and invidia is the 
common Latin term used to render φθόνος.1 In both cases, the Latin terms map tightly on to 





Invidia, and its cognates are used universally in Irenaeus in pejorative ways, 
variously associated with the Devil, Irenaeus’ Gnostic opponents, or Gnostic conceptions of 
the demiurge.3 Notably, God and the apostles are sine invidia (without envy).4 The Oxford 
Latin Dictionary lists the primary definition of invidia as ‘ill will, spite, indignation; 
                                                         
1 See the LSJ entry for φθόνος. See also Crislip, ‘Envy and Anger’, 288-94, who details the 
subtle differences between φθόνος and ζῆλος.  
2 Per LSJ, ζῆλος is ‘eager rivalry, zealous imitation, emulation, a noble passion opp. of 
φθόνος… but also jealousy’. BDAG likewise lists both positive and negative meanings. Positively 
ζῆλος is ‘intense positive interest’ (see Sophocles’ Aj. 503; Judith 9:4; Josephus, C. Ap. 2.271); 
negatively it is ‘intense negative feelings over another’s achievements or success, jealousy, envy’ 
(see Hesiod’s Op. 195; Plutarch’s Lyc. 41; Josephus’ A.I. 14). Unlike ζῆλος, φθόνος is used only 
negatively. LSJ gives the primary meaning as ‘ill-will, envy, jealousy’; BDAG as ‘envy, jealousy’ 
(see Josephus, C. Ap. 222; Philo’s Mos. 1.2; Philippians 1:15; Matthew 27:18). See Epictetus, Diatr. 
3.2, where ζῆλος and φθόνος are paired together as near synonyms. On the similarities and 
distinctions between φθόνος and ζῆλος see Trench, Synonyms of the New Testament, sec. 26. Of 
special note here is Aristotle’s distinction between φθόνος and  ζῆλος. For Aristotle, the former is 
wholly bad, while the latter has a positive connotation. For Aristotle, φθόνος is a negative emotion 
that arises from the fact that a rival has some good that the envier does not possess. Whereas with 
ζῆλος, the distress arises ‘not from the fact that another has [some good] but that the emulator does 
not (thus emulation is a good thing and characteristic of good people, while envy is bad and 
characteristic of the bad; for the former, through emulation, is making an effort to attain good things 
for himself, while the latter, through envy, tries to prevent his neighbor from having them)’, 
Aristotle, Rhet. 2.11. Crislip, in his  ‘Envy and Anger’, 290, notes that ‘In Aristotle’s thinking, it is 
important that the envier and the envied be similar in status, or at least be perceived by the envier as 
similar. For no one envies those far above them or far below them’. This observation is particularly 
noteworthy with respect to the Devil’s envy of humanity. Yet Crislip cautions against pressing the 
distinction too far. At the end of his word study, he concludes, ‘The semantics of the competitive 
emotions are generally more ambiguous in early Christian texts than Aristotle’s systematization 
would allow’, ‘On Envy and Anger’, 291. 
3 For uses of invidia in Irenaeus, see Haer. 1.23.2, 3. preface, 3.23.6, 3.25.5, 4. preface, 
4.1.2, 4.16.15, 4.38.3-4, 5.4.1, 5.25.4.  




jealousy, envy’; secondary definitions include ‘odium,’ and ‘dislike’.5 Lewis and Short 
offers ‘envy, grudge, jealousy’ as the primary meaning.6 This basic meaning of invidia is 
found throughout early Roman literature. Livy recounts how a Roman dictator, after the 
defeat and plunder of Veii, was concerned that the excessive spoils of the battle might 
arouse the envy of the gods, and thus prays that if ‘his success and that of the Roman people 
seemed excessive to any of the gods and humans, it might be permitted to the Roman people 
to appease that envy [invidia] with as little detriment as possible…’7 Likewise, Servillius 
who chastises the soldiers of the Roman General Paullus because they will not allow him a 
triumph, accuses them of envy and warns the soldiers to, ‘Take care that this action be not 
looked upon as an instance of envy [invidia] and ingratitude towards all our noblest citizens, 
copying the example of the Athenians, who persecuted their foremost men because they 
were envious [invidia] of their greatness’.8  
Consistently throughout ancient documents, invidia speaks of the resentment and 
jealousy one feels with respect to another’s prosperity. Cicero, in his Tusculan Disputations, 
suggests that the Latin invidia derives from in (into) and video (to see), and has the idea of 
‘looking too closely into another’s fortune’.9 Arguing that the wise man is free of both 
compassion and invidia, he says that ‘he who is uneasy at any one’s adversity [i.e. 
compassionate] is also uneasy at another’s prosperity [i.e. envious]’, and thus both must be 
avoided.10 Whatever one might think about Cicero’s etymological analysis, his basic 





Zelus is used with significantly less frequency than invidia in the early centuries of 
the first millennium.11 For zelus, the Oxford Latin Dictionary briefly suggests, ‘a spirit of 
                                                         
5 See OLD, 959-60.  
6 LSLD, 995-96.  
7 Livy, Ab urbe cond. 5.21.12. 
8 Livy, Ab urbe cond. 45.38.6. The allusion to the Athenians likely refers to the trial and 
execution of Socrates.   
9 Cicero, Tusc. 3.9. 
10 Cicero, Tusc. 3.9. See also 4.7.16. 
11 By way of comparison, a digital search on zelus (in the nominative singular) registers no 
hits in the Packard Humanities Institute’s (PHI) collection of Latin texts (the standard repository of 
all literary Latin texts written before AD 200), whereas invidia (in the nominative singular) registers 
473 hits. Zelus, in its various verbal and inflected forms, does make occasional appearances in the 
PHI collection. E.g., zelo in Vitruvius, Arch.7.4.4, and Pomponius Porphyrio, Comm. Hor. 1.17.24-
25.1; zelum in Hyginus, Fabulae, 199.2.3, etc. For all occurrences, see the PHI online collection at: 




rivalry or emulation; jealousy’,12 and Lewis and Short, ‘zeal, emulation’.13 Zelus is used in 
Irenaeus as a synonym for invidia. Cain, under the thrall of Satan, killed Abel cum zelo et 
malitia (with jealousy and malice),14 and the Devil purposed to turn humanity against God 
ex quo zelavit plasma Dei (because he was jealous of God’s workmanship).15  
Notably, both the Oxford Latin Dictionary and Lewis and Short do not list a positive 
meaning for zelus. However, zelus, like its Greek counterpart ζῆλος, carries both positive 
and negative meanings in Irenaeus. In Irenaeus, zelus can denote positive zeal or enthusiasm 
for God or the things of God. Irenaeus says that his teaching is motivated by, ‘the fear of 
God, and zeal for the truth’ (propter timorem erga Deum et zelum veritatis).16 And God 
himself is said to be zelans.17 Explaining the meaning of the divine pronouncement ‘I am a 
jealous God’, Irenaeus writes,  
 
It is therefore one and the same God the Father who has prepared good things 
with himself for those who desire his fellowship, and who remain in 
subjection to him; and who has the eternal fire for the ringleader of the 
apostasy, the Devil, and those who revolted with him, into which the Lord 
has declared those people shall be sent who have been set apart by 
themselves on his left hand. And this is what has been spoken by the prophet, 
‘I am a jealous God [Ego Deus zelans], making peace, and creating evil 
things’;18 thus making peace and friendship with those who repent and turn to 
him, and bringing unity, but preparing for the impenitent, those who shun the 
light, eternal fire and outer darkness, which are evils indeed to those persons 
who fall into them.19  
 
Here Irenaeus is paralleling the logic of Exodus 20:5-6, ‘You shall not bow down to 
them or serve them; for I the Lord your God am a jealous20 God, visiting the iniquity of the 
fathers upon the children to the third and the fourth generation of those who hate me, but 
                                                         
12 OLD, 2125.  
13 LSLD, 2018. 
14 Haer. 2.23.4, 3.23.4, 4.18.3. 
15 Haer. 4.40.3. 
16 Haer. 5.30.3. 
17 Haer. 4.40.1.  
18 Irenaeus here combines Exodus 20:5, ‘For I the Lord your God am a jealous God’, and 
Isaiah 45:7 ‘I form light and create darkness, I make well-being and create calamity, I am the Lord, 
who does all these things’. 
19 Haer. 4.40.1. See also Tertullian, who like Irenaeus, uses the term with reference to both 
the biblical God, and the false ‘God’ of Marcion in Marc. 2.29 and 4.21, respectively. See also the 
VUL, John 2:17 where Jesus is said to be consumed by zelus for the temple. 




showing steadfast love to thousands of those who love me and keep my commandments’.21 
The good Creator God is committed to punishing the Devil and vindicating his people. His 
‘zeal’ thus runs ardently in both directions—peace and friendship toward those who repent, 
and eternal fire for the impenitent. 
  
                                                         






Possible Influences on Irenaeus’ Account of the Devil 
 
‘Christianity commits every Christian to believing that the Devil is  
(in the long run) an ass’.1 
 
C. S. Lewis 
 
Throughout his writings Irenaeus eschews originality and speculation (not surprising 
given the creative excesses of his Gnostic interlocutors). He claims to offer his readers 
nothing original, but only what was passed on to him from earlier Christian testimony. 
Given that Irenaeus’ narrative regarding the Devil’s pre-fall identity moves beyond 
Scripture (as it must, since Scripture has little to say on the matter), we might expect him to 
make explicit his sources regarding his information about the Devil. However, Irenaeus 
nowhere tells us the source of his views regarding the Devil. This suggests that Irenaeus was 
likely drawing his account of the Devil from a narrative that was already widely at play in 
the early Christian communities. 
Here in this appendix I offer a summary of the possible influences that may have 
helped to shape Irenaeus’ view of the Devil, the Devil’s envy of humanity, angels, and the 
fall. Toward this end, this appendix is divided into six main subheadings: 1) Scripture, 2) the 





The shaping influence of Scripture is massive throughout Irenaeus’ two extant 
works. John Lawson refers to Irenaeus as self-consciously a homo unius libri2 and Gustaf 
Wingren rightly notes that any question regarding Irenaeus’ use of sources must start at 
precisely this point.3 For Irenaeus, the Scriptures are divinely inspired and perfect.4  The 
Scriptures, in so far as their origins are from God himself, serve as an ultimate authority on 
all matters of doctrine, ‘But our faith is steadfast, unfeigned, and the only true one, having 
clear proof from these Scriptures, which were interpreted in the way I have related’.5 Indeed, 
the entire Epideixis is an extended proof from Scripture. According to Irenaeus, the Gnostic 
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3 Wingren, Man and Incarnation, xix-xx.  
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opponents are wrong because they do not conform to Scripture; they either reject it outright, 
or misuse it to suit their erroneous opinions. (To this latter point, Irenaeus famously offers 
the illustration of a beautiful mosaic of a king that has been rearranged into the image of a 
dog.)6  
Irenaeus, as was common in the early Christian communities, works from the 
Septuagint, quoting it extensively throughout Adversus haereses and Epideixis.7 His 
acceptance of the Septuagint means that he likewise accepts what later came to be known as 
the Apocrypha, to include most relevantly for our study, the Wisdom of Solomon. Wisdom 
2:23-24 reads, ‘For God created man for incorruption, and made him in the image of his 
own eternity, but through the devil’s envy death entered the world, and those who belong to 
his party experience it’. Irenaeus never quotes this passage, but his general treatment of the 
Devil seems evidently indebted to it. Along with the Septuagint, Irenaeus quotes from every 
book of the New Testament, 8 except for Hebrews, James, 3 John, and Jude.9 For Irenaeus 
(in contrast to the Gnostics), there are only four Gospels—Matthew, Mark, Luke, and 
John.10  
Irenaeus’ commitment to the Old and New Testament Scriptures provide the basic 
framework for his account of the Devil. Irenaeus’ conception of the Devil’s fall, as well as 
                                                         
6 Haer. 1.8.1. Irenaeus’ illustration here introduces the complex and controversial question 
about the role of tradition in interpreting Scripture. Irenaeus throughout his writings appeals to the 
‘Rule of Faith’ or ‘Rule of Truth’—a summation of true Christian doctrine (e.g. see Haer. 4.35.4). 
Paul Parvis helpfully illustrates the relationship for Irenaeus between Scripture, tradition, and the 
‘Rule of Faith’; ‘We might say that the relation of scripture to the rule of truth is rather like the 
relation of a jigsaw puzzle to the picture on the box. The picture is not a substitute for the full puzzle, 
but it does help you make sure you are putting the pieces together properly’. See Parvis, ‘Who Was 
Irenaeus’, 20. Lawson, Biblical Theology, 53 rightly notes that Irenaeus is ‘not in the habit of 
considering the possibility of one religious authority superseding or even contradicting another’. As 
such, Irenaeus in Haer. 2.30.9 can state, ‘He it is whom the law proclaims, whom the prophets 
preach, whom Christ reveals, whom the apostles make known to us, and in whom the Church 
believes’. For more on the relationship between Scripture, tradition, and the rule of faith, see 
Osborne, Irenaeus, 145-84.   
7 Irenaeus recounts a version of the miraculous story of the Septuagint, according to which 
seventy Jewish scribes, in isolation from each other, produced seventy identical copies. See Haer. 
3.21.2. 
8 Irenaeus bases the authority of the New Testament texts on their apostolic authorship, 
rather than their presence in a not yet established canon. See Lawson, Biblical Theology, 32-33, who 
offers a helpful three stage process of canonization of the New Testament: 1) a recognition of 
inspiration in particular authors by a community, 2) over time, an axiomatic acceptance of certain 
authors as inspired, and 3) the acceptance of certain authors as inspired because they are in the holy 
book. Lawson argues that Irenaeus operates in a well-developed second stage.   
9 See Osborne, Irenaeus, 33-34. For Hebrews, see Bingham, ‘Irenaeus and Hebrews’, 65-79. 
Bingham argues that Irenaeus was aware of and employed the book of Hebrews.    
10 Haer. 3.11.9. To defend his assertion, Irenaeus offers a series of biblical/theological 
arguments for the harmony and fittingness of four (and only four) gospels in keeping with God’s 
larger pattern, to include: the four faces of the cherubim, the four corners of the earth, the four 




the temptation of humanity in the Garden of Eden, draws heavily from Genesis 1-3.11 His 
account of the wilderness temptation of Christ draws upon Matthew 4 and Luke 4.12 
Irenaeus’ account of the Devil is likewise shaped by Christ’s parables (especially the parable 
of the ‘strong man’ told by Jesus in Matthew 12, Mark 4, Luke 11).13 And Irenaeus’ 
eschatological vision of the Devil’s final demise is almost a straight restatement of what we 
find in Daniel14 and Revelation 19-20.15 Notably, Irenaeus quotes extensively from Isaiah,16 
yet never associates the Devil with the ‘Lucifer’ of Isaiah 14 (such as one finds in Origen 
and beyond).  
 
 
II. The ‘Apostolic Fathers’ 
 
The earliest body of Christian writing, often referred to as the ‘apostolic fathers’, 17 
provides a limited window into early Christian accounts of the Devil. Generally, the Devil 
does not figure prominently in this body of literature (with the exception of Hermas), and 
we find no systematic treatment of his nature, fall, or identity. Nearly all comments 
regarding the Devil are made in passing, utilizing the language of the New Testament 
(‘Satan’, ‘Devil’, ‘evil one’, ‘ruler of this age’, ‘adversary’, etc.). On the whole, Irenaeus 
generally includes, but then goes beyond, what one finds in the first-century accounts of the 
Devil.  
The extent to which Irenaeus read and digested these works is uncertain. He 
mentions Polycarp by name as someone of whom he had a personal recollection as a boy,18 
and Eusebius frequently notes Irenaeus’ association with Polycarp.19 But how aware 
Irenaeus was of Polycarp’s To the Philippians, or the Martyrdom of Polycarp, is uncertain. 
Irenaeus quotes from the Shepherd of Hermas without citation in Epid. 4, and again without 
citation in Haer. 4.20.2 (the same quotation in both instances). On the whole, Irenaeus’ 
theology seems far removed from the sort of outlook one encounters in the Shepherd of 
Hermas. Irenaeus references five books of Papias, and quotes from the fourth book in 
                                                         
11 Epid. 16; Haer. 4. preface, 4.  
12 Haer. 5.24.1. 
13 Haer. 3.18.6, 4.40.1, 5.21.3, 5.22.1. 
14 Haer. 5.25.3. 
15 Haer. 5.28-33. 
16 Haer. 5.15.1, 5.34.2, 5.35.1-2, etc.  
17 Here I am referring to the texts collected in Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers. All 
quotations, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Holmes.  
18 Haer. 3.3.4. 
19 Most notably in Hist. eccl. 5.20.4-8, where Eusebius copies en toto a letter from Irenaeus 




defense of his millenarian view (which he shared with Papias).20 Beyond the above, direct 
quotations or clear statements of dependence by Irenaeus are in short supply. Smith hears 
echoes of Barnabas, Didache, and perhaps 1 Clement.21 Robert Grant suggests an awareness 
of 1 Clement, the letters of Ignatius, Polycarp, and the Shepherd of Hermas; he excludes 2 
Clement, Didache and Barnabas.22 
Similarities between Irenaeus and the above writings can be seen with respect to two 
major areas: the identity of the Devil, and the Devil’s envy. We will examine each of these 
in turn.23  
 
 
A. The Identity of the Devil 
 
The precise identity of the Devil prior to his fall is not developed in detail in these 
authors. Yet enough mention is made of the Devil to identify him as a distinct personality, 
standing in opposition to God and Christians.24 Clement urges the Corinthians to seek 
forgiveness of the sins they had committed ‘through the prompting of the adversary [tou/ 
antike,imonou]’.25 In the Martyrdom of Polycarp, the Devil is the ‘adversary of the righteous 
race of humans’,26 and stands behind the persecution of Christians.27 Polycarp names him 
both ‘Devil’ and ‘Satan’.28 Ignatius refers to him as ‘the ruler of this age’,29 and the ‘evil 
one’30—one who was trying to persuade him to forgo martyrdom.31  Barnabas identifies 
him as the one who ‘possesses the power of this world’,32 the leader of the bad angels and 
the ‘prince of the present time of iniquity’.33 In the Shepherd of Hermas, the Devil is 
primarily presented as a tempter who tries to seduce believers to vice, and thus forfeit their 
                                                         
20 Haer. 5.33.4.  
21 Smith, Proof, 37.  
22 Grant, Irenaeus, 1, and all of ch. 4.  
23 For the standard treatment of the early Christian conceptions of the Devil, see Russell, 
Satan, 30-50.   
24 Russell, Satan, 34.  
25 1 Clem. 51.1.  
26 Mart. Pol. 17.1. 
27 Mart. Pol. 2.4-3.1. 
28 Polycarp, Phil. 7. See also Barn. 2, 18; Ignatius, Eph.13. 
29 Ignatius, Trall. 4.2, 7.1. 
30 Ignatius, Trall. 7.1. 
31 Ignatius, Rom. 17.1. 
32 Barn. 2. 




salvation;34 those who keep God’s law are those who have ‘wrestled with the Devil and 
conquered him’.35  
Little is said throughout these works regarding the Devil’s nature or fall. Is he an 
angel? Is he the serpent in Genesis 3? Did his fall occur in Eden or prior? The documents 
are silent here. The one exception is the Armenian Fragment 24 of Papias,36 which offers an 
extended account of the Devil’s fall:  
 
Heaven did not endure his earthly intentions, because it is impossible for 
light to communicate with darkness. He fell to earth, here to live; and when 
humankind came here, where he was, he did not permit them to live in 
natural passions; on the contrary he led them astray into many evils. But 
Michael and his legions, who are guardians of the world, were helping 
humankind, as Daniel learned; they gave laws and made the prophets wise. 
And all this was war against the dragon, who was setting stumbling blocks 
for humans. Then their battle extended into heaven, to Christ himself. Yet 
Christ came; and the law, which was impossible for anyone else, he fulfilled 
in his body, according to the apostle. He defeated sin and condemned Satan, 
and through his death he spread abroad his righteousness over all. As this 
occurred, the victory of Michael and his legions, the guardians of humankind, 
became complete, and the dragon could resist no more, because the death of 
Christ exposed him to ridicule and threw him to the earth—concerning which 
Christ said, ‘I saw Satan fallen from heaven like a lightning bolt’. In this 
sense the teacher understood not his first fall, but the second, which was 
through the cross’ and this did not consist of a spatial fall, as at first, but 
rather of judgment and expectation of a mighty punishment…. 
 
The fragment provides a more extended discussion of the Devil’s fall than any other 
text found in the first and early second-century Christian writers. According to the fragment, 
the Devil fell to earth from heaven prior to his temptation of Adam and Eve, due to ‘earthly 
intentions’ (an obscure and intriguing phrase), arriving on earth prior to humanity. When 
humans came to where he was, the Devil led them astray into many evils. This timeline 
coheres best with the ‘later’ Devil tradition found in Origen and Augustine. But the 
                                                         
34 Herm. 48-49. 
35 Herm. 69.6.  





fragment leaves enough unsaid—specifically with respect to the Devil’s identity and his 
motive in tempting Adam and Eve—that it is difficult to identify it firmly with one tradition 
or the other.  
Notably, the fragment is only contained in three of the seven fragment collections, 
indicating a lack of consensus among scholars regarding its authenticity.37 If the fragment 
were authentic, it would be, as far as I have been able to discover, the only Christian account 
in the first two centuries of the Devil’s fall taking place outside the Garden.  
 
  
B. The Devil’s Envy 
 
As with the identity of the Devil, the theme of the Devil’s envy is present, yet 
underdeveloped in the earliest Christian writings. The Martyrdom of Polycarp refers to the 
Devil as ‘the jealous and envious and evil one [‘o ἀnti,zhloj καὶ  ba,skanoj καὶ ponhro,j], 
the adversary of the race of the righteous’.38 The Martyrdom of Polycarp, however, does not 
expound on the cause or object of the Devil’s envy; presumably it is directed against 
humanity, but the Martyrdom is not explicit on this point.  
In a similar vein, Ignatius tells the Trallians that ‘the envy (zeloj) of the wicked one 
wars against me. Therefore I need gentleness, by which the ruler of this age is destroyed’.39 
Here ‘of the wicked one’ is added by Coxe; it is possible that Ignatius is referring to his own 
envy, or of his human opponents. Given the context, however, it seems likely that Coxe has 
glossed the passage correctly. In any event, Ignatius’ comment regarding the Devil’s envy 
stands in isolation and he does not provide further detail regarding the occasion or cause of 
the Devil’s envy. In a similarly opaque reference, Clement says that envy is the source by 
which death came into the world, likely an allusion to Wisdom 2:24.40  
These pre-Irenaean allusions to the Devil’s envy are consistent with Irenaeus’ 
account, but they are far less differentiated than Irenaeus. In particular, unlike Irenaeus, they 
do not clearly identify humanity’s exalted status over creation as the chief occasion for the 
                                                         
37 See Holmes, Apostolic Fathers, 7; Kurzinger, Papias von Hierapolis; and Norelli, Papia 
di Hierapolis.  
38 Mart. Pol. 17. 
39 Ignatius, Trall. 4. The above translation follows Coxe, ANF, vol. 1. But see Holmes, 
‘…for the envy, though not apparent to many, wages war against me all the more’. The identification 
of ‘the envy’ here is not certain, but given the contextual reference to the Devil, it seems likely a 
reference to the Devil’s envy.   
40 ‘… all follow the lusts of their evil heart, inasmuch as they have assumed that attitude of 
wicked and unrighteous jealousy (zhlon) through which, in fact, death entered into the world’, 
Clement, 1 Clem. 3.4. Both Coxe and Holmes connect this passage with Wis 2:24, and thus 




Devil’s envy. In this sense, Irenaeus’ position regarding the Devil’s envy of humanity 
incorporates, but goes beyond, what is found in the earliest Christian writings.  
In sum, while Irenaeus is clearly aware of some of the texts now known as the 
‘apostolic fathers’, direct dependence on any of them for his account of the Devil is 
impossible to prove. Smith summarizes my position: ‘All these “echoes” [of the apostolic 
fathers in Irenaeus] however, are but echoes, some of them very faint, and do not prove any 





In general, the similarities between Irenaeus and Tatian are not overt. Irenaean 
scholarship does not typically suggest a connection between the two (much less 
dependence).42 That Irenaeus knew of Tatian is evident by his mention of him as a ‘hearer of 
Justin’ who later fell into error upon Justin’s death.43 The only surviving work of Tatian is 
his Ad Graecos (cir. 165). Though general theological similarity between Irenaeus and 
Tatian is minimal, there is a measure of similarity with respect to their views of the Devil 
and the fall. Discussing the creation and fall of both the angels and humanity, Tatian writes,  
 
For the heavenly Logos, a spirit emanating from the Father and a Logos from 
the Logospower, in imitation of the Father who begat him made humanity an 
image of immortality, so that, as incorruption is with God, in like manner, 
humanity, sharing in a part of God, might have the immortal principle also.44 
The Logos, too, before the creation of humanity, was the Framer of angels. 
And each of these two orders of creatures was made free to act as it pleased, 
not having the nature of good, which again is with God alone, but is brought 
to perfection in humanity through their freedom of choice, in order that the 
bad human may be justly punished, having become depraved through his 
own fault, but the just human be deservedly praised for his virtuous deeds, 
since in the exercise of his free choice he refrained from transgressing the 
will of God. Such is the constitution of things in reference to angels and 
humans. And the power of the Logos, having in itself a faculty to foresee 
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future events, not as fated, but as taking place by the choice of free agents, 
foretold from time to time the issues of things to come; it also became a 
forbidder of wickedness by means of prohibitions, and the encomiast of those 
who remained good. And, when humans attached themselves to one who was 
more subtle (fronimwterῳ) than the rest, having regard to his being the first-
born, and declared him to be God, though he was resisting the law of God, 
then the power of the Logos excluded the beginner of the folly and his 
adherents from all fellowship with himself. And so he who was made in the 
likeness of God, since the more powerful spirit is separated from him, 
becomes mortal; but that first-begotten one through his transgression and 
ignorance becomes a demon; and they who imitated him, that is his illusions, 
are become a host of demons, and through their freedom of choice have been 
given up to their own infatuation.45 
 
Two points of similarity stand out. First, in ways that are similar to Irenaeus, Tatian 
views humanity as somehow incomplete at creation. Here Tatian does not use the language 
of infancy, such as one finds it in Irenaeus and Theophilus,46 but the idea that humanity was 
created with a need to mature is shared between all three writers. Human beings are not 
created ‘having the nature of good’ but are ‘brought to perfection’ through obedience. 
Second, and more significantly, Tatian seems to associate the Devil’s fall with his 
temptation of humanity—an idea found clearly in Irenaeus.47 Assuming that Tatian’s phrase, 
‘when humans attached themselves to the one more subtle than the rest’, is a reference to the 
Eden temptation (an assumption that has warrant based on Tatian’s use of fronimwterῳ 
(subtle), which is also used by the LXX in Genesis 3:1 to describe the serpent), the Devil’s 
fall seems to take place for Tatian within the narrative of Genesis 3 and is occasioned by his 
temptation of humanity. This would be in keeping with Irenaeus’ account.  
Yet points of difference are also present; in Tatian, Satan is referred to as ‘first-born’ 
(prwtovgonon)—an expression one does not find in Irenaeus with respect to the Devil. And 
unlike Irenaeus, for Tatian, Satan becomes a ‘δαιμόνιον’ when he falls, as do those who 
follow him. Notably, Tatian does not seem to follow the ‘watcher tradition’ account of the 
origin of demons as the offspring of fallen Angels and human women, but rather seems to 
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updated as necessary.  
46 See section VI of this chapter.  




conflate fallen angels and demons as one and the same.48 Again, it is not clear that Tatian 
intends us to understand that Satan is a demon in a technical sense, and may only intend it as 
a slur, rather than an actual statement of ontology. In any event, this is not Irenaeus’ 
customary way of speaking about the Devil.  
On the whole, the similarities between Irenaeus and Tatian are minimal. Given that 
Irenaeus views Tatian as an apostate, it is unlikely that Irenaeus would look to Tatian for 
help in matters of doctrine. In any event, any similarities between Irenaeus and Tatian are 
likely more a consequence of a general shared tradition, than of direct dependence or 





Athenagoras of Athens is an early contemporary of Irenaeus. Irenaean scholarship 
does not generally connect Athenagoras with Irenaeus. Irenaeus offers us no explicit 
indication that he is aware of, and even less, dependent on, the writings of Athenagoras. 
Athenagoras’ only extant work is his Legatio pro Christianis, an apology written on behalf 
of the Christian community in the same genre as Justin’s twin Apologies.49 A number of 
striking similarities between Athenagoras and Irenaeus with respect to the Devil present 
themselves. Three relevant passages are worth observing at length. In the first, Athenagoras, 
like Irenaeus, views the angels as ministers of the material world. He writes,  
 
Nor is our teaching in what relates to the divine nature confined to these 
points; but we recognize also a multitude of angels and ministers, whom 
God the Maker and Framer of the world distributed and appointed to their 
several posts by his Logos, to occupy themselves about the elements, and 
the heavens, and the world, and the things in it, and the goodly ordering of 
them all.50 
 
                                                         
48 Without all of Tatian’s writing, it is difficult to know how much to make of this. Justin, in 
his Dial. 79 as well as his 1 Apol. 5, conflates angels and demons. Yet in 2 Apol. 5 he clearly affirms 
the ‘watcher tradition’; angels were appointed to govern the earth, but they transgressed this 
appointment and were captivated by the love of human women. The offspring of these unions were 
demons. It’s possible that Tatian is doing something similar.  
49 According to Coxe, Athenagoras is ‘by far the most elegant, and certainly at the same time 
one of the ablest, of the early Christian Apologists’. See his introductory comments in ANF, vol. 2, 
127. The translation of Anthenagoras used throughtout is taken from ANF, vol. 2, and updated as 
necessary.  




This treatment of the angels is similar to Irenaeus’ description of the same as found 
in the opening chapters of Epideixis.51 As with Athenagoras, Irenaeus views the angels as 
appointed by God to help order the material world. A striking difference, however, is that 
Irenaeus views this ‘ministering’ function of the angels as temporary—a role occupied until 
humanity comes of age. For Irenaeus, the world belongs to humanity; angels—and most 
notably the Devil—are merely stewards of creation, tasked with a temporary administration. 
Athenagoras, in contrast, gives us no indication that he sees this role as temporary.  
This same theme is picked up again in the passage below, with additional 
commentary about a ‘power’ and a ‘spirit which is about matter’, a ‘ruler of matter and its 
forms’—references to an angelic being who functions for Athenagoras much like the Devil 
does for Irenaeus. Athenagoras writes,  
   
For, as we acknowledge a God, and a Son his Logos, and a Holy Spirit, 
united in essence,—the Father, the Son, the Spirit, because the Son is the 
Intelligence, Reason, Wisdom of the Father, and the Spirit an effluence, as 
light from fire; so also do we apprehend the existence of other powers, which 
exercise dominion about matter, and by means of it, and one in particular, 
which is hostile to God….to the good that is in God, I say, the spirit which is 
about matter, who was created by God, just as the other angels, were created 
by him, and entrusted with the control of matter and the forms of matter, is 
opposed. For this is the office of the angels,—to exercise providence for God 
over the things created and ordered by him; so that God may have the 
universal and general providence of the whole, while the particular parts are 
provided for by the angels appointed over them. Just as with humans, who 
have freedom of choice as to both virtue and vice (for you would not either 
honor the good or punish the bad, unless vice and virtue were in their own 
power; and some are diligent in the matters entrusted to them by you, and 
others faithless), so is it among the angels. Some, free agents, you will 
observe, such as they were created by God, continued in those things for 
which God had made and over which he had ordained them; but some 
outraged both the constitution of their nature and the government entrusted to 
them: namely, this ruler of matter and its various forms, and others of those 
who were placed about this first firmament (you know that we say nothing 
without witnesses, but state the things which have been declared by the 
                                                         




prophets); these fell into impure love of virgins, and were subjugated by the 
flesh, and he became negligent and wicked in the management of the things 
entrusted to him. Of these lovers of virgins, therefore, were begotten those 
who are called giants. And if something has been said by the poets, too, 
about the giants, be not surprised at this: worldly wisdom and divine differ as 
much from each other as truth and plausibility: the one is of heaven and the 
other of earth; and indeed, according to the prince of matter,—‘We know we 
oft speak lies that look like truths’.52 
 
Athenagoras again here affirms the idea that angels have been appointed by God to 
order the material world. He then goes on to speak of ‘one in particular’ who is opposed to 
God. Further into the passage Athenagoras states that this ‘power’ is ‘the spirit which is 
about matter’ and that this spirit was ‘created by God, just as the other angels’, and given 
‘control of matter and the forms of matter’. The spirit is identified as the ruler of the 
material world, and presumably the leader of the other angels also tasked with governing 
matter. Athenagoras’ description here finds some continuity with Irenaeus’ account of the 
Devil. But Athenagoras’ description of this diabolical power as ‘a spirit about matter’ casts 
the material world in a somewhat negative light.53 Athenagoras comes close here to the 
Gnostic association of the material world with an evil demiurge, and this is not an 
association Irenaeus would be comfortable making in quite these terms. For Irenaeus, the 
Devil is a steward of creation, but creation properly belongs to humanity. If anything, for 
Irenaeus, humanity—even most explicitly Jesus—is the ‘spirit about matter’. 
A strong point of similarity between Athenagoras and Irenaeus is how they read 
Genesis 6.  Significantly, and in keeping with Irenaeus, Athenagoras clearly follows the 
watcher tradition account of Genesis 6. However, he goes further than Irenaeus in his 
suggestion that the ‘ruling spirit’ himself participated in the ‘impure love of virgins’. Here 
one wonders if Athenagoras has in mind a ‘spirit’ other than Irenaeus’ Devil, or is perhaps 
conflating Christian and Jewish extra-biblical accounts of Genesis 6. Irenaeus nowhere 
explicitly denies the idea that the Devil, as a fallen angel, participated in the apostasy of 
Genesis 6; but he nowhere affirms it, either.  
As a last point of similarity, Athenagoras, like Irenaeus, refers to the demons as 
being in subjection to ‘the ruling prince’. He writes,   
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…the humans themselves, too, so far as he that made them is concerned, is 
well ordered, both by their original nature, which has one common character 
for all, and by the constitution of their bodies, which do not transgress the 
law imposed upon them, and by the termination of their lives, which remains 
equal and common to all alike; but that, according to the character peculiar to 
themselves and the operation of the ruling prince and of the demons his 
followers, they are impelled and moved in this direction or in that, 
notwithstanding that all possess in common the same original constitution 
of mind.54 
 
Here Athenagoras’ ‘ruling prince’ is the leader of ‘demons’, and is the cause of 
human sin. This manner of framing things is harmonious with Irenaeus, who likewise sees 
the Devil as a ruler of fallen angels and demons.  
Notably, Athenagoras nowhere mentions the ‘Devil’ as such, nor does he use 
Irenaeus’ other customary names for the Devil (e.g. serpent, Satan, adversary, dragon, 
strong man). But this may be due to the nature of Athenagoras’ work, which was addressed 
to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, and intentionally styled as a work of philosophy (much 
more beholding to Platonic categories than one finds in Justin, for instance). In this vein, 
Athenagoras does not use the names ‘Christ’ or ‘Jesus’ to refer to the Son, but rather 
‘Logos’, a term more familiar to the Platonic tradition. It is possible that Athenagoras, for 
similar reasons, avoids using more explicitly Christian names for the Devil, but nonetheless 
has the Christian Devil in view.  
In any event, it is possible to see both similarities and differences between Irenaeus 
and Athenagoras with respect to the Devil. The differences are significant enough that 
arguments for direct dependence are ill-founded. Yet a shared—albeit differing—account of 
the watcher tradition, as well as the idea that angels were appointed to govern the material 
world, suggest a common touch point for both Irenaeus and Athenagoras.   
 
 
V. Justin Martyr 
 
Justin Martyr was one of the earliest Christian apologists.55  His three extant works, 
1 Apology, 2 Apology, and his Dialogue with Trypho, make him one of the most substantial 
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55 A standard work on Justin is Barnard’s Justin Martyr; for biographical details, see 1-13. 




of the earliest Christian writers in the second century.56  Justin was born in Samaria around 
100 AD. He traveled to Rome around 150, and composed 1 Apology around 152-54—an 
extended defense of Christianity against both paganism and Judaism. Throughout 1 Apology 
he argues that Christianity is the truest expression (and ultimate source) of all that is good in 
the best of Greek and Jewish thought. His much shorter 2 Apology, composed between 154-
60, was written as a defense of Christians in the face of pagan state persecution. His 
Dialogue was likely written around 160, and offers the reader an extensive look into the way 
Justin viewed Christianity’s relationship with second-century Judaism. Justin was martyred 
between 163-67. Throughout his works, Justin makes frequent mention of demons, the 
Devil, and the fallen angels.  
There is general agreement among Irenaeus and Justin scholars that Irenaeus was, at 
the very least, conversant with Justin’s corpus.  Notably, entire passages of Irenaeus can be 
set in parallel with the works of Justin. The way Irenaeus reads scriptural texts, as well as 
the texts he quotes, likewise coheres largely with Justin. Smith notes that Irenaeus not only 
repeats the exegesis of Justin, but even some of the same wording.57 Slusser suggests that 
Irenaeus may have known Justin personally.58 Barnard, going further than the evidence can 
likely bear, refers to Irenaeus as Justin’s pupil.59 Grant maintains that Irenaeus, in his 
Adversus haereses, relied primarily on Justin’s lost treatise, Adversus Marcionem, and was 
seeking to uphold the tradition of the Roman church as reported by Justin.60 Robinson 
argues for dependence based upon strong similarities between Irenaeus and Justin with 
respect to their treatment of the Jewish prophets.61 Likewise, Robinson, in a close reading of 
Justin and Irenaeus regarding their respective views on the Holy Spirit, argues that Irenaeus 
                                                         
56 The extant authentic works of Justin are generally agreed to be the two Apologies (cir. 151 
AD), the Dialogue (cir.  160), and the four fragments. Barnard states that Harnack, in his Geschichte 
der altchristlichen Literatur, I, 99-114, offers ‘overwhelming and conclusive’ evidence against 
accepting any works by Justin beyond the above. Barnard, Justin Martyr, 172. For comments on the 
fragments attributed to Justin, see Robert Grant, ‘The Fragments of the Greek Apologists and 
Irenaeus’. Eusebius lists, in addition to the 1 and 2 Apologies and the Dialogue,  A First and Second 
Defense of Our Faith, Against the Greeks, A Refutation, The Sovereignty of God, Songs for the 
Harp, and On the Soul—none of which are extant. See Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 4.18. The non-authentic 
extant works associated with Justin’s name are generally considered no later than third-century. See 
ANF, vol. 1, 161.  
57 Smith, Proof, 37. See also Hitchcock, ‘The Apostolic Preaching of Irenaeus’, 284-89.  
58 Slusser, ‘How Much Did Irenaeus Learn From Justin?’. So also Smith, ‘It seems not 
improbable that Irenaeus knew Justin personally at Rome, and it is certain he knew his works and 
was influenced by them’. See Proof, 37. 
59 Barnard, Justin Martyr, 12-13.  
60 Grant, Irenaeus of Lyon, 11. See also 1, 7.  
61 Robinson, St Irenaeus, 6-14. Robinson highlights nine points of continuity between 
Irenaeus and Justin. ‘These repeated coincidences, in large matters and in small, make us feel that 
Irenaeus was very familiar with Justin’s writings. Everywhere he goes beyond him: but again 




drew heavily from Justin.62 Smith summarizes the consensus when he writes, ‘The 
dependence of Irenaeus on Justin has commonly been regarded as evident and extensive’.63 
On the whole, the case for dependence is strong, but not conclusive. Irenaeus himself 
only mentions Justin three times: once as the master of Tatian, a second time as the author 
of the now lost Adversus Marcionem, and a third time with reference to Justin’s view on 
Satan64 (a point of interest to which we will return below). But nowhere does Irenaeus say 
that he has read all of Justin’s works, nor that he is dependent upon Justin. While generally 
sympathetic to the thesis that Irenaeus was dependent on Justin, I here agree with the 
caution of Smith, ‘It may well be admitted that direct dependence of Irenaeus on Justin 
cannot be shown to have been so extensive as it has been thought to be’. 65  
In any event, our primary concern regarding Irenaeus’ connection to Justin relates to 
their respective views of the Devil and the fall. Whatever the relationship between the two, 
notable similarities can be observed at this point. In what follows, I highlight those points of 
similarity that relate to my thesis, focusing on a number of relevant themes from Justin’s 
twin Apologies, as well as his Dialogue with Trypho I conclude by noting the differences 
between Irenaeus and Justin as they relate to my central themes.  
 
 
A. Angels as Overseers of Creation and Humanity  
 
In Justin’s 2 Apology, he clarifies the role of the angels vis-à-vis creation. For Justin, 
though the world is subject to humanity, the angels are appointed as overseers to care for 
both creation and humanity. He writes,    
 
God, when he had made the whole world, and subjected things earthly to 
humanity, and arranged the heavenly elements for the increase of fruits and 
rotation of the seasons, and appointed this divine law—for these things also 
he evidently made for humanity—committed the care of humanity and of all 
things under heaven to angels [th.n me.n tw/n avnqrwp,wn kai. twn u`po to.n 
                                                         
62 Robinson, St. Irenaeus, 25. See all of 25-68.  
63 Smith, Proof, 37.  
64 See respectively, Haer. 1.28.1, 4.6.2, and 5.26.2. Cf. Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 4.18.  
65 Smith, Proof, 38. Smith properly observes that there are notable differences between 
Irenaeus and Justin that may be better explained by the use of a common source book. See also 
Loofs, Theophilus von Antiochien, 5. For an overview of recent trends in Justin scholarship, see 




ouvrano.n πρόνοιan avgge,loij] whom he appointed over them [ou]j èpì to,utoij 
e;taxe pare,dwken].66  
 
God has made the world and indeed all things for humanity. Yet both humanity and 
the world are placed under the care of the angels. Presumably, the angels are to help creation 
and humanity function in the way that God intended. This idea of angels as overseers is also 
found in Irenaeus.67 A notable difference, however, is the extent of this angelic stewardship. 
For Irenaeus, the angels—with Satan as chief steward among them—are to watch over 
humanity until such time as humanity comes to maturity and is able to manage creation on 
their own.68 Justin, however, makes no mention—here or elsewhere—of the need for human 
maturation. Thus it is not clear whether Justin views this angelic stewardship as permanent 
or as temporary. Further, Justin nowhere states (as does Irenaeus)69 that the Devil is one of 
these angelic overseers. 
 
 
B. Affirmation of the Watcher Tradition 
 
In the same passage, Justin explains why it is that Christians are oppressed and 
persecuted by the wicked. Reaching back to Genesis 6, Justin links evil to the fallen angels 
and their demonic offspring. He writes,  
 
But the angels transgressed this appointment, and were captivated by love of 
women, and begat children who are those that are called demons [dai,monej]; 
and besides, they afterwards subdued the human race to themselves, partly by 
magical writings, and partly by fears and the punishments they occasioned, 
and partly by teaching them to offer sacrifices, and incense, and libations, of 
which things they stood in need after they were enslaved by lustful passions; 
and among humanity they sowed murders, wars, adulteries, intemperate 
deeds, and all wickedness. Whence also the poets and mythologists, not 
knowing that it was the angels [avgge,louj] and those demons [dai,monaj] who 
had been begotten [gennhqe,ntaj] by them that did these things to men, and 
women, and cities, and nations, which they related, ascribed them to God 
                                                         
66 2 Apol. 5. The English translation of  Justin throughout this section is drawn from ANF, 
vol. 1, which I have revised and updated as necessary. The Greek is drawn from PG, vol. 6.  
67 See Epid. 10-11. 
68 See Epid. 12, Haer. 4.11.1-2, 4.38. 




himself, and to those who were accounted to be his very offspring, and to the 
offspring of those who were called his brothers, Neptune and Pluto, and to 
the children again of these their offspring.70  
 
Here Justin—in the main—works from the ‘watcher tradition’ narrative regarding 
the role of the angels in creation, and their fall (the first of the extant Christian writers to do 
so).71 Justin views creation as made for humanity. The angels, for their part, are to exercise 
care over creation and humanity. The angels, however, transgressed this appointment and 
became captivated by love for human women and begot children through them. The 
offspring of these unions are demons—the same demons now plaguing humanity and 
fueling the persecution of Christians.72 
The only other place where Justin speaks of the fall of the angels is Dial. 45. There 
he speaks of ‘the serpent that sinned from the beginning [o` ponhreusa,menoj th.n avrcg.n 
o;fij], and the angels like him [kai. οἱ evxomoiwqe,ntej αὐτῷ a;ggeloi]. Justin here seems to 
distinguish between the sin of the Devil (which came first) and the sin of the angels (which 
followed). However, the phrase is sufficiently vague in order to render a more precise 
interpretation difficult.  
Based on these texts, it appears that Justin views the fall of the angels as taking place 
in Genesis 6, as an event distinct from the fall of the Devil.73 In any case, Justin is clearly 
following the watcher tradition, and thus—in keeping with that tradition—posits an 
ontological distinction between fallen angels and demons. Justin’s use of the watcher 
tradition, as well as his distinction between angels and demons, is consistent with Irenaeus.74 
 
                                                         
70 2 Apol. 5. Note, however, that in 1 Apol. 5 and Dial. 79, Justin is less clear about the 
distinction between angels and demons, seeming in both instances to conflate the two. His comments 
in both passages, however, are less precise than what we find above.  
71 Russell comments, ‘Justin was original in combining this late Jewish doctrine of the 
angels of the nations with the apocalyptic idea of the Watcher angels who sinned through lust’. See 
his Satan, 64.   
72 Barnard notes that Justin substitutes demons for giants, and suggests that Justin is 
following a ‘line of interpretation that may be reflected in Papias’s reference to “the angels which 
had formerly been holy” (Frag. 4)’. See his commentary Justin Martyr: First and Second Apologies, 
190.  However, the fact that Justin replaces demons for giants may be nothing more than a matter of 
emphasis. In the watcher tradition, demons are the disembodied spirits of the giants that were killed 
in the flood. Justin may here be simply skipping past the demons’ ‘giant’ phase insofar as he seems 
generally more concerned with the role of demons in the present.  
73 See Russell, who agrees. ‘Justin was unclear about the nature of [the angels’] sin, but he 
leaned strongly to the theory of the lustful Watchers. He was also uncertain about whether Satan 
induced the angels to fall, or whether they sinned on their own; in any event they followed the 
Devil’s example and their fall assimilated him so that they came to share in his evil labors’. Satan, 
65-66.  




C. The Devil Is (Likely) a Wicked Angel 
 
Justin is not explicit regarding the ontology of the Devil, yet his comments in Dial. 
79 suggest he likely views the Devil as a fallen angel. As the Dialogue progresses, Trypho 
takes offense that Justin has spoken despairingly of the angels [a;ggeloi]. Justin is then 
burdened to prove from Scripture that evil angels do in fact exist. To make his case, Justin 
references Isaiah’s statement that the Egyptian princes [avrko,ntwn] in Isaiah 30:1-5 are ‘evil 
angels’ [ἄγγελοι πονηροί ],75 Zechariah’s vision of the Devil [dia,boloj] in Zechariah 3:1, the 
account of the Devil [dia,boloj] in Job 1:6, and the serpent’s [ὄφιv] beguiling of Eve in 
Genesis 3. For Justin, scriptural texts that reference the Devil are sufficient to demonstrate 
the existence of evil angels. The line of reasoning is indirect, but it does suggest that Justin 
views Satan as an evil angel. 
The picture is made more complicated, however, by Justin’s closing comment in the 
chapter. He concludes his scriptural argumentation by drawing upon Psalm 96:5. ‘And you 
are aware that David said, “The gods of the nations are demons [δαιμόνια]”’.76 As we have 
already seen, Justin follows the watcher tradition’s ontological distinction between angels 
and demons.77 Thus the introduction of δαιμόνια into his line of argumentation regarding the 
existence of wicked a;ggeloi may indicate that Justin is not concerned here to prove the 
existence of wicked a;ggeloi per se, but rather only concerned to prove the existence of 
wicked spirits—either a;ggeloi or δαιμόνια. If so, the fact that Justin has linked Satan to the 
evil a;ggeloi should not be pressed too far. As clear statements elsewhere in Justin are 
absent regarding the exact ontology of the Devil, his comments in Dial. 79 are suggestive, 







                                                         
75 See also Dial. 124, where Justin refers to Satan as one of the fallen ‘princes’ [avrko,ntwn]. 
Joost Smit Sibinga argues that Justin’s Bible is an early Greek text that most likely represents a 
recension of the LXX typically used by Jews between 70 and 135 A.D. See his The Old Testament 
Text of Justin Martyr, 21. 
76 Dial. 79. The Hebrew reads ים  .’commonly rendered ‘worthless idols ,ֱאִליִלִ֑
77 2 Apol. 5. The amount of time between the Apologies (cir. 151-155 AD) and the Dialogue 
(cir. 160), does not favor the idea that Justin’s comments in Dial. 79 reflect development beyond his 
clear affirmation of the ‘watcher tradition’ found in his 2 Apology.  




D. The Devil Is Linked to the Serpent in the Garden 
 
Justin links the Devil to the serpent in the garden.79 His comments along these lines 
are numerous throughout his works, especially in his Dialogue. ‘For among us the prince of 
the demons [daimo,nwn] is called the serpent [ὄφις], and Satan [Satanᾶj], and the devil 
[dia,boloj], as you can learn by looking into our writings’.80  
And again, speaking of Christ’s temptation in the wilderness, ‘For when he [Christ] 
became human, as I previously remarked, the Devil [dia,boloj] came to him—i.e. that power 
which is called the serpent [ὄφις] and Satan [Satanᾶj]—tempting him, and striving to effect 
his downfall by asking him to worship him’.81  
All of this is consistent with Irenaeus.82 But unlike Irenaeus, Justin nowhere offers 
us an explanation as to the exact relationship between the serpent and the Devil. Assuming 
that Justin views the Devil as a fallen angel, in what way then, are the Devil and the serpent 
related? Did the Devil possess the serpent and use it as a disguise (as Irenaeus suggests)?83 
Or does the Devil adopt the form of the serpent—a sort of transmorphing? Justin does not 
say.   
 
 
E. The Devil’s Fall Is Linked to His Temptation of Eve 
 
In Justin’s conversation with Trypho, Justin comments to the effect that Christians are 
children of God. This causes consternation with Trypho, and so Justin quotes a portion of 
Psalm 82 for support, after which he adds his own commentary. ‘I said, “You are gods, and 
are all children of the Most High. But you shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes 
[kai. w]j eivj tw/n avrko,ntwn pi.ptete]”. Arise, O God! Judge the earth, for You shall inherit 
all nations’.84 Justin then provides the following commentary,  
 
                                                         
79 Kelly, ‘Adam Citings’, argues that Justin is the first to associate Satan with the serpent. 
This is true if one looks beyond scripture. But Revelation 12:4 points in this direction by referring to 
Satan as ‘that ancient serpent, who is called the devil and Satan, the deceiver of the whole world’.  
80 1 Apol. 28. Notably, Justin here tacitly suggests a certain commonality among the 
Christians regarding their view of Satan. For Justin, the Christian view of Satan is sufficiently 
unified that he can say ‘among us’, and ‘as you can learn by looking into our writings’.  
81 Dial. 125. See also Dial. 39, 45, 79, 88, 103.  
82 Haer. preface.4; Epid. 16.  
83 Haer. preface.4; Epid. 16. 




But in the version of the Seventy it is written, ‘Behold, you die like men, and 
fall like one of the princes’, in order to manifest the disobedience of 
humans,—I mean of Adam and Eve,—and the fall of one of the princes, 
namely the one called the serpent [ὄφewj], who fell with a great overthrow, 
because he deceived Eve’ [dia. to. avpoplanhsai th.n Eu;an].85  
 
Justin here makes a causal connection between the fall of the Devil and his deception 
of Eve. Justin’s purpose in quoting the Psalm relates primarily to the fall of humanity—not 
the Devil. As such, he offers us here no additional commentary regarding the timing of the 
Devil’s fall. But what he does say is unambiguous. For Justin, the Devil’s fall does not take 
place prior to the start of the biblical narrative, but rather occurs within the biblical narrative 
and is due to his deception of Eve. Notably, the Devil’s fall is distinct from the fall of the 
angels.  
Only on one other occasion does Justin make an oblique reference to the timing of 
the Devil’s fall. He writes of ‘the serpent that sinned from the beginning [o` ponhreusa,menoj 
th.n avrcg.n o;fij]’.86 Given his more explicit comments in Dial. 124, Justin’s reference to th.n 
avrcg.n likely refers to the beginning of the biblical narrative—namely Genesis 3 and the 
temptation of Adam and Eve.87 On the whole, Justin is economical in his commentary 
regarding the timing of the Devil’s fall. Yet his statements are consistent with what we see 




F. The Devil and the Wicked Angels Are the Chief Objects of God’s Wrath 
 
Throughout his works, Justin makes it clear that God’s judgment is directed first 
toward the Devil, the demons, and the wicked angels—not fundamentally toward humanity. 
Justin writes, ‘But when the Lord appeared, and the Devil clearly understood that eternal 
fire was laid up and prepared for him and his angels, he then began to plot without ceasing 
against the faithful, being desirous to have many companions in his apostasy, that he might 
                                                         
85 Dial. 124. Irenaeus likewise deploys Psalm 82 to speak of the fall of humanity into 
mortality and death, though he does not extend his use of the Psalm to include the phrase, ‘fall like 
one of the princes’. See Haer. 3.19.1, 4.38.4.  Daniélou also links Justin and Irenaeus (and Papias) at 
this point. See SC, vol. 188 no. 50.  
86 Dial. 45.  
87 Irenaeus likewise speaks of the Devil obtaining dominion over us ‘at the beginning’ 
(initio), Haer. 5.1.  




not by himself endure the shame of condemnation, comforting himself by this cold and 
malicious consolation’.89 Condemnation looms on the horizon of the Devil’s future. The 
Devil, not wishing to fall under God’s judgment alone, seduces humanity into his own 
demise. And again, emphasizing that God’s wrath is directed primarily toward the serpent 
and ‘the angels like him’, he states,   
 
Since those who did that which is universally, naturally, and eternally good 
are pleasing to God, they shall be saved through this Christ…in order that, by 
this dispensation, the serpent that sinned from the beginning, and the angels 
like him, may be destroyed, and that death may be contemned, and forever 
quit, at the second coming of the Christ himself, those who believe in him 
and live acceptably,—and be no more.90  
 
For Justin, the point of Christ’s coming was to undo the work of the serpent and 
demons—to save humanity from death and restore the children of God to immortality.91 The 
salient point here is that for Justin, humans—even after their disobedience and fall—are not 
the primary objects of divine wrath. Only insofar as human beings reject the salvation 
offered by God in Christ, and thus align themselves with the Devil, do they likewise fall 




G. The Devil Is Ignorant of His Doom Until the Incarnation 
  
In two fragments, one from Irenaeus and another from the writings of John of 
Antioch, Justin maintains that the Devil was ignorant of his doom until the coming of 
Christ.94 In the Irenaeus fragment Justin states,  
                                                         
89 Fragment 4, from the writings of John of Antioch, also quoted by Irenaeus in Haer. 
5.26.2. 
90 Dial. 45. See also Dial. 100. See also 1 Apol. 28.  
91 Justin’s focus in his 1 and 2 Apology tends to focus mostly on divine deliverance from 
demons—not Satan. In any case, the point remains that it is not humans that are the primary object 
of God’s judgment.  
92 For more here see Barnard, Justin Martyr, 122-25.  
93 See Haer. 3.23.3, in which Irenaeus says that hell was originally prepared for Satan, and 
not humanity. Likewise God, in Eden, pronounced no curse against humanity, but rather against the 
earth; Satan, however, was cursed directly.  
94 ANF vol. 1, 294-302, contains an extended fragmentary work on the resurrection, plus an 
additional 19 fragments that have, at various points, been attributed to Justin. Barnard follows 





Before the Lord's appearance Satan never dared to blaspheme God, inasmuch 
as he did not yet know his own sentence, because it was contained in 
parables and allegories; but that after the Lord's appearance, when he had 
clearly ascertained from the words of Christ and his apostles that eternal fire 
has been prepared for him as he apostatized from God of his own free-will, 
and likewise for all who unrepentant continue in the apostasy, he now 
blasphemes, by means of such people, the Lord who brings judgment [upon 
him] as being already condemned, and imputes the guilt of his apostasy to his 
Maker, not to his own voluntary disposition.95 
 
 And in a passage that closely parallels the above, we find the following in the 
writing of John of Antioch,  
 
Before the advent of the Lord, the Devil did not so plainly know the measure 
of his own punishment, inasmuch as the divine prophets had but 
enigmatically announced it; as, for instance, Isaiah, who in the person of the 
Assyrian tragically revealed the course to be followed against the Devil.96 
But when the Lord appeared, and the Devil clearly understood that eternal 
fire was laid up and prepared for him and his angels, he then began to plot 
without ceasing against the faithful, being desirous to have many companions 
in his apostasy, that he might not by himself endure the shame of 
condemnation, comforting himself by this cold and malicious consolation.97 
 
The two fragments differ at certain points, but both affirm the idea that Satan was 
ignorant of his doom until Christ; what the prophets foretold enigmatically, Christ makes 
known clearly. This revelation results in a deepening of the Devil’s apostasy. In the Irenaeus 
                                                         
Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, I, 99-114. As is the case with other ancient fragments, it can 
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summarizing of his thoughts. Likewise it is difficult to know where the quotations end and the 
primary author picks up again. For arguments in favor of the four ‘authentic’ fragments (two of 
which contain comments about the Devil and are noted below), see R. M. Grant, ‘The Fragments of 
the Greek Apologists and Irenaeus’, 182-88.  
95 Fragment from Irenaeus, Haer. 5.26.2. 
96 The reference here to Isaiah is intriguing, though unspecified. Likely Justin is referencing 
Isaiah 10:12-32, where the judgment of God is decreed against Assyria. In any case, the reference is 
not to Isaiah 14, and the king of Babylon—a passage that later became commonly understood as 
referring to the fall of Devil.  




fragment, the Devil restrains his open blasphemy against the Lord, supposing that somehow 
he might escape divine retribution through subterfuge.98 But once his ultimate demise is 
made plain, he throws off all restraint and blasphemes the Lord openly. In the John of 
Antioch fragment, knowledge of the Devil’s pending judgment causes the Devil to work 
more aggressively at enfolding the Christians into his doom.  Obviously, Irenaeus is 
sympathetic with Justin at this point, insofar as he quotes approvingly from Justin to this 
effect.99 Notably though, Irenaeus does not here claim dependence on Justin for this 
perspective. Instead Irenaeus, in a rhetorical fashion, seems to use Justin as evidence that 
Irenaeus’ own position is correct. 
 
 
H. Mary’s Victory Recapitulates Eve’s Defeat 
 
Justin, like Irenaeus, views the overthrow of the Devil as a recapitulation of 
humanity’s first defeat in the Garden of Eden.100 In his Christological interpretation of 
Psalm 22, Justin makes a connection between Eve and Mary. Just as the Devil overthrew 
humanity by deceiving Eve, Christ overthrows the Devil through Mary’s obedience. He 
writes,  
 
…and that he [Christ] became man by the Virgin, in order that the 
disobedience which proceeded from the serpent might receive its destruction 
in the same manner in which it derived its origin. For Eve, who was a virgin 
and undefiled, having conceived the word of the serpent, brought forth 
disobedience and death. But the Virgin Mary received faith and joy, when the 
angel Gabriel announced the good tidings to her that the Spirit of the Lord 
would come upon her, and the power of the Highest would overshadow 
her: wherefore also the Holy Thing begotten of her is the Son of God; and 
she replied, ‘Be it unto me according to thy word.’ And by her has he been 
born, to whom we have proved so many Scriptures refer, and by whom God 
destroys both the serpent and those angels and humans who are like him; but 
                                                         
98 See Irenaeus’ comments leading into the quote from Justin, ‘For he [i.e. the Devil] did not 
venture to blaspheme his Lord openly of himself; as also in the beginning he led humanity astray 
through the instrumentality of the serpent, concealing himself as it were from God’. Haer. 5.26.2. 
99 Yet differences are notable; Irenaeus’ fragment makes the interesting comment that the 
Devil post-incarnation tries to impute the guilt of his apostasy to God, rather than himself. 
100 Justin does not here use avnkefalai,wsij, (‘recapitulation’), but the concept, such as we 




works deliverance from death to those who repent of their wickedness and 
believe upon him.101  
  
 Here Justin highlights two distinct parallels between Eve and Mary; both were 
virgins, and both received angelic ‘words’ (in Eve’s case the angelic word came through the 
serpent). But whereas Eve doubted the word of God and was thus overthrown by the 
serpent, Mary believed the word of God and brought forth the savior of the world. This 
same basic connection between Eve and Mary is found consistently in Irenaeus.102  
  
 
I. ‘Satan’ Is a Hebrew Compound Word for ‘Apostate Serpent’ 
 
In one of the more striking similarities between Irenaeus and Justin, Justin 
incorrectly interprets the name ‘Satan’ to be a Hebrew compound name meaning, ‘apostate 
serpent’. Again, interpreting Psalm 22, Justin writes,  
 
Or he [the psalmist] meant the Devil by the lion roaring against him: whom 
Moses calls the serpent, but in Job and Zechariah he is called the Devil, and 
by Jesus is addressed as Satan, showing that a compounded name was 
acquired by him from the deeds which he performed. For ‘Sata' in the Jewish 
and Syrian tongue means apostate [avposta,thj]; and ‘Nas' is the word from 
which he is called by interpretation the serpent [o[fij], according to the 
interpretation of the Hebrew term, from both of which there arises the single 
word Satanas [Satana/j].103    
 
 Contrary to Justin’s claim, the etymology of ָשָטן (satan) is not ‘apostate’, but rather 
‘adversary’. Justin (or his source for this idea) has here almost certainly confused ָשָטן 
(adversary) with  ָשָטה (deviate).104 Irenaeus, in Haer. 5.21.2 and Epid. 16, offers us the same 
flawed etymology.105  That both Justin and Irenaeus arrive at the same wrong conclusion 
                                                         
101 Dial. 100.4-5.  
102 See Haer. 3.21.10, 3.22.4, 5.19.1; Epid. 33. This same connection is found in Tertullian, 
Carn. Chri. 17.  
103 Dial. 103. See also 125, where Justin refers to Satan as the serpent, and as one who 
became an avposta,thj (apostate) from the will of God.  
104 See Smith, Proof, 153. 
105 Hitchcock believes that by the time Irenaeus wrote Epidixeis he had discovered the 




regarding the etymology of ‘Satan’ must be more than a striking coincidence. But whether 
they are both drawing upon a common lost source or whether Irenaeus is following Justin 
directly cannot be determined with certainty.106  
 
 
J. Three Points of Difference between Justin and Irenaeus 
 
At no point do Justin and Irenaeus make contradictory statements regarding the 
Devil’s identity, aims, etc. As such, the differences between Justin and Irenaeus with respect 
to the Devil tend to be differences of omission, rather than proper disagreements. These 
differences of omission can be grouped into three broad categories: Justin’s exegesis of key 
Old Testament texts, his view of the pagan myths and deities, and his silence regarding the 
Devil’s envy. We examine each in turn.  
 
 
1. Typological Interpretations of Satan  
 
Justin, in a manner not uncommon in early Christian exegesis, interprets ‘Leviathan’ 
as a reference to Satan.107 Arguing that Old Testament narratives are to be understood 
typologically, Justin observes, ‘Shall it be thought, then, that the serpent saved the people at 
that time; the serpent which, as I pointed out, God cursed at the beginning and slew with a 
great sword, as Isaiah testifies?’108 Justin’s reference here is to Isaiah 27:1, ‘In that day the 
Lord with his hard and great and strong sword will punish Leviathan the fleeing serpent, 
Leviathan the twisting serpent, and he will slay the dragon that is in the sea’.109  
 In another typological interpretation, Justin views the serpent on the pole as a sign of 
the Crucified One who would cause the Devil’s defeat. Justin writes,  
 
                                                         
according to Smith, ‘The rendering “Widersacher” [adversary] given in EP* [i.e. editio princeps of 
Epid.] misled Hitchcock…into thinking that Irenaeus had found the true meaning of the word [in 
Epid. 16] since writing A.H. 5.21.2’. Smith, against Hitchcock, observes that the Armenian in 
Epideixis reads apstamb, which correlates with avposta,thj, and renders the key term ‘rebel’. See 
Smith, Proof, 153. MacKenzie renders the term ‘apostate’; see MacKenzie, Irenaeus’ 
Demonstration, 5.  
106 Smith sees the connection here as evidence of Irenaeus’ dependence on Justin. Smith, 
Proof, 153.  
107 For this connection in other early Christian writers, see Tertullian, Marc. 4.24; Augustine, 
Civ. 11.15; Gregory the Great, Moral. 3.23.  
108 Dial. 112.  
109 For more on Justin’s use of the scripture, see Oskar Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy. 




And it seems that the type and sign, which was erected to counteract the 
serpents which bit Israel, was intended for the salvation of those who believe that 
this sign was to show that through the crucified one death was to come to the 
serpent, but salvation to those who had been bitten by the serpent and had sought 
protection of him who sent his Son into the world to be crucified.110 
 
And again,  
 
For by this, as I previously remarked, he [God] proclaimed the mystery, by 
which he declared that he would break the power of the serpent which 
occasioned the transgression of Adam, and [would bring] to them that 
believe on him [who was foreshadowed] by this sign, i.e. him who was to be 
crucified, salvation from the fangs of the serpent, which are wicked 
deeds, idolatries, and other unrighteous acts. If this is not the interpretation 
of the passage, give me a reason why Moses set up the brazen serpent on the 
sign…in spite of the fact that he himself had forbidden them to make an 
image of anything whatsoever.111  
 
Such typological interpretations are consistent with Irenaeus’ overall stance on the 
Devil. But in his extant works, Irenaeus does not make use of either Leviathan or the serpent 
on the pole.  
 
 
2. View of Pagan Myths 
 
According to Justin, the similarities between Greek myths and the Christian narrative 
are Satanic attempts to counterfeit the real thing. Thus the use of a cave in Mithraic 
initiation rites is an imitation of Daniel’s vision in 2:34: ‘Now when those who transmit the 
mysteries of Mithras claim that he was born of a rock, and call the place where they initiate 
his believers a cave, am I not right in concluding that they have imitated that saying of 
Daniel, “a stone was hewn without hands out of a great mountain”? In a similar fashion, 
have they not attempted all the sayings of Isaiah? For the demons urged the priests of 
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Mithras to exhort their followers to perform righteous acts’.112 Notably, even righteous 
living is an imitation of Christian righteousness. At the end of the same chapter, Justin 
suggests that Perseus being begotten of a virgin is a satanic copy of the virgin birth, and so 
forth.  In a similar vein, Justin views the pagan gods as nothing more than demons 
masquerading as divine beings. (Here it is helpful to keep in mind Justin’s commitment to 
the watcher tradition and his understanding of demons as the offspring of fallen angels and 
human women.)  
This ‘slandering’ of the pagan gods can be found readily throughout Justin’s 
work.113 Irenaeus does not follow Justin in this respect, perhaps because he would disagree, 
or perhaps, more likely, because his primary opponents are the Gnostic Christian sects, 
rather than the paganism that Justin is writing against.  
 
 
3. Justin Does not Mention the Devil’s Envy 
 
Most significantly for our purposes, Justin makes no mention of the Devil’s envy as 
the motivation behind his temptation of Adam and Eve. Indeed, Justin offers his readers no 
insight as to why the Devil assaulted humanity. Here we must remember that—according to 
Irenaeus—Justin has written elsewhere about the Devil.114 As such, it is possible that Justin 
had more to say about the Devil’s motivations than what we find in his extant writings. Yet 
without a definitive statement one way or the other, it is impossible to know the extent to 
which Irenaeus and Justin agreed on this point. It should be noted, however, that Justin says 
nothing that contradicts what we find in Irenaeus regarding the Devil’s envy of humanity.   
 
 
K. Summary of Justin 
 
In sum, there is a high degree of overlap between Justin and Irenaeus related to their 
respective views on the Devil, demons, angels, Eve, the fall, etc. As such, it seems evident 
that both Irenaeus and Justin are working within a common tradition. Yet the extent to 
which Irenaeus depended on Justin is not certain. Clearly Irenaeus is aware of Justin’s work 
                                                         
112 Dial. 70. Mithras was a Persian deity. In Justin’s time, Mithraism was Christianity’s 
strongest rival in the city of Rome. See Halton, St. Justin Martyr: Dialogue with Trypho, 109.   
113 See for example 2 Apol. 5; Dial. 73.  




(he says so explicitly). Differences in emphasis certainly remain. But as noted above, the 
differences are not generally matters of disagreement, but rather matters of omission.  
Given the above, it seems reasonable to conclude that Justin very likely represents 
the earliest extant and detailed account of the Devil tradition that we find more fully 





Theophilus of Antioch was a second-century bishop, and a slightly earlier 
contemporary of Irenaeus.115 He was born a pagan in around 115, and, by his own account, 
converted to Christianity by reading Scripture. Theophilus had a Greek education, and likely 
knew some Hebrew.116 According to Eusebius, his bishopric began around 169, and ended 
in 177.117  We know nothing else about his life. Eusebius mentions his now lost (but then 
extant) work against Marcion, along with a number of other lost writings.118 Theophilus’ 
now only extant work is Ad Autolycum, in three books.119 Like Justin, the work is an 
apology that intends to show the superiority of Christianity over and against idolatry. 
Tixeront finds Theophilus inferior to Justin in ‘depth of philosophical insight’, but 
surpassing him in ‘extent and variety of literary culture’.120 Miggiffert considers 
Theophilus’ literary style to be ‘of high order’, and considers him a learned writer, ‘well 
acquainted with Greek philosophy’.121 Marcus Dods observes that Theophilus ‘had a 
profound acquaintance with the inspired writings’, and judges Ad Autolycum ‘well fitted to 
lead on an intelligent pagan to the cordial acceptance of Christianity’.122 Walter Bauer is less 
enthusiastic, describing Theophilus as a ‘shallow babbler’.123 Robert Grant is only slightly 
more charitable: ‘Theophilus’ arrangement of his materials thus leaves something to be 
                                                         
115 Eusebius is the only early writer to mention Theophilus as bishop. See Hist. eccl. 4.24. 
(Jerome likewise mentions Theophilus’ bishopric, but he is merely repeating Eusebius.) Subsequent 
historical analysis offers us no reason to doubt Eusebius. For the dating of Theophilus’ bishopric and 
limited biographical information, see Miggiffert, NPNF2, vol.1, 202; also Rogers, Theophilus of 
Antioch, 3-14.   
116 Tixeront, Patrology, 46. 
117 Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 4.20. See also, Tixeront, Patrology, 46. 
118 For Eusebius’ full list of Theophilus’ writings, see Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 4.24. Miggiffert 
notes that Eusebius is the only Eastern writer to mention Theophilus. In the west, Lactantius, 
Gennadius and Jerome mention his Ad Autolycum. See NPNF2, vol.1, 202. 
119 Ad Autolycum is extant in three Medieval manuscripts and has been frequently published 
in the original and in translation. Miggiffert suggests that the best edition of the original is that of 
Otto in the Corp. apol., vol. 8; the best English translation is by Robert Grant. 
120 Tixeront, Patrology, 46. 
121 NPNF2, vol.1, 202. 
122 ANF, vol. 2, 88.  




desired, and his insistently didactic tone often fails to retain the reader's interest’.124 
Whatever one’s assessment of Theophilus as a theologian, his passing remarks with respect 
to the Devil—insofar as they run along similar lines as Irenaeus—make him of special 
interest for our study.  
Generally, Irenaean scholarship sees at least some connection between Theophilus 
and Irenaeus. Friedrich Loofs, perhaps more so than any other, did much to establish this 
connection. In his posthumous work, Theophilus von Antiochien Adversus Marcionem und 
die anderen theologischen Quellen bei Irenaeus, Loofs attempted to separate the different 
sources of Adversus haereses, and argued that the most important source for Irenaeus was 
Theophilus’ now lost Adversus Marcionem.125  In addition, Loofs argued that there were 
three or four other sources—the most important being the so called IQA—all of which have 
likewise disappeared.  
Wingren, following F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock’s critique of Loofs, is 
unconvinced by Loofs’ attempt to reconstruct the sources of Adversus haereses. ‘Loofs, in 
fact, treated any discrepancies or differences that occur in the Adversus haereses as 
indications that there are various sources traceable within it, and having established what he 
took as sources, he then proceeded on the assumption that each one of these sources is 
homogenous, and therefore contains only one dominant line of thought, but not more than 
one’. Wingren then appropriately asks, ‘But can all this be ascertained about a document 
that is unknown to us?…It is completely impossible to solve a problem which provides 
nothing but unknown quantities…’126 Wingren does not contest Loofs’ fundamental thesis 
that Adversus haereses is constructed on sources, or even that Irenaeus may have been 
dependent on Theophilus; but insofar as none of the sources Loofs postulates are extant, 
Wingren sees little (if anything) to be gained by such lines of inquiry.127 Osborne agrees 
with Wingren’s assessment; Loofs’ ‘general claim for multiple sources stands, but his 
procedure is regressive rather than progressive’.128 Loofs may be right about the connection 
between Irenaeus and Theophilus, but I here agree with Wingren and Osborn: far reaching 
speculation on lost sources is of limited value in interpreting Irenaeus.  
Laying aside theories about lost sources, Armitage Robinson—on more solid 
footing—suggests Irenaean dependence on Theophilus based on a close reading of 
Theophilus’ extant Ad Autolycum. Armitage notes strong similarities in their respective 
                                                         
124 Grant, Theophilus of Antioch, xi. 
125 Loofs, Theophilus von Antiochien, 44-80. 
126 Wingren, Man and Incarnation, xviii-xix.  
127 For more on Loofs’ thesis, see Wingren Man and Incarnation, xvi-xx.   




views on the Holy Spirit and the creation of humanity.129 And most relevantly for our 
purposes, Smith and Steenberg note similarities between Irenaeus and Theophilus with 
respect to the Eden narrative in Genesis 3.130 The similarities here between Irenaeus and 
Theophilus are threefold: the ‘infancy’ of Adam, the identity of the Devil, and the envy of 
the Devil, each of which is examined below.   
 
 
A. The ‘Infancy’ of Adam 
 
One of the more striking similarities that can be found between Irenaeus and 
Theophilus is their mutual belief that Adam was created in some form of infancy. In a 
chapter where Theophilus argues that God was justified in forbidding Adam to eat from the 
Tree of Knowledge, he writes,   
 
But Adam, being yet an infant [νήπιος] in age, was on this account as yet 
unable to receive knowledge worthily. For now, also, when a child [παιδίον] 
is born it is not at once able to eat bread, but is nourished first with milk, and 
then, with the increment of years, it advances to solid food. Thus, too, would 
it have been with Adam; for not as one who envied [φθόνw/n] him, as some 
suppose, did God command him not to eat of knowledge. But he wished also 
to make proof of him, whether he was submissive to God’s commandment. 
And at the same time he wished the man, being an infant [nhpia,zonta], to 
remain for some time longer simple and sincere.131 
 
The similarity here between Theophilus and Irenaeus is strong.132 Theophilus is the 
earliest writer to assert the idea of Adam’s infancy, followed next by Irenaeus.133 For both 
Irenaeus and Theophilus, Adam is created in ‘infancy’ and not yet able to receive 
                                                         
129 See Smith, Proof, 53-62. The similarities are striking, and it is difficult to imagine that 
Irenaeus was not familiar—even if not in a derivative way—with Theophilus’ basic theological 
framework. Grant likewise suggests a connection between Irenaeus and Theophilus, stating that 
Irenaeus ‘corrected Theophilus’ language about God’s two “hands,” his Word and his Wisdom’. 
Robert Grant, Irenaeus, 40. 
130 Smith, Proof, 38; Steenberg, God and Man, 20. See also Steenberg, Irenaeus on 
Creation, 16-19. 
131 Theophilus, Autol. 2.25. The English translation of Theophilus used throughout is drawn 
from ANF, vol. 2, which I have revised and updated as necessary. The Greek text is taken from PG, 
vol. 6. 
132 Cf. Haer. 3.22.4, 4.38. 1-4: Epid. 12, 14.  




knowledge.134 What is more, in both Irenaeus and Theophilus, Adam’s infancy is the reason 
for why he is denied the Tree of Knowledge. In contrast to Gnostic conceptions of an 
envious Demiurge, God does not ‘envy’ humanity knowledge in the sense of denying it to 
humanity altogether, but intends for Adam and Eve to partake of the Tree of Knowledge as 
they mature.135 Likewise, in both Irenaeus and Theophilus, the Tree of Knowledge is given 
as a test for humanity, in order that they might learn obedience.136 
 
 
B. The Identity of the Devil 
 
In the main, Theophilus’ comments about the Devil are sparing. The Devil is 
mentioned only twice (2.28, 29), and does not seem to play a vital role in Theophilus’ 
conception of the fall of Adam.137 Yet what Theophilus does say maps closely on to 
Irenaeus. Theophilus writes,    
 
This Eve, on account of her having been in the beginning deceived by the 
serpent [ὄφewj], and become the author of sin, the wicked demon [daivmwn], 
who also is called Satan [Satavn] who then spoke to her through the serpent 
[ὄφewj],  and who works even to this day in those humans that are possessed 
by him, invokes as did Eve. And he is called ‘demon’ [daivmwn] and ‘dragon’, 
[dra,kwn] on account of his revolting [avpodedrake,nai] from God. For at first 
he was an angel [aggeloj]. And concerning his history there is a great deal to 
be said; wherefore I at present omit the relation of it, for I have also given an 
account of him in another place’.138 
 
Satan was first an angel who ‘revolted from God’;139 Satan speaks through the 
serpent to tempt Eve in the Garden;140 Satan is called a ‘dragon’.141 All of this is in keeping 
with Irenaeus. However, Theophilus refers to Satan as a daivmwn —something that Irenaeus 
does not do (insofar as we can tell from the Latin translation). Irenaeus’ account of demonic 
                                                         
134 Cf. Epid. 12.  
135 For Gnostic conceptions of an envious demiurge, see Haer. 1.23.2, 1.29.4, 1.30. See in 
particular Haer 3.23.6 where Irenaeus says that God does not envy Adam the tree of life.  
136 Epid. 15. 
137 Rogers, Theophilus, 45, 68.  
138 Theophilus, Autol. 2.28.  
139 Cf. Haer. 4.41.4; Epid. 16. 
140 Cf. Haer. 5.26.2, book 4, preface; Epid. 16. 




ontology is consistent with the ‘watcher tradition’, wherein demons are distinct from angels, 
and have come about as the result of the sexual union between the fallen angels and human 
women (Cf. Genesis 6). Thus according to Irenaeus, Satan, as a fallen angel, was not 
technically a demon. Theophilus’ use of daivmwn in Ad Autolycum is sparing, thus no final 
conclusions can be made about the semantic range for this term in his work. In any case, the 




C. The Envy of the Devil 
 
The most significant parallel between Irenaeus and Theophilus relates to the central 
theme of our study: the Devil’s envy of humanity. Like Irenaeus, Theophilus suggests that 
the Devil was motivated by envy toward humanity. He writes,  
 
When, then, Satan [after the temptation of Eve] saw Adam and his wife 
not only still living, but also begetting children—being carried away with 
envy [φθόνῳ] because he had not succeeded in putting them to death,—when 
[Satan] saw that Abel was well-pleasing to God, he wrought upon the heart 
of his brother called Cain, and caused him to kill his brother Abel. And thus 
did death get a beginning in this world, to find its way into every human race, 
even to this day.142 
  
Satan is ‘carried away with envy’ toward humanity when he sees that he has not 
been able to put Adam and Eve to death.143 Theophilus’ statement regarding the Devil’s 
envy immediately precedes a clear allusion to Wisdom 2:24 wherein the Devil’s envy is 
stated as the means by which death first came to humanity.144 All of this is consistent with 
Irenaeus.  
Yet a key difference remains. In Theophilus, the Devil’s envy is introduced only 
after the original fall of humanity, whereas in Irenaeus, the Devil’s envy is the basis for the 
Devil’s original temptation.145 Of course, these envy narratives need not be mutually 
                                                         
142 Theophilus, Autol. 2.29. 
143 Cf. Haer. 4.40.3, 5.24.4; Epid. 16. 
144 Cf. Epid. 16. Irenaeus’ use of Wis 2:24 is less explicit than what is found here in 
Theophilus.  
145 Russell fails to note this difference. Russell correctly points out that Theophilus is the 




exclusive. While Irenaeus notes the Devil’s envy as the motivation for the original 
temptation, this need not exclude an ongoing posture of envy by the Devil toward 
humanity.146 And Theophilus’ statement that the Devil was envious of humanity when he 
saw them begetting children and not dying, need not discount the possibility that envy also 
motivated the Devil’s first assault upon humanity. But Theophilus’ exact opinion regarding 
the Devil’s motivation in his initial temptation of Eve must remain speculative.  
 
 
D. Summary of Theophilus 
 
As stated above, nowhere does Irenaeus claim dependence on Theophilus—for either 
his treatment of the Devil, or any other matter of doctrine. Yet the similarities are 
suggestive, if not conclusive. The basic contours of the Genesis 3 narrative run along similar 
lines in Irenaeus and Theophilus. Humanity is created in infancy; the Devil is referred to as 
‘Satan’ and ‘dragon’ and was at first an angel; the Devil is associated with the serpent in the 
garden; he was motivated by envy toward humanity. Steenberg notes that the connection 
between Theophilus and Irenaeus is more widely accepted today than it has been in the past 






While the earliest Christian writings of the ‘apostolic fathers’ do not offer us much 
either way, I find in the extant works of Athenagoras, Justin, and Theophilus, a Devil 
narrative that is—overall—consistent with Irenaeus. While differences between the three 
writers can be seen, the differences almost entirely tend to be differences of emphasis and 
omission. At no point do we find strong statements of contradiction between these writers 
with respect to the Devil, demons, etc. Irenaeus is clearly familiar with Justin’s work (he 
says so explicitly), and the parallels between Irenaeus and Theophilus are even more 
                                                         
Russell perhaps too readily concludes that the Devil’s envy of humanity is his motivation for 
tempting Eve. This is not explicitly stated in Theophilus.   
146 In Epid. 17, Irenaeus states that the Devil filled Cain with his own ‘spirit’. Given the 
preceding context—as well as Cain’s disposition toward Abel—we might easily suppose this to be a 
spirit of envy.   
147 Steenberg, God and Man, 20. Steenberg, in Irenaeus on Creation, 16-19, argues for 
Theophilus’ influence on Irenaeus, based on their common readings of the Eden narrative. For more 




developed than what we find with Justin. While no final conclusion can be made regarding 
dependency, it seems evident that Irenaeus is working within an established tradition.  
The chart on the following page details the main lines of Irenaeus’ account of the 
Devil with respect to the Christian writers who came before and after. I have done my best 
to provide a thorough account of each author listed. A blank text box indicates that the 
author did not make mention of a particular idea—whether positively or negatively.  Red 
text denotes disagreement with Irenaeus in a particular area. The overall picture presented in 
the graph suggests that Irenaeus’ account of the Devil (with some variations) was the 
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